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Need Low cost, affordable, effective ISR/Armed Recce platform that can break the paradigm of attrition warfare in low intensity conflict; Exportable Easy to operate/maintain Limited infrastructure /support requirements Air Tractor has been delivered to UAE in less than optimum configuration soon to be exported to Libya. Significant export constraints. Opportunity exists to improve platform and improve global marketability nil export restraints

Fixedwing Light Attack Capability FLAC

Platform Fixed Wing $Thrush Designed for rough field conditions Optimum payload/hardpoints/ordinance Balance of oost/survivability/lethality Payload optimized for ?Afrioan Consider Speed/Loiter Armor FLIR

Thrush 510 Hp (GE80) 800hp a? Cruise speed QAOT5o8/glb 140kts Empty 6,000Ib Useful Load 4,500lb TOLD 3 Fuel 228 gal/1460Ib 140? Hopper 5109al/3280Ib .. 3 Burn 509ph Endurance 4.0hr . Hopper Fuel 2009/1600le 9 Hopper Endurance +8.0hr 3* TOTAL ENDURANCE 12hrs

Airframe Modifications Longitudinal stability increased rudder area/tailplane fins Wing spar fatigue spread loads off centreline Pod - Retractable (Patent) to allow for rough field conditions whilst maintaining the laser clear of prop arc in flight 2 Seaters complex mission set Mixed loads Adapters (Patent) Armoured airframe and engine Fuel System Explosive protection in fuel tanks 12 endurance 3 Tank isolation for leak resilience

.650 air .. we. aha

Survivability Assumption Insurgents are equipped with low order threats only Small calibre automatic weapons Light Gen 1 IR SAMs Not equipped with night fighting capability The most dramatic example was the Thanh Hoa Bridge, 70 miles south of Hanoi a critical crossing point over the Red River. Starting in 1965, U.S. pilots had flow 871 sorties against it, losin 11 lanes without managing to put it out of commis In 1972 the ?Dragon?s Jaw? bridge was attacked with Paveway bombs, and 14 - managed to do what the previous 871 had not: drop the span, and cut a critical North Vietnamese supply artery. The threat? Migs and 200 Med/Hi Callibre Most insurgencies do not require precision weapons to maintain survivability

Survivability Majority of lnsurgencies are low threat and do not warrant defensive aid suites and high performance but rather risk can be managed by; Operating at night against all optically guided threats Operating >4000ft for small arms Operating clear of Air to Air threats Reducing ground vulnerability Multiple FOBs Dispersed assets Irregular FOB utilisation Small on ground footprint

Survivability Ballistic armour around crew compartment only Est 200lb lnternal modification for low profile missions Fibretech Class 9mm at 100m 7.62mm at 300m Ballistic glass Hook? for mutual on wing ground recovery od aircrew AMSAFE Air bags

Lethality - Loadout Optimisation AO determines target set Africa used as nominal AO Target type/survivability/cost determines weapon ype Personnel, vehicles, armor, small boats Survivability (altitude/range) traded for lethality Weapons with reduced range/accuracy/ effectiveness Increase reqUIrement for Performance determines load out Increased survivability reduces payload due welght

Target sets African AO Assumptions Mobile targets Static: 5 a Area targets isolated personn Few urban areas e. Few PGM requirements Static 1o Vehicle Loadoutoptlmised or Armour 5 Gun 90% of targets MobiIe Land Mobile 5 Sea Urban A Dumb Bombs Area 20 Rockets

Weapon matching Gun? Rocket Hellfire 1.68 Rocket Lethality 1 3 2 4 5 6 Survivability 6 4 3 Cost 1 2 4 6 5 3 TOTAL RANK ff? 2 4 3 5 Notes. 1. Weapon Lethality is weighted against the AF RICAAO Target Set 2. Lethality, Survivability and Cost are equally weighted 3. LG Rockets require designator with increased cost 12

Close Air support *3 Armor as Fuel 3009 v? 23mm Ammo 500 b FAE 7 shot rocket pods FAE Available payload 4500lb No stores in probwash 440 b 1000 b 1000 b 1000 b 1000 b 4440 b 13

Weapon requirements Guns Self contained Pod HEI Rounds Rockets Unguided Warheads dependent on AO Bombs Proximity Fuse Anti-personnel casing 14

Forward Firing Gun Day EOTECH Laser Sight

Weapon sighting Night Twin NVG Laser spots harmonised to open fire range (heads up) Or EHVS Scope (heads down) 16

FLAC Attack Profiles Considerations Weapons Effects 3 lmpact angle, speed, Frag/Ricochet envelopes Fusing Min 150m/s 266kts impact for prox doppler Release 67m/s 120kts from 4000ft (1333ft) 240kts impact (Dud) Platform Effects Wind, speed, grazing angle Survival Small Arms 4000ft HAT Terrain Weather Lowshow/Hishow

FLAC Perch - 20deg AOB/120kts 4000ft radius (nil wind) +4000ft radius/4000ft HAT TACFLOOR 4000ft

Visual bombing Base range (On perch) via GPSNisual cue and target a??ude Day/Night target cue on trailing edge of wing Assumes constant AOB (20deg Nil wind) 19

FLAC Standard Attack Pro?le 450 Rocket/Dumb Bomb Day/Night Roll Out 3700ft HAT 5200ft SR 6:96, 11,7- ??Sr??ll 3000ft HA 17sec TOF

2 an? '00? nor ?or CRV7 Kinematic Performace Veloc?ty vs, Slant Range 4200ft SR 1200knots I M40 an.?

ISR Ball mount (IAI) - Required to have Clear FOV in all weapon passes to ensure laser ranging, safe laser firing and uninterrupted optics for tracking Lesson Learned on Caravan and Must olear prop for fonNard firing ordinance Wing mount on opposite side of prop rotation clear of FOD 22

ISR Ball mount Clear of propeller r4."

Nightfighting Compatible external, formation and Air/Ground integration - Gen 24

Seating Determined by mission and integration Complex mission with PGM) requires 2 seats Dumb weapons simple mission Recommend 2 seat 25

Summary AFRICA AO contains divers-e target set including armour, boats, personnel and vehicles Challenge is to develop a low cost capability that can succeed across the majority of mission sets Guns, Rockets and Dumb Bombs offer the most cost effective weapon load for the target set/threat environment Back to Vietnam prior to high order entering AO Low tech low program risk 26

Summary LAC offers African countries an affordable option to break attrition warfare paradigm Gain the ultimate high ground FLAC offers affordable ability raise, train and sustain the capability for the ?long war? necessary in Counter Insurgency Enduring capability 27