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The Story Behind The Move

Apr. 24 2017 — 8:56a.m.

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL (S//SI//REL) NSA SIGINT Site Relocated in Japan: The Story Behind the Move FROM: Technical Support Program Management Office (TSPMO - S01X1) Run Date: 03/16/2007 (S//SI//REL) How NSA's Hanza SIGINT collection site on the island of Okinawa was relocated to Camp Hansen. (S//SI//REL) In 1996, the US Government entered into a multi-pronged agreement with the Government of Japan (GOJ)* to relocate NSA's HF Remote Collection Facility on the island of Okinawa. The effort to execute this agreement was named Project CAMELUS. According to this agreement, the GOJ was to pay all relocation costs, including construction of the new site and acquisition of the new replacement mission systems (STAKECLAIM). This project is estimated to have cost the Japanese taxpayers in excess of 500 million dollars. The 10-year road to bring CAMELUS to its culmination was full of twists and turns, and can be only briefly summarized here. (U) The Players (S//SI//REL) NSA's Technical Support Program Management Office (TSPMO, S01X1) was the official liaison with US Forces Japan, which in turn was the interface between NSA and the GOJ. Radio Exploitation (REX, S3311) was the mission office for HANZA and was also the technical advisor for STAKECLAIM. (U) On the Agenda: Tough Negotiations (S//SI//REL) The GOJ elements involved with this program were not our Japanese SIGINT partners, and therefore their program objectives were purely political and dealt with the land return and cost and schedule; the Japanese court had issued a special land-use ruling that had a specific date assigned for land return (there have been three since the project began). Improving SIGINT collection from Okinawa was not on their agenda. NSA's objective, on the other hand, was to leverage the Japanese program/funding to maintain or modestly improve HF collection from Okinawa, all of which is remoted to NSA/CSS Hawaii and or the Meade Operation Center (MOC). (U//FOUO) These two objectives are clearly at cross purposes and resulted in many issues being elevated to very senior representatives of the two governments for resolution. The NSA CAMELUS team was called upon to participate in numerous discussions/meetings with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs (DUSD AP) to help him establish a US Government negotiating position relating to land-return dates. The GOJ position was that the USG should shut down the Hanza site and return the land prior to the new mission system (STAKECLAIM) being ready to assume the mission. (U//FOUO) The CAMELUS Team attended several meetings between Senior GOJ officials (Director General Defense Facilities Administration Agency) who came to Washington to lobby their position with DUSD AP. The Japanese Defense Minister met with SECDEF Rumsfeld in November 2004, and this program was one of the topics of discussion. Full support for the Hanza mission vis-à-vis political pressure for land return was maintained throughout the project and, in the end, full land return was not accomplished until the new site was up and running. This level of visibility is more than most programs want or need.

(U) Building the New Facility (U//FOUO) For NSA, this GOJ-funded program had two major deliverables; the first being new facilities with support infrastructure (roads and utilities) and the second being a replacement mission system (STAKECLAIM). The first deliverable was a major engineering undertaking in that the site needed to be carved out of dense, hilly Okinawa terrain being used by the USMC for small-unit jungle training. Aerial (U//FOUO) The "before" photo: View of Landing Zone Ostrich, Camp Hansen, taken in January 2000 before construction began. (U//FOUO) The facilities deliverable also included space for an antenna field (see photo). The construction of this antenna field turned out to be a major engineering task for GOJ contractors due to the amount of fill necessary to provide a flat and stable surface with a radius of 102 meters. We found that there is not a lot of experience amongst the Japanese trades in building an antenna field to NSA standards. In the end, we got what we asked for and believe the field will serve our needs for many years to come. NSA accepted the new facilities on 15 May, 2006. completed (U//FOUO) ...and "after": Completed antenna field at Camp Hansen (S//SI//REL) On 8 September 2006, the second major Japanese deliverable was accomplished when an Operational Acceptance Test and Evaluation of the SIGINT mission collection system (STAKECLAIM) at NSA Hawaii was successfully conducted and STAKECLAIM officially met desired operational capabilities. (U) Mission Complete! (U//FOUO) If ever a project showed the benefits of teaming among many, diverse government organizations and the positive results of all United States Government parties maintaining a strong and consistent message with external stakeholders, CAMELUS is a great example. Project success was not accidental and required a tremendous amount of hard work and persistence by the entire team. Credit and thanks to all team members. (S//SI//REL) If you'd like more information on Project CAMELUS or STAKECLAIM, see the TSPMO CAMELUS web page ("go CAMELUS"). (U) Notes: * (U) The agreement is officially known as the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Agreement.

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