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(U) Turkey and the PKK
FROM:
FAD's Central/Eastern Europe Office (DP13)
Run Date: 12/20/2005
(TS//SI) The U.S. fears that Turkey may undertake cross-border raids into Iraq in pursuit of
Kurdish PKK terrorists... NSA provides Turkey with SIGINT about the group.
(S//SI) NSA's robust SIGINT exchange with our two Turkish partners on indigenous terrorism
targets is primarily focused on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*, and the PKK has been a
sensitive topic of recent high-level US-Turkish discussions. The Turkish Government and general
population strongly believe that the US should be doing more against PKK insurgents operating
from northern Iraq to conduct terrorist operations inside Turkey.
(S//SI) The US condemns the PKK as a terrorist group and accepts that the coalition and the
Iraqi Transitional Government and Turkey need to work together to do more against this threat.
The US views Turkey as a valuable partner in NATO and in the global war on terrorism (the 1
March 2003 Parliamentary vote that prevented the Coalition from using Turkey for Operation
Iraqi Freedom notwithstanding) but is all too aware that the Kurds per se in northern Iraq are
friendly forces, and cross-border operations are an Iraqi sovereignty issue.
(U) The specter of 30 million Kurds coalescing into an autonomous Kurdistan is a long-standing
political problem for Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The Kurds are Turkey's largest non-Turkish
ethnic group and the only minority that can pose a threat to Turkish national unity. The PKK,
arguably the best known and most radical of the Kurdish movements, seeks to establish an
independent Marxist state in predominantly Kurdish southeastern Turkey.
(U) Since 1984, the PKK has conducted a violent terrorist insurgency against the Government of
Turkey, highlighted by attacks on Turkish security forces, bombings of tourist sites inside
Turkey, and attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European
cities. Turkey has responded by deploying army units and elite police forces to violently suppress
the insurgents. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurds established a de facto state in
northern Iraq and allowed the PKK to set up semi-permanent bases there. Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan, in an August 2005 Wall Street Journal piece, noted that Iraq should not be
allowed to remain a training ground for terrorists, whether al Qaeda or the PKK, and asserted
that the PKK has already killed more than 30,000 Turkish citizens.
(S//SI) The US Government is concerned that Turkey might lose patience and conduct crossborder operations inside Iraq while in hot pursuit of PKK insurgents. US National Security
Adviser Hadley and SACEUR** General Jones met separately in September 2005 with senior
Turkish officials to discuss the PKK. EUCOM, CENTCOM and State Department all have irons in
this fire and the value of NSA's SIGINT support to our Turkish partners has been consistently
highlighted by both the Charge' and the Office of Defense Cooperation in the US Embassy in
Ankara.
(TS//SI) NCRTURK***, in Ankara, works closely with two Turkish SIGINT partners, GES
(military) and ETI (civilian)****. NSA's collection efforts against the PKK, a third tier terrorist
organization, are generally limited to operations in northern Iraq, in southeastern Turkey, and in
Turkish tourist areas where bombings have occurred. We share SIGINT product, technical
collection and analytic support, and unique US collection with both Turkish partners. NSA
normally provides GES with a report every six hours locating a defined number of PKK handsets
active within Turkey; no data is provided to the Turks concerning PKK handsets active in
northern Iraq. NSA also provides data on insurgent handsets to ETI in support of Turkey's Law
Enforcement Access program.
(TS//SI) In an effort to support Turkey by doing more against the PKK, NCRTURK, CT/S2I3, and
GEO, in October 2005, provided GES with hourly reports on the locations of handsets used by
the PKK operating inside Turkey. This initiative was restricted by resource constraints to a twoweek period in support of specific Turkish military operations. Feedback from the Turks on the
effectiveness of this enhanced SIGINT support is pending at this time.
(S//SI) NSA, through the SINIO for Europe, is also actively participating in US Intelligence
Community and Law Enforcement efforts to track financial support links for the PKK in Western
Europe. NSA's very few expert "follow-the-money" analysts are generally deployed against tier
zero and other very high priority targets so we can only support a very focused effort against
PKK finances, one that targets individuals and organizations for which lead information is
available. Any lead information will most likely come from the Turkish partners and that angle is
being worked by NCRTURK.
(S//SI) As US political and military strategists grapple with the thorny issue of how to better
assist the Government of Turkey in combating the PKK, NSA and our Turkish SIGINT partners
are already fully engaged in this important subset of the global war on terrorism.
(U) Notes:
* (S//SI) This terrorist group changes names like a chameleon changes colors. Currently calling
itself the People's Congress of Kurdistan (KGK, or Kongra-Gel), it has in the past been known as
the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), and it originated and is still referred
to by most Turks as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). NSA also targets and shares SIGINT
with Turkey on the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C).
** (U) SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander, Europe - commander of NATO's military forces
**** (S//SI) The two Turkish SIGINT partners are the General Electronic Service (GES), a
military command under the J2 of the Turkish General Staff; and the civilian Electronic and
Technical Intelligence (ETI) Directorate of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO).
(U//FOUO) This article is reprinted from the Foreign Affairs Digest, December edition.
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108