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Life as a TLO in Oslo

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (S//SI) Life as a TLO in Oslo FROM: (S//SI) TLO Oslo Run Date: 10/14/2005 (S//SI) A Technical Liaison Officer assists the SIGINT Liaison Officer (SLO) in handling NSA dealings with Norway and Finland. (S//SI) Due to the heavy technical workload with our Norwegian partner, a decision was made over a year ago by FAD [NSA/Foreign Affairs Directorate] to assign a Technical Liaison Officer (TLO) to help offload a lot of the work from the SIGINT Liaison Officer (SLO) in Oslo, Norway. I was most fortunate to have been selected for this assignment, and now that a year has gone by, I thought that a brief exposition of my experience of this first year in Oslo would be of interest. (S//SI) BARHAUG, overlooking the Russian Border, the premier NIS technical SIGINT collection site in East Finnmark (S//SI) My primary function as TLO Oslo is to act as an interface between FAD or NSA Project Managers (PMs) and the Technical Liaison Managers (TLMs) in DP3, and the Norway partner's various PMs on all technical matters as required. I currently have this responsibility with both Norway's Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and Finland's Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment (FIRE), although NIS consumes the greater majority of time because of the large number of technical programs we have with them. In addition to a weekly meeting with NIS, I also participate in semiannual technical planning conferences to ensure major technical issues between NSA liaison and partner technical management are adequately addressed. (S//SI) During the past year, numerous communication outages have occurred between NIS and NSA facilities. As TLO, it is my responsibility to assist with the prompt reestablishment of these communications. A number of communications upgrades/changes to NIS are to be implemented in the future. I will be working with the NSA engineers to ensure the communications upgrades go smoothly by interfacing with the partner to assist with site surveys and ensure all requirements are met. (S//SI) The job also involves numerous "other duties" which involve filling in for the SLO in his absence, performing COMSEC custodian functions, attending/organizing representational functions and ensuring that shipments to/from the partner flow smoothly. In the past year, we have received more than 40 sea vans and more than 50 air shipments of electronic equipment from NSA (accommodation buy and other). It is part of my responsibility to ensure that all equipment gets to its proper destination, in either direction. I also work closely with the European Technical Center (ETC) in Wiesbaden, Germany on a variety of issues pertaining to maintaining the technical health of various SIGINT capabilities in Norway, including managing the repair/return process with which ETC assists us on NSA-sourced SIGINT systems and components at various Norwegian SIGINT sites, some of which are north of the Arctic Circle! (S//SI) Part of my responsibilities since my arrival have also been to provide a measure of technical oversight for NSA with its new SIGINT partner in Finland. This is especially important at times because NSA does not currently have a SLO presence in Finland. In the past year I was part of an NSA install team that installed a direct communications link among FIRE, NSA and NGA [the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]. The establishment of this link is critical in growing the relationship between NSA and FIRE. (S//SI) Did I mention that Oslo is a fantastic city in which to live? And that the Norwegian partner is one of the most professional SIGINT outfits with which NSA works? All in all, being

FAD's TLO in Norway is anything but boring! (S//SI) CODHOOK, the NIS Space Collection site near Fauske (U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the Foreign Affairs Digest, September edition. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

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