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(U) The Current Israel-Hizballah-Lebanon Hostilities -- What Caused
Them?
FROM:
SINIO for the Near East and South Asia (S17)
Run Date: 07/27/2006
(U) An Israel-Hizballah conflict erupted suddenly on 12 July 2006
and appeared to be ratcheting toward broader regional hostilities
by the 15th. Israel's conditions for a cease-fire are two-fold: the
safe return of the two soldiers Hizballah elements kidnapped on 12
July; and the removal of Hizballah military elements from the
southern part of Lebanon and its replacement by the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) or a proposed international peacekeeping
force.
(U) Concurrently, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) is conducting
operations in the Gaza Strip to effect the release of another soldier
whom Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) kidnapped on 29
June. Most observers conjoin these separate incidents as
emblematic of the root causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
(U) Hizballah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers during a crossborder operation sparked a harsh Israeli response, including air
strikes on Lebanese transportation infrastructures intended to
prevent Hizballah from moving the kidnapped soldiers out of
Lebanon. IDF naval forces imposed a blockade, while Israeli air
assets bombed Rafiq Hariri (formerly Beirut International) Airport's
runways and fuel storage tanks, other smaller airfields throughout
Lebanon, and the land routes connecting Lebanon with Syria. IDF
ground units have conducted small-scale incursions into southern
Lebanon in an effort to eradicate the close-in military threat.
(U) Few observers doubt that Hizballah operates under Iran's and
Syria's watchful guidance. The coincidence of the 12 July operation
with the international community's deadline for Iran to respond to
an proposal of incentives to coax Iran into ending its nuclear fuel
cycle enrichment program is unmistakable, and seems to link Iran
to Hizballah's operational timing. However, there no empirical
evidence to prove the linkage has surfaced to date. Syria disavows
any control over Hizballah's military wing, and claims that it has
fulfilled its UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559
responsibilities in vacating Lebanon. Most observers, though,
believe that a remnant, covert Syrian presence interacts with
Hizballah leaders.
(U) Israel faces growing international criticism for its
"disproportionate" retaliation, but the somewhat surprising, lowkey Arab reaction indicates a possible degree of satisfaction that
Israel is addressing the radical Islamic threat with a firmness that
threatened Arab regimes feel constrained to implement. In Cairo,
18 Arab foreign ministers adopted a resolution calling for UNSC
intervention. But moderates, led by Saudi Arabia and joined by
Egypt and Jordan, denounced the Lebanese guerrilla group's action
in provoking the conflict.
SERIES:
(U) Middle East
Hostilities
1. The Current IsraelHizballah-Lebanon
Hostilities -- What
Caused Them?
2. Mideast:
Complexities of
Predicting the
Spread to a Regional
Conflict
3. Prognosis: 'More of
the Same' for Middle
East Strife
(U) Israel's conditions for ending its operations in Lebanon will be
difficult to achieve in full. Most observers agree that the Lebanese
government (GOL) is impotent to move against Hizballah. Fears
that the LAF could splinter into sectarian factions, as occurred early
in the Lebanese civil war, or that the government itself could
collapse, fuel GOL reluctance to deploying the LAF to dislodge
Hizballah from the south.
(U) Aside from its stated objectives, Israel is motivated by a set of
intangible factors to deal firmly with what it considers existential
threats from Islamic radicals, their patrons, and from states that
allow safe haven or permissive operating environments for these
elements. Israel's security establishment has faced continuing
criticism from the hard-line, religious right, who claim that Israel's
formerly unquestioned deterrent--devastating and immediate
retaliation--had been rendered invalid through years of disuse.
Maintaining Israel's credibility as the defender of the Jewish nation
looms constant in its military planning.
(U) Politically, former Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon's untimely
departure from the political scene left the leadership of the ruling
Kadima Party with relatively little military experience, and
questionable security credentials. PM Olmert and Defense Minister
Peretz presumably feel the necessity to prove their security
acumen and willingness to employ convincing force in defending
Israel. Israel views this moment as historic, apparently intending
to deal a decisive deathblow to Hizballah's military elements. PM
Olmert has vowed to punish "all parties responsible" for the deadly
rocket attacks on Israeli populations, including those in Haifa,
Israel's third largest city. Israeli leaders presumably include Syria
and Iran in this pronouncement.
(U) Watch for part two of this article, "Complexities of Predicting
the Spread to a Regional Conflict," coming soon.
(U//FOUO) Do you have thoughts on this topic? Post them on the
SID today Blog .
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108