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A Lesson in Sharing at the FBI (part 2)

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (U) A Lesson in Sharing at the FBI (part 2) FROM: Intelligence Analysis Intern Run Date: 10/13/2004 (U//FOUO) This is the continuation (and conclusion) of yesterday's article about experiences working at the FBI: (U//FOUO) In part 1 of this article I gave an example that hopefully illustrated the importance of being able to exchange information with the FBI. I also mentioned that education and infrastructure can often pose significant challenges to this effort. I would now like to elaborate on each of these and also describe the great strides that are being made to face these challenges. Education (U//FOUO) In addition to attempting to make sure that NSA products are routed to the FBI squads that should see them, and submitting requests for information back to NSA on their behalf, a large portion of my time at WFO was spent explaining who NSA is, what we do, and how we can help them. Almost every one of the analysts and agents I encountered at WFO was cleared for TS//SCI, but a relatively small percentage of them took advantage of the wealth of information that was readily available to them at that level. Many of them were simply not used to working with SIGINT and had not learned the value of it. Others relied on the NSA representative to give them any products that might be relevant to their investigations, which was often difficult due to the large number of investigations being conducted at any one time. (U//FOUO) I tried to take advantage of every opportunity I had to encourage WFO personnel to get Intelink accounts so they could do their own research and pull product reports for themselves. Inevitably, as soon as they found something relevant to their case they would begin to realize the value of SIGINT and continue to come back for more. It's not easy for a "culture" to start thinking differently than it has for so long, but education is the key to bringing institutional change and it is beginning to happen at the FBI. Former SID director Maureen Baginski has initiated several programs to help facilitate this transition, including mandated SIGINT training for new agents as well as senior managers. Infrastructure (C) Infrastructure issues such as facilities and computer systems have also traditionally been a key challenge to information sharing. Many of FBI's field offices have little or no SCIF space and the computer systems and electronic databases that they access from their workstations on a daily basis can only contain information up to the SECRET level. Obviously this makes it very difficult for them to exchange any information with NSA. (C) NSA's Customer Response is currently working on a series of tearline seminars, and FBI personnel will have easier access to tearline reporting through Intelink-S. This is the most customer-oriented approach and allows the FBI to gain the greatest benefit from NSA's products. The facilities are improving also, as more SCIF space is being built and the FBI deploys its Sensitive Compartmented Information Operational Network (SCION) systems to the field offices. SCION allows access to TS/SI/TK/G/HCS material and users can request Intelink and ICemail accounts. This system will greatly enhance FBI's access to NSA information once it is fully operational in all of FBI's field offices. (C) In fact, I was fortunate to be involved in a "virtual representative" initiative at FBI's Los Angeles Field Office. Personnel in LA's counterterrorism division, acting as an intelligence hub for the FBI's west coast offices, will use InfoWorkSpace (IWS) to network with NSA subject matter experts as well as representatives at FBI HQ, Washington Field Office, and the Joint Terrorism

Task Force (JTTF) in New York. Once the necessary infrastructure upgrades are in place, this technology will be used to augment LA's CT efforts and facilitate the exchange of information from coast to coast. Tour at FBI HQ (S//SI) My tour at FBI HQ has been different from my experience at the field office in several ways. First, I am working inside of a large SCIF with the analysts and agents that comprise the Communications Analysis Unit. Although we still must pass only SECRET information to the field offices, information can be shared freely with my colleagues in the CAU and it is easy to reach back to NSA via secure communications. Secondly, CAU personnel have fairly extensive experience with SIGINT and have already established a working relationship with the CT product line at NSA. In fact, several CAU detailees are currently sitting with CT analysts in OPS2B. (S//SI) But the biggest difference is that, after working through some policy-related questions, I am now sitting here as an analyst and not in the representational role that I had at the field office. This allows me to have access to more databases and analytic tools, which better equips me to assist the CAU in their mission to uncover the domestic connections to international terrorism and prevent potential attacks on U.S. soil before they can be carried out. For example, the FBI routinely conducts call-chaining analysis on domestic numbers of interest. These numbers are often in contact with foreign numbers, but until now the FBI had no way of knowing if the foreign numbers had terrorist connections. As a result, potentially valuable leads were frequently overlooked. (S//SI) Now I am able to use NSA resources to analyze any foreign contacts and determine if they could possibly be associated with terrorist activity. Additionally, the CT product line is providing the CAU with a weekly listing of terrorism-related phone numbers, and we hope to be able to soon do the same with e-mail addresses. So FBI analysts can now immediately tell if an individual in the U.S. has any foreign terrorism-related contacts, which enables the FBI to better protect our homeland by focusing their effort and resources appropriately. (U//FOUO) This is an example of Transformation 2.0 in action and I believe it is a glimpse into the future of NSA's relationship with FBI. I am proud to be a part of these information-sharing success stories. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

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