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Embedded with USSOCOM: NSA Reps Provide Direct Analytic Support

SUMMARY

The NSA helped U.S. special forces “discover a vast and disparate network of Iranian agents in Iraq serving the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence ... or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.” Analysts embedded with special forces also help to find enemy safe houses, “ratlines,” and VIP facilities.

DOCUMENT’S DATE

Jan 09, 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

Aug 15, 2018

TAGS

Iran

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Page 1 from Embedded with USSOCOM: NSA Reps Provide Direct Analytic Support
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (S) Embedded with USSOCOM: NSA Reps Provide Direct Analytic Support FROM: NCR SOCOM Technical Rep in USSOCOM's Center for Special Operations (F1T) Run Date: 01/09/2006 (TS//SI) Geospatial exploitation techniques are particularly useful in tracking terrorists. (U//FOUO) The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is fully engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). According the GEN Brown, Commander USSOCOM, "The asymmetric nature of this war and diversity of the enemy require our nation to employ an exceptionally skilled, highly responsive, and adaptive force. These hallmarks of Special Operations Forces (SOF) are why USSOCOM is assigned a leading role in our nation's fight." Today's battlefield is not defined by geography, sovereignty, or sophisticated weaponry. Rather, it is an ill-defined battlefield of regional and global networks that terrorists exploit to further their beliefs... and NSA's support to USSOCOM is adapted to this fluid environment. (TS//SI) NSA has several representatives embedded throughout USSOCOM and the SOCOM Center for Special Operations (SCSO). NSA reps support their customers through a variety of venues, including direct analytic support to the USSOCOM analysts and planners. This analytic support runs the whole gamut of NSA's capabilities, to include passive and active exploitation, telephony, and DNI support. To be effective, the NSA reps must be trained in the GeoCell mission and possess an overall knowledge of the NSA SIGINT system. (TS//SI) While traditional contact-chaining techniques continue to serve as a powerful developmental tool, a purely geospatially based approach to target development can be even more significant. Using powerful geographic information systems tools like ArcView, a geospatially oriented approach can be particularly effective at finding things such as safe houses, ingress/egress "ratlines," meeting sites or hide sites, suspect sites, or VIP facilities. These techniques have also allowed analysts to locate and track al-Qa'ida associates and discover a vast and disperse network of Iranian agents in Iraq serving the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). (TS//SI) The NSA analytic team at USSOCOM uses geospatial exploitation techniques to track terrorists as they transition from communications mode to communications mode, and provides this data to USSOCOM analysts and customers in a timely manner. Geolocational exploitation directly supports active operations planning -- operations to find certain people and physically target them, operations to find a way to make contact and recruit or capture them, or operations in which law enforcement takes action to deter a crime. (U//FOUO) Forces assigned to USSOCOM are tactically and strategically engaged in this war, whether on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq, or as planners looking at the next potential area of conflict. NSA analysts are supporting this effort as well, either as expeditionary SIGINTers, or as support to planners at SOCOM HQS. Both jobs are vital to success and fulfill the NSA mission of supporting the warfighter. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108