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(S//SI//REL) North Korea SIGINT Assessment Report Pays Off
FROM:
Technical Director, North Korean Military Operations Dept. (HS2B4)
Run Date: 10/23/2006
(S//SI//REL) Fellow analysts: recent articles from SID leadership have encouraged reporting
shops to publish comprehensive SIGINT assessment reports, because our customers find them
very useful 1 . The tremendous customer response to a recent Hawaii SID assessement report
regarding North Korean military activity demonstrates just how worthwhile such an effort can
be.
(S//SI//REL) The Korean People's Army assumed a heightened alert status due to the "tense
situation" following North Korea's launch of seven missiles in early July and the U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1695 2 condemning the launches. North Korean Leader Kim Cho'ng-il issued a
Supreme Commander's Order (SCO) 3 dated 19 July calling for the military to mobilize, probably
initiating the beginning of transition to a "semi-war" status.
(S//SI//REL) The NSA/CSS Hawaii Signals Intelligence Directorate (HSID) North Korea Military
Operations Department (HS2B4) stood up an analysis and reporting team with each
department executing hundreds of man-hours of research and analysis. This effort
culminated in HS2B4 releasing a detailed SIGINT assessment 4 in early August 2006 on North
Korean military activity alerting the Intelligence Community and national-level decision-makers
to North Korea's heightened alert posture and mobilization preparations. The assessment
provided the political background leading up to the situation, gave an in-depth look at the
current alert and mobilization activity, and put it in historical perspective based on previous
instances of an increased alert state in North Korea.
(U//FOUO)
and CW2
authored the assessment.
(TS//SI//REL) On 2 and 3 August, HS2B4 issued two CAT III reports 5 generated from the
prosecution of North Korean Naval communications that provided unique insight into national
mobilization orders issued in North Korea. These reports were utilized by national-level and
peninsula organizations to begin monitoring the situation in North Korea and were the first
significant indication to the intelligence community that North Korea was gearing up its alert
posture.
(S//SI//REL) Consumer response to the assessment report was overwhelmingly positive with
analysts and executives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center (PACOM JIOC), United States
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) J2, United States Forces
Command Korea (USFK) J2 responding with feedback and thanks for a job well done. Senior
analysts across the Intelligence Community lauded the report as one of the finest NSA products
ever produced on the North Korean military target.
(S//SI//REL) The report quickly became the basis for numerous SIGINT and all-source products
and briefings for:
the White House,
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Executive Highlight and Briefing slide,
SIGINT National Intelligence Officer (SINIO) Special Warning Notice,
NSOC DIR standup,
Department of State Intelligence and Research special report,
PACOM JIOC products and Briefings, and
USFK J2 products and Briefings.
(S//SI//REL) Based on our positive experience, we encourage other reporting
organizations to consider investing the time and resources into writing assessment
reports as well -- clearly, customers value this type of product very highly!
(U) Notes:
1 (U//FOUO) For example, see the earlier article Early Results Look Good: Assessment Report
Update
2 (U) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 was unanimously adopted on 15 July 2006 during
the Security Council, 5490th meeting. Resolution 1695 "urges Democratic People's Republic of
Korea to return immediately to Six-Party Talks without precondition, condemns missile launches,
demands that the North-East Asian country suspend all ballistic missile related activity and
reinstate its moratorium on missile launches."
3 (U//FOUO) Supreme Commander's Order - for additional information, refer to 2/F2/4923-06
DTG 150352Z AUG 06
4 (U//FOUO) On Intelink, see the entire SIGINT assessment , and the follow-up 1 to the original
assessment report.
5 (U//FOUO) To view the two Cat III reports, see (on Intelink):
(TS//SI//REL) North Korea/Naval Activity: 9th Naval Command Receives Combat
Mobilization Instructions, 22 July 2006
(TS//SI//REL) North Korea/Naval Activity: 9th Naval Command Receives Continuation of
Combat Mobilization Orders, 22 July 2006
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108