May 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report

ECRET SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED PDWERS EUROPE ensue cuasnse GENERAL ees PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EURDPE SHAPEI BELGIUM Dur ref: 1BDEISDCISCT Tel: leerater} Tel: ext NCN: I ext Date: 13 May 11 Fax: +aa-tc}_ TD: NATD HEADQUARTERS, CENTRE SUBJECT: SHAPE Weekly Report en Clperaticns INTERNATIDNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FDRCE AFGHANISTAN IZZ'Iverview 1. Security. The seuthem half cf AFG is halfway threugh the peppy harvest and centinuing ANSF and cperaticns have maintained pressure en insurgents cf the kinetic activity in althcugh this is expected to change back tc tcwards the end cf lvlay. ccntinue te avcid direct ccntact with ISAF and te a lesser degree ANSF. preferring tc target 2. [in May. the attempted tc execute their first spring cffensive?related attack in Kandahar ISity. At least 4 Suicide 'v'ehicle Bcrne Devices and 14 Perscn Berne lEDs were used as the INS tried tc attack nine key GchA buildings?. Altheugh the attack appeared mere and better than any previcus cne. it still failed tc cutmanceuvre the ANSF. ISAF intelligence reperting indicates ccmmanders have expressed disappcintment ever the cutccme cf the attack ccnsidering the amcunt cf planning and resources expended. The had 1? killed and 2D captured, rescurces and that will be difficult tc replicate within the next few weeks. 3. During the past winter, cache finds have been featured regularly in reperting Theatre. Hewever. since March. the number at cache disccveries has decreased significantly. Repcrting indicates the INS have adjusted tactics?ratherthan stering materials in a few large caches they are beginning te stcre smaller quantities cf materials in mere dispersed Iccatiens te prevent significant less and captures a single ANSF er ISAF find. Altheugh this might make the caches harder tc find, a significant disadvantage tc the is that it prevents caches being readily available fer large events. thereby requiring them tc mcre area fer effective dispersicn. I The Previncial Palace. NDS HQ. Cild Ecrps H0 and F?clice District Sub Staticn f, amcng others. 1 NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET 4. In RC(SW), Sangin remains one of the most volatile districts in Helmand Province, although due to the poppy harvest and associated tax collection, kinetic activity decreased during the past few weeks. ISAF assesses that the fighting season in Sangin will commence in earnest after the poppy harvest. Reporting indicates that INS continue to prepare for summer operations, to include an extensive intimidation campaign, executing attacks against off duty ANSF members and their families and use of out of area fighter reinforcements. Sangin District will likely continue to be one of the most contested areas for the insurgency this summer. However, ISAF assesses that GIRoA’s improvements in Helmand Province are gaining support among local nationals, even as INS commanders continue to reinforce the area with fighters and increase kinetic activity during the summer. 5. In RC(S), Operation MOUNTAIN JAGUAR began during this reporting period. It aims to disrupt INS preparation for the summer offensive and achieved effects across the region. Notably, INS finance and logistic networks were significantly affected by two air assault operations in the troublesome Zharay and Maiwand Districts. The air assaults, executed by Task Force SPARTAN (10th MTN DIV), resulted in the seizure and destruction of 7 ½ tons of hashish, 150 kg of homemade explosives, 120 kg of opium and a large quantity of IED-making materials. Intelligence sources indicate that key INS leadership has taken notice of the operation and expressed concern about its effects. 6. Governance. On 30 Apr 11, municipal elections were held in Laskar Gah, the capital of Helmand in RC(SW). The ANSF took the lead, planning and executing a highly effective plan that saw the ANP running security and the Operational Coordination Centre Province (OCC-P) delivering coherent command and control for the ANA and ANP. ISAF assisted by conducting an initial search of facilities and providing a quick reaction force. 1,900 Elders and notables from every mosque elected a 25 member municipal body (including two women) which will improve the resolution of disputes and help bridge the communication gap between the mayor and the people. Although ANSF and ISAF made headway by removing the INS from Laskar Gah, certain key malign local (non INS) actors2 remain in place. The abuse of their position presents the most insidious threat to further improving governance. 7. Development. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) is collecting the biggest portion of the revenues for the AFG government, approximately US$ 129 million for 2010 and an estimated US$ 150 million this year. Approximately 85% of AFG population currently has access to telecommunication services. The telecommunications network is planned to expand to the remaining 15% of the population, which include some of the country' s less secure areas such as Zabul and Helmand provinces, by the end of 2011. To date, a total of US$ 1.5 billion has been invested in the AFG telecommunications sector, which is the largest foreign direct investment in any sector. Current Issues 8. Insurgency Largely Unaffected by Osama bin Laden’s (OBL) Death. A number of factors since 2001 have strained the relationship between Al Qaida and the Taliban, including conflicting strategic visions, isolation of organizational leadership, geographic separation, and Al Qaida’s reduced capacity to provide financial and operational support 2 Examples: Senator Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, related to President Karzai through marriage. He is the single most powerful powerbroker in Helmand and is known to be involved in narcotics activities. Abdul Rahman Jan is a key powerbroker in Marjeh and former Chief of Police of Helmand, and is also involved in narcotics. 2 NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET following counter terrorism strikes in PAK’s tribal areas. These tensions as well as the Taliban’s ability to draw upon alternate financial sources of support will ensure that OBL’s death will have a limited impact on the Taliban’s ability to sustain their campaign. Furthermore, ISAF sources estimate that only about 100 or so Al Qaida militants currently operate in AFG, mostly in the remote mountainous areas along the northeastern frontier with PAK. Areas such as Nangahar, Nuristan, and Kunar retain Al Qaida connections through the Haqqani Network (HQN), which remains a key enabler for Al Qaida to operate in AFG. 9. The Taliban’s relationship with Al Qaida has not been a key factor influencing the senior leadership’s opposition to a political settlement with the AFG government and their demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops. OBL’s death offers an opportunity for the Taliban to highlight that they were not harboring OBL, in an attempt to detach themselves from international terrorism and increase their political and moral legitimacy. 10. Following the successful operation against OBL, an increase in operational security (OPSEC) in the short term might limit the operational communications of Al Qaida and Taliban. Due to the decentralized nature of the AFG insurgency, this potential disconnect with their leadership is unlikely to translate into a reduced operational tempo. 11. Private Security Companies (PSC). After signing the PSC bridging strategy, ISAF continues to support the AFG Government with the implementation of the plan. To accelerate the AFG Public Protection Force (APPF) growth and to minimize the chances of further disruptions to new and ongoing projects, ISAF is assisting the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in developing APPF training procedures and directives to relicense legal PSCs, register vehicles and weapons, issue visa and implement the bridging tashkil3 procedures. The unresolved issue on APPF ownership within the AFG government remains a concern. OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) Overview 12. Security. The situation on the ground remains strategically unchanged over the past week. The arms embargo and no fly zone remain effective, and the air campaign continues to degrade the regime’s capability to threaten the civilian population and population centers through the use of kinetic strikes against deliberate and dynamic targets, along with non-kinetic methods. 13. In the East. There are no significant strategic changes in the disposition of proGadhafi and opposition forces along the coastal strip from Brega to Ajdabiyah. Regime and opposition forces continue to conduct tactical probes likely aimed at determining the disposition of each other’s forces in this area. 14. Misurata. The Misurata port re-opened on 04 May after the sea mine threat from 29 Apr was minimised. Despite continued hit and run indirect attacks against Misurata by regime forces, 4 ships entered the port in the past 7 days bringing urgently needed supplies and enabling more evacuations. During 05 to 07 May, pro-Gadhafi helicopters conducted night operations at the port, and reportedly dropped landmines on port facilities, hitting the piers. Mines were also thought to have been fired from artillery, possible BM21, over the city. Mines that fell in the water are not considered a threat to shipping. Similarly, on 06-07 May, a large fuel storage tank was set on fire at the Steel and Iron 3 Afghan “tashkil” refers to table of equipment. 3 NATO SECRET