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Write Right: Seven Things Not To Do in a SIGINT Report

SUMMARY

The seven deadly sins when writing signals intelligence reports include releasing intelligence about a target to that same target; focusing on the United States (persons, companies, or activities); and omitting information.

DOCUMENT’S DATE

Aug 21, 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

Aug 15, 2018

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Page 1 from Write Right: Seven Things Not To Do in a SIGINT Report
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (U) Write Right: Seven Things Not To Do in a SIGINT Report FROM: of the Reporting Board (S12R) Run Date: 08/21/2006 (U//FOUO) This month's "Write Right" has a special guest columnist filling in for usual contributor : (U//FOUO) Sometimes being in the right place at the right time means that you see things others do not. This can be downright frightening, as members of the Reporting Board can attest. Usually, a report will be forwarded with the question, "Can we do that?!" Quite often, the answer is "no." Here is the Reporting Board's list of what not to do in a SIGINT report, based on some reports that have come our way recently. 1. (U//FOUO) Omit the SIGINT - You'd be surprised how many reports do. Or how many focus not on the SIGINT, but on collateral, on detailed background (going back hundreds of years in some cases), or on recommending a course of action. Give the SIGINT bottom line and wellthought-out, reasoned analysis (in comments) about what the SIGINT means, and let your customers take it from there. 2. (U//FOUO) Release information from a target to a target - Say you have some traffic that came from the Elbonian Ambassador's comms and you have written a report. Make sure that you do not include a tear line that is releasable to Elbonia. That's likely to make the Elbonians cranky. 3. (U//FOUO) Write UNCLASSIFIED tear lines - You are encouraged to sanitize to SECRET (sometimes even CONFIDENTIAL), but unless you're sitting behind a verrrry big desk, you may not sanitize below that classification. If you're wondering whether your desk is big enough, check here: list of Original Classification Authorities . 4. (U//FOUO) Cross-reference other IC Agency reports Long story short: the "Third Agency Rule" says not to do this. Likewise, don't refer to "...a CIA report..." or "... FBI information..." since that inappropriately reveals the source of your collateral. 5. (U//FOUO) Focus on the U.S. - If your report starts out with "a U.S. Person," "a U.S. Company," or "the U.S. President," change your focus. Find the foreign intelligence and focus on that. 6. (U//FOUO) Report on U.S. Activities - If you think your report should have a "US_" Intelligence Source Indicator (ISI), then you should think really hard about that and what it is we do here. 7. (U//FOUO) Disseminate to one addressee - At a SERIES: (U) Write Right '06 1. Write Right : Grab Bag 2. Write Right : Frequently Asked Question: Where Do I Go for Help With USSID SP0018 Issues? 3. Write Right : The Style Manual vs. USSID 300 -- er, USSID CR1400 4. Write Right : The Paperless Society 5. Write Right : Is That Collateral, or Is It a Comment? 6. Write Right : What's a URS Center? 7. Write Right : Caveat Scrutator (Or, 'But I Saw It on the Internet!') 8. Write Right : Seven Things Not To Do in a SIGINT Report 9. Write Right : Breaking an Old Reporter's Heart 10. Write Right : Where Does It Say I Can't? 11. Write Right : Urban Myths of SIGINT: 'I Can Just Mark It ORCON' 12. Write Right : Loaded Words: Don't Politicize Reports
Page 2 from Write Right: Seven Things Not To Do in a SIGINT Report
minimum, reports must go DNI and SECDEF. If an addressee asks you to do otherwise (this is called "Single Agency Dissemination"), resist the urge and seek guidance. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108