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(S//SI) Life as a TLO in Oslo
FROM: (S//SI)
TLO Oslo
Run Date: 10/14/2005
(S//SI) A Technical Liaison Officer assists the SIGINT Liaison Officer (SLO) in handling NSA
dealings with Norway and Finland.
(S//SI) Due to the heavy technical workload with our Norwegian partner, a decision was made
over a year ago by FAD [NSA/Foreign Affairs Directorate] to assign a Technical Liaison Officer
(TLO) to help offload a lot of the work from the SIGINT Liaison Officer (SLO) in Oslo, Norway. I
was most fortunate to have been selected for this assignment, and now that a year has gone by,
I thought that a brief exposition of my experience of this first year in Oslo would be of interest.
(S//SI) BARHAUG, overlooking the Russian Border, the premier NIS technical SIGINT collection
site in East Finnmark
(S//SI) My primary function as TLO Oslo is to act as an interface between FAD or NSA Project
Managers (PMs) and the Technical Liaison Managers (TLMs) in DP3, and the Norway partner's
various PMs on all technical matters as required. I currently have this responsibility with both
Norway's Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Finland's Finnish Intelligence Research
Establishment (FIRE), although NIS consumes the greater majority of time because of the large
number of technical programs we have with them. In addition to a weekly meeting with NIS, I
also participate in semiannual technical planning conferences to ensure major technical issues
between NSA liaison and partner technical management are adequately addressed.
(S//SI) During the past year, numerous communication outages have occurred between NIS and
NSA facilities. As TLO, it is my responsibility to assist with the prompt reestablishment of these
communications. A number of communications upgrades/changes to NIS are to be implemented
in the future. I will be working with the NSA engineers to ensure the communications upgrades
go smoothly by interfacing with the partner to assist with site surveys and ensure all
requirements are met.
(S//SI) The job also involves numerous "other duties" which involve filling in for the SLO in his
absence, performing COMSEC custodian functions, attending/organizing representational
functions and ensuring that shipments to/from the partner flow smoothly. In the past year, we
have received more than 40 sea vans and more than 50 air shipments of electronic equipment
from NSA (accommodation buy and other). It is part of my responsibility to ensure that all
equipment gets to its proper destination, in either direction. I also work closely with the
European Technical Center (ETC) in Wiesbaden, Germany on a variety of issues pertaining to
maintaining the technical health of various SIGINT capabilities in Norway, including managing
the repair/return process with which ETC assists us on NSA-sourced SIGINT systems and
components at various Norwegian SIGINT sites, some of which are north of the Arctic Circle!
(S//SI) Part of my responsibilities since my arrival have also been to provide a measure of
technical oversight for NSA with its new SIGINT partner in Finland. This is especially important
at times because NSA does not currently have a SLO presence in Finland. In the past year I was
part of an NSA install team that installed a direct communications link among FIRE, NSA and
NGA [the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]. The establishment of this link is critical in
growing the relationship between NSA and FIRE.
(S//SI) Did I mention that Oslo is a fantastic city in which to live? And that the Norwegian
partner is one of the most professional SIGINT outfits with which NSA works? All in all, being
FAD's TLO in Norway is anything but boring!
(S//SI) CODHOOK, the NIS Space Collection site near Fauske
(U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the Foreign Affairs Digest, September edition.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108