NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information Listing, 12 September 2003

TOP OF NATIONAL SECURITY SERCURITY SERVICE EXCEPTIONALLY CONTROLLED INFORMATION (ECI) AS OF 12 SEPTEMBER 2003 CLASSIFIED BY MANUAL 123 DATED: 24 FEB 98 DECL ON: XI TOP

TOP (S) This document contains a total listing of National Security Agency/Central Security Service Exceptionally Controlled Information (ECI). Dissemination and extraction of information from this document is controlled by the originator. (S) This listing is highly sensitive and must be strictly controlled on a need-to-know basis and only used for speci?c ECI management or other administrative needs as approved by the Director, NSA (DIRNSA). (S) This list is not to be reproduced by physical or electronic means unless expressly authorized by DIRN SA or his designated representative. 2 TOP

TOP (U)Trigraph (U) Protected Information (U) Overlapping Programs Coverterm (U) Protects information related to (S) Encompasses four ECIs: ABEYANT sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships. APERIODIC, AUNTIE, AMBULANT, and FIRSTDOWN AMB Protects information related to (S) Under ABEYANT AMBULANT sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships. program APR Protects information related to (S) Under ABEYANT APERIODIC sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships. program APR Protects information related to (S) Under ABEYANT AUNTIE sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships. program BTM Feasibility study for special (U) BOATMEN ex?ltration initiatives between NSA and a Third Party. BXD Protects a sensitive sole (U) BOXWOOD source of lucrative communications intelligence emanating from a target. BLT (TS//SI//NF)Protects potential (U) BULLET assistance in reconstituting a Third Party's SIGINT collection capability. CHI Protects details of NSA IJSTO is the US CHILLY association with and active participation Government process for the in planning and execution of sensitive planning, deployment and Integrated Joint Special Technical employment of Special Access Operations (IJSTO) offensive Information Program (SAP) weapons Warfare (IW) strategies. CLC Protects policy exchanges (U) CLERIC between NSA and GCHQ related to Special Source activities. CON Protects fact of joint (S) CIA's KLAMATH (KLM) CONQUERER clandestine Radio Frequency Control Channel operations. DKP Protects information that (U) DECKSTOP would reveal clandestine SIGINT sources of collection against a high priority target's internal domestic communications. DCH Protects raw traf?c and signals (U) Disestablished on 1 Oct DICHOTOMY reporting information gained from 03. especially sensitive (perishable) and clandestine sources. DLM Summary description A Relates to a US DILEMMA dormant ECI. A failed attempt to Military unacknowledged SAP convince an IC partner to remove the and Control System referred to "Fact Of" a particular collection at NSA as RAMPART M. capability from their controlled channel and placed in this ECI DOM Protects sensitive sources (C) All intelligence derived DOMIN ATE and methods used to determine the under this program is handled ?'equencies targeted by a target COMINT via FLEXURE reporting collection system. channels. 3 TOP

TOP ENS Protects potential NSA STAIRWELL ENSIGN partnership with a Third Party in also covers NSA partnership clandestine SIGINT activity in a speci?c with this Third Party in location. unconventional SIGINT initiatives. ESCP U.S. component to ECI STATEROOM ESCAPEE STATEROOM EVY Protects NSA's capability to (U) EVADEYIELD exploit voice or telephonic conversations from an extremely sensitive source. FRS Protects information related to (S) Under ABEYANT FIRSTDOWN sensitive SIGINT Enabling relationships. program FLX (S) Protects military and civilian assets (S) Works with data collected FLEXURE from detection by an adversary. by DOMINATE FBD Protects information (U) FORBIDDEN pertaining to joint operations conducted by NSA, GCHQ, CSE, CIA, and FBI against foreign intelligence agents. FBR TO USA, CAN, AND GBR) (U) FORBORNE Protects the fact that the National Security Agency, GCHQ, and CSE can exploit ciphers used by hostile intelligence services. GRL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR (U) GRAYSCALE AND NZL) Protects information that could allow Second-Party-partner- assisted network in?ltration operations to be detected and recognized. HLF Protects activities of non- (U) HELLF IRE INFOSEC elements of NSA providing INFOSEC assistance to another non- hostile government. HST Protects NSA and certain (U) HISTORY commercial equipment manufacturer relationships. INV Protects vendor access to various (U) INVEIGH diplomatic targets within the United States. IVT Protects NSA partnership ENSIGN covers INVENT with a Third Party in special SIGINT clandestine SIGINT activity collection efforts in a speci?c location. with this Third Party as INVENT. STAIRWELL covers unconventional SIGINT activity with this Third Party. LSG Protects NSA's efforts to select (S) CIA's KLAMATH (KLM) LYSERGIC and prosecute foreign deployed Control System. telecommunications cables as SIGINT targets. MSF The highest level of access RAGTIME MISCHIEF protecting sources, targets, sites, and unique collection techniques of the BLARNEY program. 4 TOP

TOP OPALESCE OPS TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR AND NZL) Protects Close Access SIGINT collection operations, which require a specialized sensor, positioned in close physical proximity to the target device or facility. (U) PAWLEYS PAW Protects and covers clandestine access to information and material. It protects the operational details, as well as any materials, technical information and SIGINT capabilities (S) CIA is the primary partner organization, which includes the FBI and through TAREX. Also includes 2nd Party counterpart organizations. PENDLETON PEN TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Protects NSA's investment in manpower and resources to acquire our current bottom line capabilities to exploit SIGINT targets by attacking public key as well as investment in technology. (U) PIEDMONT PIE TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) Provides protection to NSA's bottom line capabilities to exploit SIGINT targets by attacking the hard mathematical problems underlying public key as well as any future technologies as may be developed. (U) PITCHFORD PIT Details of certain in which materials have been derived from a sensitive source or method. (U) RAGTIME RGT The second level of access protecting the identity of targets/target locations and cooperative relationships within the BLARNEY program. See MISCHIEF entry. (U) REFRACTOR RFR Protects engineering and operational processes associated with tailoring US. Information Assurance equipment for release to and use by foreign countries. (U) RUBIOUS RBI Protects information that could allow otherwise unilateral U.S. network in?ltration operations to be detected and recognized. (U) STAIRWELL STRW Protects NSA partnership with a Third Party in unconventional SIGINT activity. ENSIGN and INVENT STATEROOM STRM Restricts access to information about personnel involved in covert collection, processing and reporting of SIGINT from diplomatic missions abroad. This activity is conducted by USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, and NZL. (S) U.S.-only version is ESCAPEE 5 TOP

TOP SRO The same level of access as ECI (U) STEREO RAGTIME, though used to identify those individuals who require special handling/data sanitization training. SRF Protects exploitation of (U) STRESSF UL speci?c communications associated with individuals and organizations involved in money laundering in support of narcotics traf?ckers and organized crime targets of interest. TXM Protects policy exchanges (U) TAXONOMY between NSA and CSE related to Special Source activities. VSR The lowest level of access (U) VISITOR protecting the fact of the BLARNEY program and that it is governed by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. WSB Covers CLAN SIG effort with (S) CIA's KLAMATH (KLM) WASHBURN CIA to exploit a SIGINT source in a Control System. Middle Eastern location then in the research and analysis phase. ECI created for use solely with GCHQ to shield GCHQ from CIA's NOFORN Control Channel. 6 TOP