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(S//SI) Uncovering North Korea Nuclear Programs
FROM: Frances J. Fleisch
Deputy Production Manager, China/Korea Product Line
Run Date: 04/09/2003
(S//SI) Not long ago, a State Department delegation to Pyongyang confronted North Korean
officials with evidence that they had violated the 1994 U.S./North Korea Nuclear Agreed
Framework. The U.S. knew that the North Koreans were developing a uranium enrichment
capability--an effort banned by the treaty. To the surprise of many, the North Koreans admitted
that this was true and declared the Framework to be null and void.
(S//SI) How did the U.S. know what the North Koreans were doing? SIGINT! The ONLY source
of information on this treaty violation was SIGINT derived from North Korean external
communications. A collaborative effort involving SID's China and Korea and the Proliferation and
Arms Control Product Lines put the SIGINT pieces together.
(S//SI) Furthermore, our Intelligence Community colleagues provided technical information (CIA
and DOE), initiated operational efforts (CIA), conducted imagery searches (NIMA), reviewed
historical information (DIA and FBIS), and issued demarches (State Department) related to this
uranium enrichment program.
(S//SI) Without this intelligence, the U.S. would have been unaware of the North Korean
enrichment program, which, if successful, would both enhance North Korea's nuclear weapons
programs and enable it to proliferate nuclear weapons material to other nations of concern. This
is both a SIGINT success story and an example of how cross-organizational collaboration can
produce key intelligence. Hats off to everyone involved!
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108