Metadata Policy Conference (2008)

NSA: for the foreseeable future. was has separate definitions of what constitutes content based on EU 12333 and FISNPAA collection. PISA considers communications data to be part of the content of the communication, hence FISA has no separate concept of metadata. All discussions at the conference were therefore focused on "standard" collection under the authorityr of ED 12333. 3. There is a constitutional expectation of privacy within the US. Fer communications data this is harder to quantify than fer content. New procedures will permit a differentiation between content and communications data allowing fer far greater data usage and advancing ether related changes. A tension remains bebveen the desires to minimise shared data containing US identifiers. and engaging more openly to supportthe foreign mission. 3. It is harder to define what constitutes a US identifier with DNI data - where unclear it is treated as US. MBA is moving from minimised records within their databases to minimising identifiers within reports. Sharing unmasked US identifiers with second party SIGINT partners will be easier than with some US domestic partners. it]. All: All SIGINT agencies seek to protect their equities. especially relating to Special Source Exploitation 11.3pecial categories ofdata were considered in the contest of their potential to contribute to pattern of life analysis. An increasing amount of new data types are available to SIGINT agencies. some proving difficult to categorise as either content or communications data. The conference agreed to step back from trying to categorise the data and simply to focus on what is shareable in bulk. Comment Page: 3 12. L'Jonsideration was given as to whether any types of data were prohibited, fer lawn "mils"- esample medical= lggl= religiogs or restricted business information, which may be regarded as an intrusion of privacy. Given the nascent state of many of these data types then no. or limited. precedents have been set with respect to proportionality or propriety, or whether different legal considerations applies to the "ownership" ofthis data compared with the communications data thatwe were more accustomed to handle. It was agreed that the conference should not seekto set any automatic limitations. but any such difficultcases would have to be considered by "owning" agency on a case-by-case basis. (comment: NBA normally considers any taroet data {pattern of life or other} that can be characterized as ?foreign intelligence? as proper for collection. analysis and production.

35. ?still a pilot. this proyides minimised data to Sigint-cleared and appropriately trained across the US Intelligence community. Second Party deriyed data is currently net made available to US Intelligence Community {although GCSE has agreed that theier Etle metadata may be shared}. but such data would be yalued. In the hope that such agreement will be forthcoming, NBA has persuaded ether US ?agencies to make almost 100 bn preyiously records shareable with the 5-eyes yia GLUEIAL READH. is treated as though with only DNFI records and fields shown to ly'laking DNI ayailable through ICREAGH is currently restrigteg due to limited automated {general counsel approyed} methods topreyented?by?lel??s?pelisyen minimize Ell-ll metadataatiee. 36. 'Deconfliction' is not formalised through ICREACH. Query records can potentiallyr be used to alert that other are looking at the same data. Deconflicting operations remains a tough challenge reguiring increased coordination of operations and collaboration. 3?.There is interest in the relationship bebyeen the implementation of {a U3. UNI initiatiye to link all LLS. IG to common tools} and sharable databases and allow for greater collaboration} and IGREAGH inasmuch as it may affect Second Parties? internal procedures and access issues with domestic agencies. 33. ENSCIDE: This is a specific method of groyigimsharing uniminimized SIGINT data to fee if had collected it itself} in support ofthe latter's operational missiongeanddgata from Second Parties is shared with BIA in accordance with special agreementsbetwe_en NSA and eagh sEong 39. GCHD are employing methods and For military SIGINT needs GGHD uses races1 to reach back to UK and repositories. The military's work within the ambit of the National SIGINT Drganisation comes under the authority of GCHD. 4D. NSA shares US SIGINT data with all US SIGINT elements that operate under operational controlageecies. With Second there is an initial minimisation of the data when gossible; howeyer all segom games hgye agreeg to abide by US. minimization criteria; Efor US intelligence agencies NSA mustdeere?is fastener: minimigsing-ef the data, before sharing and for other US agencies {such as law enforcement} A onl royi er i ?technical su ort? mission. all such data is minimized before restricted data set.} Comment Page: 6 I The was In statement but no: mined at the time.