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The Little Card that Made a Big Impact in Iraq


The Information Sharing Card presents new guidelines on sharing more signals intelligence with NSA customers.


Jan 04, 2005


Feb 05, 2018



Page 1 from The Little Card that Made a Big Impact in Iraq
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (U) The Little Card that Made a Big Impact in Iraq FROM: Peggy Maxson Deputy Chief, Military Integration (S13) Run Date: 01/04/2005 The Info Sharing Card sees action. (U//FOUO) (S//SI) Posted at my desk, in the wilds of Baghdad, the Information Sharing Card (shown below), in a single page captured the essence of what information sharing for NSA should be, can be and will be. In my seven years working in customer environments -- in DCI, JCS/J2, DIAC, CENTCOM HQ** and twice in Baghdad -- I had come to realize how sharing information in "non-traditional ways" makes a difference. When I received the Information Sharing Card in Iraq, I literally stood up and cheered. Plainly stated, perfectly executed, the card gives customer liaisons of all descriptions the latitude to support their customers as desired under Transformation 2.0. (U//FOUO) The Information Sharing Card makes it easy for people to accept the changes brought about by Transformation 2.0. Clear, easy-to-read guidelines are intended to enable NSA's production community to deal with NSA reps in the field, as well as with NSA's customers, without fear. The day I received the card, I was trying to encourage one of my colleagues to talk about SIGINT details to encourage analytic flow, but he was uncomfortable. Then I read Guideline Number 8 on the Information Sharing Card: "Its OK to talk about, show and share evaluated, minimized unpublished SIGINT to customers/partners in order to facilitate analytic collaboration." This has become my personal favorite, as it describes what I was trying to explain and gives clear, written authority from HQ that analysts can refer to and feel comfortable with. The card has made immediate impact. (U) Force Protection: (TS//SI) The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has conducted over 3000 missions this past year in their search for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. While traveling through Iraq is inherently dangerous, certain missions are considered more dangerous than others. When the threat level is high around a certain facility/area that the ISG is going to visit, NSA liaisons here draw a box around the area and GEO (S2L) provides threat tips on hostile emitters within the area. (S//SI) On 24 March 2004, the ISG was in its third day of a four-day mission, each day returning to a suspect facility that had previously produced dual-use chemical components. There were OPSEC concerns about their return to the same location, even though they were deviating their route. One of the GEO tippers placed a hostile emitter in their direct line of return from the site. Because of this tipper the team took an alternate route, potentially avoiding an incident. While we will never be able to prove that NSA information actually averted an incident, the customer felt incredibly grateful for this support from our Agency. The geolocation tipper was unfinished intelligence that was evaluated and minimized**. And it made a difference. (U) Collaborative Analysis: (TS//SI) In another case, the ISG Nuclear Team requested that NSA be particularly attentive to any information concerning a deceased Iraqi nuclear scientist, and they provided phone numbers of the scientist's family. NSA tasked the numbers and shortly thereafter issued a SIGINT product report based on the collection. Because the report showed the existence of certain documentation, a mission was planned to search the son's residence. (U//FOUO) This outcome would not have been possible without the open, informal analytic discussion encouraged and made clear by the Information Sharing Card. Analytic discussion is the critical element: this is where the SIGINT hits the road. The card -- and the actions it encourages - has made a huge difference in Iraq and throughout the extended enterprise.
Page 2 from The Little Card that Made a Big Impact in Iraq
**(U) Notes: DCI = Director of Central Intelligence JCS/J2 = Joint Chiefs of Staff/J2 (Director of Intelligence) DIAC = Defense Intelligence Analysis Center CENTCOM = U.S. Central Command "Minimized": for further information, see USSID 18 . "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108