NSA Intelligence Relationship with Norway, April 2013
Mar. 1 2018 — 5:02p.m.
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NOR National Security Agency/Central Security Service 17 April 2013 Information Paper (S//REL TO USA, NOR) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Norway (U) Introduction (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) The SIGINT relationship between the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) began informally in 1952, and was formalized in 1954 when both services signed the Norway – United States of America (NORUSA) SIGINT agreement. Subsequent additions included the exchange of FISINT and Space Collection in 1963, ELINT in 1970, and PROFORMA and COMINT Technical Extracts of Signals in 1994. While NIS produces all-source reports combining SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, ACINT, RADINT and TELINT, the strength of the service remains its SIGINT capabilities against principally Russian targets. Over time, the NIS has expanded its customer base within the Norwegian government and has acquired new systems that can access INMARSAT, FORNSAT and microwave transmissions. This expansion has permitted NIS to respond to new national-level transnational requirements specific to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental issues. NIS has also deployed tactical intelligence systems and SIGINT personnel to support Norwegian and coalition forces in Afghanistan. (U) Key Issues (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) Modernization – NSA and NIS are beginning to collaborate on modernizing the Norwegian SIGINT service’s end-to-end collection and processing capabilities. The main focus will be to address a request from the partner for advice on coping with the growing volumes of SIGINT data they are able to access. The overarching goal of this interaction is to maximize mission benefit of NIS accesses by enabling the partner to exploit those accesses more effectively from an analytic perspective. NSA is prepared to advise NIS on technology investments they can make over the next five years. NIS has received a four-fold increase (approximately US$100M) in their budget to support this effort. (TS//SI//REL TO USA, NOR) On 7 March 2013, NSA and NIS completed their annual Strategic Planning Conference. NIS specifically requested strategic discussions on several technical issues including cable access, deployed sensors, CLOUD computing and FORNSAT modernization. High level Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20340501 TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NOR
TOP USA, NOR discussions were also held on Afghanistan, forensics, Human Language Technology, Russia, and Weapons Space. NIS was especially pleased with the technical discussions as they are currently making significant financial investments to modernize their SIGINT capabilities. TO USA, NOR) What NSA Provides to Partner Daily TS/ISl-level counterterrorism (CT) reports shared multilaterally, Fre uent exchan es of technical data and anal tic ex ertise on CT targets, Hana other threats to Norway's national security; Daily force protection support in Afghanistan and technical expertise to support target development ofAfghan insurgent targets; Regular reporting on counter-proliferation GP to ics Ad-hoc reporting and analytic expertise on -- Exchanges of reporting, tech data and analytic expertise on -- -- Tech data and expertise on topics of mutual interest; and FORNSAT communications metadata TO USA, NOR) What Partner Provides to NSA SIGINT analysis as well as geolocational and communications metadata specific to Afghan targets of mutual interest (this analysis also supports Norwegian Special Operations Forces (when deployed); All-source analysis specific to Afghan targets of mutual interest. The analysis is based on operations conducted jointly between NonNay and local and/or coalition authorities; Potential to leverage NIS FORNSAT capabilities to augment NSA collection against high priority CP SIGINT targets, Potential to leverage NIS unique access to SIGINT on high priority CT targets: SIGINT reports on Russian civil targets of mutual targets, particularly Russian energy policy; FORNSAT communications metadata: and (U) Success Stories TO USA, NOR) NIS has been a model partner in the Afghanistan SIGINT Coalition (AFSC) and a leader in the production of regional governance reporting as part of the AFSC's Analytic Division of Effort in Afghanistan. Nowvay has led the entire AFSC partnership in reporting in support of the Analytic DOE since its inception in October 2011. Overall, Norway has been responsible for approximately 53% of the reporting on Afghan government targets from the TOP USA, NOR 2
TOP USA, NOR AFSC members, and 56% of the AFSC reporting that has been re-issued to US. customers. - TO USA, NOR) NIS revealed an organic Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) capability to NSA in September 2011. In response, NSA engaged NIS and gained its agreement to share reporting from NonNay's CNE access. NSA is working to expand and deepen its intelligence exchange with NIS, focusing on report sharing and target development on Russian political, natural resources and energy issues, and including sharing of selected data from NSA CNE collection. - TO USA, NOR) NIS is in the process of acquiring STEELWINTER (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has entered into a collaborative partnership with NSA's and Exploitation Sen/ices to develop applications of mutual benefit. - TO USA, NOR) NSA's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) considers Nowvay one of its top two partners. NTOC has a direct line with our NIS counterparts over which we collaborate on discovery and analytic issues. The NonNegians have provided IP addresses, techniques, and tradecraft they obsen/e from foreign adversaries on NonNegian national networks. NTOC shared its methodology to help the partner improve the discovery, characterization, and attribution of the capabilities, activities, and intentions of malicious actors to exploit or disrupt protected entity networks. - NIS is currently ranked among the top two foreign partners for Technical SIGINT and is a leading contributor to Colorado's TECHELINT NIS is also a leading contributor to the FISINT mission, with many sole-source intercepts. Norwegian collection represents approximately one-filth of NSA's overall space FIS collection. (U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner - (U) None at this time TO USA, NOR) Prepared by: Name: Title: Country Desk Officer (CDO) NonNay Phone:-- TOP USA, NOR 3