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(U//FOUO) Birth of the Cryptologic Support Teams
FROM: John E. Hill
Future Operations Branch, Office of Military Integration (S13)
Run Date: 07/19/2005
A quick look at how it all happened... (U)
(C) S13 has a long history of providing warfighter support to deployed areas, some extremely
dangerous. In early 2004, S13 had about 60 civilians and military deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. These individuals were deployed primarily as tactical Cryptologic
Support Groups, the usual configuration of NSA deployments since the Balkans Conflicts of the
mid-late 1990's. At the time, however, we may have taken for granted how important and
effective our teams have been in helping win the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. That
case was made quite clear to our office when, in March of 2004, the US Army came to Fort
Meade requesting an increased SIGINT capability in the field. The concept that was born of these
discussions was the Cryptologic Support Team (CST).
(S) The Army wanted an increased capability for national SIGINT within their division-level units
scattered across Iraq. At the time, NSA elements were mainly concentrated at the corps or
headquarters levels, providing SIGINT to the Army and Special Operations commands within
Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of these rumblings in the Army, Dr. Eric Haseltine began a long
TDY documenting the realities and needs of tactical SIGINTers waging the war in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
(S) Dr. Haseltine observed that while the JTFs* and Marine Corps units were in excellent shape,
the Army division-level units were lacking the tools and training to even know they needed
additional SIGINT capability. The reality was clear: NSA needed to help the Army do a better job
in pushing SIGINT from the national level down to the tactical. MG Quirk proposed that CSTs
augment the Army's SIGINT capability for two years, at all of their divisions in Iraq. The Army
accepted and the CST program was created.
(U//FOUO) The initial discussions on how NSA would build this capability were heated. Where
would we get the people? How would we establish secure communications at multiple sites?
Could NSA take on the responsibility of training an additional 25 deployers every six months?
These were legitimate concerns, but through the heated debate and discussion a plan began to
emerge. While S13 would still solicit volunteers from NSAW and the Extended Enterprise, we
also made the case to the Cryptologic Centers that their active support was an outstanding way
to get into the fight.
(U//FOUO) Over the course of the next four months, NSA teamed with the all of the Cryptologic
Centers to develop a deployment plan. The CC's were to provide the bulk of the personnel for
the teams, while NSAW would provide the training, funding and "ringers" -- seasoned deployers
who had previous experience. As the deployers began to arrive at NSAW, they were inprocessed and scheduled for training.
(S) All deployers were given a two-month training program, consisting of GEO Boot Camp, indepth analytical training within the MOC , small arms training, and NBC* training. Additionally,
those deploying as Officers-In-Charge visited CENTCOM* headquarters and NSA/CSS Georgia
(nee GRSOC) for in-person consultations and training with regional experts. At the end of the
two months, our teams were ready to go. Their deployments were staggered over several weeks
to lessen the strain on forward elements in Qatar that were providing the bulk of the logistics
support.
(U//FOUO) Our first deployments occurred in August of 2004 and went off without a hitch. In
our office's experience of deploying hundreds of NSA personnel since the Balkans Conflict, it was
without a doubt the smoothest we had ever witnessed.**
(U//FOUO) The result has been nothing but praise by US Army field commanders and a
tremendous increase in our capabilities to support and protect the warfighter. So much so, that
two additional teams have stood up since the original four teams formed in August of 2004. Our
CSTs have been lauded by Army units consistently since their inception. They have been
responsible for countless mission successes and have been a major factor in saving American
lives and defeating terrorists and former regime elements throughout Iraq.
(U) We have many personal successes as well. We have seen one Bronze Star awarded and
countless Joint Service Commendation medals and cash awards for the many military and
civilian personnel who have deployed to the region.
(U) I was proud to be a part of this initiative but the real credit goes to all the people who made
the deployment possible, and to the troops and civilians who went to a war zone for six months
and made our whole agency look great!
* (U) Notes:
JTF = Joint Task Force
NBC = Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
CENTCOM = Central Command
** (U//FOUO) It is important to note how many moving parts were involved in setting these
teams up. The training portions alone demanded the coordination of several major elements of
the Agency including Q (Associate Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence),
SID/Counterterrorism (S2I), GEOCELL, MOC , COBRA FOCUS , NSA/CSS Georgia, NSA/CSS
Representative (NCR) CENTCOM and Army TCAE . The NSA Deployment Center, in coordination
with NIST (National Intelligence Support Team) and NCR CENTCOM Forward, was able to deploy
25 people (on top of the usual 10) in the space of 30 days! Sure, there was the occasional error
or mistake in the deployment process, but to almost triple your usual output in a space of 30
days with little or no disruption is a credit to the skill and competency of our soldiers and
civilians who make up the agency workforce.
(U) See other recent articles about CSTs:
(U//FOUO) Providing Actionable Intelligence in Mosul
(U//FOUO) How NSA Teams Support Tactical Forces in Iraq
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108