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CROSSHAIR — Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US

SUMMARY

The U.S. closed a number of High Frequency Direction-Finding sensor sites in the 1990s. To ensure they're able to track signals in areas that had previously been covered by now-shuttered stations, the Signals Intelligence Directorate worked with Second and Third Party partners to share resources and establish a global direction-finding network.

DOCUMENT’S DATE

Feb 24, 2005

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

Feb 05, 2018

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Page 1 from CROSSHAIR — Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (C) CROSSHAIR -- Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US FROM: Corporate HF Services, Operations (S33113) Run Date: 02/24/2005 A multinational effort for High Frequency Direction-Finding (HFDF) (C) Q: (TS//SI) What do these Third Party partners have in common? Austria, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Israel, India, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Taiwan A: They all participate in the CROSSHAIR program, enabling the US to maintain an HFDF capability worldwide. (U//FOUO) CROSSHAIR implementation occurred on 01 October 1993 and is the project name (and subsequent name of the US HFDF network) for the consolidation of all US Service Cryptologic Element (SCE) HFDF resources into a single DF Network managed by NSA. Prior to CROSSHAIR, each of the military SCEs had its own DF resources. In fact, at some large field sites (e.g, Misawa , Hanza ), all three SCEs operated DF systems within their respective nets (numerous field sites had two SCEs conducting HFDF operations). However, there was no interoperability and each SCE was funded for DF separately (a waste of dollars and resources). (C) In the early 1990s, the Terrestrial Overt-Transition Study looked at our big, fixed, field sites throughout the world and decided that it was necessary to close some of them to eliminate duplication and save money. About 25 field sites were closed, which meant that the HFDF mission lost a great many opportunities to get the lines of bearings needed to hone in on targets. Instead of, say, 10-12 sites providing lines of bearings, maybe one or two existed. The office that is now SID's HF Mission Management organization (S33113) needed to find other resources to do the same job. (C) In fact, all of our Second Party partners were fulltime members in CROSSHAIR - Canada had four sites, Great Britain had six, Australia and New Zealand each had one; however, there were still uncovered areas all over the world, and it occurred to S33113 that Third Parties might be able/willing to help out. They came to what is now FAD , talked with various country desk officers to see which countries might be willing to get involved, and thus began the expansion of the CROSSHAIR program. The network has grown to the point where there are even trilateral arrangements whereby some of our Third Party partners exchange HFDF information with each other! (C) The expanded CROSSHAIR has been so successful that chief of HF Mission Management, said, "Without Third Parties,we probably wouldn't have a worldwide US HFDF network." CROSSHAIR HFDF Network blue dot = US HFDF sensors; red dot = partners HFDF sensors. (TS//SI//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, and NZL) (U) This article is reprinted from the February Foreign Affairs Digest "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
Page 2 from CROSSHAIR — Foreign Partners Filling HF/DF Gaps for the US
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108