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(U) International Incident Avoided, Thanks to Intelligence
FROM:
Combating Proliferation, High-Interest Cargo Branch (S2G23)
Run Date: 05/30/2006
(TS//SI//REL) US intelligence regarding a North Korean ship convinces Israelis not to board,
thereby averting a politically sensitive incident. Israelis feared the ship was carrying missilerelated cargo to Syria or Iran.
(S//SI//REL) In early October 2005, several vessels were observed loading cargo at the Secured
Storage Area (SSA) in the Songnim Port Facility, North Korea. Why was this news? Since the
SSA is known to support Weapons of Mass Detruction (WMD) and military-related cargo
shipments, the Intelligence Community pays special attention to vessels which depart that
facility. In this case, based upon SIGINT reporting and supporting imagery, we began to track
and report on one of the vessels, the Song Hoa 1.
(U//FOUO) North Korean ship Song Hoa 1
(TS//SI//REL) As of late November, while this vessel was in the Suez Canal waiting to transit,
our Israeli SIGINT partner (ISNU) approached us through the Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD)
asking about the nature of the cargo on board the Song Hoa 1. It became clear that the Israelis
had intelligence suggesting that the vessel was carrying missile-related cargo, and that they
were prepared to board the vessel based upon their intelligence source. The Israelis were
determined not to allow this cargo to reach the intended recipients, either Syria or Iran, if it was
in fact missile-related.
(TS//SI//REL) Working with various entities, we were able to arrange for the Egyptians to
inspect the cargo on Song Hoa 1 while it was in the Suez Canal. We then worked closely within
the Intelligence Community, and with the full support of the National Security Council, to
provide feedback to the Israelis. Subsequent SIGINT convinced us that there was no cargo
worthy of a boarding and the potential international incident that would follow.
(S//SI//REL) While part of the success story was averting an unwanted international
event, the perhaps more far-reaching success story was the cooperation that existed
as this vessel was tracked from North Korea to eventually Syria. We worked extremely closely
with CP SIGDEV*, the Maritime Analysis Support Team (MAST) in Denver, and NSOC*. In
addition, coordination across product lines, in particular between CP and MENA*, as well as with
the Cryptologic Center in Georgia helped enhance the SIGINT picture.
(TS//SI//REL) The NSA, CIA, ONI*, and NGA* team was complemented by our new relationship
with ISNU. In fact, a result of this incident may be the further sharing of critical WMD
proliferation data among international partners. Our ability to work with key Intelligence
Community partners continues to improve, and our relationships with 2nd and 3rd party
partners is expanding and providing extra benefits to our consumers.
(TS//SI//REL) The Song Hoa 1 event is a very good example of SIGINT leading the way, and
providing key policymakers with the right information to take the proper action. In fact, the
close cooperation between NSA and the ISNU on Song Hoa 1 was cited as a success story in
discussions between DIRNSA and his ISNU counterpart.
*(U//FOUO) Notes:
CP SIGDEV = Combating Proliferation SIGINT Development
NSOC = National Security Operations Center
MENA = Middle East/North Africa
ONI = Office of Naval Intelligence
NGA = National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108