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(S) North Korea MULTI-INT Process
FROM:
Customer Gateway (S11)
Run Date: 10/09/2003
(S) SID has developed a variety of processes to improve our understanding of what our
customers need from us - from the new National SIGINT Requirements Process (NSRP), to
feedback from NSA people integrated with our customers, to Senior Executive Account Managers
(SEAMs) and Account Managers (AMs), to emails, phone calls and VTCs between analysts,
managers and customers. But there's still no substitute for personally meeting with customer
analysts and the decision-makers they support to understand the challenges they face and
exactly what they'll need from intelligence to support their planning, decisions, and actions.
That's why SID is committed to the multi-intelligence (MULTI-INT) requirements gathering
process, which involves direct face-to-face meetings with analysts and decisions-makers to
understand their goals, objectives, and plans. The MULTI-INT process was first used successfully
for the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) SIGINT Architecture and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and we're now in the process of using it to support North Korea Campaign planning.
(S) The MULTI-INT process begins by identifying those customers who have key operational
roles in support of U.S. Government objectives. In the case of the Campaign to stop North
Korea's development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we determined
that State Department, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
had the lead for operational planning. Meetings with State Department were first with members
of both the Customer Relationships Directorate (CRD) Gateway organization (S11) and
OPSIGINT conducting a series of meeting to understand State Department's planning for North
Korea.
(S) These reviews have garnered very positive reactions from State Department leadership to
include the Secretary's Chief of Staff, and senior analysts and policy advisors on East Asia Pacific
Affairs who participated directly in the meetings. We followed that up with meetings with
USPACOM and USFK senior officials who were directly involved in crafting the operational plans
for the Commander of USPACOM. Although we are still in the very early stages of planning and
all plans are subject to frequent revisions, we now have a better understanding of needed
adjustments to formal requirements and where the Korea Issue Management Team (IMT) needs
to focus its attention.
(S) We call this process the MULTI-INT process because we and other Intelligence Community
(IC) members recognized that this process was useful for all intelligence disciplines and not just
SIGINT. While the IC has been happy that NSA is taking the lead on this planning, they want to
participate in the effort as well. As such, we are working with DIA, CIA, and other IC partners to
form a common understanding of the intelligence requirements for North Korea and to avoid
conflicting understanding of priorities. We'll continue to work with our IC partners to make the
MULTI-INT process a regular part of IC planning and prioritizing.
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108