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SIDtoday Interview on Death of Bin Laden
May 18, 2015
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TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
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(U) What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?
FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
Run Date: 05/17/2011
(U//FOUO) SIDtoday recently met with Jon Darby (pictured), SID's Associate Deputy Director for
Counterterrorism, to find out what impact the recent killing of Usama bin Laden is likely to have.
1. Q: (U) In recent years, was Usama bin Laden actually directing al-Qa'ida operations?
...or was he just a symbolic or inspirational figure who had no real control over what alQa'ida affiliates around the world were doing?
A: (S//REL) What we're finding from the media seized from his residence is that he was more involved
in directing al-Qa'ida operations than we realized. He was definitely more than a symbolic figure.
Despite the fact that he was isolated and had to conduct all of his business by courier -- in order to
avoid detection -- he was effective as a leader and managed to exert influence. His strategic guidance
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Web search
Agency-all Emails
SID-all Emails
NSA Rolodex
SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
SIDtoday Blog
SIDtoday Series
SIGINT Worldwide VTC
SIDtoday Article
Letter to the Editor
SIGINT-y Social Media Page
(U) What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?
FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
Run Date: 05/17/2011
(U//FOUO) SIDtoday recently met with Jon Darby (pictured), SID's Associate Deputy Director for
Counterterrorism, to find out what impact the recent killing of Usama bin Laden is likely to have.
1. Q: (U) In recent years, was Usama bin Laden actually directing al-Qa'ida operations?
...or was he just a symbolic or inspirational figure who had no real control over what alQa'ida affiliates around the world were doing?
A: (S//REL) What we're finding from the media seized from his residence is that he was more involved
in directing al-Qa'ida operations than we realized. He was definitely more than a symbolic figure.
Despite the fact that he was isolated and had to conduct all of his business by courier -- in order to
avoid detection -- he was effective as a leader and managed to exert influence. His strategic guidance
to al-Qa'ida was to focus on attacking the US.
2. (U) After 9/11, did NSA ever see reflections of UBL himself or members of his inner
circle in SIGINT or did that access shut down completely?
(TS//SI//REL) Our loss of SIGINT access to bin Laden actually occurred prior to 9/11 -- it happened in
1998. After the Embassy bombings in Africa, it was reported in the press that bin Laden was using
INMARSAT and we never again saw him in communications. The one possible exception was in late
2001 when we may have gotten intercept of him on the radio in Tora Bora [in Afghanistan]. His #2,
Zawahiri, has never been seen in SIGINT. However, people in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy at the level just
below that -- the #3 leader and below -- who are responsible for coordinating operations abroad have
no choice but to communicate electronically, either personally (sporadically) or via communications
cut-outs (preferred), and we have seen reflections of them in SIGINT.
3. (U) In NSA's assessment, how important is bin Laden's death in terms of weakening
al-Qa'ida and terrorism in general?
(U//FOUO) We believe this was a very significant blow to al-Qa'ida -- the single biggest blow the US
has ever dealt them. Bin Laden was the one-and-only leader of al-Qa'ida, a symbolic and unifying
figure. He provided operational guidance to affiliates all over the world.
(U//FOUO) It is unclear who will take over that role now that he's gone. Zawahiri comes with baggage
-- some members of al-Qa'ida don't like him, and he doesn't have bin Laden's fighter credentials.
[Note: Usama bin Laden fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's.] Who will step up? -- it's
not clear. There is an opportunity now for us to be assertive in pressing them; they may get careless
and leave themselves open for capture.
(S//REL) We are now mining the media captured during the raid on his residence, looking for lead
information. It consists of nearly 3 terabits of data. It will take weeks and months to go through it all.
An interagency task force has been put together to analyze the data. NSA is participating on that task
force. Here at NSA, the SIGINT Forensics Center and many Product Line analysts both here at Fort
Meade and in the extended enterprise are also examining the seized media. There's a lot to go around!
(U) Is it possible that al-Qa'ida leaders will compete with each other in a struggle for the
top leadership spot?
(U//FOUO) It is possible. There may be personal animosities between members of the organization
that we could possibly exploit to create fissures.
4. (U) Has the recent success against UBL given us any lessons learned that we can
apply in future to other terrorist targets? ... Any revelations?
(U) There haven't been any major revelations. It was not a surprise that he was living in a populated
area -- other al-Qa'ida leaders have been captured in cities in the past. They don't all live in the FATA
[Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border].
(U) I think the biggest lesson from this success is to highlight what we already knew: the power of
cooperation across the Intelligence Community. No single source of intelligence alone could have
to al-Qa'ida was to focus on attacking the US.
2. (U) After 9/11, did NSA ever see reflections of UBL himself or members of his inner
circle in SIGINT or did that access shut down completely?
(TS//SI//REL) Our loss of SIGINT access to bin Laden actually occurred prior to 9/11 -- it happened in
1998. After the Embassy bombings in Africa, it was reported in the press that bin Laden was using
INMARSAT and we never again saw him in communications. The one possible exception was in late
2001 when we may have gotten intercept of him on the radio in Tora Bora [in Afghanistan]. His #2,
Zawahiri, has never been seen in SIGINT. However, people in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy at the level just
below that -- the #3 leader and below -- who are responsible for coordinating operations abroad have
no choice but to communicate electronically, either personally (sporadically) or via communications
cut-outs (preferred), and we have seen reflections of them in SIGINT.
3. (U) In NSA's assessment, how important is bin Laden's death in terms of weakening
al-Qa'ida and terrorism in general?
(U//FOUO) We believe this was a very significant blow to al-Qa'ida -- the single biggest blow the US
has ever dealt them. Bin Laden was the one-and-only leader of al-Qa'ida, a symbolic and unifying
figure. He provided operational guidance to affiliates all over the world.
(U//FOUO) It is unclear who will take over that role now that he's gone. Zawahiri comes with baggage
-- some members of al-Qa'ida don't like him, and he doesn't have bin Laden's fighter credentials.
[Note: Usama bin Laden fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's.] Who will step up? -- it's
not clear. There is an opportunity now for us to be assertive in pressing them; they may get careless
and leave themselves open for capture.
(S//REL) We are now mining the media captured during the raid on his residence, looking for lead
information. It consists of nearly 3 terabits of data. It will take weeks and months to go through it all.
An interagency task force has been put together to analyze the data. NSA is participating on that task
force. Here at NSA, the SIGINT Forensics Center and many Product Line analysts both here at Fort
Meade and in the extended enterprise are also examining the seized media. There's a lot to go around!
(U) Is it possible that al-Qa'ida leaders will compete with each other in a struggle for the
top leadership spot?
(U//FOUO) It is possible. There may be personal animosities between members of the organization
that we could possibly exploit to create fissures.
4. (U) Has the recent success against UBL given us any lessons learned that we can
apply in future to other terrorist targets? ... Any revelations?
(U) There haven't been any major revelations. It was not a surprise that he was living in a populated
area -- other al-Qa'ida leaders have been captured in cities in the past. They don't all live in the FATA
[Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border].
(U) I think the biggest lesson from this success is to highlight what we already knew: the power of
cooperation across the Intelligence Community. No single source of intelligence alone could have
provided enough pieces of the puzzle; it was only through our cooperative efforts that we achieved
what we did. SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT all contributed bits and pieces. When SIGINT would run
out offends, HUMINT would provide a clue, and then IMINT would add another key piece of
information, and back to SIGINT again. They all played off each other
(U) At right: The compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was found,
(U) Then, once the 1C had put together a complete picture, we worked seamlessly with the military to
bring about the successful raid. We saw the power of a true team effort across the US government.
Nowadays we cooperate like this all the time, but for people who didn't understand how far the 1C has
come since 9/11 in terms of working together, this success was a real eye-opener
(U) Besides the value of teamwork, another lesson learned is the need to be patient. This was a long
and difficult problem and we had to stay focused on it, even though there was no tangible reward for
our efforts right away,
5. (Uj Are there any other thoughts you have for the readers?
(U//FOUO) We're under no illusions that the death of bin Laden will mean the end of al-Qa'ida... this
struggle against violent jihad istS could go on for decades. But this was a major blow to al-Qafida and
it’s important for all employees to know that NS A was in the middle of the operation right from the
very beginning.
(S//SI//REL) For example, we played a key role in identifying the compound where bin Laden was
found, and during the raid itself we provided force-protection support for the SEALs. In the aftermath
of the raid, we have produced SIGINT on the reactions by governments, intelligence services, and
terrorists to the operation. We played a critical role... it simply could not have come off without NSA. i
am incredibly proud of all the NSAers, past and present, who contributed to this incredible success.
Comments/Sugues lions about this article?
"(LV/FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or repusted outside NSANet
without the consent ofS0l2l t PL sid_conimsk"
SiH
I email)
fÿÿÿfÿemail)
121 ,
Page Publisher
Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed; 1 1/10/2012
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET ii SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED OS JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON:
20320108
provided enough pieces of the puzzle; it was only through our cooperative efforts that we achieved
what we did. SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT all contributed bits and pieces. When SIGINT would run
out offends, HUMINT would provide a clue, and then IMINT would add another key piece of
information, and back to SIGINT again. They all played off each other
(U) At right: The compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was found,
(U) Then, once the 1C had put together a complete picture, we worked seamlessly with the military to
bring about the successful raid. We saw the power of a true team effort across the US government.
Nowadays we cooperate like this all the time, but for people who didn't understand how far the 1C has
come since 9/11 in terms of working together, this success was a real eye-opener
(U) Besides the value of teamwork, another lesson learned is the need to be patient. This was a long
and difficult problem and we had to stay focused on it, even though there was no tangible reward for
our efforts right away,
5. (Uj Are there any other thoughts you have for the readers?
(U//FOUO) We're under no illusions that the death of bin Laden will mean the end of al-Qa'ida... this
struggle against violent jihad istS could go on for decades. But this was a major blow to al-Qafida and
it’s important for all employees to know that NS A was in the middle of the operation right from the
very beginning.
(S//SI//REL) For example, we played a key role in identifying the compound where bin Laden was
found, and during the raid itself we provided force-protection support for the SEALs. In the aftermath
of the raid, we have produced SIGINT on the reactions by governments, intelligence services, and
terrorists to the operation. We played a critical role... it simply could not have come off without NSA. i
am incredibly proud of all the NSAers, past and present, who contributed to this incredible success.
Comments/Sugues lions about this article?
"(LV/FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or repusted outside NSANet
without the consent ofS0l2l t PL sid_conimsk"
SiH
I email)
fÿÿÿfÿemail)
121 ,
Page Publisher
Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed; 1 1/10/2012
DYNAMIC PAGE - HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET ii SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED OS JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON:
20320108