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(U) Battlefield SIGINT Conference
FROM:
CES Military Operations Staff (S31094)
Run Date: 07/07/2004
(U//FOUO) On 25-26 May 2004, Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES - S31) hosted its
first-ever BATTLEFIELD SIGINT CONFERENCE. The conference succeeded in gathering key
SIGINT partners from across the Extended Enterprise to discuss how to move toward improved
national/tactical integration in support of military operations. Attendees included representatives
from the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE), service engineering/technical offices, collection
management staffs of the theater and unified commands, 2nd Party SIGINT partners, the
Regional Security Operations Centers, and NSA.
(U//FOUO) A host of briefings were presented during the two-day conference. On the first day,
the Chiefs of CES and NTIO (National Tactical Integration Office - S14) provided an overview of
how battlefield SIGINT looks from their perspective and discussed actions that should be taken
to meet the challenges posed by new technologies. Also provided were a number of
presentations about key NSA initiatives, such as a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) tactical effort
called PINERIDGE and Net-centric Exploitation Applications via the Distributed Common Ground
System .
(U//FOUO) The second day included an in-depth look at NTI from a tactical perspective.
Presentations included a review of the requirements message format that CES is currently
implementing to make the process used by the military to request cryptanalysis support faster
and easier. Two of NSA's 2nd Party SIGINT partners presented their country's NTI efforts, and
the FAD/Military Affairs Advisor briefed 3rd Party relations and how they impact the use of hostnation airspace, land and sea-lanes by the U.S. for SIGINT purposes. Each SCE briefed its
strategy for NTI, often referencing "lessons learned" from cooperation with NSA during recent
deployments.
(U//FOUO) A major point of discussion was centered on the move away from tactical "black
boxes" toward processes whereby military customers can directly leverage cryptanalytic
capabilities when the exploitation systems themselves cannot, due to technological and
analytical factors, be forward deployed to combat venues as self-contained packages. In these
cases, combat commanders must be able to routinely benefit from cryptanalysis via a virtual
"black box" made up of geographically separate and distant exploitation systems and analysts
that dependably disseminate actionable intelligence when needed to front line forces.
(U//FOUO) A recurring theme during the conference was that as steps are being taken by
members of the extended enterprise to improve SIGINT NTI, conferences like the BSC are
needed to review their status, ensure they are being taken in the same direction, and provide a
venue to honestly discuss potential disagreements about the implementation of the individual
steps in an open forum. BSC attendees understood that advances in communications technology
coupled with the large number of potential SIGINT targets means that the distinction between
national and tactical no longer exists - everyone must act as partners in one seamless enterprise
to provide the best possible intelligence for customers.
(U//FOUO) To view the conference agenda, list of attendees and presentations, you can visit CES
homepage at the following URL:
.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108