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Working at the Executive Office of the President

SUMMARY

An NSA intern worked at the Executive Office of the President for 7 months to learn about the agency's role in supporting key government decisions. She worked to expand the number of regular readers of SIGINT reports by ensuring they were classified only at the SECRET level (as opposed to a higher level of classification)

DOCUMENT’S DATE

Sep 26, 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

May 29, 2019

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Page 1 from Working at the Executive Office of the President
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (U//FOUO) Working at the Executive Office of the President FROM: Recent IADP graduate Run Date: 09/26/2006 (U//FOUO) A recent Intelligence Analysis Development Program graduate describes her intern tour in DC... (C) I spent 7 months working alongside the NSA Liaison at the Executive Office of the President in a building not far from the White House. This tour offered an eye-opening experience to see what SIGINT provides to policy makers, and what NSA Offices of Primary Interest (OPI) gain from feedback. (U) A Liaison's Duties (C) This downtown customer has one NSA and one CIA liaison assigned to retrieve items of interest, arrange meetings with the individual customers, set up analyst-to-analyst exchanges, and create Key Reads* for upcoming events. During this tour, it was essential that I acquire knowledge of the customer and its various components so that I could retrieve all of the relevant traffic and perform various other duties. Also, regular communication with Senior Executive Account Managers (SEAM), the National Support Division Policy Pillar (S112), and OPIs was important to facilitate requests and answer customers' questions. (U) Matching the Customers' Long Hours (U//FOUO) Unlike the early-in, early-out hours that most workers at NSAW keep, my customers' days typically started with a morning staff meeting before 9 am and continued late into the evening with various meetings around DC. The permanent NSA liaison and I worked with our customers to ensure that they were kept up-to-date on their SIGINT reading, even if that entailed us staying late. The long hours were very rewarding because our customers had confidence in our ability to select valuable reporting for them to read and would make time in their hectic day to meet with us. Often, on some of the busiest days for our customers, we had great reporting tipped to us by the OPI and we were able to pull the customer aside before a key meeting or phone call. (C) Tear Lines Bring In New Readers (C) Nearly half of my customers were cleared only to TOP SECRET and had only occasional interaction with the permanent liaisons. When establishing my goals for my external tour, we decided to conduct a study on the impact of trying to service as many customers as possible with NSA's SECRET Tear Lines. This was of extreme importance, since there were changes in the high levels of the organization at this time, and many of the key policy-makers had not received their SCI clearance. (S//SI) The OPIs did an excellent job in responding to requests to provide as much information as possible in their Tear-Line reporting. During the 9-week study, we were able to turn 25 occasional customers into regular readers; 160 relevant Tear-Line reports were shown to multiple customers. The customer was not the only one to gain from the increase in readership: the OPIs back at NSA also gained insight from feedback on SIGINT product as well as readouts from policy meetings. (U) Summary (U//FOUO) Overall, my external tour was very rewarding. I enjoyed working with key US government policy makers and seeing firsthand how SIGINT can assist them. Please contact me for further information or questions about this external tour at or
Page 2 from Working at the Executive Office of the President
* (U) Notes: (U//FOUO) Key Reads = Customer-driven needs tied to a specific, near-term -- generally less than 72 hours -- customer event, action, decision, or outcome for which the customer expects a cryptologic product or service. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108