Pakistan Ambassador Opens Up

This week on Deconstructed, Munir Akram, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations, joins Ryan Grim and Murtaza Hussain to discuss a wide array of topics, including the escalating conflict in Yemen and Israel’s attacks on Palestine. Akram also discusses the complicated relationships between Pakistan and some of its neighbors, including India, China, and Iran, as well as Pakistan’s own internal instability and challenges as it nears elections.

Ryan Grim: Welcome to Deconstructed. I’m Ryan Grim.

I’m joined here by Murtaza Hussain, my colleague at The Intercept, and my coauthor on a number of pieces about Pakistan and its collapsing democracy over the last couple of years.

Maz and I are going to be joined by Munir Akram, who is the permanent U.N. representative for Pakistan at the United Nations. He’s been in that office since 2019, so he actually straddled Imran Khan, who was ousted with the encouragement of the U.S. State Department, leading to the current caretaker government ahead of upcoming elections.

Murtaza, why do you think that the ambassador wanted to do an interview with The Intercept?

Murtaza Hussain: You know, that’s a really good question, I was wondering that myself at first. But I think that a lot of it is due to the fact that, because The Intercept at this time has done this very critical reporting on Pakistan at a time when the Pakistani media has been more or less blocked or suppressed from doing it themselves, there is a considerable listenership and readership in Pakistan and, ultimately, The Intercept has a lot of credibility in that country, despite some criticism from the government or attempts to rebut our reporting in various ways. It’s kind of undeniable, both in Pakistan and the diaspora.

Someone actually told me recently they were at a wedding in Pakistan, they said that people were talking about Ryan Grim, Murtaza Hussain in this context,  because it was very interesting to them in the wake of one of our recent stories about Imran Khan. So, I think, ultimately, at some point you have to recognize the fact that this is a media outlet which has a significant following in your country. And if you want to speak to people in your country, and also in the diaspora, you have to engage with it in some sense. You can’t ignore it as you would a purely Pakistani publication, or to suppress it.

RG: Yeah. So, I found the conversation interesting. You know, he’s a diplomat, and he’s obviously good at his job, which is using diplomatic terminology. But there were some moments I thought — not to tease too much of the conversation — but I thought there were some interesting moments, and some moments of honesty, and maybe some things that the U.S. might even get upset about. What was your take on it?

MH: Yeah. I think you said it very well, that when you’re talking to diplomats, really, you have to read between the lines of their answers here and there to see what’s interesting. I think that what you do is you kind of tease out what’s the most consequential or important points of what they’re saying.

I think that, in our context of a conversation with him, he laid bare some of the fault lines, really, between the U.S.-Pakistan relationship at the moment, and Pakistan’s relationship with its neighbors; India and China and Iran, which are becoming more and more fraught these days for many different reasons.

I think that in Pakistan’s case, it’s very interesting, because Pakistan is a very large country by population; it’s about 240 million people, it was the fifth biggest country in the world by population. And yet, its diplomatic stature has decreased year by year and decade by decade, from a point where it once was relatively influential, and now its influence is decreasing precipitously, particularly in relationship to India, which is a longtime rival.

It’s interesting to see from a diplomat how they navigate this, or how they actually see Pakistan positioned now, as year by year goes by, when the country’s sort of out of place. During the Cold War, it had a role with the U.S. During the War on Terror, again, it found a way to make itself useful to U.S. military and U.S. elites. But now Pakistan does not really have a country which is its patron, which is often something it sought, nor does it have a clear geopolitical role where it fits in these conflicts. How diplomats navigate that and what they foresee as a role of Pakistan is very interesting because, ultimately, it’s a very big country.

It’s very influential one way or another — positively or negatively, it’s going to be influential just by its size — so, the way he sees it and the way he sees the relationship has been fascinating. And, again, I think, in the subtleties of what he says, we see more consequential answers.

RG: Yeah. And we talked with him about why the U.S. may have encouraged the ouster of Imran Khan. We talked about the Pakistani arms sales to the Ukrainians, which he said they don’t officially acknowledge, but he suggested that after our story came out, there may have been some conversations between the Pakistanis and the Americans about where those weapons wound up, as if they didn’t know. We talked about the Iranian strikes inside Pakistan, the Pakistani strikes inside Iran. And, like you said, a lot about the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., Pakistan and India, Pakistan and China.

So, here is our interview with Ambassador Munir Akram.

RG: Mr. Ambassador, thank you so much for joining us here. We really appreciate it.

Munir Akram: It’s my pleasure to be with you.

RG: There’s a wide range of things we want to get to while we have you here, but the biggest issue right now here in the United States is the U.S. support for the Israeli war in Gaza. And Pakistan, among many other countries around the world signed on to South Africa’s case before the International Court of Justice.

I know that a number of countries received private diplomatic pressure from the United States, either not to sign on to that application, those allegations, or, after they did so, received a call — just gently — asking, what the heck are you doing?

So, I’m curious. Did you receive any pressure from the United States? Did Pakistan in general receive any pressure from the United States, or any other country around the South Africa case?

MA: No. I mean, first of all, we have not joined formally in what is called the Declaration of Intervention in the case. We have expressed support for South Africa’s action politically but, so far, legally, we have not joined the case in the ICJ. So, I can tell you, we have not received any calls yet.

MH: So, in recent days, Mr. Ambassador, there have been some reports about diplomatic maneuvering over the conflict involving some Arab nations with whom Pakistan has close ties — such as Saudi Arabia — and Israel, negotiating through interlocutors and through messaging publicly, to the extent that all the parties are seeking a resolution to the war on as quick terms as possible. And it’s been floated that Saudi Arabia in particular may be amenable to recognizing Israel in exchange for a cessation of hostilities, and creation of a Palestinian state.

And, obviously, there would be some negotiations over the status of Gaza, and who governs it, and so forth, but the crux of the offer is that Israel can achieve normalization in the region, which has been a long-sought goal for Israeli leaders, in exchange for statehood for the Palestinians. Or, as it’s been described in the press, irrevocable steps taken by Israel that would create a pathway to a Palestinian state in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan has not been mentioned anywhere in the context of these conversations. Pakistan obviously does not have ties with Israel, since, for many decades, as a form of solidarity with the Palestinians and the Arab League, has declined to have ties with Israel. If there were a situation whereby the Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia were to negotiate a normalization with Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state, would Pakistan also normalize its relations with Israel in that case, if there were a Palestinian state created?

MA: Well, I think, first of all, this process of either Saudi Arabia or other Arab states recognizing Israel in exchange for Israeli agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This has been a longstanding position; it is not a recent development as it has been portrayed recently, that diplomatic moves have been made, Secretary Blinken was in the region, and conversations have taken place around this issue. But the Arab position on recognition has been long standing, I think, since the Arab Peace Initiative was moved by the former king of Saudi Arabia.

The question, of course, is, at this time, how to get there? How to get to a stage where there will be, as you said, irrevocable steps taken towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. We are still far away from that.

First of all, we have to get a ceasefire. We have to get humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians, we have to get the release of the hostages. These are the immediate steps that need to be taken. And we still do not have a clear path of how those steps are going to be taken. There is no agreement as yet in the Security Council for a ceasefire. Israel has rejected calls for a ceasefire, even to scale down the conflict.

So, I think there are important steps that will have to be taken before we are at a stage where actual discussions can start on a two-state solution, and the first thing that has to happen is the Israeli government has to agree that that is the end state that we are aiming for. And, so far, there is no agreement from the Israeli government on this issue.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, I believe that if the Arab world were to move towards recognition, in the light or in the context of the establishment of a Palestinian state, I think a number of other Islamic countries — including Pakistan, but also Indonesia, Malaysia, other countries — will also, I think, join with the Arabs towards that end state.

But, as I said, I think it is still too early. We are not there yet. We don’t even have the first step, which is the ceasefire in Gaza.

RG: One of the areas that I cover here over in the U.S. government is, in particular, the State Department. And the State Department has been pretty vocal over the last couple of months insisting that the upcoming elections in Pakistan need to be free and fair, right? That’s the phrase they continue to use. They use that phrase as it applies to a lot of countries around the world.

We’ve also been seeing  a lot of reports in the press here of candidates who are filing for office getting arrested or abducted. We’ve seen the High Court, I think, remove a symbol from one of the major competing parties. Obviously, the leading candidate for the PTI has been disqualified.

But separate from that, there do seem to be a lot of pre-election irregularities that have gone against the opposition party, and I’m curious if you have heard from diplomats at the State Department about these issues, or whether they’re saying it publicly, but privately they’re not actually raising these with you.

MA: I must tell you that I cover the United Nations, and the issue of elections is not part of the responsibilities that I have to deal with, fortunately. So, if any such interactions have happened, they probably may have happened with my counterpart in Washington, rather than myself.

MH: Mr. Ambassador, a few months ago, The Intercept reported on a story which dealt with Pakistan’s foreign relations in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. And, over the last year, Ukrainian officials have expressed various forms of appreciation for Pakistani support materially of their position vis a vis Russia, and those statements have been echoed by British officials and others. But there’s been very little commentary directly by Pakistani officials about what forms of support that they are providing to Ukraine.

The story that we published last year dealt specifically with documentation of Pakistani arms sales brokered by the U.S. for the benefit of the Ukrainian war effort. This has not been directly publicly acknowledged, but it’s been hinted at, as I mentioned, very, very strongly by Ukrainian and British officials.

Can you say anything about what support Pakistan has provided to Ukraine, or continues to provide, particularly now as the war enters a stage of attrition?

MA: Well, as you know, our position on the Ukraine conflict is one of neutrality and, therefore, we have not officially provided any supplies to either side in this conflict. If some exports from Pakistan have been redirected, we are not officially aware of that, and our position remains that we will remain neutral in this conflict, and that we will not support either side, as far as equipment, defense, supplies are concerned. So, that’s our position.

RG: Have you taken it up with the United States, maybe perhaps after our reporting suggested that those exports were, in fact, being routed over to Ukraine? Is that something that the government took up with its counterpart in the United States?

MA: I don’t have direct knowledge of that, but I would imagine that some conversations would have taken place after your report,

MH: So, obviously, the Pakistani government’s moving towards elections, and is currently being led by a caretaker government. One of the major planks of Pakistani foreign policy from the inception of Pakistan has been the issue of Kashmir. And, obviously, it’s been a disputed issue between Pakistan and India for many, many years.

But it seems that, in recent years, the Indian government has taken steps to take the Kashmir issue off the table of bilateral relations between the two countries; most specifically, the revocation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted Kashmir autonomy within the Indian state. And now, it seems the Indian government’s moving forward with plans to effectively, economically, and politically assimilate Kashmir, and remove it from the realm of political disputation between Pakistan and India.

The caretaker government has not taken any seeming overt steps on this subject, at least in public, nothing significant. I’m curious if Pakistan has any plans on how they plan to address the Kashmir issue going forward, given that it’s been such a central part of Pakistani foreign policy for many, many decades.

MA: So, Pakistan’s policy on Kashmir has not changed. Our position remains that Kashmir is a disputed territory, that the Security Council has decided that the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir will be decided by the people of Jammu and Kashmir, through a free and fair plebiscite held under the auspices of the United Nations. That remains Pakistan’s formal position.

The Security Council has also legislated in two resolutions that any unilateral steps taken by any of the parties to the dispute to change the structure within Jammu and Kashmir will not constitute a final disposition of the state, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. And, therefore, legally, internationally, the unilateral steps which the Modi government has taken in India to change the status of occupied Jammu and Kashmir, these are legally null and void, as far as international law is concerned, as far as the United Nations is concerned.

So, opposition remains what the Secretary General of the U.N. has expressed on the 8th of August, 2019, after the Indian measures were taken on 5, August. And the Secretary General said that the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir has to be in accordance with the U.N. Charter, the United Nations resolutions, and bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan. That remains our position.

So, we do not recognize what the Indians have done to change the status in occupied Kashmir. Our position remains that this is disputed territory, and the Security Council resolutions must be implemented, a plebiscite must be held to resolve this issue.

While India has taken these steps, and it has been brutally imposed on the Kashmiri people, the fact of the matter is, no matter what is stated by the Indian government, the steps that have been taken have not been accepted by the Kashmiri people. Not even the chief ministers and political parties who are pro-Indian have accepted the change of status. And, certainly, the Hurriyat Party — which is the party supporting a freedom of Kashmir — they have not accepted. Most of those leaders remain incarcerated in jail or under home arrest. The public is still under major restrictions on freedom of expression, association, freedom of religion.

So, these impositions by the Indian government is not an indication that things have changed in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir have not yet accepted Indian occupation and Indian rule, and we believe that the freedom struggle will keep rising, will keep erupting, until there is a solution which is acceptable to the people of Kashmir.

MH: It’s interesting, because this issue has been the source of several wars that were fought between India and Pakistan for a number of years, including ongoing diplomatic tensions between the two countries. Is it the case that Pakistan would not move towards greater economic or political integration with India, absent a solution to the Kashmir crisis? Or, sorry, I should say the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

Because it seems, from the Indian perspective, they have decided that the issue is no longer subject for bilateral relations, and is purely internal to them. And, while Pakistan, as you mentioned, does not accept that position, it seems that India has developed a view that its relative power has grown significantly over Pakistan over the last two decades, I would say, such that Pakistan no longer has the ability to raise this issue effectively, vis a vis its relations with India.

So, would the non-recognition — or I would say the non-resolution — of the Kashmir issue to a status meeting Pakistan’s criteria, would that represent a barrier permanently to greater economic or political ties with India?

MA: Well, certainly, unless we have some sort of agreement on how to address the Kashmir issue, some resolution which is acceptable to the Kashmiri people, and to both India and Pakistan, this problem will remain a thorn in the side of both sides, and it will impede good relations between India and Pakistan. And we have said, time and time again, that the key to stability, peace, and security in South Asia runs through Jammu and Kashmir, and the resolution of this dispute is imperative for good relations between India and Pakistan. So, I think that reality will not change.

The reality that the Kashmiri people do not accept what India has done — its annexation of Jammu and Kashmir, its unilateral steps, its repression in Kashmir — those are not accepted by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. And, until that remains, it will remain a dispute, it will remain a problem for the Indians, and between India and Pakistan. And that is the reality of the relationship between the two countries.

RG: On that relationship, the conventional wisdom here in Washington, in the thinktank world, is that the reason that the United States and the State Department were willing to support the removal of Imran Khan for power and continue to kind of quietly oppose his return to power, has to do with India, and has to do, also with China. They feel that removing him is a way to bring Pakistan and India closer together, resolve the tensions over the years. And, through that kind of formation of a new relationship, push back against the rise of China, because everything in the U.S. nowadays revolves around pushing back against China.

Is that an accurate assessment, you think?

MA: I don’t think so. The fact of the matter is that the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in Pakistan is a national issue. No government — whether it is Imran Khan, or the People’s Party, or the Pakistan Nawaz Sharif Muslim League — none of these parties, when in power, are able to capitulate on Kashmir, to concede to India’s position on Jammu and Kashmir, to move away from our formal position on Jammu and Kashmir. It’s a national position. And, therefore I don’t think that that is any link between the position of Washington.

I, of course, do not subscribe to conspiracy theories. I believe that Pakistan and the U.S. have interstate relations, which have a much broader canvas than just the issue of Kashmir. But, certainly, I do not believe that that is something that will change with any government that comes into power in Pakistan.

MH: I’m interested in the sense that, as Ryan mentioned, in D.C., there’s great focus on containing China, or emerging to confront what’s seen by many in the U.S. as the threat of China, or the rivalry of China, politically, economically, and maybe even militarily, sometime in the future.

Obviously, Pakistan is a country which has quite close relations with China, it’s had [them] for many, many decades. One of the only close military relationships China has with a foreign country, really, is with Pakistan, ironically.

How does Pakistan see its own relationship in the context of a potential cold war between the U.S. and China? Because, obviously, Pakistani leaders and elites have also had very close ties with the U.S. as well, too. If there’s a situation where the conflict or the competition between China and the U.S. reaches a more acute stage, how may Pakistan position itself?

And I guess I’ll say one very particular question, it’s a specific scenario which has been raised by some U.S. military planners, that, if there is a conflict one day between the U.S. and China regionally in Asia, it could also involve India as well, too, as part of this alliance, which has been created to contain China. Would Pakistan stay neutral in such a situation? Or how would it navigate the fact that it has a close relationship with China, but also seeks to stay on good terms with the U.S.?

MA: Yeah. So, we’ve had good relations with both China and the U. S. across the board, [in terms of] economic, defense, etc. And, obviously, we see this rising competition between the U.S. and China not very positively for our interests as such, especially, since the strategic partnership between the U.S. and India is translated into the supply of major weapons systems, military support, information and technology support. Which, by the way, is by and large deployed by India against Pakistan, not against China.

All the weapon systems that have been acquired by India, what it is acquiring — the airplanes, missile systems, and so forth, the submarines — they are all being deployed, almost all, 70 percent of it is deployed against Pakistan as such. And, therefore, we see this as a direct impact on our security, with these supplies. And we have obviously been in discussions with the U.S., we have told them we want good relations, but this is a security threat to Pakistan.

And, since we do not have access to any other sources to balance this armaments, this buildup by India, we have to rely on wherever we can get those different systems, and that comes from friendly countries like China and other friends in the Islamic world, where we are able to mobilize, and to be able to continue to have a credible deterrence against Indian aggression. So, that is how we see it.

Of course, there are various scenarios of what will happen in the case of a confrontation between the U.S. and China. My one assertion is — and I remain convinced — that India will never fight with China on behalf of the United States. India, it may have its own differences with China — and they are resolving them, they are addressing them bilaterally, the talks are going on, on the line of control in the Himalayas — but India has never stated and will not commit to joining the United States as an ally against China in a conflict, say, over the South China Sea, or over Taiwan. We are totally convinced India will never fight on the side of the United States against China, as such.

So, I think those scenarios are very speculative. I think India-China relations will remain on their own, Pakistan’s relations with the United States will remain on a separate track, and I do not believe that kind of calculation will come into play, where the United States thinks that with China, in the context of a conflict. I think that’s a far-fetched scenario, as I see it.

RG: We hear a lot of concern here among Pakistani Americans in the United States, that around the collapse of democracy in Pakistan, around human rights abuses that are underway, you have a lot of people putting it in context of previous explicit military regimes, and arguing that things are even worse today in Pakistan than they were under explicit military rule, rather than what appears to be de facto military rule.

And I’m curious, as a diplomat, if that has been causing you problems at the United Nations, if these are issues that are being brought to you as part of your day job, making it more difficult for you. Say, when the Supreme Court justices are resigning from the Supreme Court, and then issuing rulings against the opposition party, things like that. Does that cause you problems in your day job, here in New York?

MA: Not so far, I must say. But you have to keep it in perspective, in the sense that, at the United Nations, there are 193 countries. Many countries, a majority of countries, everybody has domestic problems, some form of domestic issues that they have. But the charter of the United Nations is very, very clear: it does not allow interference in the internal affairs of states.

So, very largely, issues of internal concern are not overtly raised, unless they become uncontrollable, or they are a threat to peace and security, if a major conflict will arise out of that. So, to answer your question: I have not faced any sort of difficulty with regard to our domestic situation.

Our army chief was in New York just the other day, he had a very good meeting with the Secretary General of the United Nations, and we discussed all the foreign policy and security issues that face Pakistan, very frankly, and in a very nice and friendly way with the Secretary General.

MH: Ambassador, in the last few weeks, there was a very interesting and unexpected military exchange between Iran and Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan. It took many people by surprise, because, obviously, though Iran and Pakistan’s relationship is not perfect, they have a relatively constructive and non-hostile relationship, for the most part.

Iran bombed Pakistan, a target inside Pakistan, which it said was connected to a terrorist group involved in terrorism inside Iran, and Pakistan retaliated by carrying out attacks inside Iranian Balochistan as well, too. Thereafter, the two countries issued a statement saying that they had amended their differences, and were moving forward in restoring diplomatic ties, which had been briefly severed.

Can you talk a bit about this exchange, and what precipitated it? There were some indications in the press — reported and now confirmed — that Iran had given Pakistan forewarning of the attacks, but there was no specific clarity about that from the Pakistani side. I was curious what you know about this, and whether Pakistan plans to continue to pursue this issue in international fora.

MA: Well, as you know, both Iran and Pakistan face terrorist issues in their part of Balochistan and our part of Balochistan. And there are groups which utilize the freedom of movement across certain ungoverned parts of the border between the two countries to cross back and forth. And I think this is the case, both with the Jaish ul-Adl, which obviously crosses back and forth, as well as with the Baloch insurgents, which are the Balochistan Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front. These are insurgent movements which also utilize the border to escape from action by either side.

We were surprised by the Iranian action; there was no forewarning, as such. But we responded by taking the opportunity to hit some of the Baloch insurgents — our Baloch insurgents — that had taken refuge across the border. But this is obviously not the way that we would like to address the problem of terrorism that both countries face. And, given the close relationship between the two countries, we have now decided that both sides will cooperate and coordinate their actions against such insurgents if they happen to cross on the  other side.

So, we would like to put that behind us, and to continue our part of close cooperation with Iran, to address the mutual problems of terrorism that both of us face in this restive part of our two countries.

RG: Several years ago, there was credible reporting that some of those Baluchistan insurgents were actually funded and backed by the Mossad. This was evidence that Iran had presented as well, at some point. That was a while ago, though, and I’m curious, from your perspective, if you think that there might still be foreign support for the insurgency, either inside your borders against Iran, or inside Iran’s borders against them.

MA: Well, I can’t speak about insurgency against the Iranians; I think they probably know the situation better. But I can say with confidence that the Baluch insurgents — the BLA and the BLF — are supported by India. They are financed by India, they take refuge in India, they have supplies from India, they go to India for their medical issues, and there are clear links between India and these Baluch insurgent movements.

Whether there are other countries which support them, I’m not very clear, but some of these Baluch leaders, these insurgent leaders, are residing in some European countries, as such, and seem to have safe havens in some places.

So, Pakistan certainly believes that these insurgent movements have foreign support — especially Indian support — and we have taken that issue up with all of our interlocutors.

MH: And, to that point of Indian support for separatism inside Pakistan, the Indian government has long alleged that Pakistan has provided overt and covert support to Kashmiri insurgents inside Kashmir, but also to Sikh insurgents inside Punjab. A few months ago, The Intercept also reported on some documentation showing that The RAW — or Indian intelligence — had carried out assassinations of Sikh dissidents living in Lahore, in the Punjabi province of Pakistan.

Can you speak a bit about Pakistan’s dispensation regarding Punjab and the Sikh movement for Khalistan, or an independent Sikh state? What sort of relationship does Pakistan have with this movement, and what is Pakistan’s view of this issue of Khalistan, in general?

MA: Well, as you know, there was an active Sikh movement, the Khalistani movement, back in the 80s, and there was a massive repression against the Sikhs in India, post the assassination of Madame Indira Gandhi, as such. That insurgency was put down in the 90s by India, and, so far, it seems that there is no resurgence of that movement within India itself.

So, I think that the Khalistani movement is largely now a diaspora movement, centered both in Canada, the United States, and some other countries. But what is shocking is that the Indians, despite the fact that there is no real Khalistani movement, they have gone to the extent of actually planning assassinations of people who are in the diaspora in Canada and the United States. As such, it is an indication of the sense of insecurity on the part of the Modi government, but also, it is an indication of the sense of impunity they feel that they have within the Western world that they can get away with doing something so blatant in two friendly countries, as such.

RG: You may have seen that we reported that, as well as the efforts that India launched in Canada and the United States, there were also some assassination attempts in Pakistan itself. Is that something that you’re aware of? Is that something that you have raised with the Indian government?

MA: Well, we have instances where some people have been assassinated. We have complete proof of Indian involvement in certain assassination attempts against the Kashmiri leaders, for example. There have been instances of people being assassinated on Pakistani soil; we presume it is the Indian intelligence which is behind it. Of course, we do not have an official dialogue with India, but we have raised the issue with friendly countries about India’s involvement in terrorism in Pakistan.

And this is not the only… I mean, assassination is only part of what the Indians are doing against Pakistan. Their major campaign is the sponsorship of the TTP, and the sponsorship of the Baluchi insurgents to disrupt Pakistan stability, to disrupt the China-Pakistan economic corridor — especially in Balochistan — and to sow fear and terror within our population, as such.

So, it is a well-planned, well financed, organized campaign of sabotage and destabilization of Pakistan that India is conducting.

MH: Obviously, Pakistan has had many different iterations and phases of its influence internationally. I think one of the high points, probably, was many years ago, when Pakistan helped facilitate the rapprochement during the Cold War between the U.S. and China, and it still maintains relations with both those countries, which have now become respective superpowers.

It seems like, in recent decades, Pakistan’s influence diplomatically has declined. And, particularly, it’s been manifesting vis a vis its relationship with India, where it seems India has more of the upper hand, and is courted internationally by different alliances, and economically and politically by various parties, whereas Pakistan seems to be more neglected.

Can you give your own perspective, as someone who’s a diplomat and seen this from the inside, what has been the source of Pakistan’s seeming relative decline of status, and whether and if you see a possibility of a revival of that, and how that may be accomplished?

MA: Well, I think you’re right in the sense that India has grown into a large economic market. India has also become more powerful, militarily. But the critical change that has taken place is the partnership between India and the United States. I think India draws a lot of its so-called influence because it is seen as a strategic partner of the United States, and it has a sense of impunity, in many respects, in Kashmir, in the treatment of its Muslim population, in this kind of assassination campaign that it carries out, in the threats to Pakistan.

All these are manifestations of Indian sense of impunity, its sense of power, its sense that it can adopt a very arrogant position vis a vis its neighbors. But the critical difference, the change that has taken place is the strategic partnership between India and the United States, which has changed all the calculations.

On the other side, of course, Pakistan has not kept pace economically, our economy has not done too well. We have structural difficulties with our economy. We have suffered, in several ways, economic setbacks and, therefore, we have been economically dependent, and that is a weakness, and that has to be faced.

How would Pakistan rectify this? The fact of the matter is, Pakistan is one of the most underinvested countries in the world. We have major resources, natural resources, human resources, and the ability to catch up and to accelerate our growth. We have to mobilize ourselves to organize ourselves in a strategic way in order to be able to capture the opportunities that exist in Pakistan for economic and social development. But that, of course, requires peace and stability, and it requires concerted, consistent economic policy, which is what we are trying to do at the present moment, is to establish [that].

RG: Last quick question from me. One of the biggest international issues right now is, on the one hand you have Operation Prosperity Guardian being led by the United States, which is attempting to stop the Houthis, the de facto Yemen government from blockading shipping around the Red Sea. And then you have the blockade from the de facto Yemen government, where they say they’re going to block shipping until Israel ends its assault on Gaza.

So, does Pakistan believe that the Houthis have the right to carry out this blockade? They cite their obligations under the prevention of genocide. And, if not, why hasn’t Pakistan joined in with the United States with Operation Prosperity Guardian?

MA: Well, I think that what the Houthis are doing — at least in their declared statements — is to support the Palestinians in Gaza who are facing the Israeli onslaught. I think there is considerable public sympathy in Pakistan with the Palestinians, and with the suffering that they have had to suffer under this Israeli military campaign.

So, I think that, politically — I mean, I will not delve into the legal situation, whether the Houthis are right or wrong — but politically, our sympathies are with the Palestinians, and the Houthis say that they are acting in support of the Palestinians. And, therefore, I think Pakistan, politically, would be well advised to keep away from taking sides in this particular aspect of the conflict.

RG: Great. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.

MA: Thank you, Ryan. Thank you Murtaza.

RG: That was Munir Akram, and that’s our show.

Deconstructed is a production of The Intercept. José Olivares is our lead producer. Our supervising producer is Laura Flynn. The show is mixed by William Stanton. Legal review by David Bralow and Elizabeth Sanchez. Leonardo Faierman transcribed this episode. Our theme music was composed by Bart Warshaw. Roger Hodge is The Intercept’s Editor-in-Chief. And I’m Ryan Grim, D.C. Bureau Chief of The Intercept, and that was Murtaza Hussain, the cohost of Intercepted.

If you’d like to support our work, go to the intercept.com/give. If you haven’t already, please subscribe to the show so you can hear it every week. And please go and leave us a rating or review, it helps people find the show. And, obviously subscribe to Intercepted as well.

If you want to give us additional feedback, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com, or at Ryan.Grim@theintercept.com. And put “Deconstructed” in the subject line, please. Otherwise we might miss your message.

All right. I’ll see you soon.