Excerpts-From-An-Exclusive-Archive-Of-US-Military-Documents-Compiled-by-The Intercept

May. 23 2023 — 3:07 p.m.

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Pages 3-5: Response from the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Henry Kissinger’s request for information regarding civilian casualties in Cambodia Page 7: U.S. Army Report of Inquiry into reports of civilian casualties due to B-52 strikes in Base Area 740, Cambodia, May 16–20, 1970 Pages 9-14: U.S. Army Report of Investigation, attack on the village of Doun Rath, Cambodia, August 1969 Pages 16-17: U.S. Army memorandum on “Alleged Helicopter Shootings” in the villages of Sre Kandal and “Moroan” [Mroan], May 1970 Page 19: U.S. Army Summary Report of Investigation into an attack on the village of Tralok Bek, March 1969 Pages 21-35: “Brooks Incident,” Report of Investigation into “firing incident” — the killing of civilians and looting of a village — by U.S. and South Vietnamese military personnel in Cambodia, May 18, 1970 Pages 37-38: “Brooks Incident,” Final Summary by the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, May 1, 1972 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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Response from the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Henry Kissinger’s request for information regarding civilian casualties in Cambodia EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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Dm saesstrereaias Goth, JARS atmmesenenersess TE TR T-2082 reset TI F227 +k P01 ne = rece TERSHISSI ST 2 Boe 20 Fite oun az oro. co mete. SETIOVWETRsD. RSs olTioy wwe muzizace pp os wistonicn. rFice re ——— ea 73s Te wearers SE FAX COVER SHEET g Ne = —— Roe ’ Offs cf the Secretary of Deena Aa 7 ‘Site 3000, Rosslyn Plaza North a 1777. Keat Steet NM - Alfogon vA B3092165 TO: A Hever + 1850 MOEA SAX NCBER: hinge DFFIEE FEONENGMBER: 2 Ea sssace: Co) AEpeuse To Youd Reauenr fon rursenpmo od Pifbwe Toasgers yu [aes oo Ares Gowpfere FROM: Alfred Goldberg oate__[ [7 [oom ru ( pes 3 ding cover I] CL oo JR]
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FOIE = FEXRY TRAGISSION STRICT? 16523 Bosc 18434 Fue 10m tas She. cn meio, swronweTRD. mes nel wx oe meio azn caren mon ori - eatmeerceseseeese 705 598 7272 sare Zo crecle fog lo : EE a 165 00 S . 3 — FAXNUMBER: prove wove: I sar Ora Trees Cosila eo ee Ci he Dy frail hr AL CR TE RRL EN Seti onl or Es a a oo ol FROM: Alfred Goldberg svniflor far ; PATE | acing over er) PER wo:
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A 13 Dec 01 Memo for A. Goldberg. Subject: Civilian Casualties in Cambodia Tam not aware of any official estimate of civilian casualties produced by US air operations in Cambodia 1969-73. Thomas’ Thayer estimated 65,000 civilians killed in North Vietnam by about 800,000 tons of air ‘munitions 1965-73. Since about 600,000 tons of air munitions were expended in Cambodia, an estimate of 50,000 civilians killed there might not be too far off. Cambodia and North Vietnam were «comparable in size, but the population of North Vietnam was more than twice that of Cambodia even before Pol Pot's genocidal regime- 18 million in North Vietnam versus 7 million in Cambodia. While North Vietnam was sending its troops to South Vietnam, a civil war like the one in Cambodia was not raging within the borders of North Vietnam. On the other hand, B-52 area bombers accounted. for a much higher proportion of bomb tonnage in Cambodia than in North Vietnam--two- thirds in Cambodia versus a quarter in North Vietnam, During 1969-73 in Cambodia, it was difficult for reporters in Phnom Penh to estimate the proportion of civilian casualties caused by air operations. There is no doubt that most of those casualties occurred in 1973. Pol Pot’s forces laid siege to Phnom Penh while cease- fire agreements in Vietnam and Cambodia permitted American air power to focus on Cambodia. Reporters in Phnom Penh could see that many nearby villages had been destroyed by bombing. According to the American air commander, General Vogt, those villages had already been vacated by civilians fleeing into the city. His forces were using a range of intelligence sources (including infrared sensors) to determine which villages were occupied. The worst error occurred at Neak Luong, where more than a hundred civilians were killed when a B-52 crew failed to calculate an offset and dropped on a beacon in the town. ~The attached CHECO report describes the command and control arrangements for bombing Cambodia in 1973. For arrangements used during covert bombing 1969-70, see the attached book by Bernard Nalty, especially pages 129-133. Wayne Thompson ~ AFHSO 191 s
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U.S. Army Report of Inquiry into reports of civilian casualties due to B-52 strikes in Base Area 740, Cambodia, May 16–20, 1970 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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CONFIDENTIAL | 1. HQ CONDUCTING DNVESIZGATICN: US Army Advisory/Group — IT CTZ z 5. QONPIDIG TITIE OF ASD: Report of Inquiry —/B-52 Strikes in Base Area 70 Sa EE he 5. CLASSTFIOATION: CONFITENTIAL/NOFORN __/. a 4. DATE (S) OF INCIDENT INVESTIGATED: 16 A 20 May 1970 i» . 5. UNIT CONCERNED: oR verre fo L Say 4. PLACE OF IIOIDENT: YKRXXXKE Cambodia. . oz Shim a 4. SMGURY OF TNESTICATION/IN-UIR{: _ Inquiry into reports of civilians Killed/wounded by B-52 strikes in Cambodia. Conclusions: A unmown number of civilians were wounded/iclled by Bus? strikes 4n Base ares 710. Montagnards were mobile and their haslets ere not accurately reflected on comonly used maps. Solstiun payments have been made to SuTVANOr of known dead and to identified wounded. in. meee SPSANIIG LL re th SAR SER EA ETSI REE CONFIDENTIAL //2/ 2 #74
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U.S. Army Report of Investigation, attack on the village of Doun Rath, Cambodia, August 1969 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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y Ce Wy LEY er a 1 3 RADE EPARTIENT Gt . 1 CPC oy CAVALRY BIVIStON (morc Gok 0 Ban Fema CoA : i Pame aE. # 1 EL ; armen 2 Soptoabar 1969 ] : TH Retort of Davesttpetion (6) ! Commandtog Genera) " i lat k y 3 Ant Covel pivision (izmobile} 1 i I. Authority 1 Ae (U) The lavestigation of this incident of cstottsn border 1} Violation was sonoma oy anootty 3% LT PTE Contigatelel assege Cite 3 umber AVEC gOPSTL, pe] 2 host 3969. (Soe Bxhibit 1) 8. (U) The investigation to LYC Hubert Borris, Inspector General, let Chvalzy Divieion (Ammobilesy by verbal direction af" the Com oe manding Generel through the Chief of Staff. II. Matters Investigated a he (C) Matters investigetod wore tuo separete but related lncidenmts of C alleged border violation in shich US/ARVN helicoptors allegedly attacked the ~( Village of Doun Rathy Noung Cosine, Misot District, Kompong Chen Provinces Cambodis. (Sve Exhibit 1)e 117, Background fo (U) The village of Coun Rath fe reported to be located st coordinates XT 267995. This location pleces it in tho near vieiuity of the Conbodimn/ South Vietasnese border, B. (U) The South Vietnam area contiguous to this sogaent of the Cambodian border lies in the sree of operations of the lst Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Almobile)s (See Behibit 2)e C. (C) Recent contact with enemy forces in this eres of operation smd known infiltration of Forth Vietnsmose and Viet Cong forces have necessitated tactics to negate these activities, One such action is iy ev af URI This 1s a teem of two helicopters. One iu a Uiiel utility helicopter with standard K-60 machine gune mounted in the door firing tracer emminition. Also on board 4s © Xenon high intensity light aligned to @ night observation deviess wrismAvan 4 3 YTAR TYTERVALS TT) A¥TER 12 YEARS REE ——. BUD DI3 5200.10 5 5 TRE —— 5
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Ai CONFIDENTIAL iy Raport of Tnvestigation pe opaber HS) z © othex afrorett oaslin a7 of tha tosn 1s en /iel0 (Cub) amed hellsopter G7 Lai Ln TE RR ee Bie LL LE melomand of Bess amt oon hatte Shere hits 1 I RE SL een Si Bid Blots an stundted nilitnxy ss sitiiEi0 een to ba segrchad, 30 Basticules area 15 wich Piha, Tos ms epazetng oie Di pine. a ‘August 20d the moxning of ‘migiat vas a Free Fixe Zones, Tesgeid $3 | na Bis ae uly be gee, dotemination that no are dn ee 4 atsclon wis manitonsd by redux tive Landing Zong Grats Gos Exhibit 2). ou 9 fupinke tha HE ein an to the ards bo searched, Fo 7d of the presise gress 1s available. The noxthem conten vas weg ayproxtastaly ooe wile south of Bis Folly todos, This fs supported the. wtatament of PEC Brache, the Madar Dpertar at Lz Grant. (See 2 3]. The boas ox sxess to be seszched had, rund to this zedar site end were plotted un the radar SFC The yedar eh tomed. the FLL ad provided hesdinges 1s SEUITC Cn victors, to the “Highthewk™ Yeas. The roder seo provided guidance fzom one Er A ta postition the aizcratt vidhta, the Shor ind 4 FEOLCL BH ton oe. tothe Jogatian of the sizasaft in sep TefSlstiChy advisory afomation 06, shea the aircraft wes Ln the poxisiSY of Gonbodian border, The det Brigade ntel1igeses cusmary (Exhibit 4) shows that at 2200 hours Highthank xvod six (6) ughts and ten (10) ving structuresy eed trie wn 7 of G20 SALE et Gaged the area with 7.6mm meine oun &nd Oo tach sockets. The report Pied 3 structures destroyed and the lights extinguished, The statements 02 the crow (Exhibits Dy 6 7 € 8) very soaeshitt in their description of $a Three action et epprocdsataly 2250 ae They easentislly sgreo that Hiente wera seen end they wont to Lavestigate, arrent Cfficor Tanngeotess operator of the might vicion device, states (Exhibit 6) that upon seedng the Sights thay proceeded to investigate. Tha generel dirvetion wes northward hte He border, AG this tine they had positive redur controle Upon arriv ore ex tho 1ighke ho mitehed on the Yemon bch dataoetey light, 10 en attempt to idintify structures, and/or drew fire, The covreniigits 10 80 A mado a Firing mn but the 7.62 etliog pUrtiRLlY malfunctioneds - (Cobra) foe ut this time and both aircraft returaed to Tau Tieng to refusl and reer. rorant Officer Tanngeotes further states that Then 40 cele ress they wore again eisbome snd began to Meare) Ti "box" 100 to 0200 hours Hwy Toturned So the axed share they had provicsly soan the lights. At this tino, the lights were 8gein uminge The xenod Light was used and buildings were identified, ‘The Cobre engaged with rockets and machine qubs. There was no retum fim. Fuel and swoundtion were low ond the sircraft returned to home station. ‘There are contasdictions in the statements of the crow of the “Nighthewk” when gonpared to the statements of tho radar oporatorse The crue of the “Highthank® aircraft states that redar ei ned them that they wers within tho borders of South Vietnam. (See Exhibits 6, 7s + B)e The two radar operators state that the aircraft wes in ARITA CONFIDENTIAL
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Bk HBL fs 4 wm. VUNEIDEN UAL MRICS Ryport of etn an 2 fepteabor 1969 the tnasatats Stites Bro] ity ofy, en 4b times drifted over, the border. (See Lot Brigade Tote The Actual coordinates of the strike 8s reported on the ITER Betas matte ene marta ecatian of ain village to ve XT 247008, 80 locations plat spproximately 1,000 meters apart. Thon Henibit De We Conalustans Ae (0) ‘The Sighthawk airopate did 8 target fn the vielnl the chine, Tn Mishra stiurats dd saphena B. (U) These Ls no the Wghthid Ca is JI0HAIYe pot tat o tight grew knowingly pe ele Dn Sr 0 RT rence hours of darkness. by Sate " De (U) Tho Sighthads was onder redex surveidlange dusing the alsaione 2. (U) The sireraft comswnder exoreiesd poor Judguant Lo engaging 8 target under these C4rCUNSTANGOss J. Recommendations. A (U) No disetpiinary action be taken. 5. (UA cysten of chacke over known Land marks visible at night be conducted by Highthawc and radar prior to apeating ino proatalty of the Cambodian border. CL. (C) let Cavalry Divksian secret message, cits tunbin 9722110, data 9 iug 69, which restricts operation of airersft tn 1 ia stand off distance Fron the border be given continuous command attention to prevant futura incidentss a pat ah od Pr 9 Incl HUBERT MORRIS as LTC, FA Inspactor Genaral : 5
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} CONFIDENTIAL on Grang, Ne niga 3) re ei LSE IME pide op SIE Sek ginR, Tay Ninh and 12 Pedi Cor cp Sound LECT 50 hewn him clear of artillery. Then I 0X north-west. of LZ Grant. Wail Hawk a on ie hin ground tie edge of the box (eastern woundry) I gave Nignt Ey, clots te a from 360° to 270°, The turn took him north of the northern Bound- 01d his Tig the Cambodian border. hile trying to get. him back to the box, he a is Tien Bin (she snore sevmmntre him) that he thougat he saw a ligat. K his time I advioed bin that ho was clos to he Cambodian border, and he rogered RY transmission. Night fa snd Tiger started circling. I was receiving a bad Sarget on the two aircraft, about the same time I advised him that he appeared to Be’ over the Wordr. 1 donit, rensmber 1% he rogered my transmission, but I beleiv he did. Ab one time I told him he was over the border. A few minutes later Nigh eo a oe Ee cok awe winolings, I sivised Lim © eouldng give St n87 grid as he vas flying too large a circle. I gave whit I thought to oe the center orev Ta Jor aroma a fou minutes more, then went back to the box. I don't remember either aircraft fireing. The 2 aircraft (Night Hawk and lb. gun ship) usually talked to each other over our frequency, so that Night Hawk Wo oe in constant contact with GCA. I do remember that the grid I gave Night Hawk was on the 25 vertical grid line. a ug 2 hl 7 PW & Pr 29 SP5 RUGBEN K. PALMAR GCA Watch Supervisor, LZ Grant ATC Platoon H:C, llth avn Go 1st Cay Div (AM) 30 Aug 69 7 2 AER NA
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fg. CONFIDENTIAL gai Extract of lst Bde INTSUM #222 11 August 1969 C&D co ang 09 2200 XT 275975: Obs 10 x hooches, 6 x Lights, zeceived speredic unk type fire. Eng with 7.62mm and 75 x 2.75" rocket flechettes. Dest 3 x hooches and lights went out. a TITAN
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A CONFIDENTIA SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION/ INQUIRY/ INSPECT ION a UNIT: 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion and 11th Combat Aviation roup. 2. LOGATION: Village of Doun Rath, Roung Commune, Miuvot District, Komp Cham Province, Cambodia. oo ais ge 3. DATES: 9-10 August 1969. 4. (C) ALLEGATION/PURPOSE: Two separate but related incidents of alleged border violation in which US/ARVN helicopters allegedly attacked a Cambodian village. 5. (U) SOURCE: Il Field Forces message 0805712 Aug 69 (U). 6. (U) FINDINGS: 2. The Nighthawk aircraft did engage a target in the vicinity of the 3 Cambodian border which could have been the village of Doun Rath. ~ [' b. There is no conclusive proof that the Nighthauk crew Knowingly engaged a target in Cambodia. i A a1 i c. The definition of the border in the proximity of the fncident is impossible to ascertain with accuracy by visual reference during the hours of darkness. ia 4. The Nighthawk was under radar surveillance during the mission. o. The aircraft commander exercised poor judgement fin nee ging a target under the prevailing circunstances: 7. (@ 18 ACTION: The Inspector GeneralirEcameRseeNTIR p= 2. (WU) No disciplinary action be taken b. (U) A system of checks over k dm isible at night be conducted by Nighthawk and radar priof erating fn the proximi¥ L Cambodian border. 8 CL SEGRET message, Cite number 9F22110, dated c. (C) lst Cavalry Division SECRET WORREREL 5) 5p el a 9 Aug 69, which restricts ope Ts pO from tne border be given co i r incidents. os
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U.S. Army memorandum on “Alleged Helicopter Shootings” in the villages of Sre Kandal and “Moroan” [Mroan], May 1970 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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| \ iY wp ey A § we | Fis gregpr Ic UJ iT . | | ame 2 TE | in er Sidi | J Be tn 3 ie . A Srp oh Tatantry Division 3 : 4 Le Ree 4 g 3 b 1. The faloviag 2 incidents vere brought to the Ettantion of the b 15% Sdn, 11th CR while it ves GPCON to 1st Bde, 25th Taf Div. 144 i 3 - 2 ou 18 Nay 1970 at 1102 hrs, Wi Atraismsen, 53, 1/11th ARs hai 3 approximately 30 civilians at XU 267212 traveling south on & sha, Akl By % 0, € Troop, 1/11th ACR stopped the refugees and interrogated i or Ccumbonien civilims fron the village Of Bh See Kamiily | iid] 0 D525. They had aft their village on 17 Nay and bees SCTE Rl to Memat, vie XU 2907. ved that on 3 May 1970 af 1700 kre & AEN ex ‘of unknown 758 yg roported thet on 2 Hee Sia. Thay. “Fines. aa Fevightened wna started to Tus, at viich tize the BEVICORCEC He A y fire Tires pele rv tllesely turd 38 LASS) dl Sa | ire. figitemrter ett pore egedly received shrapnel wounds. : § They $hat 1 burn victim later dled. OPT Buzeh, surgeon, 1/11%h 3 Te ees persons ia the refugee group for buims. lo cl40 Lresiel 1 one man for an infected wound, ‘which could have been ‘caused by shrapnel. ” : The refugees were given further medical aid as required i i; for injuries unrelated to the alleged shooting. After they were be } 2 ats, ty vase iigued to comizms 0 Some yl] < NSH . “iil to 3. A615 hea on 20 Nay 1970 a group of epprexiastely 2) SET ti © sprout ia at11top, vie TU 3409. They desired to Tetum io their aX Ee aak of Ta aroun, vie TU 4408. They here been Jiving dn Sie 08° CC ee of Kenta Vic TU 311, sine the time of en alleged on thel or) 4 © villages They repo that on the morning of i May 1970, 4 om 3 hell- 85 WW. copters of an uh type circled their village of Fi Moroes, The « Ti "5c. hedcopters allggedly began firing Tor a, UFC + he villagers | § i Oe 18 parsons wero Killed nd 5 wounded in the sitecky i RFs i w SEI i? fei dae is gr con gh a sii tall i igh Ha Uy OFFICIAL | Line SE SORT 3 wiF a agar ; ly he iy
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TTR A Na ia Sut’ in M004 000000 RE YIKm- gen: 191430: 404. —~ _ AND d el Ta fi 08 wou UE "nh, , ay GAARA tay 4 ; EEN 3 a ee ss pte pgs 6 tatoos - i Heldoopter, described as having ETE PAR re of the villagers have not sea to 5 vouded since they were © gmoutel, The reinin ra reported that they attempted to return FH fillage on 18 May, but were turned back by US soldiers. They a came to FSB Hi oe ho i | Dllage. Mey were told th could return on 21 May. The majority i | °F Bis dafomation cans fron Kaing Souerng, Village hie of Ph orem. 4 Le me yim een E 5 2 Rr 3 able to seat ‘the veracity of Ha Bo ae ht Ks dla Hay SER RR SR 3 58 PIE i Evi Bee pest premed ty GG f EE Tema hi SE a Be Plame HA co AO 4 REE Tne a me os : 2 a ae Bue cr : os i x “ Sa - EMEA fe wo dv EER & a LE Sh aE SR » 0 TN Ls EI Gag Ly li [ie REY % 7 Sih Ey i oa MEA Ag SE Li a Mae ra ’ A Zap Lg ih At ih > Corr i Sl {HR COSEIONLY “ Cd AE ERA i Sa i
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U.S. Army Summary Report of Investigation into an attack on the village of Tralok Bek, March 1969 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION/ INQUIRY/ INSPECTION (Investigation was conducted by HQ, 25th Infantry Division) I. (U) UNIT: 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 7th Battalion, IIth Artillery and Ist Battalion, 27th Artillery. 2. (U) LOCATION: Tralok Bek Village, Daung Commune, Romeas Hek District, Svay Bieng Province, Cambodia. 7 3. (U) DATES: 13-15 March 1969. 4. (0) ALLEGATION/PURPOSE: To determine the facts and circumstances concerned with Cambodian protests fo the US that at 0930 and 1130 hours, 21 Feb 69, twenty-two helicopters landed troops around Tralok Bek Village, Cambodia, and that four helicopters and two observation aircraft, supported by mortars, then overflew and fired rockets af the village resulting in two women being wounded. 5. (U) SOURCE: Message, CG, Il F Force V, LBN, AVFB-RE 030254, DTG 011040 Mar 69, subject: Cambodian Border Incidents. 6. (C) FINDINGS: a. The allegation was not substantiated. b. The helicopters landed troops at an LZ well with the RVN. c. All firing done during the morning of 21 Feb 69 was directed against targets within the RUN. d. All firing in the afternoon was within RVN except at 1315 hours when artillery fired into Cambodia In response to enemy initiated small arms fire and at 1452 hours when the artillery fired In response fo enemy initiated mortar fire from Cambodia. 7. (U) IG ACTION: Recommended that findings be approved and that copies of ROI be forwarded to II F FORCE, V. 8. (U) UNIT ACTION: None indicated. 9. (U) ADDITIONAL ACTION: None indicated. 10. (U) FOLLOW UP: None indicated.
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“Brooks Incident,” Report of Investigation into “firing incident” — the killing of civilians and looting of a village — by U.S. and South Vietnamese military personnel in Cambodia, May 18, 1971 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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RUS 3 7 TVEINHATANGD MEADQUARTERS THIRD REGION asians comunn 120 3 rancscn rs 4 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL MACTR-IG SUBJECT: Report of Invest vestigation Concerning Firing Incident/Accider tof ot Squadron, 9th Cavalry, in. the Bepibise of ceric yt °F A Teor, Somanging Gesera leglonal Assis inn: Rotlonal dasiatance Comant APO 96266 I.(V) AUTHGRITY. 1. This investigation was conducted during the period 10 June 1971 to 4 September 1971 by LTC John W. Mantooth, Deputy Inspector General, at Headquarters Third Regional Assistance Command ETON Long Binh, Vietnam, pursuant to a directive from the Acting Deputy Commander, TRAC, 10 June 1971 (EXHIBIT RED T4B 4). II(C). MATTERS INVESTIGATED. 2. This investigation was concerned with an alleged firing incident/accident reported to have occurred during an aerial reconnaissance mission of A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, (4/1-9 Cavalry), in the vicinity grid coordinates WU 521048, Republic of Cambodia, on 18 May 197) (EXHIBIT RED TAB H-1). III(C). BACKGROUND. 3. On or about 18 May 1971, 4/1-9 Cavalry, while conducting an aerial recon- naissance mission in Cambodia, became engaged in a firing incident in a Cambodian village or hamlet which possibly vas being used es an enemy resupply or transfer point. During the course of ensuing events; approximately 6 adult males vere killed; approximately 2 Cambodian children were killed; 15 to 20 Cambodian civilians were wounded; 3 or 4 buildings destroyed; 15 or 20 bicycles and motorcycles were destroyed; one unidentified individual taken into custody for interrogation; a US Army Captain accompanied an ARVN Ranger Platoon into the area and removed a motorcycle; and the ARVN team members looted the area. 4 contact report was submitted on 18 May 1971 to the TRAC, tactical operation center. However, subsquent debriefings and inquiries, by a series of imvesti- gating officers, indicated that mmerous facts concerning the incident had been onitted, thus culiiinating in the requirement for a formal investigation of the incident. Group 9 0 Down graded of RENTIAL Pomgesdl Aa TIDENT Bgeer Gwin
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NAT GLILLIN RAR a. / MACTR-TG SUBJECT: Report, of Tayest. tigation Concerning Firing Inoident/Accident of 4 Toop, Lat Squadron, Stn Caveley, in the ROPMSLLY of Gemtatia (1) 4 m0). VIDE. 4s Journal, 63, ng fe re pr Er eat and establish the approximate time and location (EXHIBIT RED TAE 5). 2: USARY Regulation 525-7, dated 7 May 1970, Tibes the procedures to be Lolloved when combat. actios of US Army units/elensnts caine Geathy injury or , froperty damage to civilian porsomel. This regulation defines a firing 7 cident as an oocurrince caused by any type weapons fire which occurs in the gourse of military operations resulting in civilian casualities or property » damage. A major accident/incident is an ocourrknce which results in loss of life, orippling injuries to personnel or property damage in the amount of $500.00 or more. The regulation requires that all US Army Commands, Units, Elonents, Detachnents, or Agencies stationed in Vietnam will transmit spot Teports of firing incidents/accidents by electrical means within 12 hours of occurrence (EXHIBIT RED T45 E). 6. Msg. MACTR-G30P, HQ TRAC, 110615Z June 1971, Subject, Spot Reports, forward- ed information contained in Journal entries referenced in para 4 above to MACY COC Saigon Vietnam (EXHIBIT RED TAB F). : 7. MACV Directive 335-12, dated 30 September 1970, prescribes the Tespon- sibilities and procedures for expeditious reporting of significant information to the MACY Command Center. Significant events include all incidents, accidents resulting in a major property destruction or loss, or the killing, wounding, or mistreating of a friendly personnel by US or Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (EXHIBIT RED TAB G). 8. Photograph, FYJ3120, HQ 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 17 June 1971 shows the area taken under attack on south side of road. The destroyed build- ings are visible (EXHIBIT RED T4B H). 9. Photograph of Suzuki motorcycle, SN KIO 52-3984, removed from area of the alleged firing incident/acoident (EXHIBIT RED TB I). 10. MAGV Directive 381-24, dated 1 August 1969 extablishes procedures for the proper handling, reporting, and disposition of captured enemy material. This directive defines captured material as any article of supply or equipment taken from the enemy forces in any manner. It defines the responsibility for recovery and evacuation of captured enemy material as a command responsibility at all levels, The prescribed method of evacuation is through normal logistic channels, this directive defines exploitation as the examination, snalysis, evaluation, intelligence production, and use of captured material for imtellige purposes. Exploitation of captured enemy material by US units, below the level of division and separate brigade, is limited. Their primary responsibility is 2 ra CONFIDENTIAL
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FA ume * Roport of Tnvestigation Cone FR I rR, the recove; nr Bi BT ren 11. MACY Directive sok 3 1 Yay 1971, defines the rules of = 2pplies specifically to Fold copters. (RCITAIT RED Tab By 12. LTC Carl A Putnam, Squa roan 19 Yay 197, iar Richard by Optsommnr Teton dommes: SRSA et 1 hitted a written report to him (EIEISIR BLUE TAB BY of A firing incident Cambodia that occurred on 16 May 1971, Ho further testilied thas during Sena Jeiietings tint additional unreported disturbing facts came to his lninesing in he etuess on 37 Tog TT bh COL Hoorih Torn thy opted | ing Officer, 12th Combat Aviation Group (GAG), to appoint an investigating officer from outside the 1-9 Cavalry Squadron. He further stated COL Fern appointed MAJ James R. Rafferty, Executive Officer 3rd Squadron, 17 Cavalry. £7¢ “00k Putnam readily admitted accepting a motorcycle at the 1-9 Cavalry stand- dom party on 23 May 1971, and operating it on Di An Post. Fe testified i ‘that at the time of acceptance he did not know it was connected with this ; bon um lent considered the vehicle as a war trophy (EXHIEITS 13, LIC Harbin 4, Constance, Deputy Commander, 12th CAG, testified that on 27 Yay 1971 that he relayed instructions from COL Fern to MAJ Rafferty to investigate an alleged firing incident in Cambodia, involving A/1-9 Cavalry and prepare a fact shoet with supporting statements on which COL Fern could base a decision of the need to initiate a formal investigation. le further testified that he gave the instructiong tc Nas Rafferty and that he He coL . Fern forgot these exact nstruotionsCiniing ‘the interim period from‘dtirt to completion of, the report. He further stated that COL Fern and he were initially dfsmtisfied with MAJ Rafferty's efforts, but that viewed in retrospect, MAT Bree had satisfactorily accomplished his assigned mission (EXHIBIT RED T4B B-2). 14. MAJ James R. Rafferty, Executive Officer, 3-17 Cavalry testified that, . LIC Constance informed him on 27 May 1971, that COL Fern desired him to conduct an informal investigation of a firing incident in Cambodia involving A/1-9 Cavalry and to prepare a fact sheet on which COL Fern could base a decision for a requirement for a formal investigation, He further testified that vhen ho arrived at the 1-9 Cavalry, on 29 May 1971, he found MAJ Chole had already taken statements from all personnel concerned, so he re-swore the’ personnel ‘to their statements and questioned the respondents about them, but did not record verbatim testimony as he saw no reason to do so in light of the instructions he had received. MAJ Rafferty stated he was thoroughly familiar vith Air Cavalry Operations in Cambodia, the rules of engagement, and ete and that he Satsc nothing unusual about this mission, with the exception > of CFI Amold H. Eooks having accompanied the ARVN Rangers on their growid surveillance portitn of the mission, He further stated that since CPT Brooks CONFIDENTIAL BRR Z
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feo) in : CT: Report of Investigation Concern: F Incident Ac: v 4 Troon, 15% Suan, th Savalng, in Lhe TePULLD of Cambetia (1 had been reprimand I Esme SE, 15. OFM Gifford I. Knight, 4/1-9 Cava: o "low bird" on © 187ay 2971, made o nite A = or Ae le RE Aeneas Az8 in nia View Recomatasanca (VR) sectcs vier fo spotted Putazeus bioyeles and notorycles, a fa of wiloh had packs, around sone = attempted to investigate their presence in this erea, Mhen ‘e personnel in the area refused to cooperate, he requested rocked fire be Placed in an open £161d to attempt to draw out any enemy that might be in ‘the area. He further stated that the personnel started leaving the area acting susplelously, and as he returned to the area he Teceived ground to eir fire (CAF) from 'his right rear and reported this to the “high bird" vio «dived in and rocketed the area, He stated he again geturned and spol v5 bodies, 18 bicycles and 4 motor bikes pik and 2 tin build- i, nines destroyed, her stated his er shot" another military age male, wh wey when the TRAC estigating {cer warned CFT Knight of his rights under « Artiele 31, UCMJ, and advised him of his rights to counsel, CFT Knight requested counsel ,and-refused to make—anyfurkher—sbatenent On advice from his gout defo (EXHIEIT BLUE T4B T and EXHIBIT RED TAB B-4)s #0 mnths are) froithon alobomert 16. SB, Vernon J. Gregory Jr., A/1-9 Cavalry, testified that he was an observer on the "low bird" flown by CFT Knight and that they spotted numerous bicycles in the area under quegtion. He stated that when they attempted to determine 7 what was in the packs,in accordance with practices they had previously used, that the personnel in the area were uncooperative and that CPT Knight requested the "high bird" to place fire near the area, which he did. He further stated that the "igh bird" then rocketed the area and that when they returned to the area he only personally observed ome body. He stated ho observed nothing unusual about this mission (EXHIEIT BLUE TAB H and RED TAB B-5). A 17. SE, John A. Nicholes, A/1-9 Cavalry, was a gunner on the "low bird" flown by CPT Knight, Ho testified he heard GAF and that the appearance of the area lead hin to believe they had spotted a YO bigele convoy. SP, Micholes, in adaftion, tostified thet ho hot one wilttery age male vearlng ial punta nd a long sleeve khaki shirt, vith his H-60 machine gun that was mowsted in he_"ow—bErd Ril they Word making their assessment of danage,after the "high bird" had rocketed the area (EXHIEIT BLUE TAB K and RED TAB B-6). 18. CPT David P. Schweitzer, 4/1-9, the aircraft commander of the "high bird", + testified that at approximately 1230 hours §8 May 1971, the "Low bird" reported sighting several bicycles and motorcycles with packs in an area he had recon- noitred for several days previously, He further testified that he checked with the Vietnamese—INO-when he received a request fo fire and received per- nission to place fire in an adjacent open area near the sighting in en attempt to draw out any enemy that might be present and to cause any civilians present to 4 AL ee ————————————————————
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ae ey PAF, MACTR-IG SUBJECT: Report * RORent of Investigation Gomoerning Firing Tactdent/Acctdent. of P, 18% Squadron, 9th Cavalry, in the Republic of Cambodia (U) ‘take cove / atuarter Placing the fire dn the open area, the "Low brd¥ workin BE gam etumed to the ares and reported receiving Eromd to ar five (41F). / i er fostified he thon rocketed and strafed the area, opening up the bulliings ao FIs Trou sire oukt sen testament oe he | peluested insertion of an ARVN Ranger tean te attempt to find two individuals \_ fnperted to be hiding in tho area, and that when the ARVN Rangers arrived in v © area he fired preparation fire for them immediately prior to their in- sertion. He stated that a misalignment of his rocket tubes caused him to fire so elose to one of UE 1 helicopters carrying the ARVN Rangers that the helicopter vas forced to go around again before landing. He stated he vas unavare that the ARVN Rangers did not have ground to air commmnications when they were inserted (EXHIEIT BLUE TAB L and ED TAB B-7). 19. CPT Bentley C. Humphrey, 4/1-9 Cavalry, testified that he was flying the "high bird" with CPT Schweitaer. His an concerning the events up to the point of insertion of the ARVN Rangers was essentially the same as CFT Schweltzer's testimony, CFT Humphrey testified that he was in Tay Ninh when ers returned and that the ht back civil: key — chickens, pocket combs, wallets Tian g, and numerous items of non- “ar ma tebIaT. Fo Turthor statei ohet 1s vas 4 souton scomerence™s Rangers to 1 an area when they were inserted (EXHL LUE TAB M and RED CS TTT I em 20, CPT Thomas C. Uzanski, 4/1-9 Cavalry, testified that he was the mission commander for this mission and “2 on board the "C and C", Wl 1 helicopter, v/ being furnished by the 229th Asstidllt Helicopter Company and that he cleared the area with the ARVN liaison officer and granted CFT Schweitzer permission to Eid initial fire near the area, CFT Uzanski also testified that he wv saw mua: flashes from weapons in a dike line firing at the "low bird", He further testified that all rules of engagement were observed and that none of his team unnecessarily expended ordnance (EXHIBIT BLUE TAB G and RED TAB B-9). 21. Aspirant Do Huu Cong, S-3 section, 25th ARVN Division, testified that he was accompanying CPT Uzanski in the "C and CV helicopter on 18 May 1971. He identified the aerial photograph (EXHIBIT TAB H) as being the correct area and stated he did not clear the area as a free fire zone or authorize Teconnaissan by fire, but granted permission to "fire when attacked by the enemy. Fe cor- roborated testimony received from CP! Usanski concerning radio transmissions Teceived from the "low bird" and stated his primary reason for being in that e was to observe the area since his unit planned operations in that area in the near future (EXHIBIT RED T4B B-10), 22, WO Richard F. Smail, 229th Assault Helicopter Company, Hirot of the "C a 0" helicopter gave testimony essentially the same as CPT Usanski. Ee stated, that although he did not personally see any GAF, that the evasive actions of the "low bird" and the rise in the inflections of the voice during commm \ 0 . i CONEIDEN IAL
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UUINT LEDs urea Jp” . HACTR-TG SUBJECT: Report of Kroon, 100 sotigation Concerning Pixtng Tnotdent,/docident of iron, 9th Cavalry, in the Republic of Cambodia (U) indicated the "low bira® vas arproxinately 135 to gy fi eCoLvIng CAP. VO Smid further stated thal te flov im So s oach month on similiar rlesions and that ho saw 1g unusual occur during this mission (EXHIBIT RED TAB B-11). 23. 0i2 Roger R. Sant: 2, : . Santo, 229th Assault Helicopter Company, Bo-pilot on the de plied Soul mot identify tho ben fron the aerin) on om radio transmissions, Fe 7 feria stated, that sinco the, helicopter wag making left turns he was unable , w dpigere elites of valuef that would assist in the investigation (EXHIBIT 2. SE, Danald I. Morehouse, 229th Assault Heldcopter Company, the crew chief on the %C and CY helicopter festified ho could not identify the area from the aerial photograph of the area and stated he was unable to make any contribution toward the investigation because he participated in so many missions he could not Tocall any periieulare of this mission (BNIEIT RED TAB B-13). 25. SH, Dale L. Howell, 229th Assault Helicopter Company, was the gunner on thé C and 0" helicopter and vas unable to recall any of the particulars of the incident. (EXHIFIT RED TAB B-14) 26. CHa Davin G. Nolaughlin, 4/1-9 Cavalry, had departed the commnd, However, ho furnished a statement to MAJ Rafferty on 29 May 1971, in which he stated ‘that he received a briefing on station and replaced "white" which was the “low bird" flown by CPD Knight that originally reported taking GAF. C2 Mclaughlin stated he Informed his "high bird" to hold fire as the ARVN Rgnggre were on tho station zeady to be inserted. He stated that the ARVN Vére inserted amd recom toridhyty fire, but that he stopped them before thoy reached the rain avea of interests Ye further stated that the ARVN Rangers met no Tesistance, grabbed what they could, and were extracted. He reported Seeing vOURQTS Civilians and — v it intention of picking up one wounded girl but that she vas already dead (OHTA BIE NE Ie 27. SB, Len J. Shattuck, A/1-9 Cavalry, was the gunner on the "low bird" pilot- od by Gi2 McLaughlin. He testified the ARVN Rangers appeared melodramatic when _they were inserted pinion fired excessively in the area) however, he did not observe anyone engaged by their small arms fire. He stated that there were approximately 15 wounde 1 in the avea and tha he observed 7 males 50-60 years of age, and one female 8-10 years of age, er appeared to bo dead. He refused to answer when questioned if the aircraft No vas in land- ed to attempt to evacuate the wounded. SF HFTington, A/L9 favalry, the ther Tiomber of The alroraft orew,had departed the comnand¥vas mot available for questioning (EXHIBIT BLUE TAB Q and RED T4B B-15). a g 6 a dn ) CONFIDENTIAL
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GONC Uw win wie fips . MACTR-TG I SUBIECT: Report. of Ines: ostigation Conc A Tro erning Firing Incident/Accident of 97, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, in the Beperaic or nsSta (1) 28. CFT Thomas S, Agnes, 4/1-9 as the Tilot ana Gis gape agg CtVALYs testified that on 18 Vay 1971, he a 80 Billa, uho'han departed the comand, was the co r the. eros enn aa a portion of the ARVN Ranger Team that was inserted in rene < 4/15. he ure ho, foam vas accompanied on the grouwd by CFT Ammo H, Brooks, Blasion in th nearty ren to. obtite Erle ToT OE TN te eh 25th ARVN Divito Fomsere Taal i fadivitul Tor urtioning ty she ol “perforn the TenatohT in the contact area. CFT Agnéss stated the AVI ancers “Eiger 4 FON a POF and placed hin on board 418 VEL vith his hands tied and then he tean proceeded through the area. Ho stated the tean met no resistances. tis CFT Agness stated ho did not observe any desd or wounded personnel but did = ued . Fossa a sadia 10 evacuate a wounded girder Me denied rh Trstrvon\ ions of GFT Brooks aa fully loaded vith the ARVN Ranger Teun, end: cape 8 = i low on 1. He also testified bo the ARVN Rangers rar rs mal) arm (XE SEPLuTed PAT abandoned, ono Gla type widentified small arn (SUSI BLUE Ti 29. SP, Gary T. Grawey, A/1-9 Cavalry, testified he was the crew chief on the UHL helicopter, flown by OPT Agness, that carried Captain Amol H, Brooks and the ARVN Ranger Team into the area. He further teatified that. CFT Br o "hog wila® when they deplancd shooting Hp the area although they received no return five. SP Grawey stated he aid Lf... not ses CET Brooks or the ARVN Rangers engage personnel with their small #7 farms, but!&hat in the course of events he did observe 5 to 10 Cambodian _ sonnel that appeared to be wounded, but that he did not know if they were onde ro stron gro ri To, SF, Gravey further testified that tha ARVN Rangers, accompanied by CPT Brooks brought back a motorcycle which was later ¥ given to ITC Putnam,and that he hud observed LTC Fitnam operating the motor— cycle on Di An Post (EXHIBIT BLUE TAB S and RED TAB B-17). N eT 30. SP} Howard M. Dumn, 4/1-9 Cavalry testified he vas the gunner on the UHL, P1own by CPT Agness, that inserted the ARVN Ranger tean,and phat he saw CFT Brooks accompany the team into the area, He also testified to the capture of the detainee, his observing some 10-15 wounded Cambodians, and the extra 0) and disposition of the motorcycle (EXEL BLUE TAB T and RED TAB B-18). i. 31. GFT John T. Liberg, an AHIG pilot, A/1-9 Cavalry, testified that he V Teplaced CPT Schweitzer on station as the "nigh bird" for the hunter-killer ‘ean, He stated that he saw nothing out of the ordinary about this mission and did not expend any ordnance in the area, CF Liberg testified that the area had been cleared as a free fire area, Ho did not see any wounded individuals in the area,but did witness the ARVN "Brown Tean! leaving the area with ducks, chickens, cigarettes, and a IaTge quARTIty of combs. He also saw CPT Bracks : ie motorcycle back to the airer Since that time he has seen this motorcycle Tn the pofsession of TNC Pitman, (EXGIEIT BIVE TAB O and RED TAD 5-19 32. OFT Thomas T. Cappone, vas the co-pilot for the AHIG Cobra aircraft piloted by CPT Iiberg, A/1-9 Cavalry. CPT Cappone substantiated the testimony of OPT Liberg, but did not add anything of significance to it. (EXHIBIT BLUE TAB P and RED T4B B-20). on 4 MEELIS i GONKEDLN 1h
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Lon Blip, lu = Nil, [Tos dome UBIEOT: Report of Investigation Concerning Firing Incidemt/Acctd 42000, Lot Squndron, 9th Cera in Ho Bepveaia of Sembeia (1) 23. SP, Rudolph Koods Jr., crew chief, 4/1-9 Cava: eotified s do foe oF TAT Ig Thy et AL dud, torsion ua ie doe A Etat nm ated She IR . SP Kol notice ual at o arom Tan" insortion; fovover, he aid note that upon extraction the teen yas © aa: Chickens, oom, “tobacco, writ: r, and-a-elvidian—rmato,~ EE TER Ete ees Se TG Putman 2i2irs oT sis mitovere BLE T43 U and RD 143 8-21). 34. Major Richard A. Chilcoat, Troop Commander, A/1-9 Cavalry testified that hs troop alvays carried an ARVN Maison officer aboard the "C and CV aircraft each tino they went on an ARVN support mission into Cambodia, It was the Job of this ARVN INO to define the aren that vas to be worked and obtain the nocessary clearances to fire. Major Chilooat stated that it vas common know- ledge to everyone that US, personnel were not allowed on the ground in BE iE ane oF some such thing, He ‘Stated this had been emphasized inmmerable times at briefings, Major Chilooat was at Tay Ninh when the ARVN Erown Team deplaned the aircraft and noticed that they had chickens, a radio, combs, and tobacco. He also testified oe aa tool possession of a motoreyele fron OFT Beacks atthe ~f=tleld and ater prodented this motoreyole to LIC Fines ot & hall and faeuen) party, ? Major Chileoat got tHe créWs LogethsT WoW They Bad returned from This particular mission and discussed it with them. At that time it was almost unanimously agreed upon that there was a lot of Irdiscriminate TirThg ty The ARVN "Brown Team" upon their insertion and that this firing had caused the civilian casualities. later on That same SvemInE, Major Chilcoat conducted another neetine—wi the pilots Involved, enatieceived another impression at "high bird" after the "low bird" had taken fire, co have caused the civilian < cagualities. No one saw the ARVN "Brown Tewm" members engaging civilians, Major Chilcoat stated that the normal procedure for handling captured material was followed in all cases, with the exception of the motorcycle. It was not followed in this particular case because it was "an effort to build some, not build, but maintain some ekprit, just more or less as a presentation to the Squadron | Comander. since! this vas the last day of operations for the Squadron", lajor Ciilooat testified that he had told the officers of his troopat an officers * call about three days prior to this mission, that he would like to get a motor- cycle for the Squadron Commander. At this time he made it clear that it had to bo enemy equipment or taken as a result of a contact. Major Chilcoat stated that he believed that the motorcycle was taken from the building where all the other bicycles were located in the area of contact (EXHIBIT BLUE TAB B, BLUE TAB C and RED T4B B-22). 35, SP5 Michael L. Williams (EXHIBIT BLUE T4B E), end SP5 Dennis E., Holzen (EXHIBIT BLUE T4B F) and SP Steven C. Koelle (SXHIEIT BLUE TAB V) 811 fron A Troop, 1st Sqd, 9th Cav., were not present when the incident took place and could not contribute to this investigation, a A 5 CONFIBEN HA L
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: GON 11), BN Gly, Prngid ; MACTRTG SUBJECT: Report of Tnvastigation o an enceming Firing Tnotdent/Acotdont 3 4 F008, 18% Sauadron, Sth Gevaley, bn Lhe Bevemnie ot Sombetta (0) 36. MSG Doung Van Van, the ARVN ve; ron Toan” platoon leader, or um ; itm, SITE S80 TL rom tot ton seer ai or an of the firing incident mooident, Ea SE ga 5 doad men’ 1n the asen aroma i Lomita ne SE a dai ag siuien: Ho further stated there na mo abandgied pduipment snd Shat he s © bieycles vere of communist mae beseuse Shite roar ors n TO Gena thr nin 2 cmmies mks beoserithtte intent penile ho US Army Captain that lead them on tho assilt, in removing a” blue’ motos velo from the battls field (EXHIBIT RED TAB Bi23). | 27. CPT Amold H, Brooks, A/1-9 Cavalry had been sypgquently transferred to Fort Knox, Kentucky. In Tosponse to the investigate officer's request £ the Jnepector General, Fort knox, Co a83tet in he ArvestiEa pe {F. BrooksuGestified that ho or Chilooat had discussed ol ig-a_ar vehicle fof a trophy, but that hie did not consider this to have the force of one gin ta 5 Et testified thutho accompanied the ARVN Erowm ‘oan on thie round in Cambod: B He Jew 1t vas again: Fo { rr pe Ee RI a ee some Cambodians civilians with superficial flesh vounds, end, some destroyed motorcycles, and bloyoles., Ho stated he did not see the ARVN Brown Team Sranayort thy proprty wie, Tron’ tho aren, a siased Frey sssistod him 1n Tonoving the motores otter er orosented to Putnam. GPT Brooks furfher stated he considerod the motorcycle a var trophy and a1d not, consider he vas stealing it, Fe further stated he reported the motorayele among the captured and destroyed material (EXHIBIT RED T4B B-2 and EXHISIT BLUE TAB N). 38. 2IT Nguyen Van Fay, an observer from the ARVN 25th Infantry Division, testified that he accompanied CFT Amold K. Brooks on the grownd in Cambodia in the vicinity of WU 521048 on 18 May 1971, He stay JRL vas devastated bry $hat he\(6nly observed 2 men about 40 years ola 1 were lightly wounded. He Stebed—, d1d not observe any dead or wounded WAAC soldiers, Fe further stated thay dotained one Inatvidual and took bir to She 9th ARV Reglasntel Hoaaquasters, 2 Srwen-Yem tay-ststodytiey Fils individual rovaaled that aout 200 NVA/VG, had been in this areas WII fay Stated the AUN Brow Team found 2 oten rifles used for training, aui-thot Hey destroyed 1 onda motorcycle by shooting it up and bhat—the ARN Broun Toan, removed the Blue Su: or CFT Brooks. 2LT Hay stated he did not see the ARVN Brown Team lobt any civilian property. vHe statednbecause of the number of people versus the amount of food in the area Ghat he Bolloved tmt this vas a VOAVA supply point) (EXHIBIT RED TAB B-25). V.(C). DISCUSSION. 39. On 18 May 1971, ITC Carl M, Putnam, Commanding Officer, 1-9 Cavalry, received some information thatdistunbed him, concerning an alleged firing incident/accident involving 4/1-9 Cavalry. The clan t/ucotent was reported as occurring on or about 1200 hours 18 May 1971 in the vicinity of] Republic of Cambodia, As a GONE id; A180 Putnam directed Major NERA Ya : 2 > EE
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a Gop hig, , LN gp, fie Gr MACTR-IG co SUBS: Report of Tovaett gation co he neon Piring Inotdent/Accident R092) Lat Sauadron, "oi Gomming Firing has Spmnodia (0) fachard dh Setloont, Commanding ores v, Tonemt oar, or? 1-9 Cavalry to submit nin a veitben v eof the taal igs T Chtleont subareas veges report on 19 ra stant iets a totetatings opor o Tnvistiaetice te fortimed a anaske, LAITLUELLEL SEER pertnent ma ,Jinvestigation to be (inducted by an officer from outside ne 4/1-9 Cavalry, 7 TEC Pron append Has HS SrEASeT fron out CrE1%er, 13 Oayatiy te (oniuct an dnvestigation of th aiisges firing noldant/acidont om aed {PLE TAB A). Tatar that suns mosis: #TH3-Ohoto-bogen- bo dnast patios cl ee SCR A et Comsanding Ostio 25 Caradon rots ; S30p% iambors ot pe gE en drm aval Eon sent Hneitetaty, iyo) es Officer, 10th Combat Aviation Sroup, (CAG). appoint an investigabing orttecs from another yinit, COL Sem tnatructed LIC Harbin A. Constance, Deputy Commanding Officer, 126°CiG, to ESE, In. Sonch vith MAS Janes R. Rafterty, Brsouim officer, 3-17 Cavalry,"¥s have him informally investigate the matter and prepare o Jat shost wilh supporting. statensmys en oro ot Fern could base a decision Of Whether a formal investigation sronnd conducted or-not, LIC Constance relayed these instructions to Mig Rafferty, whose date estimated return from overseas (DEROS) was 11 June 1971, 41. When MAT Rafferty arrived at 4/1-9 Cavalry and began his investigation 4.90 29 May 1971, he found MAJ Chole) had already taken statements from the wit- nesses, MAJ Rafferty accepted these statements, again swore tho witnesses, and questioned them concerning their $estimony, but did not record verbatim Jostinony. Major Rafferty submitted his compyste report, dated 5 Juno 1971, to COL Fern (BXHIEIT RED TAB 0). 42, On Teceiving MAJ Rafferty's report on 7 June 1971, COL Fern, whose DEROS was 11 June 1971, did not approve MAJ Rafferty's recommendations, COL Fern then brought the alleged firing incident /accident to ‘the attention of the Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Comnand (TRAC) during the even- ing of 7 June 1971, He stated ho was not satisfied with toh investigation, or ¥orea to hab effect. Tho Ohlef. of Staff instructed Lig hopory oo Clark, Stalf Judge Advocate, TRAC, to review the report of investigation St had boon submitted to COL Fom, LIC Clark reviewed the paper tar concurred vith COL Ferns opinion that the imestigation was mot surtiiens to Clark Sopomended 10 the Chief of Staff, TRAC, that the Inoident to forunr investi- gated, preferably by an officer from Headquarters TRIG. 43. The Chief of Staff, TRAC, designated [126 Sok v. Mantooth,) Deputy Inspector Jeneral, TRAC, as the investigating officer on T0 June 1971, and personally inforned the TRAC investigating officer, that the Comanding General, TRAC desired a thorough investigation of this incident. and thatthe investigating missions. - CONE yan owas,
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J GONG LLL, Xl Katy: SHiTEGT: Report of. SECs ‘eatigation Concerning Firing Inotdent/Accident; of A 2000, 1st Squadzon, 9th Cavalry, in ume Bepmi iceident of 1) 4 Tho previous dnfornal investigation, performed by ¥ajor Tazes R. Rafferty, ecutive Qiioer, 3-17 Cavalry, ua 50 beter and wneraroosions tot et aT Investigating Officer immediately contacted MAJ Rafferty; who wns out Thocons A Eimear 1 Rafferty, va davolved dn an abtenpt,to conceal information pertaining be tho investigations Questioning revealed thes way Rafferty, had received instructions zelayed ty, LTC Constance, which viewed An metxoapeot, re confusings Iithensh 4g Rafferty used AR 1504 asia guide, he did mot attenpt to perform an inves | Heation of the thoraughnass xequtzed ty tho Tegulation, nor did ho anticipate, [ In view of his instructions, that COL Fem¥yould later interpret 16 as being | 2 Sgmplete davostigabion. | 1G Constance later corroborated HAJ Rafertyia | + astEtion that ha had mot boon apnised that a thorough formal inyasbipiiion 7 Yas dosized, 110 Constance algo agreed that the instructionsuhen vieved in Zebrospectytiora confusing, ssdlStated HAY 1a the Tesh Of activity of gebiing ~ COL Fem cleared for DERQS otc, that they had forgotten the exact instructions passed ho Major Rafferty. | | 45. ginning on 11 Jue 1971, the TRAC investigating officer had all known | ¥ltnesses, that still remained in Vistnan recalled and ipitisted g completo [ investigation of the allaged firing incijent/aceident)”ucotiontin, them on | Previously submitted statements, pte additional "evidence, shd taking hed vorbatin testimony, hErmonshondbhe—investisatiof the investigating officer's “activities were closely coordinated with the S74, TRACK facause of tho, veTvans (nature of the incidenty 5 HA rink ms 46. Questioning of tho witnesses revealed that on or about 1230 hours, 16 Yay 1971, in the vicinity of URMICHIANCOGIAINAtes WUS21048] Republic of Cambodih, members of Mi Cavalry, dorking as a hunter-killer tean,were conducting a visual ~ reconnifssance mission, at pres toe toureg J the est of their Enon or an area in which recénissands by fire Was permitted, Aotording to testimony of US personnel, tho avea had heen slcared by, tlio ARVN 25th Division INO, @spivant Do Haw Comp, fAspivent Cong dented ’, i By a 6" and stated that the Americans. automatic . ally returned fire when they rece: fj GAF. Aopiant—Bomys—command—of—tire Serena vor Sete) HLthough ho vas responsible for interpreting, granting clearances, and vorking with the US. personnel supporting and coordina §ing tha mission of ‘the 25th ARVN Division, print Come Lommaud oF Hhe Eyl Ang 42 was very Lim ied, 47, "The b/1=9 Cavalry, huterskiller team vas composed of a "low Bra", 06d, Light Olsexvation Helicopter, flown by GPT Clifford L, Fight, ami i carried 2 orev members: SH, Vernon J. Gregory, the observer, and SF, John S. IMoholes, the guuner. The Vhigh bird", AHIG, Attack Eelicopter, commonly ~ luo as a Cobra vas flown by CPT Bentley C. Humphrey and vas commanded by CFT David P. Sohveitzer, Also assisting in the mission vas a UHL utility helicopter, known as the Command and Control, "Ciand C", flown by {OL Rihard 1 GON fia ; ONg biauy HM,
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3 GONEIN 1 fon, 1 le ix uom-10 SURECT: Report of Investigation Concern Firing Incident/Accident of Lgteoon, 2a Studien, su Coir J Lo 4. Smasd, (85-pllotod: by. G2 Rodger Re-Santos The crew chief was SEL Donald Lu Morhiiepfand the. gunes vas Sik Dale Ty Hotels: ALL vere penvers of 4 _ 29th dsqfi1t Helicoptor Company. Tho mission commander, CFF Tnonas. da Upfibot, [ 4/1-9, Cavalry, vasa Passenger. on board the. "C and C' aa’ vas the 25th ARTA Division Liaison Officer, Aspirant Cong. 4€+ During recamaissnce ‘through a small group of build- is idingenc on menios, HMI R ay Cal Coutp of Pull Moy ay nunflerous partially concealed bicyclesy and motorcycles, somcsf hick Someta ral lars and ‘packs. Tho appearance of the Lions aroused she. Mov bird" crouts suspicion and they motioned, from the helicopter, for the individuals in the area $o open.up the packs on these vehicles. ito is a com zenly employed oesiilliammsing to Shatin" 3 rer on the grow . in the area did not comply and started moving away from the area,and looking back tovard the buildings in a suspicious manner. OFT Knight,from the "low bird" called CPP Schweitser, in. the "high bird", and requested he place probing fire moar the area in an attempt to. force into’ action any enemy personnel that | might. be ini the areas and to cause any civiliang, in the area to move out. The | "high bird" nade a pass and. placed 2 white phostprous rockets in an open field | about, 50 yards south of the buildings. Tho: Mot bird" proceeded back into. tne area,Foportod wecsiving ground to air fire (GAF), and then requested the area be attacked. Armed helicopters are required to defend their members in accord- A ance with annex C paragraph 2f(5) MACV Directive 525-13, 1 May 1971 (EXHIBIT 5 RED TAB K). The "low yt ‘took evasive action, departing the area while # similtanecusly reporting, it had taken GAF, although it did not receive any hits. yi The "high bird" then came in and rocketed and strafed the buildingg and surrounding area with appronipgtsly 15 # 18 rounds of high explosive rockets ahd mac- hine gun fireJ ‘the roof off one large building and sotéing, it on . fire, along with some other thatched roof, structures in the area. Tn the process several bicycles and motorcycles were destroyed and more were reveal- ed in the buildings. Approximately 6 adult males, and 1 female and 1 male sub teenage children were either killed or very seriously wounded, aang 15-20 other personnel were wounded or gave. the. appearance of being wounded by the aerial rocket attack, The "low bird" then returned to the area for battle Damage Assessment (EDA), reported the above results, and spotted one addition- ally rv age mls attanting to seek cover ty Hlusing into» Jytlding. The om gunner, SP} Nicholes, machine-gunned the building toiich he was « fleeing apparently killing the individual as he fell part cut and part in the + building he had reached, Shortly after this, the "low bird" departed the station because of low fuel bi replaced by another QHOA "low bird" flown by D2 Davin G, Mclavghling: crew chisf, wes SP, Odell Harrington)and b= $F, Ien J. Shattuck, the Gunter, 411 were members of A4/1-9 Cavalry. 12 GONE Lisa \ 4 Elisa gi Ie ind
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4 Lou, : nia, SH O2 Roan, op Tvestigats, 4 Troop, 190 oRceming Firing Tnotdant/hoetdent of Sm % Stuadvon, 9th Guvatzy, tn Lhe perien/ a Camotia (v) A En 0 th tn tin a pr sortie o un 48h Bangor Go "00neL8HnE of agmmostiasedy 50 ninth inserts Sho AST, SeBtact, but. on o giterio Yer Helicopter homo th vicinity of the fl Bart of pa jem erent mission at the tines One wi helicopter, ing ! Pliotod ty Gia moun Bean, wan comands or a nls” Aenosay AEE Sumer vag Sy esses Baits, ng are chief, wes SP Gary T. Gravey, ‘the Dur Gp Oh J Ges Tho scbond UR Felicopter was piloted hy Ho teks Jackson, the poy hie as 55 meter Covas and tho gunner vas S24 Steves G. otha) BEL Tombora of 4/1-9 alive: The ARVN Brown Tosn, Vgc mar acconpani®d by a US Army Captain, Anold. Hu Brooks, Troop: Operatisny Officer, A/ics Cavalry, was orginally on on oBagle PUGhtd ith the mission to aes individual for questioning, This team wag diverted to the contact area and inserted. arten ‘the. Janding z0ne tho Prepared with suprression fine by CO Sehweliser iu tho high bird", Tn ! ‘the Process, CPT Schveitzer fired. so close to one of the UH1A helicopters carrying rert of the ARVN Brown Team, that, the helicopter was forced to £0 around Baan pefore landing, CF! Sohuaitsor stated hia Tosket tubes ware net correctly bore sighted. At this point CPT Schweitzer returncd to Tay Ninh for fuel and i was replaced i tiagion by another AHIG "high bird" bei] yo John 2 Liberg jand (Cf Thaodore I. Capone, the—domptioty both of A/1-9 Cavalry. They expended nf ordaance, 20. lihon the ARVN Brow Team members deplaned from their helicopters they ~~ ongaged, to the mximm capability of ‘their individual weapons, ail objects on or near’the landing sone that. could afford cover ou. someeitennt. enemy. This tactical procedure gave the appearance of reckless firing and melotramtics bo some of the US personnel, especially since no return fire wos Tossived, To person questioned, concerning this incident, at any time saw an on Bee Team member, or. fe Army I meh Sv smal ad ’ ine 1, a ee BT fu yy Sobiaiy ini therrockebed:asea that - ambulatory, ad. moved pth ot the immedigto area before or during Sree re "high bird, (es +7;,30m8 of the replacement Sl 5 kok, bE fhe "high birdl, db, ae mn A BOE 2 Len J. Shattuck estimated Soprosiestely 3 Lid ee in tae been, ignded. area to a Rial i es Tho, ARTY Brown Teen mone a abick sweep of the area, encountered no, resistance,and departed with the items they had looted. iso ON on hank IS Ming 171, 51, MAJ Richard A, Chilcoak, Commpning Officer, A/1-9 Cavalry, ad expressed a desire to the officers of to LTC Carl M, Putnam, a captured motorcycle, or motor bike, for Bamgyon to os Le Ss Sauadzon, Coppgpger, 1.9 Cavalsy, during oT ; fete the! B® This 13 CORNmr + LONE E35 i ERT ‘ VENTS;
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/ MONE Sol MACTR-TG 7 SUBTEG: Ro Koo t Tivestigation gone P, 15t Squasee, Faing Firing Moident/Acoident of This, OXEronsed. dans Ms 9th Cavalry, in the Repuniis of Gembossa (0) Te of uy Sebloted as being a wu Chtloont, mioubtedty tntiuenced crt Brooks, who us ; nally tg riodies a aioghgEressive, und highly motivates officer Yeinten~ 0d £0 wooden te, Bros Fler prohibiting US ground troops in’ Cambodia, Of the rocietar ail oy oun Tean which looted the buildings and grounds ’ Tadios, (elvilian ayers UN Brown Tau took chickens, ducks; siviiies watnces STE sales’ hg from the area,and a quantity of combs, tobacco, and Blue Suztict Pitan Std that had bebn damaged, OFT Brocke brown pack a arproximtaty eorele; SN KIO 52-3964, in a good state. of sepeie. art £00k possegsyon” lol), kilometers , registered on the odometer. MAJ Shilemat Subsequently on OF the motorcycle, with knowledge of how it was obtained, and ly presented it to LIC Putnam at the stand down party. 52. LTC Putnam accepted the mot pezated the unregistered vehicle ok fon pS RS gel een Teglstering the vehicle as a privafoly owned conveyance, or a var trophy. In the course of events that followed, INO Bytnan realized pis position in the incident was vulnerable to criticism, Hig aleo learnedylie could not register the vehicle, The motorcycle was then turned ‘into the S-2, 12th CAG, on 12 June 1971, where it vas processed as captured war material, and disposed of under the provision of MACV Directive 381-24. 53. Operational reports of this incident were submitted 1£1305H May 1971, to the Tactical Operations Center, TRAC, and a delayed report submitted on 11 June 1971,, to the Combined Operations Center, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, under the provision 6f MACV Directive 335-12, dated 20 September 1970, VI.(C). CONCLUSIONS. 54. On 18 May 1971, members of 4/1-9 Cavalry,while fen authorized aerial reconnaissance mission in support of the ARVN 25th Infantry Division in the vicinity of UDM Grid Coordinates WU 521048, Republic of Cambodia, killed approximately 6 military age males, 2 sub-teenage children, and Wounded 15-20 Cambodian civilian personnel by aerial rocket and machine gun fires 55, The OH6A helicopter, flown by CPT Clifford L. knight, the "low bird" of 4/1-9 Cavalry, "Hnter-Killer" team, received ground to air fire from ome or more locations within the area of the firing incident accident and requested that fire $e be placed on the location, 36. The ARVN Rangers used standard suppressive fire techniques during insertic In the area that nay have been excessive, considering the conditions ab the tine, but did not cause casualities with’ their individual weapons. u AEE oo CONE Ejiiri:v. NEiDE vs,
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Gone bravo AM YACTR-IG . SUBJECT: Report of Kegon, 1m eobieation Songerning Firing Tnottant/Accidort, of | oe uadron, 9th Cavalry, in the Republic of Cambodia (U) / 57. The ARVN Rang | miittary materia on i o0ed the erea of the firing incident/acoident of non— %°f an undeternined value, for their personal use. A 58. AUS Army Ca y tain, Amold H, Brooks, A/1-9 Ca Led the ARVN Rangers on thy peneniny . Brooks, 4/1-9 Cavalry, accompanied the Can of sf rs of whieh he har on poz, e501 in viclatlon of stunting ore OFT Arnold H. Brooks looted a blue Suzuki motorcycle, SN KIO 52-3984, om the area of the firing incident/accident. 60. CPT Arnold H. Brooks ed desire 3 i actions vere probably due to an expressed desire mde by his commanding officer, MAJ Richard A. Chilcoat, to obtain a motorbike v for presentation to the Squadren Commander during the unit's stand down. 61. MAJ Richard A. Chilcoat took possession of the looted motorcycle and subsequently presented it to LIC Carl 4. Putnam. 62, LIC Carl M, Pubnan accepted the looted motorcycle, retaining and operating ton Di in Post while attempting to register it as a privately cuned conveyance or a war trophy. VIII.(U) RECOMMENDATION. 63. It is recommended that: a. This report be approved and forwarded through chamnols to Headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, in accordance with MACV Regulation 20-4. b. That consideration be given to informing the Commanding General IIT ARVN Corps, of the conduct of members of the ARVN "Erown Team". c. 4 copy of this investigation be furnished to the Commanding General, 34 Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), for appropriate action and a reply to the Commanding General, HQ TRAC, as to the action taken. ¥ GON:
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“Brooks Incident,” Final Summary by the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, May 1, 1972 EXCERPTS FROM AN EXCLUSIVE ARCHIVE OF U.S. MILITARY DOCUMENTS COMPILED BY THE INTERCEPT
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CONFIDENTIAL CAS OF 1 May 197 219. 5w0oks mere TED Liscaon: 1. Excessive bomburaneo, vy 3 age of a Cambor 5) Violation of tha sures illase. SUBJEGI/SUSTECTS: 1. 170 Carlo. Cpe hy SUBJEGT/SUSPECIS: 1. axl C. Putnam 20 MAT Richard Chilooues eb ah Srols O8Y Div. 3. GFT Arnold K. Brooks, sams wpe 1°F CV DL. 40 GPT Clitsord 1. Riper mooie: 5. CPT David B, ‘Schweitses, save unit 6. CPT thionds C. Uzanski, Same wnit 7. 8P4 John S41 Nicholes, same unit. CONPLATNANT: CO, 1/9¢h Cav, lst Cav Div. BACKGROUND (C): ‘A US helicopter "hunter-killer" team, vhile on a vious Toconnaissance mission over Cambodia on 18'May 71, engaged a builtee area with excessive fire power. A ground reconnaissance condueted by an ARVN platoon which was Inserted by helicopters followed the aerial attack. The aerial atcack and ground recon resulted in several Cambodians being killed and wounded, and one male being detained for interrogation. Members of the ARVN platoon and a US CPT, who accompanied the platoon, retained property removed from the village vhen they were extracted. k STATUS/PROGNOSIS (GC): Investigation completed; substantiated. An davestigation UP AOU Dix 20-4 was conducted an the ropults foriarded to HQ, DA. The investigation revealed that on/8 fay 71, / helicopter huneer-killer team from Trp A/L/9th Cay vas of wvisuei-Fecon mission in Cambodia. Crew members of the LOH helicopter observed a number of motor cycles and bicycles with packs near a small village which they suspected was an enemy ‘convoy. Visual indicators were given to the villagers to 3 open the packs for inspection. Ordnance was fired near the village to dray fire and force the inhabitants into the open for observation after they did not comply with the request. On a subsequent pass the pilot of the LOH heard gunfire behind him and notified the gunship that he was taking fire. The mission GO in the comand and control (C&C) helicopter y saw muzzle flashes of automatic fire from a dike 100 meters south of the village and so advised the cobra gunship, which fired rockets at the dike i and at buildings near it, The gunner aboard the observation helicopter E engaged various targets in the village i gun fire. Gunship 3 preparatory Eire preceded the landing of an ARVN platoon, which had been | diverted from another mission. A US CPT accompanied the platoapyon the | ground in violations of standing orders. The troops, reconnottering by |. fire, did not search bunkers for enemy forces, nor were enemy weapons of |: other war materiel found, One wounded Cambodian male was taken aboard an aircraft for interrogation at the base camp. Civilian casualties were p estimated at eight dead, including two children, 15 wounded, and three or four structures destroyed, There is mo evidence that che wounded were § 0 y _DIWHGPADED AT 3 YEAR IFIERVALS ne NOT AUTOMETIOALLY DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL 200 0E 220010
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CONFIDENTIAL (hs of vay 759 209. BROOKS INCIDENT (continues) rovided medical treatment by either US or an eporced friendly casualties. Other than the morse gril fo8 mo hoard by the pilot of the LOW, there appears to fuse pei ind to alr fire ee. che! toviit ve natieoptor worn. horn, t eve Sens wo ovis Drees fia eEecTats wha Letos qoencinims aomiezs of the BRYN platen Seutlles tobacco, poultry, and radfos, and the US GPT returned to dhe mimes th F Letng on the ground approxinately 30 minutes. The motorsycre a tie ted to the Sqdn CO vho, after several days, requested an investigss ios of the incident and turned in the motoreycle fo a maintensnce sollebring Ee Tin I ves eee Dereety seston ns pe re ally, ers of reprimand were issued to LTC Putnam and MAJ Chilcoat for thelr actions and/or TRATEIONS concerning This Tneldmi, Courcomavetel charges preferred against CPT Brooks were dismissed by CG US Amy Amor and Tratning Center Fort Knox, XY on 21 April 1972. The CC, Ft Kaox, however, gave CFI Brooks an administrative letter of reprimend for his actions, No action was taken against the other subjects: WIINESSES: Members of Trp A/L/3th Cav, 1st Gav Div. 3 INITIATED BY WHOM: CO, 1/9th Cav. RESPONSE T0 INITIATOR: CO, 1/Sth Cav was. interviewed.