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Third Party Relationships

Mar. 13 2014 — 12:17p.m.

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION 15 TOP SECRET ll SI lTl( la' REL TO USA AU5 CAN GBR NZL What Are We After with Our Third Party Relationships? -- And What Do They Want from Us, Generally Speaking? FROM: the Editor and -we HE-=-amen Deputy Assistant for SIGINT Operations tom) Run Date: (UHFOUDJ We've posted articles recently examining specific Party relationships.' but today we'd like to step back and look at the big picture- What is underlying motivation behind its dealings with Third Party nations, and what approach do we use'? To find out, SlDn;-day askedl N-WE I from the SIGJNT Operations Group in Foreign Affairs Directorate to answer a few questions. Here's what r-I-'-Km-rm: told us: MADE - l. (U) Does NSA establish 3rd Party lies to meet specific short-tenn needs, or do we take it! more long-term approach, thinking in terms of developing relationships over the course oftfecades, even though they may not bear fruit' for some time? (SHSUIRELJ We establish foreign partnerships to satisfy U.S. intelligence requirements. For specific short--tenn needs. it may be suflicient to work dirough CIA Chiefs of Station {Cos} at those locations where we do not have SIGINT partnerships established. Formal relationships require considerable resources. so if we can meet our objectives particularly shoi1--terrn ones working through CIA. that's okay. If. on the other hand. our SIGIN eschanges increase in volume andior complexity. or if a direct partnership is necessary because of Indications and Waming (ISLWJ considerations we need rapid. direct exchange of information). then we will establish a formal SIGINT relationship. after DNI approval. (CHRELJ Many of our relationships have. indeed. spanned several decades. allowing us to establish higher degrees of trust with and reliance on one another. This, in tum, has led to greater levels of cooperation, where, for instance, NSA might be willing to sham advanced techniques with a proven and reliable partner. in retum for that partner's willingness to do something politically risky. Trust requires years to build up but it can be lost in a very short period of time. - 2. (U) What are we qfter, in general? is it our partners' accesses, or their expertise on a specific or is it impossible to generalize, because it varies on case-by-case basis? Yes. yes yes! Our partners' geography and access to high-priority target communications are a huge plus. as is their expertise on specific targets. With rare exception. they know their regional 'hoo-ds better than we do and they exponentially add to our foreign language capability. - 3. (U) Are anrforeigri intelligence relationships usually insulatedfram short-tenn political ups and downs, or not'? For a variety of reasons, our intelligence relationships are rarely disrupted by foreign political perturbations, international or domestic- First, we are helping our partners address critical intelligence shortfalls. just as they are assisting us. Second. in many of our foreign partners' capitals, few senior officials outside of their defense-intelligence apparatuses are wilting to any SIGIN connection to the There are exceptions. both on the positive and negative sides. For instance. since the election of a pro--i5.merican president. one European partner has been much more open to providing information on their own capabilities and techniques. in hope of raising our intelligence collaboration to a higher level. Conversely. another of our partnerships has stalled. due largely to that country's regional objectives not being in with those of the US. 9 4. (U) What do Third Parties typically as? What do get out of the relationship? (SHSIHRELJ Generally speaking. our Third Party partners want access to our technology, as well as our regionaliglobal reach. In exchange for their providing unique accesses. regional analytical esmrtise. foreign language capabilities andfor support. we provide them with technical solutions hardware. software) andlor access to related technology. We must keep in mind that our partners are attempting to satisfy their own national intelligence requirements; with the exception of the assistance we provide during crises. we can only move our SIGINT relationships forward. when U.S. requirements intersect with theirs. you for the opportunity to describe some of our foreign partnering considerations. It's important for us to foot-stomp that FAD is an enabling organization. We do not conduct relationships in a vacuum; and our Country Desk (Hfioers. front-end SIGINT Liaison Clflicors, Foreign Affairs Officcrs and staff are wholly committed to being in with or helping to SID. IAD. DIRNSA. DN1. the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (US Dill) and others in the intelligence Community.

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