CSE “Speaking Points”

an UNAUTHORQEDIMSCLOSURES UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES SPEAKING POINTS: 0 The continuation of the disclosures of speci?c aspects of intelligence capabilities and those of our allies, have a cumulative detrimental effect on our operations. 0 CSE has observed our foreign targets discussing changes to their communications security as a result of the disclosures. Canada?s allied partners have also publically stated that they have observed terrorist groups and other threat actors changing their methods of communications in an effort to hide their planning efforts from intelligence gathering capabilities that were revealed through the unauthorized disclosures. 0 Our success is hard won and is dependent on our targets being unaware of the methods and technologies that we use against them. a The unauthorized disclosures have diminished the advantage we have had, both in the short term but more worryingly in the long term. 0 Under the law, CSE does not target Canadians anywhere or any person in Canada through its fereign intelligence and cyber defence activities. - CSE also cannot ask our international partners to act in a way that circumvents Canadian laws. - activities are reviewed by the independent CSE Commissioner, who has never found CSE to have acted unlawfully. IF PRESSED ON THIS OR ANY OTHER DISCLOSURE: - We do not comment on the operations, methods, targets, or capabilities of Canada or our allies. 000036 Page 1 of 2

mum (may orscLosunas INFORMATION Major unauthorized disclosures relating to CSE: In October 2013, Globo, a Brazilian television program released a report based on a classi?ed CSE deck on the topic of intelligence collection related to the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy. The story was then linked to an release regarding participation in standard cyber threat and security brie?ngs to critical infrastructure operators in the energy sector. The leader of the opposition has referred publically to these media stories as clear evidence that CSE has been complicit in industrial espionage. CSE does not share foreign intelligence with Canadian companies for their commercial advantage. In November 2013, the CBC reported that, based on the unauthorized disclosure of a U.S. National Security Agency brie?ng note, the Government of Canada allegedly authorized the U.S. National Security Agency to collect intelligence in Canada during the 2010 620 Summit. Follow-up'reporting by other media outlets and academic commentators noted that the brie?ng note did not clearly support this conclusion. The January 30, 2014 unauthorized disclosure of details from a highly classi?ed CSE technical deck led to allegations in the media and in Parliament that CSE is acting unlawfully by conducting mass surveillance and directing its foreign intelligence activities at Canadians. The classi?ed document that was released is a technical presentation that outlines an exercise to build a mathematical model of typical network activity patterns around a public internet access point. The analysis conducted was based on a snapshot of historical metadata from the global internet. No data was collected from the monitoring of any airport. No private communications were targeted, collected or used. No data was used to identify any individual Canadian or person in Canada. The previous Chief of CSE appeared before Senate Committee to provide a full description of the analysis undertaken in the January, 2014 disclosure. in his statement, Mr. Forster con?rmed the activities described were for the sole purpose of ?nding legitimate foreign targets under legal mandate for foreign intelligence. Further, the CSE Commissioner has looked into this activity and publicly con?rmed that this analysis did not involve any ?mass surveillance?, that no Canadians or persons in Canada were tracked, and that no activity was directed at Canadians or persons in Canada. 000037 Page 2 of 2