DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
(S) Status of the China and Korea Mission Build-Out
FROM:
Global Capabilities Manager for China and Korea (S2B)
Run Date: 05/02/2006
(S//SI) When it comes to mission buildout of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and North Korean targets, we are already beginning
to see a light at the end of the tunnel. In reality, the activities of
the past year have been part of an evolution that began in the mid90's when it was decided first, that the China military mission
would transfer from NSAW to the Kunia RSOC*, then - in 1997 that the Korea mission would follow suit. What the mission
alignment and buildout initiative has allowed us to do is get both
missions to a higher level of capability and empowerment,
complete the unfinished business of the initial mission transfers,
posture the Korean and China missions for success, and implement
a global collaborative effort.
(S//SI) According to the plan (and, admittedly, with some luck), it
won't be too long before the China and North Korea military
missions in Hawaii are adequately resourced, and by the end of
2011, up to 100 more people will join the effort in Hawaii. Almost
the entire North Korea military target set is already in Hawaii; it
will be my first mission area to be completely delegated to a
Cryptologic Center. The original plan was to complete mission
alignment of PRC military targets in 2007, but that timeline is
slipping. I'm watching that trend closely with NSAH (NSA/CSS
Hawaii) SID leadership.
(S//SI) For me, from the perspective of the China and Korea
missions, I'm already thinking beyond the numbers; the issue is
not in the volumes. Let's face it; I had a 10-year head start on
Counterterrorism (CT), GEO, Combating Proliferation (CP),
Regional Targets, Weapons & Space and other missions in the
works for NSA Hawaii. Also, in many respects, I have a less
complex task than the other GCMs because I am focused only on
Hawaii; I have no plan to assign and delegate mission to Georgia or
Texas. My main challenge now is to chart a course and establish
hiring goals that are consistent with the needs and priorities of my
fellow GCM's.
(S//SI) On the one hand, I am driven by priorities: How can we, as
a corporation, grow the CT mission and establish real CP and GEO
capabilities in Hawaii as quickly as possible? What's the minimal
number of people those missions need to reach a critical mass that
will allow them to get down to business? On the other hand, there
are practical considerations that compel us to strive for completing
the buildout of the China and Korea missions as quickly as possible;
we're so close! I have to find the right balance.
(S//SI) In addition to NSA Hawaii, we are also working hard to
stand up a production capability at the Regional Language Center
in Utah ( URLC ). My strategy is to start with a subset of the China
civil mission while simultaneously beginning a talent search for
high-caliber Korean linguists who could help us on the North
Korean target. I'll state up front I am not opposed to expanding the
SERIES:
(U//FOUO) A&P BuildOut
1. What's A&P Doing
About Mission
Alignment and the
Build-Out?
2. Weapons and Space
Build-Out Status
3. GEO Build-Out
4. Middle East and
North Africa BuildOut Status
5. Build-Out of the
Combating
Proliferation Mission
6. The Counterterrorism
Build-Out
7. Status of the China
and Korea Mission
Build-Out
8. The International
Security Issues
Build-Out
missions at URLC to include reporting roles; in fact, that is my
vision. But we will take it one step at a time, beginning with
language analysis, transcription and translation and building from
there, depending on the number of hires I can get and the skills of
the work force in Utah.
(S//SI) I cannot implement mission buildout and alignment in a
vacuum; there are many things going on in customer realms and
real world that I must not ignore. The very nature of the nation's
China strategy is rapidly evolving, for example, and we must be
able to shift SIGINT analysis in response. PACOM's (US Pacific
Command) strategic thinking is currently far beyond the context of
planning for war with the PRC over Taiwan (CONPLAN 5077).
Today, the emphasis is also on ways we can shape China (without
a war!) into becoming the kind of nation we want and the world
needs - turn it into a "responsible stakeholder" on the world stage.
This approach will compel us to reexamine SIGINT priorities and
explore changes in what we report, and how.
(S//SI) Much is changing in Korea, too! I cannot plan for success
against the DPRK* without factoring in the role of the SIGINTers
on the Peninsula. The linguists and analysts at SUSLAK (Special
U.S. Liaison Advisor-Korea), in Osan and Pyongtaek have been
essential in providing support to our warfighters in Korea for years;
they are definitely a critical component of the calculus today. In
recent years, much has been done in collaboration with USFK*, the
SCEs* and our Korean partners, to improve the collection posture
and communications architecture in Korea, adding a new flexibility
and agility that has been heretofore unavailable to the SIGINT
System. Initiatives like our HF Modernization program have done
much to bring capabilities in Korea into the 21st Century, giving
the SIGINT System an ability to collect more sophisticated HF
signals. The challenge now is to optimize the new capabilities while
working the mission more efficiently, to improve the quality of life
for personnel serving in Korea, and strategize ways to take the
Korean architecture to even higher levels.
(S//SI) One thing is clear: My end strength for the Korean mission
will not increase; no one gets more people just because there is
more collection available. In an effort to meet this challenge and to
take advantage of other changes taking place in Korea (such as the
Army's relocation from Seoul to Pyongtaek), I initiated a KOREA
ROADMAP initiative. With representation from NSAW, NSAH, the
Peninsula and the SCEs, this Korea Roadmap team is now
investigating several potential courses of action. My plan is to roll
out final recommendations to NSA senior leaders later this spring
and summer.
(S//SI) In collaboration with NCPAC*, NCR* Korea, NSA Hawaii and
the CSGs* in both Hawaii and Korea, we are taking every measure
possible to make the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC)
successful, and ensure that NSA performs critical value-adding
functions within the new construct. One major initiative we are
pursuing in this context is in the area of data sharing and access to
NSA databases. We are now well into the process of giving
personnel in the CSGs in Hawaii and Korea access to the databases
they need to improve their support to US Forces Korea and PACOM
commanders. Integrating these production capabilities into the
work being done at NSA Hawaii and other production centers
around the world will not be easy. It is, however, critical and
necessary if we are to achieve mission success and become the
kind of net-centric enterprise we envision.
(U) Notes:
RSOC = Regional Security Operations Center (old name for
Cryptologic Center)
DPRK = Democratic People's Republic of Korea
USFK = US Forces Korea
SCE = Service Cryptologic Elements
NCPAC = NSS/CSS Pacific
NCR = NSA/CSS Representative
CSGs = Cryptologic Services Groups
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108