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(U) What's Happening in Counterterrorism? (part 1)
FROM: SIGINT Communications
Unknown
Run Date: 01/26/2005
An interview with
S2I) (U//FOUO)
, Deputy Production Manager for Counterterrorism (CT,
(U) Since 9/11, terrorism has been the nation's #1 intelligence target. What has this
meant for the CT Product Line in terms of staffing levels, increased resources, etc?
(S//SI) Prior to 9/11, the CT Product Line was quite small -- 90 or so workers. Today we have
over 400 in our workforce, so the growth has been dramatic. However, not all of our work force
is permanent -- approximately 35% is considered "temporary," such as interns and military on
6-month tours, contractors, and personnel under the TEDNE (Temporary Employment for the
Duration of the National Emergency) program. We're fortunate to have these talented
individuals working with us, but we need to shift from crisis manning to a work force posture
that will endure for the long fight. We are working with SID and A&P leadership to achieve a
level of staffing consistent with our mission demands.
(S//SI) Our target is very complex -- almost indecipherable to those who are unfamiliar with it - and it demands the kind of expertise an analyst gets by working a target over an extended
period of time. Another consideration is that the terrorism target is worked in many places
outside the CT Product Line, and we need to coordinate those efforts. We have also deployed
people to locations where they can have maximum effect. For example, we have two CT analysts
working in Islamabad, Pakistan, where they are closer to the front line, yet can still tap into CT
resources as needed. That has paid great dividends. So for all these reasons, we are looking for
additional permanent staff.
(U) How's morale in the CT Product Line?
(U) Our workforce is incredibly dedicated and focused on their mission to prevent another 9/11.
However, this dedication, over time, comes at a cost to people's health and personal lives. And
since we are in this struggle for the long haul, we must plan accordingly. We can't continue to
rely on or ask our folks to work excessive hours to accomplish the mission. And, people have to
know that the most critical work is covered, so they can go home.
(S//SI) The CT leadership intends to look after its workforce by making sure personnel can take
leave, receive training, and work reasonable hours. We'll protect our work force from distractions
that slow them down, try to get enough manning -- spread across the whole extended
enterprise -- to complete the mission, and use partnerships and collaboration to increase
efficiency.
(S//SI) For some time now we've been running a CT watch operation to respond to queries at all
hours. This reduces (but not eliminates) the need for calling people in, yet allows us to be
responsive to customer needs (and CT gets high marks in that regard). If personnel wish to
transfer to another organization, they should be able to do that knowing they have given of their
time and talent; maybe using that talent elsewhere in the GWOT [Global War on Terrorism]. But
before analysts leave, we need to make sure that any unique knowledge they have is passed on
to others working the target.
(U) What's the greatest hurdle the CT Product Line faces at this time -- collecting against
the target? ...getting personnel with the right specialized skills? ...something else?
(TS//SI) We don't have one key problem -- we have multiple issues that need attention. One
area I already touched on is the need for appropriate staffing . The struggle against terrorism
will be with us for the long haul -- we view it as a generational war. After 9/11 we went into
crisis mode, but that cannot continue indefinitely. As I mentioned, we are negotiating with A&P
and SID for the right personnel mix to carry out the mission in CT. But we are also looking at
this across the board -- how we can work with foreign partners, the RSOCs, and others, to get
the job done. All of the RSOCs are already doing significant CT work, and we expect even more
of the mission to be handled by the RSOCs as part of the build-out. [See DIRgram-390: "Mission
Alignment and RSOC Build-Out - An Update" ].
(TS//SI) Another concern we are struggling with is technology . Some of the systems our
analysts use require a lot of time-consuming manual manipulation of data. We need to be just as
flexible as our targets, who constantly switch communications from one mode to another -phone to e-mail to SMS [short message service], etc. To tackle this problem, CT's technical
directors are working on what we call the "Manhattan Project." Its goal is to improve our
analytic capacity. Like the original Manhattan Project, we're bringing together some of the best
minds across NSA to focus on a specific task of delivering tomorrow's capabilities today. It's
intended to have long-term benefits, and near-term results. Our tech directors have expanded
an existing great partnership with S3/Data Acquisition that has resulted in some tremendous
successes. We work hard to provide S3 clear, prioritized requirements for the CT mission.
(S//SI) We need help in the area of training . We are talking to NCS to see whether they can
take up additional training responsibilities, easing the significant self-help training burden on
personnel in CT. Space is another concern. We've had to "hot desk" and schedule additional
shift work for some personnel because there were not enough desks to go around. We're also
trying to improve our infrastructure , working with ITIS to have all needed systems available.
(TS//SI) The target itself presents many challenges. SIGINT collection against some CT targets
isn't always possible -- sometimes they use couriers to pass messages. In those cases, HUMINT
is the only possible means of getting the intelligence. Also, we're following individuals (not big
organizations) who come and go, who operate with little guidance, who change their
communications often, use unusual dialects and speak in codes -- it all adds up to a complex
target.
(U) See the conclusion of this interview tomorrow on SIDtoday.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108