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Build-Out of the Combating Proliferation Mission

SUMMARY

An update on how the Combating Proliferation mission — including counterproliferation aspects of advanced conventional weapons; high-interest cargo; and terrorist acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons — is being transferred to the regional centers in Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, and Colorado.

DOCUMENT’S DATE

Apr 18, 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

Aug 15, 2018

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Page 1 from Build-Out of the Combating Proliferation Mission
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (S//SI) Build-Out of the Combating Proliferation Mission FROM: Jonathan L. Darby CP Global Capabilities Manager (S2G) Run Date: 04/18/2006 (S//SI) The Combating Proliferation (CP) mission alignment has been proceeding resolutely at each of the four NSA/CSS Cryptologic Centers. In 2005, S2G elements were stood up at Georgia, Hawaii and Texas to work CP aspects of advanced conventional weapons (ACW), high-interest cargo (HIC), and terrorist acquisition and use of chemical-biological-radiologicalnuclear (CBRN) weapons. Efforts are currently underway to staff a HIC effort at NSA/CSS Colorado, to become operational this year. CP mission personnel throughout the enterprise continue to work together to successfully build-out these missions and to resolve the inevitable trials and tribulations (sufficient manning and subjectmatter expertise, training, space, IT infrastructure) associated with such an extensive undertaking. (U) Collaborative, Cooperative Communication (U//FOUO) The emphasis of the CP build-out is partnership. At the analytic level, collaboration and cooperation occur with increasing frequency and success as the CP mission production centers are established. CP senior leadership, including managers and technical directors from NSA-Washington, NSA-Georgia, NSA-Hawaii, NSATexas and the joint NSA/CIA SIGINT Cell, collaborates almost daily. Along with a steady stream of phone calls and emails, the extended CP leadership team convenes twice a week for staff meetings and strategy planning sessions (one via VTC and the other via polycom). Quarterly CP town meetings are televised to the CP production centers. The importance CP places on successful mission alignment is also reflected in the allocation of an S2G staff position devoted entirely to just that -- successful CP mission alignment. (U) Division of Effort (S//SI) The division of effort across the enterprise is evolving as the production centers ramp up personnel, expertise, space and IT. Georgia, Texas, and Hawaii have SIGINT analysis and production responsibility for their respective regional aspects of each CP focus area - ACW, CBRN, and HIC. The idea is not to have the centers augment what is already being done at NSAW, but to take ownership of analysis that increases the scope of SIGINT support to CP. (U) NSA/CSS Georgia (S//SI) CP Georgia began standup and transfer on 1 April 2005 to work on CBRN, ACW, and HIC for the Middle East /CENTCOM AOR*. The CBRN mission is well underway with a focus on Iraqi WMD scientist diaspora and attempts within the Iraqi insurgency to acquire WMD. ACW efforts are on Iranian and Syrian weapon systems-related acquisition. The HIC mission is temporarily on hold until CP Georgia can get enough analysts to adequately work both SERIES: (U//FOUO) A&P BuildOut 1. What's A&P Doing About Mission Alignment and the Build-Out? 2. Weapons and Space Build-Out Status 3. GEO Build-Out 4. Middle East and North Africa BuildOut Status 5. Build-Out of the Combating Proliferation Mission 6. The Counterterrorism Build-Out 7. Status of the China and Korea Mission Build-Out 8. The International Security Issues Build-Out
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the ACW and the HIC missions, hopefully in FY07. (S//SI) CP Georgia has exceeded every stated mission and production expectation in 2005 and has built strong connections not only within NSA/CSS Georgia, but also with key mission partners spanning the globe. Vital links have been established with MENA Georgia and have led the way in surfacing and resolving mission transfer issues, proactively clarifying mission responsibilities, and reaching out to the other Cryptologic Centers to share best practices and expertise. CP Georgia serves as a microcosmic view of how a net-centric, self-synchronizing SIGINT system should work. (U) NSA/CSS Hawaii (S//SI) CP Hawaii's mission includes Far East Asian, Southeast Asian, and Southwest Asian CBRN and ACW. Since S2G did not previously have the manpower to develop many of these target sets, CP Hawaii has focused most of its efforts on target development. To do so, CP Hawaii has worked closely with SIGDEV (SIGINT Development) to incorporate the most innovative and creative techniques to develop its targets at the earliest stages in the proliferation process -- focusing on the intent to acquire or develop capabilities, rather than reacting to individual transactions or relying on the interdiction process. (S//SI) Despite limited manning, CP Hawaii is already producing significant intelligence on North Korean HIC and Pakistani ACW and has brokered partnerships with DSD* and GCSB* to publish joint reporting on several projects, including country assessments. As of the end of March 2006, they accepted full ownership and reporting responsibilities of the PRC HIC mission. (U) NSA/CSS Texas (S//SI) Texas stood up its CP production center last summer to work CBRN, ACW, and HIC for the Latin America AOR. As NSA/CSS Texas assumes a leadership role for Homeland Security, CP Texas will work with CT and ICN to determine networks and links between legitimate actors, suspected terrorists, and narcotrafficker networks. Included among the analysts to deploy to Texas CBRN later this year will be an experienced Follow-theMoney (FTM) analyst to bring this unique analysis to bear against these critical target sets. (S//SI) In addition to target development efforts, CP Texas has issued a number of ACW reports on Russian arms firm Rosoboronexport continued involvement with maintenance and training issues related to Venezuelan acquisition of helicopters. DIA lauded the level of detail and overall importance of the contract information regarding the flight training of Venezuelan pilots in Russia. (S//SI) CP Texas works closely with on-site analysts from National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and U.S. Navy Fleet Information Operations Center to track shipments of military cargo from its point of origin to destination, whether by sea, land, or air. (U) NSA/CSS Colorado (S//SI) In the second half of FY-06, CP will begin an HIC mission in Colorado to develop and provide continuity on transportation networks suspected of supporting terrorism beyond the current maritime focus. CP/HIC Colorado will be co-located with
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S2J's Maritime Analysis Support Team (MAST), which tracks commercial maritime vessels, and will also work closely with the National Air Navigation Team (NANT), which tracks aircraft. (U) A True Enterprise (U//FOUO) Most certainly, the greatest asset for the CP Enterprise is the continuing enthusiasm and dedication of those assigned to develop and work the mission. Upon the completion of mission alignment, the goal is to staff each of the CP elements in Georgia, Hawaii, and Texas with around 100 people and around 12 in Colorado. Although FY-06 hiring numbers for CP analysts have fallen short of original expectations, those currently in place at the CC's have shown considerable flexibility and versatility in adapting to changing circumstances. Those in NSAW/CP are committed to doing whatever is possible to support our CP colleagues as we develop and build the global CP mission to support the US Government's objective to disrupt, deny, and deter proliferation around the world. (U) Notes: AOR = Area of Responsibility DSD = Australia's Defence Security Directorate GCSB = New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108