Documents
Iowa Fusion Center and Omaha FBI Wind Energy Security Exercise December 2019 Report
Aug. 23, 2020
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
(U//LES) Accessibility of Electric
Transmission Equipment at Iowa Wind
Farms Likely Provides Opportunity for
Environmental Extremist Attacks To
Discourage Wind Energy Expansion
Alternative Analysis
(U) PREPARED BY OMAHA FIELD OFFICE
CO-AUTHOR IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE / FUSION CENTER
2 DECEMBER 2019
FB I AAI A0 4 9 2 0 1 9 1 2 0 2
(U) This document is classified: Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive.
(U) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and may be distributed within the federal government (and its contractors), U.S.
intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution
beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is
stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not
be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited
from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website on an unclassified network without first obtaining
FBI approval.
(U) Alternative Analysis Intelligence Assessment template approved for fiscal year 2020, as of 1 October 2019.
1
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
(U//LES) Accessibility of Electric
Transmission Equipment at Iowa Wind
Farms Likely Provides Opportunity for
Environmental Extremist Attacks To
Discourage Wind Energy Expansion
Alternative Analysis
(U) PREPARED BY OMAHA FIELD OFFICE
CO-AUTHOR IOWA DEPARTMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE / FUSION CENTER
2 DECEMBER 2019
FB I AAI A0 4 9 2 0 1 9 1 2 0 2
(U) This document is classified: Unclassified//Law Enforcement Sensitive.
(U) LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE: The information marked (U//LES) in this document is the property of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and may be distributed within the federal government (and its contractors), U.S.
intelligence, law enforcement, public safety or protection officials, and individuals with a need to know. Distribution
beyond these entities without FBI authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is
stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not
be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited
from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website on an unclassified network without first obtaining
FBI approval.
(U) Alternative Analysis Intelligence Assessment template approved for fiscal year 2020, as of 1 October 2019.
1
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Executive Summary
(U//LES) The FBI’s official assessment is environmental extremists a possibly will increase their
criminal activity against the industrial wind industry. Given the high level of uncertainty and lack
of reliable reporting on this issue in Iowa and Nebraska, FBI Omaha, in conjunction with the Iowa
Division of Intelligence and Fusion Center (Iowa DOI/FC), conducted a Red Hat exercise to
improve collection against and harden security at potential wind farm targets. The accessibility of
electric transmission equipment b at Iowa wind farms likelyc provides opportunity for attacks to
discourage the expansion of wind energy operations. While only 6.3 percent of the United States’
total energy production came from wind in 2017, 37 percent of Iowa’s total energy that year was
wind-based. By 2019, Iowa had 4,859 wind turbines disbursed across the state, the third most in
the United States. Despite growth of the wind energy sector in Iowa, opponents cite health risks,
damage to farmlands, lower property values, and bird kills as reasons to discontinue use of wind
turbines. Based on the Red Hat exercise, FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC estimated that, as
wind energy projects become more common, there is a roughly even chance that attacks against
wind energy assets in Iowa by environmental extremists will occur. These acts would likely
inspire similar attacks, thereby generating higher energy costs for consumers as energy
companies attempt to recover their losses.
(U) Analytic Methodology
(U//FOUO) In February 2019, FBI Omaha, the Iowa DOI/FC, and an USBUS private energy
sector partner held a Red Hat analytic exercise in which two teams—composed of federal, state,
and local law enforcement personnel—identified methods environmental extremists might use to
attack wind turbines. The Red Hat exercise approach was chosen to identify vulnerabilities
associated with energy infrastructure, including conventional and wind energy assets. Wind
turbines were specifically chosen due to the limited instances of documented, real-world attacks
against wind energy assets in Iowa. The exercise used a four-team format, with each team
developing a notional attack plan against an energy facility in Iowa. Within the notional exercise,
facilitators tasked two teams to consider how they would target individual wind turbines and
equipment directly connected to the turbines, while the other two teams considered how they
would target electrical substations. For purposes of the exercise, these teams had access only to
open source information, but could surveil the targets physically and use any real-world knowledge
they already possessed to simulate the possibility of insider threats. Two teams also had one
participant each from the private energy sector partner, who functioned as an insider actor. Finally,
the notional plots had to disrupt energy operations in a noticeable way.
a
(U) An environmental extremist refers to an individual who believes criminal actions—which may involve threats of
violence or actions that intentionally damage, interfere, or cause the loss of any real or personal property—are
necessary and justified to end perceived exploitation or destruction of our natural resources or environment.
b
(U) Electric transmission equipment consists of the pad-mounted transformer and the transmission wires that connect
a turbine to transformers and substations. These components are located outside the physical structure of the turbine.
c
(U) See Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood.
2
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Executive Summary
(U//LES) The FBI’s official assessment is environmental extremists a possibly will increase their
criminal activity against the industrial wind industry. Given the high level of uncertainty and lack
of reliable reporting on this issue in Iowa and Nebraska, FBI Omaha, in conjunction with the Iowa
Division of Intelligence and Fusion Center (Iowa DOI/FC), conducted a Red Hat exercise to
improve collection against and harden security at potential wind farm targets. The accessibility of
electric transmission equipment b at Iowa wind farms likelyc provides opportunity for attacks to
discourage the expansion of wind energy operations. While only 6.3 percent of the United States’
total energy production came from wind in 2017, 37 percent of Iowa’s total energy that year was
wind-based. By 2019, Iowa had 4,859 wind turbines disbursed across the state, the third most in
the United States. Despite growth of the wind energy sector in Iowa, opponents cite health risks,
damage to farmlands, lower property values, and bird kills as reasons to discontinue use of wind
turbines. Based on the Red Hat exercise, FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC estimated that, as
wind energy projects become more common, there is a roughly even chance that attacks against
wind energy assets in Iowa by environmental extremists will occur. These acts would likely
inspire similar attacks, thereby generating higher energy costs for consumers as energy
companies attempt to recover their losses.
(U) Analytic Methodology
(U//FOUO) In February 2019, FBI Omaha, the Iowa DOI/FC, and an USBUS private energy
sector partner held a Red Hat analytic exercise in which two teams—composed of federal, state,
and local law enforcement personnel—identified methods environmental extremists might use to
attack wind turbines. The Red Hat exercise approach was chosen to identify vulnerabilities
associated with energy infrastructure, including conventional and wind energy assets. Wind
turbines were specifically chosen due to the limited instances of documented, real-world attacks
against wind energy assets in Iowa. The exercise used a four-team format, with each team
developing a notional attack plan against an energy facility in Iowa. Within the notional exercise,
facilitators tasked two teams to consider how they would target individual wind turbines and
equipment directly connected to the turbines, while the other two teams considered how they
would target electrical substations. For purposes of the exercise, these teams had access only to
open source information, but could surveil the targets physically and use any real-world knowledge
they already possessed to simulate the possibility of insider threats. Two teams also had one
participant each from the private energy sector partner, who functioned as an insider actor. Finally,
the notional plots had to disrupt energy operations in a noticeable way.
a
(U) An environmental extremist refers to an individual who believes criminal actions—which may involve threats of
violence or actions that intentionally damage, interfere, or cause the loss of any real or personal property—are
necessary and justified to end perceived exploitation or destruction of our natural resources or environment.
b
(U) Electric transmission equipment consists of the pad-mounted transformer and the transmission wires that connect
a turbine to transformers and substations. These components are located outside the physical structure of the turbine.
c
(U) See Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood.
2
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Alternative analysis challenges official assessments, established mental models, or consensus
and expands the range of possibilities considered to enhance understanding and minimize the risk
of surprise or intelligence failure.
(U) Scope Note
(U//FOUO) This alternative analysis intelligence assessment focuses on threats to wind turbines or
equipment directly connected to wind turbines in Iowa posed by environmental extremists. While
neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence suggesting environmental extremists
intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, the construction of wind turbines across the state changes the
physical landscape and has caused the death of birds. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC assume
environmental extremists will consider incorporating destructive attacks as a means to counter the
expansion of wind energy assets in Iowa, especially if peaceful protests are perceived as
ineffective. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC further assume environmental extremists believe
damage to the electric transmission equipment connected to wind turbines would discourage wind
energy companies from expanding their operations. Reporting that identifies environmental
extremists conducting reconnaissance on wind farm locations, monitoring law enforcement activity
in areas near wind farms, or planning to perform physical attacks against wind farms would
increase the likelihood of criminal activity against wind farms. This is the first product addressing
threats to wind farms specifically in Iowa by environmental extremists.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO) Reporting in this alternative analysis intelligence assessment was derived primarily from information
presented and discussed during a February 2019 Red Hat analysis involving an USBUS private energy sector partner,
FBI employees, Iowa Department of Public Safety analysts and agents, and representative of local law enforcement.
The exercise focused on identifying vulnerabilities associated with wind farms and electrical substations in Iowa.
Analysis of this exercise was the most significant source of information for this product. Information provided by an
Iowa utility company; a human source with direct access in Iowa; media reporting, based on foreign law enforcement
statements; and a survey of open source geospatial data provided input on the viability of attack plans and the
vulnerabilities of wind turbine equipment. Additional reporting from private wind energy lobbyist groups, regional
media outlets, and websites of anti-wind-energy activists provided context regarding the threat environment. This
collection occurred between November 2015 and September 2019. The reporting was current as of 23 September 2019.
(U//LES) Accessibilty of Transmission Equipment Likely Would Provide
Environmental Extremists with the Opportunity To Target Wind Energy in Iowa
(U//LES) In February 2019, FBI Omaha, the Iowa DOI/FC, and an USBUS private energy sector
partner held a Red Hat analytic exercise in which two teams—composed of federal, state, and
local law enforcement personnel—identified methods that environmental extremists might use to
attack wind turbines. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC found that if environmental extremists
perceive peaceful means as ineffective in preventing the expansion of wind energy in Iowa, the
accessibility of electric transmission equipment for wind turbines would likely provide the
3
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Alternative analysis challenges official assessments, established mental models, or consensus
and expands the range of possibilities considered to enhance understanding and minimize the risk
of surprise or intelligence failure.
(U) Scope Note
(U//FOUO) This alternative analysis intelligence assessment focuses on threats to wind turbines or
equipment directly connected to wind turbines in Iowa posed by environmental extremists. While
neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence suggesting environmental extremists
intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, the construction of wind turbines across the state changes the
physical landscape and has caused the death of birds. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC assume
environmental extremists will consider incorporating destructive attacks as a means to counter the
expansion of wind energy assets in Iowa, especially if peaceful protests are perceived as
ineffective. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC further assume environmental extremists believe
damage to the electric transmission equipment connected to wind turbines would discourage wind
energy companies from expanding their operations. Reporting that identifies environmental
extremists conducting reconnaissance on wind farm locations, monitoring law enforcement activity
in areas near wind farms, or planning to perform physical attacks against wind farms would
increase the likelihood of criminal activity against wind farms. This is the first product addressing
threats to wind farms specifically in Iowa by environmental extremists.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Source Summary Statement
(U//FOUO) Reporting in this alternative analysis intelligence assessment was derived primarily from information
presented and discussed during a February 2019 Red Hat analysis involving an USBUS private energy sector partner,
FBI employees, Iowa Department of Public Safety analysts and agents, and representative of local law enforcement.
The exercise focused on identifying vulnerabilities associated with wind farms and electrical substations in Iowa.
Analysis of this exercise was the most significant source of information for this product. Information provided by an
Iowa utility company; a human source with direct access in Iowa; media reporting, based on foreign law enforcement
statements; and a survey of open source geospatial data provided input on the viability of attack plans and the
vulnerabilities of wind turbine equipment. Additional reporting from private wind energy lobbyist groups, regional
media outlets, and websites of anti-wind-energy activists provided context regarding the threat environment. This
collection occurred between November 2015 and September 2019. The reporting was current as of 23 September 2019.
(U//LES) Accessibilty of Transmission Equipment Likely Would Provide
Environmental Extremists with the Opportunity To Target Wind Energy in Iowa
(U//LES) In February 2019, FBI Omaha, the Iowa DOI/FC, and an USBUS private energy sector
partner held a Red Hat analytic exercise in which two teams—composed of federal, state, and
local law enforcement personnel—identified methods that environmental extremists might use to
attack wind turbines. FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC found that if environmental extremists
perceive peaceful means as ineffective in preventing the expansion of wind energy in Iowa, the
accessibility of electric transmission equipment for wind turbines would likely provide the
3
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
opportunity for environmental extremists to inflict damage, in an effort to prevent further wind
energy expansion. The FBI and Iowa DOI/FC base this conclusion on the Red Hat exercise, with
context from a private sector partner, a human source with direct access, and open source
information. While neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence that suggests
environmental extremists intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, exercise participants identified
electric transmission equipment as the ideal components of a wind turbine to attack, because other
operational components of the turbine, including the generator, motor, and control electronics, are
located inside the nacelle d (see graphic, on the following page), which is only accessible by a
ladder that spans the inside of the turbine tower. The exercise participants estimated attacks on
electric transmission equipment would result in costly repairs and highlight vulnerabilities for
environmental extremists to exploit in subsequent actions against wind energy assets to attempt to
discourage wind energy companies from expanding their operations.
•
(U//FOUO) One of the Red Hat teams decided that vehicle rammings against the towers
and substations that controlled the operations of wind towers was the most effective
means of attack. 1 According to a September 2019 FBI survey of wind turbine
installations in Iowa, using an online mapping tool, the locations for most wind turbines
had neither fences nor enclosures around the installation site to control or prevent access
to the site; however, the substations that control wind turbine operations were protected
by fenced enclosures. 2
•
(U//FOUO) The second Red Hat team proposed simultaneous explosives attacks against
the pad-mounted transformers of wind turbines in different geographical areas of the
state. The lack of protection, such as security fences or enclosures, around wind turbines
in Iowa would allow easy access to electric transmission equipment for environmental
extremists to conduct attacks and inflict damage. Locked doors to the turbines
themselves, however, would prevent access to internal equipment for the turbine,
according to September 2019 reporting from an FBI human source with direct access. 3
Exercise participants from a private sector energy partner indicated the use of explosives
would disrupt normal turbine operations, pose personnel safety concerns, and require
immediate and costly repairs. 4 Wind turbines have been targeted by disruptive attacks in
the past. Wind turbines have been shut down in Alberta, Canada, due to gunfire, and
wind turbines in Iowa have been vandalized, with the Canadian incident resulting in the
operational disruption of a turbine, according to September 2019 reporting from an
USBUS private energy sector partner with direct access, and open source reporting. 5, 6
•
(U//FOUO) Both teams agreed that the remote locations of wind turbines in Iowa were
advantageous as they made pre-operational detection by law enforcement difficult. 7
According to a September 2019 FBI survey of wind turbine installations in Iowa, using
an online mapping tool, the locations for most wind turbines were in rural, sparsely
populated areas. 8
d
(U) The nacelle of a wind turbine is the housing that sits atop the tower and houses the motor, generator, drive gears,
and control electronics. The blades of the wind turbine are mounted to the front of the nacelle.
4
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
opportunity for environmental extremists to inflict damage, in an effort to prevent further wind
energy expansion. The FBI and Iowa DOI/FC base this conclusion on the Red Hat exercise, with
context from a private sector partner, a human source with direct access, and open source
information. While neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence that suggests
environmental extremists intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, exercise participants identified
electric transmission equipment as the ideal components of a wind turbine to attack, because other
operational components of the turbine, including the generator, motor, and control electronics, are
located inside the nacelle d (see graphic, on the following page), which is only accessible by a
ladder that spans the inside of the turbine tower. The exercise participants estimated attacks on
electric transmission equipment would result in costly repairs and highlight vulnerabilities for
environmental extremists to exploit in subsequent actions against wind energy assets to attempt to
discourage wind energy companies from expanding their operations.
•
(U//FOUO) One of the Red Hat teams decided that vehicle rammings against the towers
and substations that controlled the operations of wind towers was the most effective
means of attack. 1 According to a September 2019 FBI survey of wind turbine
installations in Iowa, using an online mapping tool, the locations for most wind turbines
had neither fences nor enclosures around the installation site to control or prevent access
to the site; however, the substations that control wind turbine operations were protected
by fenced enclosures. 2
•
(U//FOUO) The second Red Hat team proposed simultaneous explosives attacks against
the pad-mounted transformers of wind turbines in different geographical areas of the
state. The lack of protection, such as security fences or enclosures, around wind turbines
in Iowa would allow easy access to electric transmission equipment for environmental
extremists to conduct attacks and inflict damage. Locked doors to the turbines
themselves, however, would prevent access to internal equipment for the turbine,
according to September 2019 reporting from an FBI human source with direct access. 3
Exercise participants from a private sector energy partner indicated the use of explosives
would disrupt normal turbine operations, pose personnel safety concerns, and require
immediate and costly repairs. 4 Wind turbines have been targeted by disruptive attacks in
the past. Wind turbines have been shut down in Alberta, Canada, due to gunfire, and
wind turbines in Iowa have been vandalized, with the Canadian incident resulting in the
operational disruption of a turbine, according to September 2019 reporting from an
USBUS private energy sector partner with direct access, and open source reporting. 5, 6
•
(U//FOUO) Both teams agreed that the remote locations of wind turbines in Iowa were
advantageous as they made pre-operational detection by law enforcement difficult. 7
According to a September 2019 FBI survey of wind turbine installations in Iowa, using
an online mapping tool, the locations for most wind turbines were in rural, sparsely
populated areas. 8
d
(U) The nacelle of a wind turbine is the housing that sits atop the tower and houses the motor, generator, drive gears,
and control electronics. The blades of the wind turbine are mounted to the front of the nacelle.
4
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Perspective
(U//FOUO) In February 2019, FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC conducted a Red Hat analytic
exercise at the request of an USBUS private energy sector partner, following 14 environmental
extremist attacks against transportation infrastructure in Iowa that services the energy sector,
particularly oil pipelines. While only 6.3 percent of the United States’ total energy production
came from wind in 2017, 37 percent of Iowa’s total energy that year was wind-based. 9
According to a wind energy lobbying group, Iowa had the third-most wind turbines in the United
States, with 4,859 turbines disbursed across the state as of the third quarter of 2019. 10
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Schematic of a Wind Turbine and Its Components
(U) Source: Book Advances in Wind Turbine Power “Wind Turbine Generator Technologies” 21 November 2012
www.intechopen.com/books/advances-in-wind-power/wind-turbine-generator-technologies accessed on 31 July 2019 Graphic is based on
information and schematics provided by an expert in wind turbine design and construction.
(U//LES) Despite growth within the wind energy sector in Iowa, opponents cite health risks,
damage to farmlands, lower property values, and bird kills as reasons to discontinue use of wind
turbines. 11 While neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence that suggests
environmental extremists intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, opponents of wind energy in Iowa
have had limited success in legal battles against wind energy expansion in that state. 12 In
September 2018, FBI Omaha assessed environmental extremists in Iowa whose legal and
political efforts failed to halt pipeline infrastructure projects servicing the energy sector likely
would opt to sabotage that infrastructure. 13 In November 2011, the FBI assessed environmental
extremists nationwide would possibly increase their criminal activity against the industrial wind
industry. 14
5
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Perspective
(U//FOUO) In February 2019, FBI Omaha and the Iowa DOI/FC conducted a Red Hat analytic
exercise at the request of an USBUS private energy sector partner, following 14 environmental
extremist attacks against transportation infrastructure in Iowa that services the energy sector,
particularly oil pipelines. While only 6.3 percent of the United States’ total energy production
came from wind in 2017, 37 percent of Iowa’s total energy that year was wind-based. 9
According to a wind energy lobbying group, Iowa had the third-most wind turbines in the United
States, with 4,859 turbines disbursed across the state as of the third quarter of 2019. 10
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Schematic of a Wind Turbine and Its Components
(U) Source: Book Advances in Wind Turbine Power “Wind Turbine Generator Technologies” 21 November 2012
www.intechopen.com/books/advances-in-wind-power/wind-turbine-generator-technologies accessed on 31 July 2019 Graphic is based on
information and schematics provided by an expert in wind turbine design and construction.
(U//LES) Despite growth within the wind energy sector in Iowa, opponents cite health risks,
damage to farmlands, lower property values, and bird kills as reasons to discontinue use of wind
turbines. 11 While neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC has intelligence that suggests
environmental extremists intend to attack wind farms in Iowa, opponents of wind energy in Iowa
have had limited success in legal battles against wind energy expansion in that state. 12 In
September 2018, FBI Omaha assessed environmental extremists in Iowa whose legal and
political efforts failed to halt pipeline infrastructure projects servicing the energy sector likely
would opt to sabotage that infrastructure. 13 In November 2011, the FBI assessed environmental
extremists nationwide would possibly increase their criminal activity against the industrial wind
industry. 14
5
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Outlook
(U//LES) Neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC possesses information of planned attacks
against wind energy in Iowa; however, results from the Red Hat exercise led us to estimate that,
as wind energy projects become more common, there is a roughly even chance that attacks
against wind energy assets by environmental extremists will occur. These acts would likely
inspire similar attacks, thereby generating higher energy costs for consumers as energy
companies attempt to recover their losses. The attacks very likely would attract attention and
support for the environmental extremist causes, leading other extremists to justify attacks against
other infrastructure. Protecting wind energy in Iowa very likely will be difficult, as many of the
wind energy assets are located in remote locations. Detecting plots to attack wind energy
infrastructure likely will be more difficult, as attackers would not have to access or scale
individual wind turbines to cause significant damage.
(U//FOUO) Possible indicators that environmental extremists will target wind farms and the
equipment integral to their operation include the following:
–
(U//FOUO) Individuals conducting reconnaissance on wind turbine sites or attempting to
access sites without authorization;
– (U//FOUO) Signs of forced entry or tampering with equipment, fences, gates, or doors
adjacent to or part of the wind turbine;
– (U//FOUO) Indications of damage to, or tampering with, pad-mounted transformers, or
other support equipment, on wind farms in Iowa or anywhere in the United States;
– (U//FOUO) Social media posts or public announcements calling for direct action
campaigns against wind energy assets; and
– (U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious gunfire or spent shell casings found near wind turbine
sites.
(U) If you would like to provide qualitative feedback on this product, please send an email to the appropriate address
with the product title as the subject line: DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.gov; DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.sgov.gov;
or DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.ic.gov;
(U//FOUO) FBI Omaha Field Office and the Iowa DOI/FC prepared this alternative analysis intelligence
assessment. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI Omaha Field Intelligence Group at 1-402-4938688. This alternative analysis intelligence assessment addresses a Tier One Intelligence Priority Requirement for
the Iowa DOI/FC and HSEC SINS 8.1, 8.5, and 8.8. The reference number for this product for the Iowa DOI/FC is
20190026.
6
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
(U) Outlook
(U//LES) Neither FBI Omaha nor the Iowa DOI/FC possesses information of planned attacks
against wind energy in Iowa; however, results from the Red Hat exercise led us to estimate that,
as wind energy projects become more common, there is a roughly even chance that attacks
against wind energy assets by environmental extremists will occur. These acts would likely
inspire similar attacks, thereby generating higher energy costs for consumers as energy
companies attempt to recover their losses. The attacks very likely would attract attention and
support for the environmental extremist causes, leading other extremists to justify attacks against
other infrastructure. Protecting wind energy in Iowa very likely will be difficult, as many of the
wind energy assets are located in remote locations. Detecting plots to attack wind energy
infrastructure likely will be more difficult, as attackers would not have to access or scale
individual wind turbines to cause significant damage.
(U//FOUO) Possible indicators that environmental extremists will target wind farms and the
equipment integral to their operation include the following:
–
(U//FOUO) Individuals conducting reconnaissance on wind turbine sites or attempting to
access sites without authorization;
– (U//FOUO) Signs of forced entry or tampering with equipment, fences, gates, or doors
adjacent to or part of the wind turbine;
– (U//FOUO) Indications of damage to, or tampering with, pad-mounted transformers, or
other support equipment, on wind farms in Iowa or anywhere in the United States;
– (U//FOUO) Social media posts or public announcements calling for direct action
campaigns against wind energy assets; and
– (U//FOUO) Reports of suspicious gunfire or spent shell casings found near wind turbine
sites.
(U) If you would like to provide qualitative feedback on this product, please send an email to the appropriate address
with the product title as the subject line: DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.gov; DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.sgov.gov;
or DI_Customer_Feedback@fbi.ic.gov;
(U//FOUO) FBI Omaha Field Office and the Iowa DOI/FC prepared this alternative analysis intelligence
assessment. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI Omaha Field Intelligence Group at 1-402-4938688. This alternative analysis intelligence assessment addresses a Tier One Intelligence Priority Requirement for
the Iowa DOI/FC and HSEC SINS 8.1, 8.5, and 8.8. The reference number for this product for the Iowa DOI/FC is
20190026.
6
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
ENFORCENIENT SENSITIVE
(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood
(U) Phrases such as ?the FBI judges? and ?the FBI assesses,? and terms such as ?likely? and
?probably? convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how
expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of
likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for
comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting of other government agencies. Furthermore, the
FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis and will not use terms of probability to
convey rmcertainty in FBI external intelligence products.
UNCLASSIFIED
Almost Roughly
Terms of Very Very Almost
. . No . Unlrkely Even erely . .
erelrhood Chance Unhkely Chance erely Certam(ly)
Terms of Highly Improbable Probable Highly Nearly
Probability em? Improbable (Improbably) (Probably) probable Certain
1-5% 5-20%
of Chance i
(U) Table showing terms of likelihood aligned with terms of probability and percentages of chance.
7
ENFORCENIENT SENSITIVE
ENFORCENIENT SENSITIVE
(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood
(U) Phrases such as ?the FBI judges? and ?the FBI assesses,? and terms such as ?likely? and
?probably? convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how
expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of
likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for
comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting of other government agencies. Furthermore, the
FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis and will not use terms of probability to
convey rmcertainty in FBI external intelligence products.
UNCLASSIFIED
Almost Roughly
Terms of Very Very Almost
. . No . Unlrkely Even erely . .
erelrhood Chance Unhkely Chance erely Certam(ly)
Terms of Highly Improbable Probable Highly Nearly
Probability em? Improbable (Improbably) (Probably) probable Certain
1-5% 5-20%
of Chance i
(U) Table showing terms of likelihood aligned with terms of probability and percentages of chance.
7
ENFORCENIENT SENSITIVE