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June 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report
May. 18 2015 — 12:08 p.m.

II-IATC.I SECRET
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED PDWERS
EUROPE
GRAND CIUARTIER GENERAL ass PUISSAHCES ALLIEES
EN
BELGIUM
Cur ref: Tel: Cperatcr)
Tel: +32- [1
NCN:
Date: Jun 11 Fax: {Registry}
TC: NATCI HEADQUARTERS. CENTRE
SUBJECT: SHAPE Weekly Repcrt cn Cperaticns
INTERNATIDMAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AFGHANISTAN
Overview
1. 1With the peppy harvest ccming tc a clcse, the expected increase in INS activity is
steadily maten?alizing. The past week saw a number cf incidents1 including the 24 May
11 failed attempt by INS tc take ever the De Ab District Centre {Nuristan Prevince,
RCIEH, the 25 May 11 Kandahar IEU strike that killed eight USA ISAF scldiers and the
23 May 11 in the Gavemcr?s Palace in Talcgan District {Takhar
Prevince that killed the Regicnal Chief cf Pclice LTS Dacud Dacud and
wcunded the ccmmander, MG Kneip. The Talcgan attack is the latest in a series1
cf high prctile attacks in targeting senicr prcvincial ?gures.
2. The 19 May 11 spike in INS activity in reperted in last week?s SHAPE
Weekly effectively marked the beginning at the ?ghting seascn. Hcvvever, despite the
incidents menticned in Paragraph 1, Ftegicnal Ccmmands ccntinue tc repcrt INS activity
belcw ncnnal levels far the Spring pericd. example, ncted that the INS are
fccusing cn defending their remaining area cf cperaticns against ANSF and ISAF instead
cf executing cffensive cperaticns. Intelligence indicates that althcugh scme INS leaders
are planning tc retake key terrain tc regain scme influence, they alsc fear a pcssible
ISAF and ANSF reacticn shculd they expcse their ?ghters.
3. previded scme interesting and enccuraging insights intc the 19 May spike
cf incidents in Helmand. It appears the INS had planned tc- execute a three day
cffensive but required rest and re?t after just cne day cf cperaticns. Alsci unlike previcus
cperaticns. the Taliban leadership was clcsely in the tactical planning and
the executicn cf the attacks. This is a pcssible indicaticn cf Icvv level ccmmanders
1Cln El Cict1l11Mar 1?1 IEIZII attacks targeted key GIRDA
in killing amung athers the Kunduz F?rcvincial Chief of Felice and the Hunduz Prcvincial Severncr.
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incapable or unwilling to commit themselves and illustrates the growing gap between the
senior leadership and tactical commanders. Intelligence sources assess that ISAF and
ANSF targeting of the INS command and control structures and logistical chain during
the past months appears to be having an impact. However, it should be noted that the
ability and willingness of the INS to fight, although diminished, is still present. ISAF
anticipates a further increase in kinetic activity over the summer, but with a greater
number of lulls between attacks, since the INS are forced to rest and resupply more
frequently as a consequence of the increased ANSF and ISAF footprint and operations.
4.
Insurgent Command and Control (C2). Taliban senior leaders (TBSL) primarily
operate out of PAK and rarely venture into AFG out for fear of ANSF and ISAF targeting.
This distance limits leaders’ situational awareness, inhibits effective communications,
and complicates command of operations in AFG. Additionally, the autonomy exercised
at lower levels of the insurgency limits the effective control exercised by the TB
hierarchy, interfering with implementation of a coherent strategy. Despite continued TB
assertions of confidence in their success, the insurgency currently faces pressure on
virtually all aspects of operations. C2 issues have been of particular concern for TBSL,
and are exacerbated by a continuing degradation of facilitation lines, loss of AFG
sanctuaries, and strained resources. Limited influence over tactical commanders and
leadership degradation will also pose obstacles to the insurgency. The level of
ANSF/ISAF pressure on the insurgency will continue to challenge the bonds between
TBSL in PAK and the local networks that make up the majority of the INS fighting force.
Weakened links between TB echelons will likely impede implementation of a coherent
INS military strategy and lead to disparate elements operating in a manner counterproductive to the strategic aims of the insurgency.
5.
ISAF Lines of Communication. Since the death of Osama Bin Laden, both the PAK
government and public have expressed anger over the USA raid on PAK soil. On 14
May 11, the PAK Parliament passed a resolution calling for a commission to investigate
the Abbottabad raid, as well as calling for an end to UAV strikes. The resolution
threatened that continuation of UAV strikes may lead to PAK government withdrawal of
NATO transit authority. However, subsequent UAV strikes and the 17 May 11 helicopter
cross border2 incident have not provoked any additional PAK reactions. Previous
closures of the border crossings have lasted two to twelve days, with no effect on ISAF's
ability to conduct operations over the short term (14 days or less). Further, border
closures have significant economic and employment impacts within PAK and hence PAK
is unlikely to respond with such a stance.
6.
Concerning the issue of shipping ISAF equipment using the northern lines of
communication, during the Lisbon Summit (Nov 10) an agreement was reached with
Russia to allow reverse transit of weapons-free vehicles, and Kazakhstan indicated it
would allow the same. Despite this, NATO will not be able to use the northern route to
their full potential until Uzbekistan also permits transit or alternate agreements are made.
Following the Uzbekistan presidential visit to Brussels in Jan 11, the country announced
it would not allow NATO to make reverse shipments or move armoured vehicles through
its territory, even without weapons.
7.
Improvements to Afghan Health Care. During the 64th World Health Assembly in
Geneva on 17 May 11, the AFG Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) stated that AFG has
2
On 17 May 11 two CF attack helicopters supporting operation Oqab Behar VI in Khost Province (RC(E))
inadvertently crossed into PAK airspace in Khost (RC(E)). The helicopters received fire from a PAKMIL OP
and subsequently returned fire, wounding two PAKMIL.
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