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(U) 3 1/2 Months in Qatar: Supporting CENTCOM
FROM:
IA Intern
Run Date: 11/24/2003
(U//FOUO) My tour with Central Command was probably my best
experience at NSA, and perhaps the least expected as well. I
volunteered to deploy to Central Command's Forward
Headquarters at Camp As Saliyah, Qatar in early January 2003
with others from CSG CENTCOM in Tampa. I was one of only two
civilian intelligence analysts who deployed to Qatar before OIF
(Operation Iraqi Freedom) began.
(TS//SI//REL) Working in the High-Value Targets cell during my
time in Qatar, our mission was to locate any of the leadership
figures in the Iraqi regime. At any given time, the team consisted
of two NSA/CSG analysts, one or two imagery analysts, and
several all-source analysts from CENTCOM. Most of our work
focused on Personal Communications Service (PCS) devices, Iraqi
regime security communications, Inmarsat, and High-Powered
Cordless Phones (HPCP). During the weeks leading up to 20 March,
we were actively developing new targets on our own and in
conjunction with analysts at NSAW. Developing targets in the field
represented a unique and groundbreaking experience, and in
several instances, new targets were independently generated.
Previously unknown Iraqi regime personalities were uncovered,
often based on the collocation of PCS and security communications
devices. Nevertheless, we constantly liaised with our analytic
counterparts at NSAW, and relied on their expertise to fine-tune
our work in the field.
(U//FOUO) I first heard of the outbreak of war like everyone else from the news... except my news was a bit less sophisticated.
Around 5:00 AM on 20 March, while half-awake in my bunk bed, I
tuned my short-wave radio to a faint Voice of America station in
Egypt broadcasting the news of the first strike.
(TS//SI//REL) Once OIF began, SIGINT information played an
extremely valuable role in tracking leadership figures. TimeSensitive Targeting (or TSTs) were often announced in the HVT cell
when tippers alerted us to priority PCS activity. In several
instances, this SIGINT information - in combination with other
intelligence - led to direct attacks on these targets. In other cases,
HUMINT sources provided information to the HVT cell, and we
would attempt to substantiate this information through the
presence of SIGINT activity. Needless to say, the success of the
HVT cell hinged on the fusion of all sources of intelligence.
(TS//SI//REL) The close collaboration between CSG CENTCOM and
NSAW was demonstrated on 2 April when, after urgent analysis by
GEOCELL, CSG CENTCOM, and MENA, a facility near the Iraqi
Intelligence Service Headquarters was destroyed because of hostile
communications emanating from its grounds. Analyst-to-analyst
cooperation in this example proved to be decisive in quickly
prosecuting this dangerous target.
SERIES:
(U//FOUO) IA Interns
Abroad
1. Coming Soon: IA
Interns Abroad
2. 3 1/2 Months in
Qatar: Supporting
CENTCOM
3. 3 1/2 Months in
Qatar: Outside of
Work
4. Deployed to
Afghanistan
5. Camp Virginia to
Camp Victory: In
Kuwait
6. Camp Virginia to
Camp Victory: Into
Baghdad
7. NISTing in Kabul and
Baghdad - Part One
8. NISTing in Kabul and
Baghdad - Part Two
9. Working at Prince
Sultan Air Base, SA
10. Deployment
Sketches - Part 1
11. Deployment
Sketches - Part 2
12. Dispatch from CSG
Baghdad
(U//FOUO) Tomorrow I'll talk a bit about life outside of work, the
living conditions, and some of my adventures into Doha.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108