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This page contains dynamic content -- Highest Possible Classification isTOP SECRET//SI/TKSecuritYBannerTerms of Use 1. Intelink 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Blog~ Bookmarks eChim Inteldocs Intelligedia Search 1. Entemrise Search 2. Entemrise Catalog 3. Man 4. Peogle 5. Recent Intel 6. 7. Search Su12nort 8. More 1. CommunitY2. GallerY3. IC Connect 4. IC PKI 5. IntelShare 6. iStOIY7. iVideo 8. Living Intelligence 9. Mans 10. Messenger 11. Passgort 12. RSS Reader 13. Tanioca 14. URL Shortener 1. Helg 1 . Intelligedia Helg 2. 3. Submit a Ticket 4. ISMC Watch 5. About Intelink (U) Supply Chain Cyber Threats TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN Jump to: navigation , search Contents 

[hide] o L(U). Background o 2._(U).Vulnerabilities o 2.1 (U). PC Power Su1212lYo 2.2 (U). Network Interface Cards (NICs). o 2 .3 (U). RAID Controllers o 2.4 (U). Graghics Cogrocessor Units (GPUs)_ o 2.5 (U). Firmware o 1..(U).Regorting o 3 .1 (U). Recent o o o o 3 .2 (U). CIA 3.3 (U).DIA 3 .4 (U).FBI 3.5 (U).CYBERCOM o ?_(U).Other Links o i_(U). References [edit] (U) Background (U) A supply chain cyber threat is a defect , exploited vulnerability , or remote exploitation capability that is embedded into a produ ct by an adversary by virtue of access to produ ct's design or produ ction. (U//FOUO ) Creator s and supervi sors of the supply chain take many precaution s to prevent lapses in security. Malicious actors are targeting the global supply chain as a mean s to infiltrate global computer network s, including the United States. Global supply chain s have pro cedure s in place to prevent the loss/tampering of produ cts en route to a final destination. Unfortunately , there are ways maliciou s actors can use the supply chain to their advantage and alter produ cts before they ever become a part of the supply chain. [edit] (U) Vulnerabilities (U) Thi s section detail s a variety of supply chain vulnerabilitie s that exist in traditional desktop and laptop system s. [edit ] (U) PC Power Supply (U) The PC power supply is well po sitioned for remote exploitation. Power supplie s are distributed as sealed metal container s, they contain a co-pro cessor that executes its own program , and it interfa ces to both the power line and the computer 's electronic s . Thu s the power supply is well po sitioned for exploitation by an adversary. (U) Power supplie s can be signed through coded messages sent through RF or through the power line itself. A power supply could be set to shut down , self-de struct , damage the computer 's motherboard (through the introdu ction of higher-than-expe cted voltage ), or even start a fire or explo sion. (U) Power supplie s are frequently changed by manufa cturer s during a produ ction run , making it difficult to determine if a power supply was substituted in the supply chain or in the field. They have standard sizes and connectors, and are frequently replaced in the field when they fail. It would be very difficult to detect a 

targeted power supply substitution. [edit] (U) Network Interface Cards (NICs) (U) Network Interface Cards (NICs) such as ethernet interfaces are well-positioned to plant malware and exfiltrate information from a PC in a manner that is invisible to the operating system or other host-based defenses. (U) Modern NICs have a co-processor that runs its own firmware. Frequently this firmware can be updated in the field, allowing for the insertion of malicious code by an adversary. The NIC has DMA access to the computer's physical memory---it can read or write protected memory belonging to the kernel or to any userlevel process. [edit] (U) RAID Controllers (U) Disk controllers, and especially RAID controllers, are well-positioned as an attack point against PCs. (U) Disk controllers frequently have their own co-processors and firmware that can be updated in the field. The standard disk controller receives requests from the host computer, executs the request on the disk, and then transfers information from the disk to main memory (or vice-versa). As a result, disk controllers have unrestricted read/write access to the computer's memory. (U) A disk controller can plant malware in an operating system binary on the disk, or inject the malware directly into the computer's memory. Better than a root kit, the controller can tell the difference between a request to read a file for execution vs. reading it for anti-virus---so the malware oculd be inserted when the program is run, but not when it is scanned. The controller could also execute its own search algorithms, as the disk controller has unrestricted access to the computer's hard drives. When data is found the controller could inject a process into the computer's memory for the purpose of sending the data to another host. [edit] (U) Graphics Coprocessor Units (GPUs) (U) GPUs are another location where code can be loaded and execute autonomously of the CPU. Today's GPUs typically have a dozen or more execution units. Each individual unit is slower than the computer's primary CPU, but the combination of them all together is faster than the host CPU. Typically there is a lot of bandwidth inside the GPU but limited bandwidth from the GPU to the host memory. (U) GPUs are equipped with firmware that can be updated in the field. Malware operating on the GPU could preserve the functionality of the GPU while scanning the system for sensitive information. Unlike malware running elsewhere with the computer, malware within then GPU would be well positioned to scan the computer's screen for sensitive information. This information could then be exfiltrated using traditional means. [edit] (U) Firmware (U) Malicious software has been found in mouse drivers which interface between operating systems and hardware made by Razer USA. This malicious software tricked users into downloading and installing malware onto their computers.[1] [edit] (U) Reporting 

[edit ] (U) Recent click column headers to sort I Agency l Feed J Open Source State Department [edit ] (U) CIA (SIINF) CIA assesses that tampering with hardware circuitry may ultimately be an equally as dangerous as a software threat. [2] According to experts, as advanced systems like aircraft, missiles, and radar have become increasingly dependent on their computing capabilities, the specter of computer hardware subversion causing weapons to fail in times of crisis, or secretly corrupting crucial data, is a growing concern. Computer chips are increasingly complex and subtle modifications made in design or manufacturing processes could be made impossible to detect with the practical means currently available. United States now lacks the capacity to produce the computer chips needed for classified systems, and therefore relies on foreign vendors to support the demand. [J] . The Institute for Defense Analyses identified Critical Network Routers and Transport Layer Switches that could affect the integrity of the entire USG communications information architecture. [~], [edit ] (U) DIA (SIINF) DIA Sup!2lYChain Threat AnalY-sis Team assesses with moderate confidence that the Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) components such as application and terminal servers, routers, switches, and distribution consoles used by the Trusted Thin Client are vulnerable to the global supply chain threat. W See also Potential Supply-Chain Threats to the DISN Core. llil The best opportunity for subversion of SCADA supply chain would involve recruiting an insider.rn The threat against BMD networks will likely employ insiders, supply chain, or SCAD A. [[I (SIINF) The increasing role of international companies and foreign individuals involved in U.S. IT supply chains and services will increase the potential for persistent, stealthy subversion particularly by foreign intelligence and military services but also by international terrorist and criminal groups and even companies engaged in industrial espionage. [2:1Risks to the GIG will continue to rise commensurate with growing threats to telecommunications supply chains. IJ.QJ (SIINF) Supply chain concerns will be exacerbated as U.S. providers of cybersecurity products and services are acquired by foreign firms. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) works to identify such concerns and mitigate them as necessary, but the Committee 's reach is limited. The CFIUS process depends almost entirely on voluntary filings by companies involved in foreign acquisitions. As a result, CFIUS examines a relatively small percentage of such transactions and acquisitions of smaller firms 

that are developing emerging security technologies may escape the Committee 's notice. ill] Supply chain threats even provide foreign intelligence services potential access to DIA systems. [12] [edit ] (U) FBI (U) In 2008 , the FBI conducted Operation Cisco Raider which has led to 15 criminal cases involving counterfeit products bought in part by military agencies , contractors , and electric power companies in the United States. LU]. In 2011 , FBI assesses with high confidencethat the state-sponsored and criminal threat to supply chain integrity is a high cyber threat. [I 4 J [edit ] (U) CYBERCOM (U)In 2010 Huawei Technologies , ZTE , and Meadville Holdings Limited are among the many Chinese based companies that could pose a threat to the GIG in Chinese Companies and United States Supply Chain Vulnerabilities. Ll.il [edit] (U) Other Links o (U) Air-Gap_pedNetwork Threats o (U) DoD Sup_I21YChain Risk Management Threat AnalY.sisCenter Chain Threat Assessment Team A-Space Workspace o (U) The Sup_I21Y- [edit] (U) References 1. 2. 3. 4. _j_(U) McMillan , R; 21 September 2009; Gaming Mouse-maker Razer hit with Infected Firmware. _j_.(U//FOUO) Central Intelligence AgencY.- CY.herThreat Intelligence Highlights 220CT09 . _j_(U) Markoff , J. , Old Tricks Threatens the Newest Weapons The New York Times , 10/27/2009. _j_(U) IDA; Document D-3222 Log: H 05-002122 / 1; January 2006; USG Integrated Circuit Supply Chain Threat Opportunity Study; pg. 14. 5. _j_(U) Cyberthreat to SecureOffice Trusted Thin Client; DIA-06-1003-001 . Prepared by ' CTA-6B , 31DEC09. 6. _j_(S/INF) DIA , S-1566-07 /CC 0-5 , Potential Supply-Chain Threats to the DISN Core.28 November 2007. 7. _j_DIA; Defense Intelligence Study; 9 September 2009; DIA-08-1101-021 Information Operations Capstone Threat Assessment , Volume 10: Computer Network Operations; p 31. 8. _j_(U//FOUO) DIA; Defense Intelligence Assessment; 30 September 2009; DIA-06-0909-045 Cyberthreat to Ballistic Missile Defense Programs. 9. _j_(S) DIA; Defense Analysis Report; TS-1593-08 /CC0-5 ; 24 Nov 2008; Global: The Global Cyberthreat Environment Through 2028. 10. _j_(S/INF) DIA; Defense Intelligence Report; 13 December 2010; DIA-06-1012-121.A ; Telecommunications and Supply Chain Threats; A Systems Primer. 11. _j_(S) DIA; Defense Analysis Report; TS-1593-08 /CC0-5 ; 24 Nov 2008; Global: The Global Cyberthreat Environment Through 2028. Chain Threat AnalY.sis. 12. _j_(S/INF) DIA; DAC-6 Special Report; 30 November 2010; Sup_I21Y13. _j_(U) Markoff , John; New York Times; 9 May 2008; FBI SaY.SThe Military. Had Bogus Computer Gear 

14. l (S//NF) FBI; Technology Cyber Intelligence Unit; Intelligence Bulletin; 27 June 2011; Su1212lYChain Poisoning: A Threat to the lntegritY-of Trusted Software 15. J_(TS//SI//NF) USCYBERCOM; 26 August 2010; J2 Bulletin 10-064 ; Chinese Companies and United States Supply Chain Vulnerabilities. Retrieved from "ht Chain Categories : CY-berThreat Assessments I Su1212lYTOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN o This page has been accessed 757 times. o 2 watching users o -was last modified 18:26, 19 October 2012 by Personal tools o o o o o o MY-talk My_12references MY-watchlist MY-contributions Log out Namespaces o Pag~ o Discussion Variants Views o o o o Read Edit Page historYWatch Actions o Rename/Move o Tag this 12ag~ Search l..... s_ea_rc_h_____ I ____. ! Search Most recent editors 

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