DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(U) A Lesson in Sharing at the FBI (part 2)
FROM:
Intelligence Analysis Intern
Run Date: 10/13/2004
(U//FOUO) This is the continuation (and conclusion) of yesterday's article about
experiences working at the FBI:
(U//FOUO) In part 1 of this article I gave an example that hopefully illustrated the importance of
being able to exchange information with the FBI. I also mentioned that education and
infrastructure can often pose significant challenges to this effort. I would now like to elaborate
on each of these and also describe the great strides that are being made to face these
challenges.
Education
(U//FOUO) In addition to attempting to make sure that NSA products are routed to the FBI
squads that should see them, and submitting requests for information back to NSA on their
behalf, a large portion of my time at WFO was spent explaining who NSA is, what we do, and
how we can help them. Almost every one of the analysts and agents I encountered at WFO was
cleared for TS//SCI, but a relatively small percentage of them took advantage of the wealth of
information that was readily available to them at that level. Many of them were simply not used
to working with SIGINT and had not learned the value of it. Others relied on the NSA
representative to give them any products that might be relevant to their investigations, which
was often difficult due to the large number of investigations being conducted at any one time.
(U//FOUO) I tried to take advantage of every opportunity I had to encourage WFO personnel to
get Intelink accounts so they could do their own research and pull product reports for
themselves. Inevitably, as soon as they found something relevant to their case they would begin
to realize the value of SIGINT and continue to come back for more. It's not easy for a "culture"
to start thinking differently than it has for so long, but education is the key to bringing
institutional change and it is beginning to happen at the FBI. Former SID director Maureen
Baginski has initiated several programs to help facilitate this transition, including mandated
SIGINT training for new agents as well as senior managers.
Infrastructure
(C) Infrastructure issues such as facilities and computer systems have also traditionally been a
key challenge to information sharing. Many of FBI's field offices have little or no SCIF space and
the computer systems and electronic databases that they access from their workstations on a
daily basis can only contain information up to the SECRET level. Obviously this makes it very
difficult for them to exchange any information with NSA.
(C) NSA's Customer Response is currently working on a series of tearline seminars, and FBI
personnel will have easier access to tearline reporting through Intelink-S. This is the most
customer-oriented approach and allows the FBI to gain the greatest benefit from NSA's
products. The facilities are improving also, as more SCIF space is being built and the FBI deploys
its Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION) systems to the field
offices. SCION allows access to TS/SI/TK/G/HCS material and users can request Intelink and
ICemail accounts. This system will greatly enhance FBI's access to NSA information once it is
fully operational in all of FBI's field offices.
(C) In fact, I was fortunate to be involved in a "virtual representative" initiative at FBI's Los
Angeles Field Office. Personnel in LA's counterterrorism division, acting as an intelligence hub for
the FBI's west coast offices, will use InfoWorkSpace (IWS) to network with NSA subject matter
experts as well as representatives at FBI HQ, Washington Field Office, and the Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) in New York. Once the necessary infrastructure upgrades are in place, this
technology will be used to augment LA's CT efforts and facilitate the exchange of information
from coast to coast.
Tour at FBI HQ
(S//SI) My tour at FBI HQ has been different from my experience at the field office in several
ways. First, I am working inside of a large SCIF with the analysts and agents that comprise the
Communications Analysis Unit. Although we still must pass only SECRET information to the field
offices, information can be shared freely with my colleagues in the CAU and it is easy to reach
back to NSA via secure communications. Secondly, CAU personnel have fairly extensive
experience with SIGINT and have already established a working relationship with the CT product
line at NSA. In fact, several CAU detailees are currently sitting with CT analysts in OPS2B.
(S//SI) But the biggest difference is that, after working through some policy-related questions, I
am now sitting here as an analyst and not in the representational role that I had at the field
office. This allows me to have access to more databases and analytic tools, which better equips
me to assist the CAU in their mission to uncover the domestic connections to international
terrorism and prevent potential attacks on U.S. soil before they can be carried out. For example,
the FBI routinely conducts call-chaining analysis on domestic numbers of interest. These
numbers are often in contact with foreign numbers, but until now the FBI had no way of knowing
if the foreign numbers had terrorist connections. As a result, potentially valuable leads were
frequently overlooked.
(S//SI) Now I am able to use NSA resources to analyze any foreign contacts and determine if
they could possibly be associated with terrorist activity. Additionally, the CT product line is
providing the CAU with a weekly listing of terrorism-related phone numbers, and we hope to be
able to soon do the same with e-mail addresses. So FBI analysts can now immediately tell if an
individual in the U.S. has any foreign terrorism-related contacts, which enables the FBI to better
protect our homeland by focusing their effort and resources appropriately.
(U//FOUO) This is an example of Transformation 2.0 in action and I believe it is a glimpse into
the future of NSA's relationship with FBI. I am proud to be a part of these information-sharing
success stories.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108