Documents
1967 FBI IS CH1 OCR SM 47
Feb. 1, 2020
~
V
'
•
b3
b7E
(1) The Cincinnati
Office be furnished
the member~ist
of the CSWAand that these lists
be searched_! ____
__,
r1----------:-Jin order to determine which former members of the CSWA
now hold security
clearances.
Such a procedure
should substantially
reduce the list of possible
suspects
as well as
furnishing
the present location
of these individuals.
agencies,
'
ll
(2) The Bureau, through liaison
with
would attempt to obtain the following
appropriate
information:
(a)
An evaluation
of the scientific
of China in 1949 in the field
science.
knowledge
of nuclear
(b)
The point to which Chicora knowledge in the
nuclear field could reach through information brought back by scientists
returning
from the U.S. and other countries
and through
the utilization
of overtly
and cl~ndestinely
obtained unclassified
publications.
(c)
It is believed that the above effort
would
establish
the existence
of an information
gap which could only be filled
through a
clande~tine
intelligence
effort
to obtain
classified
material.
(3) Armed with the list of former CSWAmembers who
now have security
clearances
the Bureau would then be in a
position
to further
cut down this list by determining
which of
these individuals
have access to the classified
material
necessary to fill
the information
gap.
These individuals
would
then be afforded
intensified
investigation
to determine whether
or not they are working f9r the CCIS.
It
is the further
opinion of San Francisco
that given
the current status of Chicom science as regards
its military
potential,
an effort
should be made through liaison
with
appropriate
agencies to determine the Chicora intelligence
needs
for the immediate future and the more distant
future with the
view of developing
a group of Chinese scientists
in the U.S.
who because of their access and work would be logical
targets
if the Chicoms are to fulfill
their intelligence
needs.
Appropriate
steps should then be taken to contact these "target
scientists"
and seek their cooperation
as .doubles in the event
of a Chicora approach.
I(
- 2 -
~
V
'
•
b3
b7E
(1) The Cincinnati
Office be furnished
the member~ist
of the CSWAand that these lists
be searched_! ____
__,
r1----------:-Jin order to determine which former members of the CSWA
now hold security
clearances.
Such a procedure
should substantially
reduce the list of possible
suspects
as well as
furnishing
the present location
of these individuals.
agencies,
'
ll
(2) The Bureau, through liaison
with
would attempt to obtain the following
appropriate
information:
(a)
An evaluation
of the scientific
of China in 1949 in the field
science.
knowledge
of nuclear
(b)
The point to which Chicora knowledge in the
nuclear field could reach through information brought back by scientists
returning
from the U.S. and other countries
and through
the utilization
of overtly
and cl~ndestinely
obtained unclassified
publications.
(c)
It is believed that the above effort
would
establish
the existence
of an information
gap which could only be filled
through a
clande~tine
intelligence
effort
to obtain
classified
material.
(3) Armed with the list of former CSWAmembers who
now have security
clearances
the Bureau would then be in a
position
to further
cut down this list by determining
which of
these individuals
have access to the classified
material
necessary to fill
the information
gap.
These individuals
would
then be afforded
intensified
investigation
to determine whether
or not they are working f9r the CCIS.
It
is the further
opinion of San Francisco
that given
the current status of Chicom science as regards
its military
potential,
an effort
should be made through liaison
with
appropriate
agencies to determine the Chicora intelligence
needs
for the immediate future and the more distant
future with the
view of developing
a group of Chinese scientists
in the U.S.
who because of their access and work would be logical
targets
if the Chicoms are to fulfill
their intelligence
needs.
Appropriate
steps should then be taken to contact these "target
scientists"
and seek their cooperation
as .doubles in the event
of a Chicora approach.
I(
- 2 -