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(U) Prognosis: 'More of the Same' for Middle East Strife
FROM:
SINIO for the Near East and South Asia (S17)
Run Date: 08/02/2006
(U) In parts one and two of this series, we looked at what caused
the current crisis and what may happen in the near future. In
conclusion, here are some thoughts on the longer term outlook in
the Middle East...
(U) The prognosis for improvement in the future of Middle East
conflict is poor. "More of the same" conducted with increasingly
lethal weapons and tactics, is guaranteed as core issues go
unaddressed amid the cycle of recurring pursuits of retaliation,
superiority, and punishment.
(U) For example, the summer 2006 Israel-Hizballah/Lebanon and
Israel-Palestinian Authority/HAMAS hostilities were ignited by
Hizballah's and HAMAS' abducting of Israeli soldiers from within
Israeli territory. Both organizations were motivated by a desire to
effect a prisoner exchange with Israel. The traditional, regional
response to "cross-border aggression" is retaliation, including
immediate, disproportionate responses and punitive actions.
(U) In this case, Israel's overt objective was to enhance the
chances for the hostages' safe return. Israel's longer-range goal of
neutralizing the long-standing Hizballah military threat, or at the
very minimum pushing it north at least 20 miles from the IsraelLebanon border, will drive its military decisions in the current
conflict. One press item from 20 July put it well: Israel will not stop
its Lebanon offensive until Hizballah is pushed at least 20 miles to
a river north of the border and its ability to fire deadly rockets into
Israel is neutralized, officials say. Even more importantly, Israel
wants to send a strong message to all its enemies, especially Iran,
that the consequences of attacking the Jewish state will be
unbearable.
(U) But this tactical engagement is not likely to evolve into a
broad, regional conflict, accepting that nothing in the Middle East
occurs in a localized vacuum. Regional dynamics, intense
international diplomatic efforts, and Israel's satisfaction that its
objectives have been achieved should serve to prevent the current
conflict from spreading. Israel has expressed its desire to live in
peace with Lebanon.
(U) Some Arab states secretly applaud Israel's striking a blow to
Islamic extremists who represent a similar threat in their own back
yards. Byzantine intrigues and deep-seated emotional issues form
a complex stew of dynamics that are the core of revolving conflict
within this rough neighborhood. Ethnic hatred (often omitted from
analysts' discussion), and religious and political rivalries have
fueled centuries-long disputes, literally since Abraham arrived in
what is now commonly called "The Levant" from modern-day Iraq
SERIES:
(U) Middle East
Hostilities
1. The Current IsraelHizballah-Lebanon
Hostilities -- What
Caused Them?
2. Mideast:
Complexities of
Predicting the
Spread to a Regional
Conflict
3. Prognosis: 'More of
the Same' for Middle
East Strife
some six millennia ago.
(U) The basic conflict pits Jews against Arabs/Muslims and
emanates from a fundamental birthright dispute. The descendants
of Abraham's first born, Ishmael (popularly characterized as the
progenitor of the "Sons of Allah"), have long held that Abraham's
second son, Isaac (born according to God's promise to Abraham as
the beginning of God's chosen people, and whose son Jacob was
later renamed "Israel") stole Ishmael's birthright.
(U) All Middle East questions require nuance in treatment. A
common scenario envisions the Arab states staging a joint
operation against Israel in a great battle of cultures and people.
However, this scenario pre-supposes that Arab cohesiveness exists
at all -- an inaccurate assumption. Support for Hizballah, for
instance, is not widespread behind Arab regimes' closed doors.
(U) The reality is that all Arab states are constrained to proclaim
solidarity in supporting their brothers, both secular and Muslim,
against Israeli aggression, portraying the façade of cohesiveness.
Further, Arab states are not a monolith; each is a sovereign nation,
dedicated to its own interests that do not routinely coincide with
those of other Arab states.
(U) There are, to be sure, certain "pan-Arab" interests over which
most Arab states share common ground. Most Arab regimes are
disturbed by the spread and rise to prominence of extremist
ideology, practice, and political engagement that has exploded
since al-Qa'ida declared Jihad against the United States and
international Jewry in the late 1990s. Additionally, Arab states
generally agree on their disdain for traditional Western stereotypes
of colonial attitudes and fickle friendships, which engender more
distrust than outright hostility.
(U) US Marine Corps medic helps evacuate an American girl from
Beirut (Reuters)
(S//SI) SIGINT and other intelligence has shown that many Arab
states privately support, and even encourage, others (including
Israel and the United States-led "Coalition of the Willing") to strike
Islamic extremists wherever they represent a similar threat in their
own back yards. These states, led by Saudi Arabia, have blamed
Hizballah, overtly and in private, for sending the region into crisis.
Egypt and Jordan work more quietly behind the scenes, belying
their public rhetoric of relative neutrality, but driven by their
respective Muslim Brotherhood presence's domestic threat.
(U) Others, notably led by Syria, will continue to pursue a policy of
violent resistance to Israel's existence and will support armed
factions as tools of that objective. Syria does support Hizballah and
the rejectionist Palestinian organizations that carry the load for
these states' agenda. Ironically though, Syria harbors similar
concerns over extremist and fundamentalist Islamist elements'
threat to regime stability. Syria's anti-Israel role is based on
secular considerations, in line with the ruling Ba'th Party's ideology.
(U) Lebanon is trapped in this equation, having relatively little
independent agenda with regard to Hizballah or the Palestinians.
Historic Syrian dominance extends to Lebanese stances, with a mix
of pro-Syria (and by extension, -Hizballah), anti-Hizballah, and
nationalist Lebanese politicos vying for primacy in forming an
independent, Lebanese domestic policy.
(U) However until root grievances are redressed -- unlikely in an
emotionally charged atmosphere in which distinctly different
cultures, albeit with common penchants for very long memories
and revenge, contest core communal values and identities -- final
resolution will remain elusive. The West's practical inability to
understand such a subjective conflict, at variance with Western
mindsets governing human and state relationships, renders
successful intervention futile. In significant measure, the
contestants find "outsiders'" attempts at mediation clumsy,
uninformed, and condescending.
(U//FOUO) This concludes the "Middle East Hostilities" series. Do
you have a comment on the topic? Post your thoughts on the SID
today Blog (PKI certificate required).
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108