Lobban NSA Visit Précis

Apr. 30 2014 — 5:40p.m.


TOPSECRET//SI//NOFORN VISIT PRÉCIS Sir Iain Lobban, KCMG, CB Director, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 30 April 2013 - 1 May 2013 GEN A Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters GEN A Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830 Accompanying Senior: Mr. James M. Cusick, Director Foreign Affairs (DIRFA) BACKGROUND: (U//FOUO) As General Alexander’s UK counterpart, Sir Iain has visited NSA on several occasions as one would expect, both in his current position and previous ones. Sir Iain most recently visited NSA on 27 March 2012, when he accompanied Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach. That visit had a more defined purpose of introducing Sir Stuart to USCYBERCOM and NSA leadership as the Commander of the UK’s newly-established Joint Forces Command. This will be the first visit in some time that will allow the visitor to reconnect with NSA Leadership on NSA/GCHQ matters. PURPOSE OF THE VISIT: (U//FOUO) As the Director of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to ensure each partner is aware of the other’s activities and future plans. CDR/DCDR/DDIR GUIDANCE: (U) N/A PREP SESSION GUIDANCE: (U//FOUO) NONE NSA/CSS REQUESTED: (U//FOUO) NONE CYBERCOM REQUESTED: (U//FOUO) NONE KEY TOPIC AREAS: (TS//SI//NF) FAD and SUSLOL are not aware of any particular issues that Sir Iain will want to address. NSA leadership should still be aware of the following topics that may pertain to their organizations or areas of responsibility, as the potential exists for them to be brought up by the visitor: - (TS//SI//NF) FAA 702 Data: Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish list and is something its leadership still desires. NSA and SID leadership are well aware of GCHQ’s request for this data, and the steps necessary for approval. NSA leadership could be asked whether we’re still supportive of this initiative. On a related topic, progress continues on “Triage 2.0,” GCHQ access to FAA 702 data under supervised conditions. The MOA is now back in Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20380401 TOPSECRET//SI //NOFORN

TOPSECRET//SI//NOFORN GCHQ’s court awaiting signature. With that said, GCHQ seems less enthused about Triage, perhaps in part because of the long steps necessary to gain approval. For additional background about these topics, see the attached paper that Mr. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXX, SID Associate Deputy Director, Counterterrorism (ADD/CT) SIGINT Authorities Lead, NSA/CSS Counterterrorism Mission Management Center (CTMMC) prepared for D/DIR’s April 2013 UK visit. - (TS//SI//NF) UK Intelligence Community Oversight: GCHQ and its sister intelligence agencies are challenged with their activities and operations being subject to increased scrutiny and oversight from their government (and public). As a result, closer attention is being paid to how UK-produced intelligence data is being used by NSA, and other partners. It is possible that Sir Iain may ask about what safeguards NSA may be putting in place to prevent UK data from being provided to others, the Israelis for instance, who might use that intelligence to conduct lethal operations. For additional information about this subject, and other UK Intelligence Community legal issues and legislation, see the attached paper prepared by Mr. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Office of the General Council, London. - (TS//SI//NF) Syria: Prime Minister Cameron continues to look to the UK security and intelligence agencies for recommended courses of action to influence the outcome in Syria, but to this point GCHQ has not offered much beyond messaging and limited online effects operations. GCHQ’s ability to contribute significantly to the overall Syria SIGINT effort is hampered by GCHQ’s limited resources. It should be noted that the UK Intelligence Community is just as concerned about the end state of Syria’s chemical and biological weapons as the U.S. Intelligence Community. Sir Iain may want to discuss Syria’s use of chemical weapons and how the U.S. Government intends to react. For more information about NSA’s posture against Syria, see attached Near East Divisionproduced paper on Syria. o (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Director Talking Points: Syria remains locked in a protracted struggle, with both the opposition and the regime firmly entrenched in their positions. Attempts to coalesce the opposition have moved extremely slowly, while the regime has not in any way indicated that it would willingly stand aside. Given this lack of movement in negotiations and the stalemate on the ground, we anticipate the conflict will not be resolved in an expedient manner. o (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA continues to monitor the situation in Syria from all angles, including from the viewpoint of the regional, international, and radical actors. NSA remains concerned about chemical weapons security and continues to monitor the situation closely, to the best of our ability. - (TS//SI//NF) Iran: GCHQ and the UK Government remain concerned about events in Iran and the possibility that tensions with the West or Israel could escalate. The visitor may ask NSA and SID leadership to share their views on what is going to happen with Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20380401 TOPSECRET//SI //NOFORN

TOPSECRET//SI//NOFORN Iran, to include potential Israeli response. For information about NSA’s posture against Iran, see attached Iran Division produced paper on Iran. o (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Director Talking Point: Emphasize that we have successfully worked multiple high-priority surges with GCHQ that have allowed us to refine maintaining mission continuity and seamless transition, and maximize our target coverage. These jointly-worked events include the storming of the British Embassy in Tehran, Iran’s discovery of FLAME, and support to policymakers during the multiple rounds of P5 plus 1 negotiations. - (S//SI//REL TO USA, GBR) Global Collaboration Environment (GCE): On 2 April 2013, SID Foreign Partner Strategist (FPS) Mr. XXXXXXXX, held a discussion with Mr. XXXXXX (Head of Bilateral and Multilateral Relations, GCHQ International Relations) to discuss the future of GCE in a post-Afghanistan era. GCE is the next generation of PARTNERMALL (PMP) and should be the future partner collaboration solution of choice. GCE expands the current single collaboration environment PMP capability into a bilateral and multilateral model. The two discussed the benefits of NSA and GCHQ having a united front in its dealings with the other foreign partners on this issue. They also discussed the possibility of the UK hosting a permanent facility where analysts from partner nations could be co-located, along with ways to better integrate GCE into each partner’s analytic workflow. For information about this discussion, see the attached paper prepared by SID’s Foreign Partner Strategist Office. o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Director Talking Points: Thank GCHQ for giving full support to GCE, and for partnering with NSA to engage in synchronized messaging to other organizations. o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Encourage GCHQ to host the permanent facility for the joint SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) collaboration center, in order to maximize the benefit for the Five Eyes partnership. o (S//REL TO USA, GBR) Offer NSA’s assistance in finding good solutions for incorporating GCE access into GCHQ’s analytic workflow. Encourage GCHQ to engage with NSA’s TD on this subject. KEY TAKEAWAYS: (U//FOUO) See above. VISIT FORMAT: (U//FOUO) General Alexander will host a dinner in honor of Sir Iain at his residence on 30 April 2013. The two directors will also have a one-on-one discussion on 1 May 2013. The remainder of Sir Iain’s agenda will involve NTOC and TAO tours/demos, along with discussions with NSA Leadership, including Ms. Teresa H. Shea, SIGINT Director, Mrs. Debora A. Plunkett, IAD DIR, Mr. Rajesh De, General Council, Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, D/DIR Analysis and Production, Mr. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, D/DIR Data Acquisition Mrs. XXXX XXXXXX, D/DIR NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC), Mr. Robert E. Joyce, CH Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20380401 TOPSECRET//SI //NOFORN

TOPSECRET//SI//NOFORN Tailored Access Office, Mr. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Incoming SUSLOL, and Mr. XXXXXXXXXX, Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES). PREVIOUS VISITS AND RESPECTIVE TOPICS: (U//FOUO) As General Alexander’s UK counterpart, Sir Iain has visited NSA on several occasions, in both his current position and previous ones. Sir Iain most recently visited NSA on 27 March 2012, when he accompanied Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach. During that visit, Sir Iain met with General Alexander, Mr. Inglis, and other NSA and USCYBERCOM leaders. POTENTIAL LANDMINES: (TS//SI//NF) GCHQ has long advocated that it work with NSA and the Israeli SIGINT Service (ISNU) in a trilateral arrangement in prosecuting the Iranian target. SID policy has been opposed to such a blanket arrangement, and the specific trilateral explained in the attached paper on Iran should not be interpreted as a broad change of approach. In other areas, NSA and GCHQ have agreed to continue to share information gleaned from the respective bilateral relationships with ISNU. OTHER INFORMATION (GOOGLE SEARCH, SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, INTERESTING FACTS, NCR/LNO ADVICE…) (U) NONE RECENT PRESS INDICATIONS: (U) N/A Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20380401 TOPSECRET//SI //NOFORN

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