June 2011 Nato Afghanistan Intelligence Report

II-IATC.I SECRET SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED PDWERS EUROPE GRAND CIUARTIER GENERAL ass PUISSAHCES ALLIEES EN BELGIUM Cur ref: Tel: Cperatcr) Tel: +32- [1 NCN: Date: Jun 11 Fax: {Registry} TC: NATCI HEADQUARTERS. CENTRE SUBJECT: SHAPE Weekly Repcrt cn Cperaticns INTERNATIDMAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AFGHANISTAN Overview 1. 1With the peppy harvest ccming tc a clcse, the expected increase in INS activity is steadily maten?alizing. The past week saw a number cf incidents1 including the 24 May 11 failed attempt by INS tc take ever the De Ab District Centre {Nuristan Prevince, RCIEH, the 25 May 11 Kandahar IEU strike that killed eight USA ISAF scldiers and the 23 May 11 in the Gavemcr?s Palace in Talcgan District {Takhar Prevince that killed the Regicnal Chief cf Pclice LTS Dacud Dacud and wcunded the ccmmander, MG Kneip. The Talcgan attack is the latest in a series1 cf high prctile attacks in targeting senicr prcvincial ?gures. 2. The 19 May 11 spike in INS activity in reperted in last week?s SHAPE Weekly effectively marked the beginning at the ?ghting seascn. Hcvvever, despite the incidents menticned in Paragraph 1, Ftegicnal Ccmmands ccntinue tc repcrt INS activity belcw ncnnal levels far the Spring pericd. example, ncted that the INS are fccusing cn defending their remaining area cf cperaticns against ANSF and ISAF instead cf executing cffensive cperaticns. Intelligence indicates that althcugh scme INS leaders are planning tc retake key terrain tc regain scme influence, they alsc fear a pcssible ISAF and ANSF reacticn shculd they expcse their ?ghters. 3. previded scme interesting and enccuraging insights intc the 19 May spike cf incidents in Helmand. It appears the INS had planned tc- execute a three day cffensive but required rest and re?t after just cne day cf cperaticns. Alsci unlike previcus cperaticns. the Taliban leadership was clcsely in the tactical planning and the executicn cf the attacks. This is a pcssible indicaticn cf Icvv level ccmmanders 1Cln El Cict1l11Mar 1?1 IEIZII attacks targeted key GIRDA in killing amung athers the Kunduz F?rcvincial Chief of Felice and the Hunduz Prcvincial Severncr. 1 SECRET

NATO SECRET incapable or unwilling to commit themselves and illustrates the growing gap between the senior leadership and tactical commanders. Intelligence sources assess that ISAF and ANSF targeting of the INS command and control structures and logistical chain during the past months appears to be having an impact. However, it should be noted that the ability and willingness of the INS to fight, although diminished, is still present. ISAF anticipates a further increase in kinetic activity over the summer, but with a greater number of lulls between attacks, since the INS are forced to rest and resupply more frequently as a consequence of the increased ANSF and ISAF footprint and operations. 4. Insurgent Command and Control (C2). Taliban senior leaders (TBSL) primarily operate out of PAK and rarely venture into AFG out for fear of ANSF and ISAF targeting. This distance limits leaders’ situational awareness, inhibits effective communications, and complicates command of operations in AFG. Additionally, the autonomy exercised at lower levels of the insurgency limits the effective control exercised by the TB hierarchy, interfering with implementation of a coherent strategy. Despite continued TB assertions of confidence in their success, the insurgency currently faces pressure on virtually all aspects of operations. C2 issues have been of particular concern for TBSL, and are exacerbated by a continuing degradation of facilitation lines, loss of AFG sanctuaries, and strained resources. Limited influence over tactical commanders and leadership degradation will also pose obstacles to the insurgency. The level of ANSF/ISAF pressure on the insurgency will continue to challenge the bonds between TBSL in PAK and the local networks that make up the majority of the INS fighting force. Weakened links between TB echelons will likely impede implementation of a coherent INS military strategy and lead to disparate elements operating in a manner counterproductive to the strategic aims of the insurgency. 5. ISAF Lines of Communication. Since the death of Osama Bin Laden, both the PAK government and public have expressed anger over the USA raid on PAK soil. On 14 May 11, the PAK Parliament passed a resolution calling for a commission to investigate the Abbottabad raid, as well as calling for an end to UAV strikes. The resolution threatened that continuation of UAV strikes may lead to PAK government withdrawal of NATO transit authority. However, subsequent UAV strikes and the 17 May 11 helicopter cross border2 incident have not provoked any additional PAK reactions. Previous closures of the border crossings have lasted two to twelve days, with no effect on ISAF's ability to conduct operations over the short term (14 days or less). Further, border closures have significant economic and employment impacts within PAK and hence PAK is unlikely to respond with such a stance. 6. Concerning the issue of shipping ISAF equipment using the northern lines of communication, during the Lisbon Summit (Nov 10) an agreement was reached with Russia to allow reverse transit of weapons-free vehicles, and Kazakhstan indicated it would allow the same. Despite this, NATO will not be able to use the northern route to their full potential until Uzbekistan also permits transit or alternate agreements are made. Following the Uzbekistan presidential visit to Brussels in Jan 11, the country announced it would not allow NATO to make reverse shipments or move armoured vehicles through its territory, even without weapons. 7. Improvements to Afghan Health Care. During the 64th World Health Assembly in Geneva on 17 May 11, the AFG Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) stated that AFG has 2 On 17 May 11 two CF attack helicopters supporting operation Oqab Behar VI in Khost Province (RC(E)) inadvertently crossed into PAK airspace in Khost (RC(E)). The helicopters received fire from a PAKMIL OP and subsequently returned fire, wounding two PAKMIL. 2 NATO SECRET