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(U//FOUO) Israel's Post-Sharon Policy Prospects: Part 1 -- the
Palestinians
FROM:
Assistant SINIO for Near East & South Asia (S17)
Run Date: 04/21/2006
(U//FOUO) Dramatic changes have emerged in the Levant and Persian Gulf regions. The
designation of former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as "permanently incapacitated" coupled
with the swearing in of The Islamic Resistance Movement's (HAMAS) cabinet following its
unexpected victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections have altered the political
landscape in Israel and throughout the region. Moreover, Iran's nuclear ambitions have
introduced an unsettling factor into the entire Middle East, with particular relevance for Israel
and the Palestinians.
(U//FOUO) Against the backdrop of these events, the questions of Israel's reactions to HAMAS's
leadership and Iran's nuclear program loom. How will the newly elected Kadima ("Forward")
Party, and its as-yet-unidentified coalition partners, respond to a HAMAS-led Palestinian
Authority (PA) and to Iran's nuclear pursuits? How will HAMAS balance its leadership role against
its anti-Israel charter?
(U//FOUO) Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (pictured) deftly assumed the reins of
government and Kadima leadership following Sharon's stroke. Political uncertainty and the
Israeli people's initial shock yielded to Olmert's leading his party to victory in the March
elections, signaling that Sharon's departure from the leadership did not adversely affect Israel's
stability or decision-making ability on security issues.
(U//FOUO) An illustration of the Israeli government's "business as usual" attitude was its
reaction to the 17 April Palestinian suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. Olmert, echoing past Israeli
leaders under such circumstances, declared that Israel would respond "appropriately, in the way
and manner required" and placed responsibility for the attack squarely on the HAMAS-led PA,
even though the Palestine Islamic Jihad was behind the perpetrator. Such distinctions have, in
the past, saved HAMAS from direct retaliation.
(U//FOUO) HAMAS justified the attack as an act of "self-defense" and indicated that the
Palestinian people have a right to defend themselves by "all" means in the face of "Israeli
aggression." HAMAS's response emphasizes the unlikelihood of its altering its hard-line stance
towards Israel. HAMAS continues to publicly maintain that the Palestinians have a legitimate
right to resist occupation, that negotiations with and recognition of Israel are not part of its
governing plans, and that a two-state solution is not acceptable.
(U//FOUO) Given these pronouncements and the recent suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, Israel
continues to view HAMAS as a terrorist organization and an unsuitable partner for peace talks.
Further evidence of this Israeli attitude was the immediate announcement that the government
would consider labeling the PA an "enemy entity," stripping HAMAS of any vestige of its
governing body cover.
(U//FOUO) It is not yet clear whether both sides' uncompromising positions are opening salvos
in what is likely to be a protracted period of punching and counter-punching which could lead to
serious discussions through an intermediary. Negotiations between sworn enemies often begin
with zero-sum game positions that then moderate over time, particularly if, in HAMAS's case,
international donations cease and it cannot keep its government afloat.
(U//FOUO) What is certain, however, is that Israel will hold HAMAS, as the PA government,
accountable for Palestinian attacks inside Israel, regardless of which Palestinian faction carries
out the deed. Equally certain is that Israel will respond with force to suicide bombings on its
territory.
(U) Watch for part two of this article: prospects for Israel and Iran.
(U//FOUO) Comments on this topic may be posted on the SID today blog .
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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