Documents
2011 Classification Guidance for CIA High Value Detainees Information
Aug. 15, 2016
CO657939O
N?atSe'CAet - (rs/q? the) The lives of the CIA and foreignl
{374 ?les) -- This document is intended to provide"alassa?caub??gurdance'
regarding information related to the Central Intelligence Agency?s (CIA) Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation Program (?the RDI Program? or ?the Program?). Because
the RDI Program was executed under CIA authorities, information related to the Program
is controlled by the CIA. The CIA protects information about the RDI Program to
ensure, among other things, that:
Ml identities of'covert CIA?o?icer-swho' assistedtheCIA i'ri"
NatSecAct
Updated 23 September 2011
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION
PROGRAM INFORMATION
PURPOSE OF THE GUIDANCE
NatSecAct
- rsr/l hm '?e'foreign'governnient'sthat assistants hearings; NatSecAct
Program remain politically viable so that they can continue to assist the US
Government in executing counterterrorism operations;
of?cers who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not threatenecrby NatseCACt
terrorists at?large; . - .
- ?871 The identities'ofthe'huma? sources (?assets?) Who assisted the?
CIA in executing the Program are not revealed so that the assets can continue
to assist the CIA in executing counterterrori operations without fear of
retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence services; and
NatSecAct
executing the Program are not revealed so that the of?cers can be posted
outside of the US. where they can continue to conduct the foreign
intelligence mission without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile
foreign intelligence
made promisesto all persons entities was partiCipated
in or assisted the CIA in executing the RDI Program that the CIA would keep their
participation or assistance secret. If the CIA were unable to keep that promise, it would
affect those persons? and entities? willingness to assist the CIA in the future. The CIA is
highly dependent upon foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, and assets to
execute counterterrorism Operations all over the world. Therefore, if the CIA were
unable to recruit foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, or assets to assist the
CIA in conducting) future counterterrorisrn operations, it would cause grave damage to
national seCurity.
ClAAct
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
CO657939O
N?atSe'CAet - (rs/q? the) The lives of the CIA and foreignl
{374 ?les) -- This document is intended to provide"alassa?caub??gurdance'
regarding information related to the Central Intelligence Agency?s (CIA) Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation Program (?the RDI Program? or ?the Program?). Because
the RDI Program was executed under CIA authorities, information related to the Program
is controlled by the CIA. The CIA protects information about the RDI Program to
ensure, among other things, that:
Ml identities of'covert CIA?o?icer-swho' assistedtheCIA i'ri"
NatSecAct
Updated 23 September 2011
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION
PROGRAM INFORMATION
PURPOSE OF THE GUIDANCE
NatSecAct
- rsr/l hm '?e'foreign'governnient'sthat assistants hearings; NatSecAct
Program remain politically viable so that they can continue to assist the US
Government in executing counterterrorism operations;
of?cers who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not threatenecrby NatseCACt
terrorists at?large; . - .
- ?871 The identities'ofthe'huma? sources (?assets?) Who assisted the?
CIA in executing the Program are not revealed so that the assets can continue
to assist the CIA in executing counterterrori operations without fear of
retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence services; and
NatSecAct
executing the Program are not revealed so that the of?cers can be posted
outside of the US. where they can continue to conduct the foreign
intelligence mission without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile
foreign intelligence
made promisesto all persons entities was partiCipated
in or assisted the CIA in executing the RDI Program that the CIA would keep their
participation or assistance secret. If the CIA were unable to keep that promise, it would
affect those persons? and entities? willingness to assist the CIA in the future. The CIA is
highly dependent upon foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, and assets to
execute counterterrorism Operations all over the world. Therefore, if the CIA were
unable to recruit foreign governments, foreign intelligence of?cers, or assets to assist the
CIA in conducting) future counterterrorisrn operations, it would cause grave damage to
national seCurity.
ClAAct
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
(106579390
ssgz?i (b)(3)NatSecAct
Because the unauthorized release of information related to the RDI
Program would cause grave damage to national security, such information can only be
of?cially released or declassi?ed by the President of the United States, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, or a CIA of?cer with original
classi?cation authority. Accordingly, leaked documents, statements by former
intelligence of?cers, or reports by senior of?cials of other government agencies cannot
declassify CIA information related to the RDI Program. 1 Similarly, reports in the media
even those sourced to of?cials do not constitute an
of?cial declassi?cation of CIA information related to the RDI Program.
Over time, certain information about the RDI Program has been
of?cially declassi?ed and released to the public. On 6 September 2006, President Bush
acknowledged that fourteen named High Value Detainees ?iVDs) who were previously
in CIA custody were transferred to Department of Defense (DOD) custody at the US. -
Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). By 2008, President Bush had
announced that two additional named HVDs who were previously in CIA custody had
been transferred to DOD custody at GTMO. In January 2008, CIA Director Hayden
released the names of three HVDs who had been waterboarded. On 16 April 2009,
President Obarna released redactedversitms of four memos regarding the RDI Program,
which were written by the Department of Justice?s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). .
Those four memos were dated 1 August 2002, 10 May 2005 (two memos), and 30 May
2005. On 24 August 2009, President Obama released pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act litigation the CIA Inspector General?s Special Review of the RDI
Program Special Review?), an OLC memo dated 31 August 2006, and an OLC
memo dated 20 July 2007. Following the raid on Usarna bin Laden?s compound on 1
May 2011, the CIA released certain information about the RDI Program.
(Ii/50(0) Apart from these limited releases, most of the information regarding
the RDI Program remains classi?ed. Determining whether certain RDI Program
information remains classi?ed and, if so at what level, often depends on subtle nuances
and carefully parsed distinctions. The guidance provided in this document is intended to
educate the user and help the user make informed decisions about whether cert?ain
information related to the RDI Program may be classi?ed. The guidance does not
constitute an exhaustive list of all categories of classi?ed information related the RDI
Program. Thus, if the user is uncertain whether a particular piece of information is
classi?ed or at what level a particular piece of information is classi?ed, the user should
handle the information at the highest classi?cation level and seek guidance or a
classi?cation determination from a CIA of?cer who is an original classi?cation authority.
The guidance does not constitute a classi?cation review by a CIA original classi?cation
authority of any particular piece of RDI information, and the guidance may not be used
in lieu of submitting information for a classi?cation review by a CIA original
classi?cation authority.
(ll/W0) One example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, which
was leaked to the New York Review of Books in early 2009.
2 NatSecAct
ma .- .-
(106579390
ssgz?i (b)(3)NatSecAct
Because the unauthorized release of information related to the RDI
Program would cause grave damage to national security, such information can only be
of?cially released or declassi?ed by the President of the United States, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, or a CIA of?cer with original
classi?cation authority. Accordingly, leaked documents, statements by former
intelligence of?cers, or reports by senior of?cials of other government agencies cannot
declassify CIA information related to the RDI Program. 1 Similarly, reports in the media
even those sourced to of?cials do not constitute an
of?cial declassi?cation of CIA information related to the RDI Program.
Over time, certain information about the RDI Program has been
of?cially declassi?ed and released to the public. On 6 September 2006, President Bush
acknowledged that fourteen named High Value Detainees ?iVDs) who were previously
in CIA custody were transferred to Department of Defense (DOD) custody at the US. -
Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). By 2008, President Bush had
announced that two additional named HVDs who were previously in CIA custody had
been transferred to DOD custody at GTMO. In January 2008, CIA Director Hayden
released the names of three HVDs who had been waterboarded. On 16 April 2009,
President Obarna released redactedversitms of four memos regarding the RDI Program,
which were written by the Department of Justice?s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). .
Those four memos were dated 1 August 2002, 10 May 2005 (two memos), and 30 May
2005. On 24 August 2009, President Obama released pursuant to a Freedom of
Information Act litigation the CIA Inspector General?s Special Review of the RDI
Program Special Review?), an OLC memo dated 31 August 2006, and an OLC
memo dated 20 July 2007. Following the raid on Usarna bin Laden?s compound on 1
May 2011, the CIA released certain information about the RDI Program.
(Ii/50(0) Apart from these limited releases, most of the information regarding
the RDI Program remains classi?ed. Determining whether certain RDI Program
information remains classi?ed and, if so at what level, often depends on subtle nuances
and carefully parsed distinctions. The guidance provided in this document is intended to
educate the user and help the user make informed decisions about whether cert?ain
information related to the RDI Program may be classi?ed. The guidance does not
constitute an exhaustive list of all categories of classi?ed information related the RDI
Program. Thus, if the user is uncertain whether a particular piece of information is
classi?ed or at what level a particular piece of information is classi?ed, the user should
handle the information at the highest classi?cation level and seek guidance or a
classi?cation determination from a CIA of?cer who is an original classi?cation authority.
The guidance does not constitute a classi?cation review by a CIA original classi?cation
authority of any particular piece of RDI information, and the guidance may not be used
in lieu of submitting information for a classi?cation review by a CIA original
classi?cation authority.
(ll/W0) One example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, which
was leaked to the New York Review of Books in early 2009.
2 NatSecAct
ma .- .-
CO657939O
scarier/i NatSecAct
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE
Declassi?ed Information Relating to the RBI Program
The 1 August 2002 OLC memo listed ten Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques (EITs) that could be applied to HVD Zayn al Abidin Muhammad
Husayn (aka: Abu Zubaydah).
The May 2005 OLC memos released the names and descriptions
of the thirteen EITs that were approved for use at that time, and speci?ed the
parameters within which the HTS must be applied.
7 The 10 May 2005 ?Combined Techniques? OLC memo released
the fact that dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation were used in
combination with waterboarding.
The 10 May 2005 and 30 May 2005 OLC memos released the
fact that detainees were watched via closed-circuit television.
(Ill/F080) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo and the OIG Special Review
released the fact that Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded 83 times during
August 2002, and that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had been
waterboarded 183 times during March 2003.
The 30 May 2005 ULC memo released certain intelligence that
was gleaned from HVD interrogations. Such information is also detailed in
two Directorate of Intelligence papers on detainee reporting, which were
released in August 2009. Both releases provide that Abu Zubaydah and KSM
supplied information about numerous plots and that their information led to
the capture of other HVDs. The releases also provide that information from
detainee interrogations was analyzed and cross-checked with other
intelligence information, and that this process enabled the CIA to con?rm
certain intelligence information and uncover plots in which other HVDs or A
terrorists at-large were involved.
The 30 May 2005 memo noted that, as of 2004, over 6,000
intelligence reports had been issued based upon information provided by
HVDS.
The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that, as of the
writing of that memo, 94 detainees had been in the RBI Programand that 28
had experienced ElTs.
manner? Noy?m~ (b)(3)NatSecAct
CO657939O
scarier/i NatSecAct
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE
Declassi?ed Information Relating to the RBI Program
The 1 August 2002 OLC memo listed ten Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques (EITs) that could be applied to HVD Zayn al Abidin Muhammad
Husayn (aka: Abu Zubaydah).
The May 2005 OLC memos released the names and descriptions
of the thirteen EITs that were approved for use at that time, and speci?ed the
parameters within which the HTS must be applied.
7 The 10 May 2005 ?Combined Techniques? OLC memo released
the fact that dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation were used in
combination with waterboarding.
The 10 May 2005 and 30 May 2005 OLC memos released the
fact that detainees were watched via closed-circuit television.
(Ill/F080) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo and the OIG Special Review
released the fact that Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded 83 times during
August 2002, and that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had been
waterboarded 183 times during March 2003.
The 30 May 2005 ULC memo released certain intelligence that
was gleaned from HVD interrogations. Such information is also detailed in
two Directorate of Intelligence papers on detainee reporting, which were
released in August 2009. Both releases provide that Abu Zubaydah and KSM
supplied information about numerous plots and that their information led to
the capture of other HVDs. The releases also provide that information from
detainee interrogations was analyzed and cross-checked with other
intelligence information, and that this process enabled the CIA to con?rm
certain intelligence information and uncover plots in which other HVDs or A
terrorists at-large were involved.
The 30 May 2005 memo noted that, as of 2004, over 6,000
intelligence reports had been issued based upon information provided by
HVDS.
The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that, as of the
writing of that memo, 94 detainees had been in the RBI Programand that 28
had experienced ElTs.
manner? Noy?m~ (b)(3)NatSecAct
CO6579390.
NatSecAct
The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that the
waterboarding interrogation technique was used only against three HVDs:
Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiril The memo also released
that waterboarding has not been used since March 2003.
(Ul/kald) The 30 May 2005 and the 31 August 2006 OLC memos
described other ?standard techniques? such as shaving, solitary con?nement,
white noise, shackling, etc. that would be employed in an attempt to get a
detainee to cooperate, prior to employing any ElTs.
The 31 August 2006 OLC memo released the fact that detainees
were held in solitary con?nement. I
The CIA released pursuant to a FOIA litigation that the CIA
destroyed 92 videotapes on 9 November 2005. The CIA also released that the
videotapes were of Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah. The 010 Special Report
released that twelve of the videotapes showed BIT applications.
The July 2007 OLC memo describes six EITs that are minimally
necessary to maintain an effective interrogation program. The memo also
released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, the CIA had a total of 98
detainees in the RDI Program and that the CIA had only used EITs with a
total of 30 detainees.
(ox/1:900) Various OLC memos have stated that CIA Of?ce of Medical
Service doctors and monitored detainees? health during the
application of HTS, but that medical personnel did not'participate in any
interrogations themselves.
The OIG Special Review released the fact that Nashiri underwent
unauthorized interrogation techniques.
(U/IForfn The CIA released the fact that Abu Faraj al-Libi received EITs.
However, Speci?c EITs applied to Abu Faraj remain classi?ed.
The CIA released the fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true
name of Abu Ahmad al?Kuwaiti, the courier/facilitator who the CLA tracked
to uncover the location of Usama bin Laden. -
The CIA released the. fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true
location of Usama bin Laden.
The CIA released the fact that KSM and Abu araj al-Libi
provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. However, all speci?c
information provided regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti remains classi?ed.
secr?nl 4' (b)(3)NatSecAct
CO6579390.
NatSecAct
The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that the
waterboarding interrogation technique was used only against three HVDs:
Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiril The memo also released
that waterboarding has not been used since March 2003.
(Ul/kald) The 30 May 2005 and the 31 August 2006 OLC memos
described other ?standard techniques? such as shaving, solitary con?nement,
white noise, shackling, etc. that would be employed in an attempt to get a
detainee to cooperate, prior to employing any ElTs.
The 31 August 2006 OLC memo released the fact that detainees
were held in solitary con?nement. I
The CIA released pursuant to a FOIA litigation that the CIA
destroyed 92 videotapes on 9 November 2005. The CIA also released that the
videotapes were of Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah. The 010 Special Report
released that twelve of the videotapes showed BIT applications.
The July 2007 OLC memo describes six EITs that are minimally
necessary to maintain an effective interrogation program. The memo also
released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, the CIA had a total of 98
detainees in the RDI Program and that the CIA had only used EITs with a
total of 30 detainees.
(ox/1:900) Various OLC memos have stated that CIA Of?ce of Medical
Service doctors and monitored detainees? health during the
application of HTS, but that medical personnel did not'participate in any
interrogations themselves.
The OIG Special Review released the fact that Nashiri underwent
unauthorized interrogation techniques.
(U/IForfn The CIA released the fact that Abu Faraj al-Libi received EITs.
However, Speci?c EITs applied to Abu Faraj remain classi?ed.
The CIA released the fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true
name of Abu Ahmad al?Kuwaiti, the courier/facilitator who the CLA tracked
to uncover the location of Usama bin Laden. -
The CIA released the. fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true
location of Usama bin Laden.
The CIA released the fact that KSM and Abu araj al-Libi
provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. However, all speci?c
information provided regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti remains classi?ed.
secr?nl 4' (b)(3)NatSecAct
(306579390
.saeREr/l - NatSecAct
(umber information that is Unclassi?ed:
0 General allegations of torture by HVDs unless such allegations
NatSecAct?m
]detentionl
reveal Speci?c details about EITs as applied to the the identities (egg.
names, physical descriptions) of CIA personnel or contractors; themlocatioiis of
detention sites (including the name of any?untry in whiehthe? detention site was
allegedly located); or any foreign! inyolvement in
NatSecAct
NatSecAct'
Information Relating to the RDI Program that Remains Classi?ed
ill?) The names of'or identifying any in "m Ogle";
than Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashin', and Abu Faraj al-Libi against whom Em
were applied.
NatSecAct
tars) rAny-infonnation-about Effsasapplied to individual'detaine?s,
except the fact that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri were waterboarded. The 1
August 2002 OLC memo was written in anticipation of using EITs against Abu
Zubaydah if he did not cooperate after using less coercive means of questioning.
The I August 2002 OLC memo did not affum that EITs would be applied to Abu
Zubaydah, if he did not cooperate.
NatSecAct
Any information regarding the. Speci?c application of a particular EIT
sequencing, duration, etc.), as applied to named detainees; including Abu
Zubaydah, KSM, Nashiri, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
(8/1 is?) Names "of or 'iderrt?ify?i'ng'in?mnatioii about anyaetz?ame?? held in CM NatSecAct
custody, other than the 16 HVDs publicly identi?ed by President Bush.
?374 infomrationabont thei'operation'o'r Iotatioii'ot'any 'oiierseas a
detention facilities, including the name of any country inwhich the detention
facility was allegedly located.
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
Any-informationregarding? 'CtA'pers'orinet ?or centract'nrs'imolved 7
the RDI Program; including names, pseudonyms, physical descriptions, or any
identifying information.
NatSecAct
Any information regarding CIA assets; inCluding namesp?m?
descriptions, or any identifying information.
NatSecAct
?soma? .. 5,
NatSecAct
saga/ii??
(306579390
.saeREr/l - NatSecAct
(umber information that is Unclassi?ed:
0 General allegations of torture by HVDs unless such allegations
NatSecAct?m
]detentionl
reveal Speci?c details about EITs as applied to the the identities (egg.
names, physical descriptions) of CIA personnel or contractors; themlocatioiis of
detention sites (including the name of any?untry in whiehthe? detention site was
allegedly located); or any foreign! inyolvement in
NatSecAct
NatSecAct'
Information Relating to the RDI Program that Remains Classi?ed
ill?) The names of'or identifying any in "m Ogle";
than Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashin', and Abu Faraj al-Libi against whom Em
were applied.
NatSecAct
tars) rAny-infonnation-about Effsasapplied to individual'detaine?s,
except the fact that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri were waterboarded. The 1
August 2002 OLC memo was written in anticipation of using EITs against Abu
Zubaydah if he did not cooperate after using less coercive means of questioning.
The I August 2002 OLC memo did not affum that EITs would be applied to Abu
Zubaydah, if he did not cooperate.
NatSecAct
Any information regarding the. Speci?c application of a particular EIT
sequencing, duration, etc.), as applied to named detainees; including Abu
Zubaydah, KSM, Nashiri, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
(8/1 is?) Names "of or 'iderrt?ify?i'ng'in?mnatioii about anyaetz?ame?? held in CM NatSecAct
custody, other than the 16 HVDs publicly identi?ed by President Bush.
?374 infomrationabont thei'operation'o'r Iotatioii'ot'any 'oiierseas a
detention facilities, including the name of any country inwhich the detention
facility was allegedly located.
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
Any-informationregarding? 'CtA'pers'orinet ?or centract'nrs'imolved 7
the RDI Program; including names, pseudonyms, physical descriptions, or any
identifying information.
NatSecAct
Any information regarding CIA assets; inCluding namesp?m?
descriptions, or any identifying information.
NatSecAct
?soma? .. 5,
NatSecAct
saga/ii??
(306579390
NatsecAct
mm mam
I a. NatSecAct
18/11 NF) Any information regarding any foreign! i'cooperation
with CIA in administering or hosting any aSpect of the RDI Brogam; including
the names of or identifying information about foreignl names
{of or identifying information about individual members of foreifi-l 7
jor any other details regarding foreigni a NatSecAct
3374??) Any information regarding the capture of individual detainees,
i NatSecAct
- cal lair-)7 ofa detaineez: NatSecAct
NatSecAct a itheleng'm'bf
the trip; and amval, departure, layover, and ?nal destination locations involved in atse'cAct
the transfer.
Mm - ?cg/l M) NatSecAct
detainee; Whil'eh'e'wasin
NatSecAct i ?Jens 0
- 514 NatSecAct
meni?"?" _]custody. .
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
I asked to'de't'ainees'in CIA debrie?ng NatSecAct
or interrogation sessions and the answers the detainee provided. Information
about gaps in intelligence that the CIA had and was trying to ?ll by questioning
the detainees.
.
NatSecAct
Other Classi?ed Information Not Relating to the RDI Program
0 All information that is not speci?c to the RDI Program, but is
otherwise classi?able under applicable law and Executive Orders including
intelligence sources, methods, and activities.
- (mm
NatSecAct
SE Tl" (b)(3)NatSecAct
(306579390
NatsecAct
mm mam
I a. NatSecAct
18/11 NF) Any information regarding any foreign! i'cooperation
with CIA in administering or hosting any aSpect of the RDI Brogam; including
the names of or identifying information about foreignl names
{of or identifying information about individual members of foreifi-l 7
jor any other details regarding foreigni a NatSecAct
3374??) Any information regarding the capture of individual detainees,
i NatSecAct
- cal lair-)7 ofa detaineez: NatSecAct
NatSecAct a itheleng'm'bf
the trip; and amval, departure, layover, and ?nal destination locations involved in atse'cAct
the transfer.
Mm - ?cg/l M) NatSecAct
detainee; Whil'eh'e'wasin
NatSecAct i ?Jens 0
- 514 NatSecAct
meni?"?" _]custody. .
NatSecAct
NatSecAct
I asked to'de't'ainees'in CIA debrie?ng NatSecAct
or interrogation sessions and the answers the detainee provided. Information
about gaps in intelligence that the CIA had and was trying to ?ll by questioning
the detainees.
.
NatSecAct
Other Classi?ed Information Not Relating to the RDI Program
0 All information that is not speci?c to the RDI Program, but is
otherwise classi?able under applicable law and Executive Orders including
intelligence sources, methods, and activities.
- (mm
NatSecAct
SE Tl" (b)(3)NatSecAct