Mali ATA Assessment

Sensitive But Unclassified United States Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance Program ATA LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT OF MALI Conducted December 201 3 Sensitive But Unclassified

. {gin Sensitive But Unclassified - b? This assessment was gointly Department of State's30ffice:of Antiterrorism Assistance and Bureau of Cp?mteyrterroristhT; The report was assembled and published by the Assessment, Review and Evaluation (ARE) staff. The following people contributed to the report: ARE Team Lead ARE Program Officer 3 ARE Program Officer Subject Matter Expert (SM) Program Officer SME Cl Bureau/Regional . . I ?airs and Progra Regional Program Manager for Africa 1 CT Bureau Strategic, \Pfam Icy ATA Program Analyst - Program Analyst, J51 Counter Narcotics and Law CM Amca command Enforcement Assistance For more information about the content of this report, contact the Chief of the ARE staf?l? i ati or the ARE team lead listed above. Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified . This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified TABLE OF CQNTENTs CONTRIBUTORS ..2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ..3 US STRATEGIC AND PROGRAMMATR: OBJECTIVES ..4 Pre-Assessment .. 4 Strategic Objectives ..4 Programmatic Objectives ..4 Post-Assessment .. 4 Strategic Objectives ..4 Programmatic Objectives ..4 GUIDANCE AND CONCLUSIONS ..5 ATA TECHNICAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .. 8 DETAILED FINDINGS OF THE ATA ASSESSMENT TEAM .. 10 New Programmatic Objectives Evaluated Since the Last Assessment (Along with Corresponding Critical - Capabilities Rated) .. 10 1 Land Border Security ..10 2: Land Port of Entry Security ..11 - 5. Airport of Entry Security .. 13 22. Institutionalization of Training .. 16 9. Information Sharing and Analysis .. 19 10. National Level Command and Control ..20 14. Kidnapping Hostage Incident Management ..22 15. Police Investigative Capability ..23 17. Crime Scene and Evidence Management ..25 18. Forensic Examination and Analysis ..26 12. Explosive Incident Countermeasures ..27 16. Post Blast Investigation ..28 Other Areas of Concern .. 29 11. Police Special Operations ..29 13, Mass Casualty Incident and Consequence Management ..31 19. Prosecutorial Capability ..32 ASSESSMENT REPORT REVIEWERS ., ..43 Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the?express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified AND PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES Pre-Assessment STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES The following were the US. strategic objectives utilized for the March 2012 Mali Capability Assessment and used for the December 2013 visit: Assist the Malian National Police (NP) over the next five years to establish a law enforcement institution to develop and sustain functional skills to detect, deter, respond to, and investigate terrorist threats, with a particular emphasis on critical incidents i.e. explosives, improvised explosive devices and post blast investigations. . - Assist Malian law enforcement agencies with establishing more effective border controls with primary focus on mobility and communications. Assist the Malian law enforcement agencies in building capacity toeffectively manage terrorist incidents and integrate counterterrorism policies throughout their security force structures to respond to critical incidents. PROG OBJECTIVES The following were the ATA programmatic objectives utilized for the March 2012 Mali Capability Assessment and used for the December 2013 visit: - Objective 1: Mali Gendarmerie Nationale (GN) will improve its capability to secure border land posts and airport(s), to include recognition of fraudulent documents, in order to inhibit terrorist transit through Mali and preventing terrorist attacks. Objective# 2: Build Mali?s capability to interdict, investigate and manage criminal investigations related to terrorist acts. 0 Objective# 3: Build capacity to respond, detect and disrupt explosive devices and conduct an effective post blast investigation in the event of a detonation. Post-Assessment STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES The following are the US. strategic objectives for Mali after the assessment visit: - Assist the Malian law enforcement agencies in building capacity to effectively manage terrorist incidents and integrate counterterrorism policies throughout their security force structures to respond to critical incidents. PROGRAMMATIC OBJECTIVES In response to this assessment, programmatic objectives will be introduced first in the 2014 Mall country assistance plan (CAP), and subsequently in the next scheduled capabilities assessment/program review. Capabilities Assessment 4' Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified CT POLICY GUIDANCE AND CONCLUSIONS Political and Strategic Context History of ATA in the partner nation A A . . . The Government of the Republic of Mali (GRM) has been a partner nation in the ATA program since 1990. However, ATA did not deliver substantial training during the first 13 years. in FY 2003, ATA renewed its program with Mali as a direct result of its inclusion in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Formal ATA assessments were conducted in November 2002, September 2004, October 2008, March 2012, and most recently, December 2013. . As a-result of the March 2012 coup d?etat, ATA withheld assistance for the remainder of calendar year 2012 and all of 2013. Until 2012, ATA spread engagements evenly among Mali?s Gendarme, National Police, and National At that time, ATA programming had been focused on strengthening border security capacity, enhancing investigative capacity, and building response capacity to a critical incident. Following democratic presidential elections in July 2013, the US restarted assistance to Mali . in September 2013. This enabled ATA to return to the country for an assessment and to plan new programming to recommence with FY13 funds in calendar year 2014. Security threat Prior to the March 2012 coup d??tat, Mali?s law enforcement (LE) sector lacked the necessary capabilities to respond to antiterrorism and counterterrorism needs. The threats emanating ~fr0m Libya and regional terrorist organizations swiftly overwhelmed Mali7s security sector. Al?Qa?ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA), al-Murabitun, and other affiliates continue to threaten Western interests and attack peacekeepers as well as the Malian Armed Forces and civilians. For the time being, France?s Operation Serval has helped address current threats within Mali and its neighbors? borders, and has provided assistance to Malian forces. The French are also working on enhancing the capacity of the Ministry of Interior. As of January 2014, the threats and challenges confronting northern Mali vary substantially from those facing the. south, and the country is effectivel bifurcated north/south along theHMOpti line, with terrorist threats largely localized north of Moptio . 1 Movement for- the National Liberalization of the Azawad (MNLA), Movemer in West Africa (MUJWA, also known as MUJAO), and other smaller gro 3 remain able to evade French pursuit in the northern half of the country. Remote and largelymparts of the country, mostly north of Mopti, provide operating space for violent extremist 'gro o-traffickers, . transnational crime, and domestic Malian rebel groups. While some narco-trafficking and transnational crime? rebels are largely confined to northern Mali. I Accordingly, the designation of the US. Embassy Bamako as a high threat post. refers more to this threat in the North than it does to the capital specifically. However, a small number of the experts with whom the assessment team met in the field anticipate a terrorist attack in Bamako at some point. Such L, the critical incident BEE, response andinvestiga?tive capabilities of Mali?s security forces. National/regional security capacity Mali lacks a national security strategy. This constrains Mali?s LE community in that they are unable to make operational?level decisions without higher guidance. The above-described security threats are the same as those faced by Mali?s neighbors in North and West Africa. Cooperation among partner nations, as well as with Libya, is essential to address terrorist threats. Capabilities Assessment 5 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.

CapabilitiesAssessment 6 1 'iv. Ht Incl ss'fied . a blip U.S. security interests and U.S.-Partner Nation relationship The limited. US. interests in Maii?focus. on supportii?ig. Mali?s securityZSectcr reform efforts and strengthening its democratic institutions. :lnceoperationjavitl'i other international partners, the US. seeks to ensure the new government?s stability amidst internal state weakness and a wide range of security threats. As articulated in the Mali security sector reform (SSR) interagency strategy led by the State Department?s Bureau of African Affairs (AF), "Supporting security sector development is a key element of US. security strategy in Africa. A reformed and more effective Malian security sector is crucial for achieving our political, development, security, and stability goals in Mali and the broader Sahel. Our overall objective is a reformed Malian security sector that can manage internal and external security threats, and contribute to national and regional stability while promoting civilian authority and respect for international law and human rights norms.? The stabilization of northern Mali is a large component of that process. These goals align closely with those of the GRM in their ?ght against terrorism. Regionally, US. interests extend to ensuringthat terrorist groups cannot operate from or transit through ungoverned space in northern Mali. Opportunities to support CT partnership between Mali and Niger are encouraged. Core U.S. CT interests in the region are similarly echoed in US. strategies?from the US. Natidnal Security Strategy (of which fighting A0 and its affiliates is the centerpiece), to the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the Bureau of Counterterrorism?s Functional. Bureau Strategy, as well as the regional strategy. Post?s integrated Country Strategy was not available for review prior to the assessment. Final versions of the and interagency security sector reform (SSR) strategy will be considered as ATA solidifies its Mali country strategy. With respect to human rights, atrocities committed by Malian forces during and after the coup d??t'at were widespread, but perpetrated by a narrow group, of people. As such, ATA does not anticipate facing significant Leahy vetting challenges for prospective?trainees. Perception of terrorism, political will to counter terrorism Mali faces several distinct, interrelated challenges, including negotiating a political situation between the GRM and northern anned groups, threats from terrorist and other violent extremists in the north and a humanitarian crisis in the Sahel exacerbated by events in Mali. Political will at senior levels to work with donors on security'sector assistance is hig' anew?; a rkino levels, where commanders warmly welcomedjaartrcularly in the context of Malian histor'ica'l?a'?' d??c"ultura sensrtivities related to the receipt of French assistance. Outline of other CT programs, U.S. programs, and international donors lsone?Of m?any donors providing Mali, but the overall volume of this assistance is quite modest. The French Government and EU are much larger financial contributors and, therefore; are leading the international community?s SSR efforts. Duplication of effort may not be a top concern, as capacity~building needs are so great that redundancy might be helpful in institutionaliZing training concepts. Of great concern is that donor decisions are all pending, so it is difficult to devise an strategy and implementation plan that effectively builds on others? investments. The French and the European Union are providing the bulk of the support and have assumed reSponsibility for providing the security themselves militarily in the north. Writ large, the donor community is focused on building Mali?s critical incident response capacities, which ATA seeks to complement with related course deliveries. The French are concerned about airport security in Bamako as well as mobilizing both military and LE to patrol the North. France also supports and. contributes to a regional EU program called Security and Justice in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Region (JUSSEC). JUSSEC aims to build the capacity-of the justice, interior security, agencies, and is specifically focused on terrorism and international crimejinMallt, Mauritania, :and Niger. In each of the Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassi?ed This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified three countries, the project has supported legislative reform to create a judicial counterterrorism center, assisted in the creation of a central investigative service to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, and reinforced the capacity of the customs service to fight trafficking. The EU Training Mission focused cin rebuilding andaretormingilviali?s Ministry of Defense. The EU is supporting the Gendarme?sspeeial intervention squad, as weft as the Judiciary sector through its CT in the Sahel program. That program seeks to enable crisis response with an assault team and risk management. The EU is also running a 9 million Euro Instrument for Stability program to purchase vehicles and radios for the National Guard. As of December 2013, EU member states were collaborating in the creation of a new EUCAP civilian mission, the civilian security defense program (CSDP) which will likely focus on critical incident response. The European Development Fund will also support TBD capacity building efforts in Mali. Mali, as part of CTBureau?s Trans?Sahara Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) region, is eligible, to receive RSI funds for programs focused on law enforcement and justice sectors. Following the restart of US. assistance in September 2013, Mali resumed participation in RSI-funded regional border security cooperation initiatives in the Maghreb and Sahel implemented via the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)-implemented training on criminal and justiceissues. In the September 2013 proposal cycle, CT awarded RSI funding to the US. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for regional training involVing Mali for intelligence Countering violent extremism (CVE) programming has resumed in Mali funded by such entities as State AF Bureau, CT Bureau, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications) and the US. Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives CVE programs in Mali aim to deny terrorist groups new recruits, by providing positive alternatives to communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence; counter terrorist narratives and the violent extremist worldview; and build Malian government and civil society capacity to counter violent extremism. Department of State hopes to establish a Terrorist lnterdiction Program (TIP) Personal Identification SeCure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) program with the GRM in early 2014. ATA Specific Findings and Country Goals In addition to military assistance, the Bureau of African Affairs seeks to ensUre that US. security sector programming bolsters Mali?s LE community. The largest investment of US. resources for LE capacity building will be improving citizen trust and confidence in the police, a responsibility that will fall to the US. Department of State?s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Mali?s National Police, Gendarme, and National Guard additionally require capacity building in nearly every area in which ATA offers programming. The guidance from the interagency is to focus U.S. assistance to Mali on building institutions before implementing traditional train and equip programs. All US. assistance to Mali?s LE sector should be considered in comparison to more robustly-funded international community contributions. Given this and anticipated modest budget of approximately per year for the next three years, CT recommends narrowing priorities for programming. As of 2012, ATA focused on three priorities Of border security, investigations, and critical incident response. Going forward, ATA anticipates focusing specifically on the roles and responsibilities of senior-level management in critical incident response, mostly likely with the National Police and Gendarme. This mid? to senior-level critical incident response and management training for the NP and GN (and potentially the NG) will complement investments of similar themes by the French, who are providing basic training to the NP. Given that the GRM is looking at restructuring or changing the mission of the National Guard, ATA may consider lessening its investments in that force in the short?term. Such decisions about particular units receiving ATA assistance will be made in close coordination with Post. All re-engagement through ATA must be in close coordination with AF and in close coordination with the Mali SSR;strategys Capabilities Assessment 7 - Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassi?ed . 9,779 TECHNICAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Government of the Repiiblic of iMali(GRM; iS-stili recovering from the March 2012 Coup d??tat by a low?ranking military officer that than a week after the'ei?idof the last ATA assessment. Prior to the coup, there had been areas of serious concern for Mali, including the fall of a military base in the north, large numbers of transient fighters and weapons flowing out of Libya after the fall of the Qadhafi government, and the displacement of Malian citizens as aresult' of these actions. After the fall of the GRM, and as events in Mali intensified, the ATA program was discontinued. Malian security forces were unable to prevent the northern two?thirds of the country, including the urban centers of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, from being over taken by violent extremists. In January 2013, France sent a. military intervention force that liberated those cities from violent extremist control. However, these areas remain vulnerable to attacks and kidnappings, even with the Continued presence of the French military and UN peacekeeping forces. Presidential electiOns Were held in July and August 2013, and were deemed free and fair. When he assumed of?ce, the newly-elected PreSident Ibrahim . Boubacar Kei?ta declared he intended to bring the military back under civilian control. Subsequent parliamentarian elections in November 2013 were also determined to be credible and transparent. In support of the new government, the ATA program intends to reengage with Mali, beginning with a capability assessment conducted in December 2013. There was no approved country assistance plan prior'to the assessment; therefore, the assessment team followed previous strategic guidance provided by the CT Bureau and the programmatic objectives that it used for the March 2012 assessment. These goals and objectives focus on developing the skills to detect, deter, respond to and investigate terrorist threats and critical incidents inVolving explosives and the need for a viable post-blast inVestigation'Of the site; establishing effectiveborder controls focusing on mobility and communications; and building the capacity to respond to and manage terrorist incidents and integrate counterterrorism policies throughout the security force structure. - Mali has no national level incident management system; when there are critical incidents, committees convene to advise the executive branch on the response. Decision-making is routinely isolated in the . upper echelons of government. The disastrous incidents that occurred before, during and after the March 2012 coup d??tat can happen again if Malian leaders do not enact a national policy that de?nes the roles and reSponsibilities of security forces at each level Cf response. During this assessment, the team learned that a plan is being developed to create a national crisis management center for terrorist incidents. During the previoUs assessment, the team learned that the Ministry of Justice had been planning to develop a National COUnterterrorism Center. While such, a center is needed, the GRM must move beyond concept to reality to prepare - manage the consequences of national-level crises. Currently, the response to each incident is handled on an ad hoc basis, with no after?action or training reviews to identify andcorrect gaps. The security forces have informal'arrangements to facilitate a coordinated response, but these practices should be formalized, trained and applied. - Mali?s borders are problematic for many reasons. The northern borders are deep within the Sahara Desert where nomadic tribes anditerrorist groups travel freely, as government forces are scarce and poorly-resourced. As of March 2014, this area remains an active military zone after the French intervention. It is the team?s understanding that at all border areas,W are minimal or non-existent amongthe security forces responsible for or er pa ro a on rol anct? Communications connectivity across borders does not eXIst. Itwas repoftedin interviews condg?gted in Bamako that immigration and customs personrlzaiat border ports of entry (POEs) are 4) wane border controls at the Capabilities Assessment . 8 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassi?ed This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified . 2W The security forces? investigative capabilities are de?cient in many areas: information sharing is not structured and is base eimwa?onshipsi?ong thgtenagarshiprather than on esta rotocol :s:uspec;e: Vice. The National Guard (NG) is a paramilitary force with limited law enforcement responsibilities, which allows them to detain suspects that they turn over to the NP or The security forces each have training institUtions, with differing levels of competence, standards and methods. The NP training academy is in poor condition with dilapidated facilities and an outdated curriculum. The GN, a military unit with law enforcement responsibilities in the rural areas has the best structure for training recruits and its of?cer corps. It provides inaservice training as well as cOurses for promotional advancement and specialized skills. ATA assessment teamsvvisiting Mali have consistently questioned security forces? ability to absorb, teach, and institutionalize ATA training. Candidates for training'should be selected based on their assignments and skill?sets and not sent .to training as a reward. The GN leadership is astute and appears to be visionaries who - terterrorism CT trainin - ?now have appropriate lead who expressed the need for training at every venue the assessment team visited. Budget constraints require that priorities be determined before training deliveries resume. See Addendum 5 for assessment methodology information. Capabilities Assessment 9 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security's Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

I - Sensitive But Unclassified DETAILED FINDINGS OF THE ATA ASSESSMENT TEAM In order to accomplish the programmatic objectives- ATA assiesses?the degree to which the counterterrorism security structures and forces are capable of meeting performance standards related to the following designated critical capabilities. New Programmatic Objectives Evaluated Since the Last Assessment (Along with Corresponding Critical Capabilities Rated) Programmatic Objective Mali Gendarmerie will improve its capability to-secure border land posts and airport(s), to include recognition of fraudulent documents, in order to inhibit terrorist transit through Mali and preventing terrorist attacks. Related Critical Capabilities . 1 LAND. BORDER SECURITY - Rating: Not Assessed Previous Rating: Not Assessed Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - There were insuf?cient security forces to protect the country?s borders. Military and security forces were poorly?equipped and -resourced. lnteragency communications were non?existent or of poor quality. Relevant Training Received Since Last Assessment - None Current Capabilities Mali shares its 4,500 mile land border with Algeria to the north, Mauritania to the north and west, Senegal to the west, Niger to the east, Burkina Faso to the southeast, and Guinea and .C?te d'lvoire to the south. Borders security responsibility is shared by the National Guard (NG), Gendarmerie National (GN), National Police (NP) and Malian ArmedForceS (MAP). 1 Meetings the assessment team had at US. Embassy Bamako provided insight on land border security, concerns. Since January 2012, there have been a series of destabilizing events including a rebellion in the nth?, the March 2012 coup d??tat, and the takeover of the northern two-thirds of the country by extremists including al Qa?ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The French-led international military intervention in January 2013 enabled the establishment of the Mission Multidimensionnelle lnt?gr?e des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali ,United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which, together with the MAF, has reclaimed the northern cities-and disrupted terrorist activities. AQIM and affiliates continue to attack MINUSMA peacekeepers, MAF personnel and civilians. The situation in northern border areas remains fluid with the only security presence coming from the MAP and relationship among security services is often unclear and ad hoc. Th . a u, securit strate that describe. riorities and roles or the allocation of resources-t I as a result, narcotics, arms, and other traf?cking are rampan . reaemalns ea, larly in the north where weekly attacks continue. The assessment team did not visit a land border or interview army or MINUSMApersonnel. Capabilities Assessment 10 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner" nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified The assessment team met with the NG chief of staff who said N-G responsibilities include monitoring and securing land borders, protecting government buildings and diplomatic missions, and controlling crowds. After the co d??tat, the NG?also assumed responsibility for protecting the President. The NG manpower level is(\ toe?30nnei insight geographiegrouos. New. recruits attend six months of basic training at the NG ac emy} followed by four to five months bf specialized?training. The NG has - authority to detain suspects but turns them over to the GN or NP. Mali's borders with Mauritania and Algeria?its longest and most remote?are traditional smuggling routes. Although the army and MINUSMA are primarily responsible for northern border it the NG's camel corps operates in three regions of the northern frontier. Each region has?b a tat ._of reote nd patrol border areas with Mauritania, Algeria an Iger; eac unit 4 . ~lThe NP has stationary border posts near the born ers with ne al c?vlef of staff requested herp obtaining communications equipment, such as?radios and". ones and border securit surveillance nd he said his units nee trainin - t: {4 ME -W The assessment team met with the director of NP Direction de la Police des Frontieres l4 Border Police, which is responsible for examining travel documents and border entry control (an immigration function) at land and airport POEs. - Current Performance Standards Deficiencies There is no national border security strategy. There is no viable border security infrastructUre. The relationship among security services is often unclear and ad hoc. - ThevNG is poorly-equipped and resourced. Conclusion Mali does not have suf?cient capacity or capability to control its land borders. It has no national border security strategy or border security infrastructure. The relationship among security services is often unclear and ad hoc. 2: LAND PORT OF ENTRY SECURITY Rating: Not assessed Prior Capability Rating: Not assessed Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - Vast borders and limited resources made land border security difficult to staff and supply. If A we: . ere located considerable distances from the actual border. a g. Relevant Training Received Since Last Assessment . None. Capabilities Assessment 11 Mali - December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of DiplomaticSe?curity?s Of?ce of Antiterronsm Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified Current Capabilities The assessment team did not visit a land POE and was unable to fully assess this critical capability, although it did meet with the NP director-ofBorde.r Policeiand the director general of Customs. NP officers are responsible for travel documentexamination and border (an immigration function) at the Customs Directorate ofthe Ministry of Economics and Finance is responsible for the customs inspection of travelers entering the country. At least one POE is on or near each land border Mali shares with seven countries. Not all land POEs are operational. Since early 2012, the NP has had a minimal presence in the northern region, including borders. Land border controls are non-existent in many parts of the country and the controls that exist at POEs are inadequate or easily bypassed. NP officers at POEs are graduates of the 12-month National Police Academy basic course where they receive only basic training in fraudulent document recognition and no refresher training. They come from police stations in the same region as the POE, have arrest authority and may carry firearms. In addition to NP and Customs officers, the ON and army provide physical security at most POEs. In some remote POE locations where there is no NP or Customs presence, the GN is responsible for travel document examination and Customs inspection. Travelers entering the country present their travel documents to NP officersand undergo Customs inspection. Travelers from other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries are generally able to present their national identity cards; others must present a passport and visa. What-Int- The Customs Directorate hast. Newly-hired Customs officers attend nine months of 6 training at the Customs academy. ey ave arrest authority for Customs-related violations and may carry firearms. Individuals who are detained at POEs for a non-Customs violation are released to the custody of the NP or GN for follow-up investigation. Customs staffs 16 land POEs, each with a minimum of ten officers; and the larger POEs may have as many as 50 Customs of?cers. The primary mission of the Customs Directorate is collecting Customs duties on merchandise entering the country. A recently added priority, mandated by the new national government, and for which the directorate created intelligence and investigative divisions at its headquarters, is to help fight terrorism by targeting weapons and explosives smuggling, especially at the northern borders. The Customs Directorate belongs to the World Customs Organization (VVCO) and has access to the WCO database. Following Immigration processing, travelers (vehicles/pedestrians) proceed to a Customs examination station manned by uniformed Customs officers. Commercial trucks pa . driver provides a manifest and Customs paperwork to be examined T'h??WC'ustoms director requested training related to money laundering ves i'ga ions, naFcoW?md? ec ion, and and explosives recognition; as well as assistance in obtaining inspection tools. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies Capabilities Assessment 12 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not he shared with the partner nation asseSsed saw vi '1 without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Capabilities Assessment Sensitive But Unclassi?ed . . . m1 M: "age?Mr . .l Conclusron The POEs are insuf?ciently equip?gedio examine the travel documents of individuals entering Mali. 1 xi . thE Cgstoms officials lack inspection. search tools andi bq f; It have no compu'T'i?e connectivity at POEs and?therefore, have no accesstp the Customs headquarters database. 5. AIRPORT OF ENTRY SECURITY - Rating: 3 Prior Capability Rating: 3 Previous Performance Standards De?ciencies Chronic turnover of personnel undermined the effectiveness of security. - .There was no equipment to verify the authenticity of travel documents. - None Current Capabilities Mali is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). its main airport?Bamako- S?nou International Airport (ICAO code GABS)??nine miles from Bamako, serves international flights from Africa, the Near East and several European countriesalso not the last departure point for flights to the US. An airport expansion and modernization program, funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent US. foreign. aid agency, includes a new terminal building, runway expansion, new taxiways/aprons and infrastructure improvements including 'security upgrades. The Agence Nationale de l?Aviation Civile National Agency for Civil Aviation (ANAC) oversees airport security operations and security regulation compliance,_but airport security is the combined responsibility of ANAC, the Ni?1 Customs and the (EN: The a$sessment team met with representatives from each entity. i - 13 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be Shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance. Mali December 2013

5d? . SenSitive But anlass??ied The airport. security director and the security department?s 12-person civilian staff are ANAC employees. The security director is responsible for the airport security plan (ASP) and compliance with ICAO security Standards. The. A39. was fast updatedin 2012; the most recent ICAO security audit was in 2009, with the next one duei?n 20.15.-ANAC ikl?iairs?an airport security that meets and includes representatives from ANAC, NP, GN, Customs, and other airport stakeholders. An airport coordination Center, staffed 24/7 rovi an integrated communications link for airport operg?pns and CCTV coveragein the terminals} and the airport perimeter, which is enclosed bLa six-foot fence . rmed GN of?cers,( . a \are at security control points, and patrol the ADA and airside . routinely patrols areas near the perimeter, especially aircraft approach/departure zones; theiripriority is protection against man?portable air-defense system (MANPADS) attack. The ASP details emergency response plans that the airport tests with full-scale exercises and critiques every two years. Participants in the exercises include the agencies?ANAC, NP, GN, Customs, ?re and medical responders, and other airport stakeholders?that respond to emergencies at the airport and focus on evaluating communications, coordination and' command and control. The most recent exercise in DeCem 012 resented a cehaiotha icairlhi'xagking, a and riot pa?: a Situation requires. speCial weapons and tactics tavv?A support, the Peloton dTntervention (Gendarmerie Nationale) Intervention Platoon of the Gendarmerie National (PIGN), based near the airport, provides it. If there is a major incident, acrisis management team comprised of representatives from response agencies forms to coordinate the response. If the incident is of national significance, the chief of staff of the Army leads the crisis management team. The security department issues and controls airport identification/security badges through its database of issued badges. Before they can receive a badge, applicants undergo record checks by the NP and/or GN. Badges, which are valid for two years, display the photograph and identifying information of the recipient and are color/number-coded for the areas Where the badge carrier is allowed access. Access to SRAs is controlled by armed NP of?cers upon verification of access authorization. noted the security-related procedures as they transited during their arrival and departure and compared the procedures they observed to the procedures that were described. NP officers are responsible for travel document examination and border entry control. Arriving international passengers, after completing embarkation forms, proceed through an SRA to document control. There, immigration officers at document examination booths examine passports and national identification cards. NP document f?cers are traine 9. and receive no refresher trainingers, ass throughan SCP at the international terminal entrance wher_ . operate an at thete?rfi?iina?i entrance anlanes havegxfi?ay machines \?/ithmonifors, metal Capabilities Assessment 14 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified - This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

. Sensitive But Unclassi?ed .. meldmm?eggimggtemgrs?j?Mas), and a set of screening standard Operating MOPS . r? After initial screening, passengers go to the airline "ticket?connier where airline representatives examine their passports before they isiSUe'poardingpasses. Holdbaggage is tagged, placed on a conveyor belt and sent to a hold baggage screening (HBS) location. Passengers then go to document control booths where NP immigration officers visually examine their passports, collect their debarkation forms and stamp their passports for departure. They continue to a two-lane passenger SCP, but prior to entering airlinetistetsete by . . . The SCP ha?"?twa unarmed NP of?cers, one at the X-ray? monitor and one "observing the and boarding passes of the departing assessment team were examined at the departure gate and prior to boarding a bus to the aircraft,'all carry-on baggage, wasms?ubjected to hand search by civiliansecurity ?gersonnfl and each passenger was patted down. it? EVE Screening procedures require departing passengers to remove their belts and shoes before gOing through the WTMD, remove laptop computers frOm carryson baggage, and there are restriCtions on liquids and gels. In fact, the assessment team was. not required to-remove computers or liquids and gels. WTMD alarms are resolved with pat-down and/or HHMD search of the passenger. If the X-ray detects a suspicious item, a screene as; he o, the 71,, of the assene and suspect item for further examination. an or explosive is detected during X?ray Inspection, Wthe )Cray machine, a supervisor is noti?ed and bomb technicians from the army respond. 7 but it can request assistance from the GN. The 100 Customs officers at GABS provide security screening of the hold baggage of departing passengers and out-bound aircraft cargo, and Customs inspections of arriving passengers. The baggage 0f some passengers is referred to a secondary area to be hand-searched by Customs officers. Prior to exiting the Customs area, passengers present baggage tag receiptser their baggage. The HBS area has an explosives detection system (EDS) with enhanced X-ray machine and color monitor. If suspected lEDs or explOsives are detected during X-ray inspection, the procedures are the same as those at the passenger SCP. The Customs cargo screening area has an machine and all out-bound car 0 reportedly is manually inspected or screened by X-ray. but they can request assistance from the GN. Customs icers wor as securi screeners are trained and certified by the ANAC. . . instruction and practical exercises baseden security standards. Practical instruction includes procedures for X?ray systems, WTMD, HHMD and pat?down protocols. ANAC provides in-service training and tests and recertifies-officers as security screeners every two years. Its, security personnel do quality control checks of screener. by random covert testing. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies - There is an absem There is no security screener performance evaluation process or quality control. I E- Mali does not participate . 0 Document examination boot 5 0 not have OCR passport scanners. Document examination is limited to visual observation; magnifying eyeloupes and gUV_lights are not used to examinedocuments, -: i - .- - Capabilities Assessment 15 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Dipiomatic Security?s, Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

- Document examination booths do not have biometric capture capability. 6 . 4-1-44? w" as?: There IS no document laboratory? or anyspecial equrpment to .helpil.?nmigrationpersonnel detect'fraudulent or alteredtraveldocuments. a Document examination of?cers receive limited training in fraudulent document recognition. Conclusion ANAC oversees airport security operations, ensures compliance with ICAO security regulations and chairs airport security committee meetings. The ASP incorporates emergency response plans and tests them with emergency response exercises every two years. Airport employees and individuals who require access to the airport are vetted. Passenger and baggage security screening locations have adequate screening technology although ETD screening equipment-would enhance the security screening process. The absence of TIP software and a process for Screener performance evaluation result in an inadequate quality control program. Overall, airport security, screening procedures and protocols comply with ICAO security standards. Travel document examination booths do not have OCR passoort scanners and document examination is limited to visual observation. I . . 22. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ATICT TRAINING Rating: 3 Prior Capability Rating: 3 Previous Performance Standards De?ciencies - Mali?s security training institutions lacked adequate resources. a The NP Academy lacked equipment, training and technical assistance for its initiative to update training to more - contemporary standards. Relevant Training Received Since Last Assessment - None. Current Capabilities The National Police Academy The assessment team visited the National Police ACademy (NPA) where it met with its director general and the NP director 'of training and toured its "campus and facilities. The director general has been at the Academy for 13 years and previously served as deputy director. The director of training is the former Academy director general. There have been no basic police training classes at the Academy since July 2012 and it is hoped that basic training will resume in 2014. The Academy has been a past venue for ATA training'and the organization structure remains as it was during the 2012 assessment. The Academy provides basic police training to enlisted recruits and of?cer candidates. While the length of training is the same for both?three months of military training followed by nine months of police-related academic and practical training?the training curricula are different. Academy training is followed by a year of on?the-job training. New recruit claSses have up to 100 students; officer classes are much smaller. Females comprise 25-30 percent of basic training classes. The Academy has a full-time staff of 22. When recruit training is in session, the instructor staff, which includes external instrUctors, is approximater 56430 pelice officers and the :rest?are civilians. The Academy purportedly uses instructionalisystemEdesign. Capabilities Assessment 16 Mali December 2013 - - Sensitive But?Unclassified . This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security's Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassi?ed TheAcademy curriculum combines classroom instruction and practical exercises. It includes training modulesin human rights, the use of force, local policing and peacekeeping (crowd control); but not training. In the past, the Academy sent two, or three staff instructOrs to each ATA delivery. The director acknowledged that aithough NFA staffimerhbei?s attend A'ngtrainir3g, they do not share the course materials they receive With colleagues nor ?.ave-they- integratodATA material into Academy course curriculum. The Academy does not use the train-the-trainer technique. The NP director of training is the focal point for all?training and Academy curricula. He coordinates all international training. received by the NP, including that provided by ATA, the EU, UN and MINUSMA. The assessment team stressed to the Academy director and director of training that they must select the appropriate right people for ATA training and it is important that those participants remain in their assignments for at least two years. In its tour of the campus, the assessment team noted that the Academy has adequate dining and lodging facilities for students and staff. Prior to 2012, ATA provided an academy development grant that enabled repairs such as rehabilitating a largeclassroom, installing air conditioning, providing audio? visual equipment, acquiring a backup generator and providing improvements to the ?rearms range. The assessment team visited the classroom that had been rehabilitated with ATA funding, which was being used for UN-sponsored training for students from the NP, GN and NG. It appeared to be in good condition although the team did not see Whiteboards that ATA had provided previously; instead, instructors were using ?ipcharts. The team visited the Academy?s multi?purpose auditorium that has theater?style seating for 50 or more, and observed that many seats were broken and the room is not well-maintained. They alsosaw no audio/visual equipment there.? In the reference section of the small library, the team saw ATA course materials, which the Academy director said are for reference only, and not incorporation into Academy curriculum. The assessment team explained to the director that ATA course material is designed to be easily incorporated into Academy curriculum and is intended, and provided, for that purpose. - .. Tbroken and the room was cluttered and dirty. The director said the Ac?a?demy? waiting for assistance, from a partner nation or the UN. The 2012 ATA assessment report noted that the ATA funding was intended to improve the ?rearms range such as clearing debris and building containment walls and included plans for installing firing lanes. The assessment team visited the range and saw no additional improvements and the assessment team observed minimal maintenance of the range. The Academy does not have a separate range for explosives training; the director said the Academy?s budget is not adequate for its needs. I - Although no NP recruit classes were in session at the time of the assessment, the Academy hosts training by partner nations, the EU, MINUSMA and the UN, which has a permanent presence there. The Gendarmerie National School The assessment team visited the Gendannerie National School near the Bamako international Airport, which includes the following units, each of which has a commander responsible forthat function: - GN Officer Candidate School GN School for non?commissioned officers (NCO) GN School for enlisted recruits - The National Center for Security Forces GN information Center Capabilities Assessment 17 Mali December 2013 I Sensitive But UnClassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diptomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

sit-E? The director of the ON School and two sub?directors briefed the team. The school was established in 1991 with a mission to educate and train. In addition to recruit level andgofficer candidate training, the school conducts in?service training, trainingfor enlisted personnel to become officers, non? commissioned officer (NCO) deve?oomenttraining, and training methods. Sensitive But Unclassified Officer candidates complete basic military training and then a ten-month program that allows them to graduate as sub?lieutenants. GN enlisted personnel complete a year of basic military training, then a two?year Gendarme training program at the school. The of?cer candidate class at the time of the visit included 16 Malians, one Nigerian, two Togolese, and a Beninois; the recruit training had 1000 cadets at various levels. The school trains mid-level and senior of?cers for assignment to the Chief of Staff Office; and was attended at the time of-the visit by five Malians and five foreign students. The school conducts courses for the SN Judiciary (Investigative) section andfor candidates for promotion to squadron commander, company commander and brigade commander. GN personnel also attend of?cer training at other Francophone nations? Gendarmerie academies and NCO training in France. GN School staff report that their training increasingly uses adult learning techniques and they hope to develop the cadre?s expertise in these techniques. training is included at many levels at the school. The assesSment team told the director and staff that ATA encourages including personnel in their training who are familiar with curriculum design and delivery, adding the caveat that the GRM does not always select the best candidates for donor training?a concept, and warning, the group accepted. The staff requested updated versions of ATA curriculum, because the copies in the?school library are being worn out from students using the material for research papers?an unusual request that should be considered, as this is a positive situation the assessment team has rarely encountered. The GN School has a permanent staff of ten officers, 20 NCOs and administrative staff. The staff is augmented by GN specialists, prosecutors, magistrates, judges and other non-assigned personnel who lecture on topics of interest and necessity. - - The director provided the assessment team with a sizable list of requests that included physical improvements to the school such as a firearms range, a conference facility, a snack bar, a ceremonial area, a water tank, adormitory for of?cers, asports facilities and a library upgrade. Current'Performance Standards Deficiencies - is not a component or the NPA core curriculum. E, - oes ot use the train? - hni ue. ool has nofirearms range and needs physical improvements to its infrastruct-Lifef" Conclusion There has been no basic police training at the NPA since July 2012 and no ATA courses since 2011. The NPA has not institutionalized its ATA training and has made no physical improvements since?the 2012 ATA assessment; assessment team observations indicate that the condition of the academy may have regressed. The few the previous assessment observed are now deteriorating from lack of use, lack of maintenance and institutional indifference. The only positive at the NPA was a remark earlier in the week by the NP director general'who candidly admitted that, in the past, the NP has hired personnel through nepotism and politics, taking on staff that are unqualified and often illiterate. He stated that he intends to enact hiring standards that will lead to better qualified, more trainable recruits at all levels. The GN School is better organized and. structuredto conducttraining at multiplelevels, and includes periodic refresher training through arf in?service programmdoevelopment courses that lead to - Capabilities Assessment 18 Mali December 2013 Sensitive. But Unclassified - This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified . premotion. Reportedly, the initial military training Gendarme candidates-undergo and'the military discipline inherent in follow?on training develop better disciplined, motivated candidates Who perform wellonthejob. Programmatic to interdict, investigate and manage criminal investigations related to terrorist acts. Related Critical Capabilities 9. INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS Rating: 2_ . Prior Capability Rating: 2 Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - There were no viable means to gather, analyze or disseminate information within the security forces. There was no formal mechanism, such as a joint operations center (JOC), to facilitate the timely transfer of information. The judicial police had no analytical tools at their disposal and were not well resourced. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None I Current Capabilities The Direction G?n?rale de la S?curit? Ext?rieure General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), which reports directly to the President, is Mali?s most viable intelligence gathering organization although it has no law enforcement or arrest authority. Reportedly, DGSE personnel initiate and control terrorism investigations until they reach a law enforcement activity outside of DGSE authority at which point they bring another law enforcement entity?typically the NP Or GN?into the investigation to move the case toward criminal prosecution. The assessment team?s meetings to discuss this critical capability were limited to the information sharing and analysis capabilities cf the NP and GN, not the DGSE. While both the NP and GN investigate terr :99? . . 01M olection arin an .1, ical wThe NP, which can be descrbed . (a 7 JRepoNedly, INTERPOL is creating the n?Centef?th-aPWI-lte?er the. access to INTERPOL databases. Investigators in the MRS Judicial Police Directorate recognize the value of utilizing cooperative sources of information, and for that reason, encourage the community policing efforts .of NP officers in municipalities and villages. information sharing among law enforcement agencies occurs mostly through personal relationships. There are no policies on releasing information to international law enforcement partners. While the NP responds to-requests from agencies such as the FBI, it does not provide timely responses to most international law enforcement requests. The GN claims to have an intelligence unit that reports directly to its director general and provides information to the director general, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of internal Security (MOIS) and the Army Chiefof Staff. The unit reportedly has branches specializing in technical and human intelligence for both criminal and terrorism cases. With the greatest presence in outlying areas, the GN recognizes the value of gathering intel? ce from local villa "ers ware of sus icious in uals or be in theircommunities - - - leadership repo?rts?that: ii] the: past, they had the trust of these people, but Capabilities Assessment 19 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security's Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified. now the conflict with lslamic extremists, ifgr; cgngern?, bf? - GN director general told the assessmentteam hiSWFfe'tli?g?na: fin?ii needs both traingng?and??smstance. exchange of information with; international law enforcement partners and neighboring countries such as Niger can be accomplished through but just as with the NP, it is usually conducted informally through personal connections. Both the GN and NP seek a framework for exchanging information with international law enforcement partners. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies - The NP and GN capabilities for collecting, sharing and analyzing information are deficient. - The NP has no analytical ability to examine and develop information. - The NP does not respond effectively or to requests for information from law enforcement counterparts. - The GN has limited information-gathering and analytical software to support link analysisor case management. The GN and NP lack a framework for exchanging information with their international law enforcement counterparts. Conclusion The DGSE, a viable intelligence gathering organization, lacks law enforcement and arrest authority. The NP and GN have intelligence units, but they are deficient. The NP has no terrorism database and no analytical capabilities. The GN hasan intelligence unit that analyzes and disseminates collected information, but it ha ited i form hein 1,9 - .. gort link analysis or case management. . Both seek a . framework for exchanging With international law 10. NATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND AND CONTROL Rating: 2 Prior. Capability Rating: 2 Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - There was no effective crisis management policy at the strategic level. - There was no national program for a coordinated response and communication among security forces, civil protection and non-governmentagencies. 0 There was no full-time or as?needed JOC. ?a "w - GRM has never developed, implemented, or trained to a developed national response plan. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment None Current Capabilities Shortly after the last ATA assessment, there was a coup d??tat, followed by incursions into the north and major population centers falling to extremists. With a new, democratically?elected president in of?ce, law enforcement agencies are attempting to introduce a security presence into northern cities. The 2013 assessment team found the capabilities of the NP, GN and NG had changed little at all levels. in March 2012, there were indications that the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was going to create a national-level counterterrorism center to serve as a JOC during crises, but that has not happened. Leaders with whom the team met mentioned a projectth develops national level crisis management Capabilities Assessment 20 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.

center to be located in the Ministry of Internal Security however, they offered few details about when it would be operational. Sensitive But Unclassified We There are many lessons to be learned from events that precededithe Coup d??tat, the takeover itself and the subsequent fall of the eXtreimiets Traditionally in Mali, crisis The French military fought the extremists in the north and maintains a presence there with sponsored military units. The French and other donor nations have provided trainingand strongly encourage the security elements of the GRM, to reestablish a viable presence in the northern cities of Kidal, Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu. The GRM needs to develop a national-level plan that incorporates policies, procedures, contingencies and planning for management of the response to crises. The security services have informal agreements and working relationships, but these informal arrangements proved to be inadequate before and during the March 2012 coup, and for the subsequent attacks in the north. The weak system then did not allow detailed policy planning, because all decision making was isolated in the highest echelons of government. There is no national incident management system, which mandates training at all levels of security services, response agencies and other stakeholders. Effective nationalplans are tested regularly through tabletop and field exercises followed by after-action reviews to critique the exercise and identify training gaps and improve the plan. The chief of operations-of the Civil Protection (CP) agency told the assessment team he has both experience and institutional-knowledge; however, that knowledge must be documented in SOPS and institutionalized to be of value to the organization or the GRM is doomed to repeat past mistakes. The many donor countries and response agencies in Mali acknowledge the immense need for crisis management training, a need so great at all levels that a coordinated effort should be put forth by those countries and agencies to bring about the best results. The GRM lacks communications equipment and mobility to coordinate response resources and to confer with higher authorities. It has no planners to develop emergency response plans, design response protocols, define incident command and control, and create contingencies; If the GRM follows a coordinated approach to ameliorating these problems, the GRM can address itsdeficiencies and put forth an improved, effective response to crises. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies I WE. -L Conclusion The GRM is at a critical juncture; it is recovering from several devastating crises and there has been a significant turnover in leadership in every agency at every level. It is in Mali?s best interest to develop a national incident management system, and provide training at all levels on responding to, managing, investigating and mitigating crises. Capabilities Assessment 21 Mali December 2013 . Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed Without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

14. HOSTAGE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT - Rating:2 V, 7 M. A PrioryCapabiIityRating:2::7- 7: *7 it Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - There was no ability to do a multi?agency coordinated investigation of terrorist kidnappings. - There wasL E. 0 There was no incident command system at the strategic or operational level. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None Current Capabilities Kidnapping is a serious concernin remote areas of Mali, with Westerners being the primary targets. Victims have included workers from the mining industry and tourists visiting Timbuktu and other historic The GRM has littleL, . mm and is poorly resourced to investigate, locate and resolve an incident that has occurred. Kidnapping victims in Mali and other Sahel nations are sometimes held for years before a ransom is paid after arduous negotiations. Security forces are not equipped to respond to the scene of an incident, pursue kidnappers into the desert, or communicate with other forces to track and locate get-away vehicles. Jurisdictional boundaries between the NP and GN can place kidnapping investigations in a legal limbo when there is no follow up to investigations and little to no coordination among inVestigators. Even when suspects are located, there are no skilled negotiators to communicate with them. After the coup d??tat and the fall of several northern cities, the area is more vulnerable than before. An incident in neighboring Niger in -E French citizens kidnapped from Niamey resulted in their execution. Even for competent, well?equipped teams dealing with this kind of kidnappers extremely dangerous; and the GRM security forces ar not deemed capable at all. No law enforcement special operations forces are deployed to1?::b brig? Surrent Performance Standards Deficiencies - Security forces are scant in areas where there have been kidnappings. A - Response to a kidnappingis slow and?mm - No special operations forces are deployed to deter,lrrespond to, andninterdict kidnappings. Conclusion GRM security forces are not deployed ?ch vulnerable northern citi 'n numbers the we et kidnappiggs. lfthemjggagoinglf ,mvmv A 7 7 fl here are no?tramed negotiatorswho can racintate the release or?captwes are faceted and isclated. The extremists and Capabilities Assessment 22 Mali December 2013 - Sensitive But Unclassified . -- This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed .without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassi?ed tribesmen who carry out kidnappingsfor ransom are better.? equipped than the. security forces charged. with responding to and investigating the kidnappings. 15. POLICE INVESTIGATIVE smash; 3 RatingPrior Capability Rating: 2.5 Previous Performance Standards De?ciencies Investigators had no initial or additional training in the field. 0 There were no investigators for terrorist-or terrorist related crimes. . There was no capacity for conducting forensic examination of collected evidence. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment 0 None Current Capabilities The DGSE investigates terrorism cases; however, since it has no law enforcement or arrest authority, it brings another law enforcement entity?typically the NP or the investigation to move the case toward criminal prosecution. Law- enforcement leaders acknowledge that since the March 2012 ATA assessment, there has been a significant increase in terrorism. They know they must all. cooperate and coordinate to counter this upsurge. The NP and GN have counterterrorism investigative units but both recognize their-deficiencies and their need for additional training and equipment. The instability in GRM law enforcement has generated reluctance among mid-level managers to make decisions about high- profile inVestigations, and has pushed decision making up the 'chain-of-command to higher authorities. The Judicial Police Directorate includes the Judicial Investigative Branch (JIB) with approximately 150 officers, all of whom are ingBamako. The sees the connection between terrorism and organized crimes such as narcotics traf?cking and routinely provides officers to outlying areas to support high- level investigations initiated by local precincts. NP investigators routinely use investigative techniques such as surveillance and soliciting information from human sources. They have no electronic reporting capability and maintain their reports in hard copy. N?s Judi ., .. .. ., . dhas no antiterrorism unit. I. f. The for} E- a an Insurgents to hide from authorities. The GN has embedded some officers into military combat units that patrol this threat, and if so, turn them over to GN officers at the JIS. The arrest and detention of suspected terrorists have created additional concerns for'the specifically, because detainees reportedly have successfully radicalized (criminals, they are no longer placed in common jails; instead, the SN now places them in jails I bf? While investigative officers worki?n plaincl?othes, both the GN and the NP undercover operations. They I prosecutor?s approval but they rarey?b?ftts?ti?ewd'?cuse it takes several months to receive GN reportedly has a national database .but it has little Useful case file information such as arrest data. If investigators want information from closed investigations, they must manually search archived hard copy case files. - 'crsjo 3 The Customs Service, under the Ministry of Finance, recently created an Investigations Directorate to counter terrorism by investigating??nancial crimes such as Customs reportedly is Capabilities Assessment 23 Mali December 2013 - Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassi?ed part of a national unit that documents financial information. Customs officers have arrest authority but 'claim to lack investigative training. In 2010, the GRM created tiileiOFfice Central (ieiLUtte centre :es Stup?fiants Central Anti-Narcotics Office (OCS) with officers from various law enforcement services toinitiate or take over major drug- related investigations. The assessment team met with its commander who said the unit operates in eight regional offices. The OCS unit?s-task force concept appears to make effective use of its combined manpoWer and shared expertise, despite resource shortfalls and a few administrative and logistical challenges associated with its start?up. By law, once investigators determine a crime has been committed, a prosecutor takes over the investigation. The law enforcement investigator who had been leading the investigation prepares a report for the prosecutor that includes opinions on the case, but, according to prosecutors, omits vital information needed to prosecute the case successfully. There are a few training opportunities for investigators from outside donors. In addition to U.S.- sponsored training, some law enforcement officers received investigative training from the government of Benin. The capacity building mission is to initiate a strategy for security and development similar to one in Niger that reinforces the rule of law and trains local police officers on terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. According to EU liaison officers, the current investigative process is not effective in successfully concluding criminal cases. Future assistance includes training on conducting crime scene investigations and the creation of a national intelligence model. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies - Investigative decisions which should be made by mid-level managers are directed up the chain of command to the highest levels of authorit . The GN has converted or terrorist 'suspects to keep them from radicalizing the general prison population. The GN and NP rarely request telephone toll information because it takes several months to receive results. When oreoarino reoorts as they pass the case to prosecutors, investigators routinely omit information that is . . - According to EU officials, the current investigative process is not effective in successful concluding criminal cases. Conclusion Law enforcement agencies?the DGSE, NP, GN and Customs?investigate terrorism cases. Of those, the DGSE has no law enforcement authority; when it determines a crime has been committed, it brings another law enforcement entity?typically the NP- or GN?into the investigation to move the case toward prosecution. When investigators determine a crime has been committed, prosecutors take over the lead and supervise the final investigative activities that bring the case to proSecution. Investigators us 3' lsl'l traditio investigative techniques, and rely heavily on? he GN has an added problem of attempting to keep incarcerated terrorist suspects awayT mm the general prison population who they have been successful in radicalizing. The government of Benin has offered the GRM a few investigative training opportunities and the capacity building program is creating a training plan similar to one in Niger to train local police on terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. Law enforcement leaders recognize their deficiencies and acknowledge their need for additional investigative training. Capabilities Assessment . 2.4 - Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified SCENE AND EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT Rating: 2 Prior Capability Rating: 2.5 7 7 Previous Performance Standards. - The retention of personnel with technical skills continued to be a problem. - There was a lack of resources, mobility and experience. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment None Current Capabilities Both the NP and the GN have units that handle crime scenes. The Forensics Brigade is one of five divisions in the Judicial Police; the Technical and Scientific Police Division is one of four - investigative divisions and is responsible for processing crime scenes. #16 Just as with other post?incident capabilities, law enforcement competencies in crime scene and evidence management are weak, Neither the NP nor has evidence technician dedi . crime scene vehicles Thefirst-?agen?cy to respo??'f'?acrime scene takes the lead in the investigation; this agency directs activities at the crime scene unless a prosecutor comes to the site, in which case, the investigator relinquishes supervision'to the prosecutor. NP and GN leadership do not feel crime scene contamination is a problem, noting that first responding of?cers routinely cordon off the site to inhibit access. Neither agency appears to have 'chain?of?custody protocols or to document collected evidence. NP and GN leaders acknowledge their lack of training and experience in crime scene and evidence management. in addition to ATA-provided Forensic Examination of Terrorist Crime Scenes training in 2011 and post?blast investigation training in 2010, they received some crime scene training from France and basic fingerprint training from the FBI. The FBI reportedly plans to provide more basic crime scene investigation and FBI training. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies Neither the NP nor the GN has trained evidence technicians or dedicated crime scene vehicles. 0 Crime scene investigators have no alternative light sources and do not use chemicals such as luminol to discover hidden evidence. - Crime scene investigators lack dental stone material for casting impressions. 0 Neither the NP nor the GN has technicians experienced in post-blast investigations nor are they capable of identifying and collecting explosives residue. - Crime scene technicians do not use GPS or?G' - Although they are able to lift fingerprints, the gay? Capabilities Assessment ?25 - Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Office of Antiterrcrism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified - Neither the NP nor the GN has chain?of?custody procedures for tracking collected evidence. Conclusion . Both the NP and the GN have. mine scene units but theyare. peony?trained; ill-equipped and inexperienced. The first agency responding to a crime scene takes the lead in the investigation until a prosecutor arrives and assumes the lead. NP and GN leaders acknowledge their lack of training and deficiencies and expressed interest in further instruction to supplement the limited training they have received from ATA, France and the FBI. 18. FORENSIC EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS Rating: 1.5 Prior Capability Rating: 2 Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies The forensic lab needed analytical equipmentvand training for its technicians. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None I Current Capabilities The assessment team found that the forensic capabilities of both the Forensics Brigade and the Technical and Scientific Police Division are practically non-existent. The NP has no forensic laboratory capabilities and submits evidence collected by its crime scene technicians to the Forensics Brigade for a cursory examination to provide potential leads to the chief investigator. The GN has better capabilities, which reportedly include collecting DNA evidence although its forensic laboratory has no way to analyze DNA samples and sends this and other complex evidence to other countries such as France for analysis. Although they can lift fingerprints, neither agency has an automated fingerprint identification system nor do their technicians compare them to prints on file. The assessment team?s visit to the GN forensic laboratory found that the technicians do not use the cyanoacrylate (super glue) fuming?a simple, inexpensive method to chemically develop latent prints?or any other method, nor do they have the equipment or the expertise to do so. According to a GN of?cial, evidence such as fingerprints is irrelevant because there are remote areas where there are no fingerprints on file. The assessment team met with a GN fingerprint technician who said he scanned and downloaded fingerprints of interest into his standalone personal computer, but those records are inaccessible by his Colleagues. There is no Integrated Ballistics Information System (IBIS) for use by any law enforcement agencies. Their leaders feel, however, that they have sufficient means to collect such information. Prosecutors recognize the negative effects a limited forensic capability and the dependence on other countries to analyze important evidence have on achieving proficiency in successfully prosecuting crimes. For example, a supervisory magistrate said neither the GN or NP were able to conduct forensic analyses on the 21 bodies found in a shallow mass grave outside of Bamako just prior to this assessment. The bodies were thought to be soldiers loyal to the former president who were killed while a junta chief was in power after the 2012 coup d??tat. According to the prosecutor, the GRM had to turn to France for assistance in conducting the forensic examinations. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies - The NP has no forensic laboratory capabilitiessends most evidence requiring anaiysisrtegcountriesgsuctf as France. Capabilities Assessment 26 Mali December 2013 - Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified '3 Neitherthe NP nor GN has an and IBIS. The GN forensic laboratory makesno attempt to chemically develop latent prints. Conclusion Both the NP and GN have units that handle forensic examination and analysis but their capabilities are practically non?existent. There are no national databases to identify or compare fingerprints or seized ballistics. The GNforensic laboratory does not use even simple methods to chemically develop latent prints that cannot be photographed at crime scenes. According to prosecutors, the lack of forensic capabilities and the dependence on other countries to analyze evidence negatiVely affects the cases they prosecute. Programmatic Objective 3: Build capacity to respond, detect and disrupt explosive devices and conduct an. effective post blast investigation in the event of a detonation. 12. EXPLOSIVE INCIDENT COUNTERMEASURES Rating: 2 r??enor6ap' amhty?atmgr' 2 Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies The bomb unit had the equipment to effectively complete their'mission but chose not to use it. The unit failed to properly train and maintain a level of proficiency. The unit'had no bomb suit(s). . The unit?s X?ray equipment was obsolete since the X?ray film was no longer being manufactured. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None Current Capabilities Participants from the NP, the GN and the NG received ATA training in 2005, which was accompanied by donated equipment that went primarily to the NP. NP technicians are assigned to the Brigade Anti-Criminalit? Anti?Crime Brigade (BAC). FOur technicians from that training are still with the NP, including the commander. (The commander was interviewed during the Marsh 2012 assessment but not during this visit, as he was out of country.) On the 2012 visit the assessment team viewed the ATA?donated eoruipme'gt which was in good sermons: The unit did not tTe?n or use their tools- and had no vehicle to tranSport technicians and equipment 0 threats. During the 2012 visit, it responded to a bomb threat at the American School and used: basic search procedures, but did not deploy with its equipment or conduct a render safe procedure. The 2013 assessment team visit to the BAC bomb unit did not discover any improvements; on the contrary, the unit has continued its decline, with decaying equipment and diminishing skills. The BAC leadership reports that they are poorly resourced and supported. The assessment team interview senior bomb technician who re orted that the?v' E20113, eb'omb?Umrdid?hb'fshUW Capabilities Assessment 27 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

any of the equipment to the assessment team. The team asked the technician if the unit wouldrespond 2 to the airport if a suspect package was detected; he replied that negis?: permanently based at the airport, but has no equipment other than some hand tools, and has never beensummoned to deal with any suspicious devices or packages. Whenthe team asked about devices or detonations in Bamako, he said the only incident he could recall was a ?suspicious bottle" in front of the French Embassy some a time ago, adding that he could not recall any detonations in Bamako. Technically, the BAC and its bomb unit would respond to any metropolitan area that has an actual or suspect device; in reality, neither unit is likely to go beyond the Bamako city limits. The BAC bomb unit?s level of capability could not be measured effectively from this assessment visit but appears minimal at best. When responding to detonations, the bomb unit canvasses the blast site for secondary and tertiary devices, but does not collect evidence, which is done by the Technical Services or the Judiciary Police. The assessment team met with the tactical unit, the and learned that four of the unit?s operators received some training in handling explosive materials and render safe procedures from the UN and some additional training in Benin. The PIGN has no equipment and did not receive any after its training. The level of its capability is unknown. Current'Performance Standards Deficiencies - skills must be maintained through traini - . oerations to be av not be determined during this assessment, . . . The bomb unit lacks mobility and cannot fulfill its responsibility to respond to NP jurisdictions beyond the capital. COnclusion The bomb units have very limited capability with the resources available to respond to, identify and render safe suspect devices or packages. The training the units received has not been reinforced through follow on training or operations in the ?eld. training, and the skills required to operate. safely and effectively, need to be reinforced regularly using the tools of the trade. It is fortunate that Bamako has not been the target of detonations or viable threats. If an actual device is encountered, the bomb units would be forced to use the most rudimentary of tactics to attempt a render safe procedure. - 16. POST BLAST INVESTIGATION -. - Prior Capability Rating: 2 Previous Performance Standards De?ciencies - There was no training in post?blast investigation. - Crime scene investigators had some training in crime scene and evidence management, but were not familiar 5, with lEDs and secondary devices. 1 Relevant ATA?Training Received Since Last AsSessment None Current Capabilities The security forces have a limited ability to process and manage crime scenes, and no experience processing actual post-blastjsitos. The prior assessment?found that the Malians had not received training in this discipline aith0uglii program management records indicate: a course was delivered in 2010. There is also no indicationthat?th?eForensic Examination of Terrorist Crime Scenes course Capabilities Assessment 3 28 Mali December 201 3 - - Sensitive But-?Unclass?ified" This report"n'1ay notib'e'sha'red with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified =-provi~ded in--?2011 hats-been incorporated into the crime scene.investigatOrsItraining or methodology. There have been no recent detonations in or around Bamako, and there is minimal crime scene investigation in the regions?, .-. .. The assessment team visited the?BAC NPbor?pb unit and leafnediaboutits: capabilities and responsibilities. It responds to blast sites principally to search the area for secondary devices and render safe as needed but does not collect or identify evide?ntiary material. Bomb unit personnel have no expertiseidentifying ordnance or explosive residue from fragmentation evidence and no ability to reconstruct lEDs or determine differentiating features by the composition of a device. - Current Performance Standards. Deficiencies - The security forces have marginal crimescene investigative skills. 0 No operational experience in exploiting and managing a post-blast site. Conclusion GRM bomb units have minimal capability to conduct a post-blast investigation, or to collect, catalogue and forensically analyze evidentiary material. Saddled with the bomb units? limited training, little to no equipment and no operational experience in post-blast investigations, if a there was a large blast, the GRM would be forced to appeal to, donor countries to investigate the incident. Other Areas of Concern 11. Ponce SPECIAL OPERATIONS Rating: 2 . Prior Capability Rating: Not Assessed Previous Performance Standards De?ciencies Not Assessed Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None Current Capabilities I The National Police Brigade Anti-Criminalit? Anti-Crime Brigade (BAC) Headquartered in Bamako, the BAC began as an armed response unit toadeal with major crimes, particularly armed assault and robbery cases. It has 94 personnel who are poorly?trained and carries out high-risk warrant. service for the counter?narcotics unit, has an antiterrorism role, has some responsibility for dignitary protection support, and has a bomb unit. It requires its volunteer applicants to have at least two years of service on the streets and once they have been accepted, their training is primarily-on'the job. The BAC has received SWAT training from the French Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion/ Research, Assistance, Intervention, and Deterrence (RAID) team, and tactics training from the FBI, which provided tWo trainers for three weeks. Theoretically, the BAC responds to majorcitieswherethe 7.. n. . evn Wi ll BAC deputy commander said the unit'has participated in three simuTation Capabilities Assessment 29 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassi?ed This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

_bensmve Peloton d'lntervention (Gendarmerie Nationale) [Intervention Platoon of the Gendarmerie NationaI(PIGN) . {f i .1 ,g Createdin2006.thePlGN ha?V~ i~ ?i - - . Lu.? .. -.. . ?r-r um .4.- ?mar 8 teams, which are trained in interdicting terrorist incndents, and penorming high risk entries, hostage rescue, and cdunter?na-rcotics takedowns, can support any security service or military unit, if requested. The unit has also been performing escort service for .twle deliverin erl to northern cities in vulnerable areas that are in desperate need. There are ,ersonnel whose duties include close protection support for the President, Prime Minis er an General Secretary. The has a rigorous selection process that includes demanding physical fitness tests and written examinations after which selected personnel undergo rigorous training that becomes incrementally more demanding. The has received tactical training from the French the Groupe d?lntervention de la GN I National Gendarmerie Intervention Group and ATA. (The unit received Crisis Response Team (CRT) training in the US. in 2008, along with equipment.) It has received hostage taking/rescue training from RAID, Algeria, Spain, Senegal, and Cameroon. Four members received some training in explosives countermeasures in Mali from the UN and in. Benin, but did not receive any equipment. The unit received training in tactical operations planning and crisis management from the EU in 2009 and from Spain in early 2013. it has no trained hostage negotiators and has no counter-sniper operations equipment or training. The canine, cavalry and units, are under the reserve group. The commander outlined the vision for the it will become a stand-alone group?the Gro?upement?de _S?curit? et ,d'lntervention de la GN Intervention Security Grouhpmoaf?mgwgu . ME upp?ort would be closer, qwcker and more complete. The plan as desoribed by the'COrnmander Is Well thought out and comprehensive. National?GUHrd The National Guard provides static security around the US. Embassy. The assessment team asked the NG leadership what tactical assets it has to respond to an incident at that location. The responSe was that the NG does not have a taCtical component and would request NG reserve units to respond and notify the National Police who would assume responsibility. The Regional Security Office (RSO) said if there was a serious incident at the embassy, it would request support from the Gendarmerie, Current Performance Standards De?ciencies - The BAC and - The BACand .. The PIG igz E. CapabilitiesAssessment 30 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified Conclusion The NP BAC unit has significant responsibilities, but is poorly-trained and -resourced to carry out its functions. As the only tactical unit in the NP organization, it strugglestomeet its challenges and neet assistance in many areas. The PIQN is?better-rtesounced and has a procersifor selecting personnel and providing initial and ongoing training for them- Like its counterpart, the PIGN has challenges providing personal protective equipment and vehicles for its personnel, and with meeting demands for service. The PIGN appears to be well suited to effectively absorb ATA training and equipment. In the future the BAC will take on more responsibility with the NP presence in the north, where it will have to develop and deploy satellite units. Commanders from both units say they can and have supported each other?s missions in the past, but they 'do little joint training. These tactical elements should have a rOIe in developing a national incident response plan and crisis management training. 13. MAss CASUALTY INCIDENT AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT Rating: 2 Prior Capability Rating: Not Assessed Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment 0 None Current Capabilities The GRM has no national strategy that assigns roles and responsibilities when there is amass casualty incident. The assessment team met with CP leadership and learned that the CP, which is under the MOIS, was created in 1998 to develop policies for organizing, coordinating, and implementing disaster response plans for natural disasters and other catastrophic incidents. It is a combination of what Americans recognize as FEMA, Civil Defense, humanitarian relief, fire suppression and risk prevention. The organization, with sub-directorates in eight geographic regions, eight fire stations, seven relief centers and 1175 personnel provided relief in response to flash flooding in Bamako in August 2013 that killed over 50 people. The CP assisted in response, rescue and recovery operations and established a management committee and coordination center fOr donations. The CP has a limited ability to provide emergency shelterand can provide some first aid in the field. Public health resources are meager, even in Bamako. The CP and the fire service have minimal abilities to manage responses to hazardous materials (hazmat) incidents, and no equipment or training to manage the response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and (high?yield) explosives (CBRNE) incidents, although they are eager to receive this type of training. The CP director of operations reported they documented their policies and procedures in SOPs to extend institutional knowledge beyond individuals; they conduct training exercises within their ranks; and they participate in joint training exercises if invited. The CP does not assume incident command in response to natural disasters or other mass casualty incidents, but instead, defers to the NP in Bamako. The director said a national action plan is being developed; the CP Will help develop response plans for natural disasters and will partner with other response organizations to develop crisis contingency plans. The CP deploys to the Crisis Coordination Center after majOr incidents. The CP appears to be the only security agency with plans and procedures for response, management and mitigation-of mass casualty incidents. It conducts periodic training exercises and facilitated an after-action review of the response to the 2013 floods. The turmoil in the north after the coup d??tat impacted the ability to respond when two of_its fire truckswerestoJen in Timbuktu. Capabilities Assessment ,31 Mali December 2013 I Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation" assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified The CP is interested in training that can support its mission and build its technical capacity. Current Performance Standards Deficiencies, There is no effective crisis manageinenfpolirfy at strateglclevei.? 7: . . There is no national program tofacilitate a coordinated response and communication among security forces, civil protection and non-government organizations. 0 Each crisis receives an ad hoc and disjointed response. The GRM needs to develop and implement a national incident response plan. Conclusion The CP appears to be the only security agency with plans and procedures for response, management and mitigation ?of mass casualty incidents, and rescue and recovery operations. lthas periodic training exercises and facilitated an after?action review of the response to the 2013 floods. The turmoil in the north after the coup d??tat impacted the ability to perform when two firefighting trucks were stolen in Timbuktu. The CP is interested in training that supports its mission and builds its technical capacity. 19. PROSECUTORIAL CAPABILITY Rating: 3.5 Prior Capability Rating: 3.5 Previous Performance Standards Deficiencies - There was a lack of trained investigators. There was no ability to collect and analyze forensic evidence. Legislation that was to create a CT Center still needed to be enacted. Relevant ATA Training Received Since Last Assessment - None Current Capabilities The assessment team met with the prosecutors general of the Bamako Court of Appeals and the newly-established Special Judicial center for Counterterrorism which was recently created by legislation to handle counterterrorism cases, organized crime and drug trafficking. According to its prosecutor general, the legislation targeted these crimes because of the relationship between terrorist acts and their funding by organized crime and drug trafficking organizations. Legislation also provided the as it became operational, with a special court to prosecute its cases. The legal system follows French civil law?an inquisitorial system where the court plays an active role investigating the facts of the case, and where prosecutors oversee the application of penal law and monitor and supervise the criminal investigative aspects of cases. As part of this process, prosecutors are obligated by law to be actively involved when it is determined. that a crime has been committed; however, according to prosecutors interviewed by the assessment team, this is not always the case. Police investigators often do not inform prosecutors when they determine a crime has been committed. Also, because of their overwhelming workload, prosecutors cannot always respond to crime scenes, where ideally, they could supervise investigators, evidence technicians and other responders. Prosecutors acknowledge the host of problems they face 'in fairly and effectively applying the law. They recognize the widespread corruption among Mali leaders at all levels from law enforcement officers accepting bribes to government leaders using their authority to persecute others based on political motives. They also acknowledgehuman rights violations bylaw enforcement that includes past abuses of detainees and view this b?havbrgas? mindset Carried overfrom prior dictators and military coups. Capabilities Assessment - 32 Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written apprOval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified Prosecutors realizethat investigatorsgand police officers have deficiencies that impede Successful criminal prosecutions. They cite a police workforce with low capabilities that is in need of extensive training; investigators whOse evidence collection skills are weak;. and thelack of forensic laboratory capabilities, investigative tools and itechniquesfln Enter/lews with the; assessment team, prosecutors referred to a section in the case f:le_rcport:whers the?lead enters observations about the crime, but said it is not uncommon forthe investigator to omit pertinent facts, information or evidence. They added that investigators do not always follow their instructions. Additionally, because of the large volume of cases assigned to their small pool of prosecutors, prosecutors cannot adequately monitor all investigations. They-said they cannot accurately determine the success of prosecutions since no criminal justice statistics are gathered in Mali. Prosecutors recognize that terforist groups increasingly use the Internet and, for this reason, feel that investigators must become more computer literate and should eventually be trained to investigate cybercrime. They understand the value of requesting subscriber and toll information from the telephone company, but note that neither the NP nor GN has the ability to analyze the information received. Since the 2012 terrorist takeover in the northern region, the prosecutors told the assessment team that all judges assigned to that area have left their offices. Following a Supreme Court decree, crimes committed in the north are now handled in a special court in Bamako, although it is difficult to prosecute these cases successfully because potential witnesses to crimes in this area fear retaliation by Islamic extremists. Presently, prosecutors have not charged anyone with terrorism but are using laws that address violent crimes until the new law goes into effect; Both prosecutors general noted the value of having a resident legal advisor (RLA) at the US. Embassy and expressed hope that this position would be re?lled. Current PerformanceStandards De?ciencies- crime was committed. . - Prosecutors have a large caseload and are unable to supervise the police investigators. - There is widespread corruption ameng police as well as government leaders. - Police: W?s) . The police lackinve tools and techniques. - Prosecutors are not always notified by investigators when an investigation has determined that a Investigators Neither the Np . Conclusion te ability to analyze information. An insufficient numheLomeqpmitncs are case-s despite the deficienciesnf the police officers who present the. cases. Deficiencies include weak evidence collection and forensic analysis, no analytical capability; and a lack bf investigativetOOIS and techniques. Corruption is widespread among government leaders and the police. Legislation creating a special office and court to handle terrorism cases and the crimes that facilitate them was recently enacted, but has yet to be implemented. - Capabilities Assessment 33 . Mali December 2013 . Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with thepartner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified 1. Land BorderSecurity 2. Land Port ofEntry Security 3. Maritime Border Security ii; I . 4 . 'i/?iaritime Port of Entry Security . 5. Airport of Entry Security i Critical Infrastructure Security till] 7. National Leadership Security :Diplo matic Community Security 9: Information Sharing and Analysis 10. Nat?l Level Mam} incident Command Control 11. PoficeEpeciaI Operations 12. Expiosiv'es Incident Countermeasures Mass Casualty Incident till 14. Kidnapping/ Hostage Incident 13x 'Policelnvestigative Capability .16. Post Blast Investigations 17. crime Scene and Evidence 18.1?c1r2nsic Examination and Analysis . . 19. Prosecutorial Capability iliir 20. Critical Digital Infrastructure Security 2 1. Cyber Crime Investigations 22. Institutionalization of Training El Perfor mance Standa rd rrent Capability lPrior Capability Capability Ratings Rating 1: The element is Absent Completely. There has not been at: effort made by the agency to address the subject area. Major developmental work is required to develop this function as well as basic and comprehensive extemal assistance. Rating 2: This element?is Present but in a condition which contributes only to a Very Limitecle'xteift in achieving its intended purpdse. Cbnsiderable External Assistance is required to- develop or impro vo tr function. Rating 3: This el?r?n?r?rt?is Present but in a condition that makes a minimum, but somewhat Adequate contribution to achieving its intended purpose. Some External Assistance is required in connection with this function. Rating 4: This element is Present and in a condition which makes a Generally Satisfactory contribution to achieving its intended purpose. Some External Assistance is r?equired to ensure that the purposeintended iSs achieved and sustained. Rating 5: This element ?is Present and in a condition which makes a Clearly certtribution to achieving its intended purpose. No . External Assistance is required to ensure that the intended purpose is achieved and/or sustained Capabilities Assessment 1 Sensitive But Unclassified Mali December 2013 This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified ADDENDUM 2: ADDITIONAL SUSTAINMENT COMMENTS The issue of sustaining ATA~provided trainingris because the National Police training institution is weak?and poorly-managed and resourced. This problem is compounded because the personnel?that ?haVe been selected to attend training, are not subsequently assigned to units where they can utilize the skills they have been trained to perform. The new NP Director General acknowledged that the NP had always hired personnel based on nepotism and political consideration, bringing in candidates who were unqualified and often illiterate. He intends to establish hiring standards that will lead to better-qualified, trainable recruits at all levels. Capabilities Assessment 7 i i Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the'partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified ADDENDUM PARTNER COUNTERTERRORISM _l=Aw ENFORCEMENT The President Minister of the Minister of Armed Forces Security and Civil and Veterans Protection National Police Gendarmerie ,Na?onal Military National Guard Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified 7 This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified - DOS, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) IDOJ International Criminal InVestigative Training Assistance Program Advice/training on developing NP institutional capacity NP I United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) - Increase capacity to prevent illicit drug trafficking - Coordinate mere effectively with interagency partners and field offices Ill Ministry of Security, Office of Drug Trafficking DOS Pilot community policing program citizen- police security dialogue to help police develop and provide visible, relevant, and accountable security for citizens. Ministry of Security DOS - Bureau of Diplomatic Security - Bureau of Counterterrorism Training to help police develop and provide security provision in two pilot locations (in tandem w/ project above) NP - DOS - DOJ Bureau of Counterterrorism Strengthen efforts to develop technical and legislative capacity to engage in CT and combat other forms of transnational crime DOS - Bureau of Counterterroris - Bureau of Educational/Cult ural Affairs 0 National Defense University?s (NDU) Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) Seminars and Workshops - International Visitor Leadership Programm (IVLP) to train legislative and civil society stakeholders to provide oversight and accountability of security services Justice Sector Capabilities Assessment . Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance. Mali December 2013

Sensitive But Unclassified ADDENDUM 5: ASSESSMENT Mir-momma Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified is report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But nclassified ADDENDUM 6: AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED The technical assessment team met with representatives 9f the gogowmg of?ces and organizationsb?H? customs Director General Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassified ADDENDUM 7: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT Abbreviation Explanation ACSS Africa Center for Strategic Studies AF (DOS Bureau of) African Affairs AFIS ANAC Agence Nationale de I?Aviation Civile/ National Agency for Civil Aviation AOA Air Operations Area AQIM aI Qa?ida in the Islamic Maghreb ARE Assessment, Review and Evaluation ASP Airport Security Plan AT Antiterrorism ATA Antiterrorism Assistance BAC Brigade Anti?Criminalit? Anti?Crime Brigade CAP Country Assistance Plan CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and (High?Yield) Explosives CC Coordination Center, CCTV Closed Circuit Television CP Civil Protection (agency) CRT Crisis Response Team CSDP Civilian Security Defense Program CT Bureau of Counterterrorism CT Counterterrorism CVE Countering Violent Extremism I DGGN Direction Generalede Ia Gendarmerie Nationale I Directorate-General of the National GendarmerIe DOJ US. Department of Justice DOS US. Department of State Department of State Office of Antiterrorism Assistance ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDS Explosives Detection System EIC Explosive Incident Countermeasures EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal ETD EU European Union EUTM EU Training Mission FBI (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation GIGN Groupe d'Intervention de la GN I National Gendarmerie Intervention Group GIS Geographic Information System GN Gendarmerie National GPS Global Positioning System GRM Government of the Republic of Mali GRM Government of the Republic of Mali GSIGN Groupement de S?curit? et d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale I Intervention Security Group of the Gendarmerie NatIonale HazMat Hazardouszmaterials HBS Hold Baggage Screening HHMD Hand-Held Metal Detector IBIS Integrated Ballistics Identification System ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICITAP InternatioiaLQjminaanlesli ativ?tinir?ssiga?j?rggam ICS Integrate;I_Count_ryiStraiggy a Capabilities Assessment Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance. Mali -??'December 2013

Sensitive But Unclassified Abbreviation Explanation IED Improvised Explosive Device INL (DOS Bureau of) International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Interpol lnternationaiCrinsinal DRelics I88 Institute for Securitygu?s JIB Judicial Investigative Branch JIS Judicial Investigative Service JOC Joint Operations Center JUSSEC Justice et S?curite en zone sah?Io-saharienne/ Security and Justice in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Region LE Law Enforcement MAF Malian Armed Forces MAN PADS Man-Portable Air Defense System MINUSMA Mission Multidimensionnelle Integr?e des Nations. Unies pourla Stabilisation au Mali/ United Nations MultidimenSional Integrated Stabilization MiSSion In Mali Mouvement National De Liberation De L'Azawad National Movement for the Liberation MNLA of Azawad MOD Ministry of Defense MOIS Ministry of Internal Security MOJ Ministry of Justice MUJAO Mouvement pour le Tawhid et du Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest MUJWA Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (also known as MUJAO) NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NDU National Defense University NG National Guard NONEL Non?Electric (shock tube detonator) NP National Police NPA National Police Academy OCR Optical Character Reader OCS Office central de lutte contre les stupefiants Central Anti-Narcotics Office . OTI 1 all-PIGN Peloto d'lntervention (Gendarmerie Nationale)/ Intervention Platoon of the Gendarmerie National PISCES Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System PME Performance Measures of Effectiveness POE Port of Entry QDDR Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review RLA Resident Le al Advisor RSI .. .. RSO Regional Sec SCP . Special JUdlClaI SME Subject Matter Expert SOP Standard Operating Procedures SRA Security Restricted Area SSR Security Sector Reform STD *s-ravelrz cements database SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics (team) TIP Terrorist Interdiction Program TIP . Threat Image Projection Trans Capabilities Assessment Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security's Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance. Mali December 2013

Sensitive But Unclassified Abbreviation Explanation TWJWA Tawhid Wal Jihad_in.West Africa a UNODC United Nations Office (in Driigs and Crime US. Agency InternationalDevesopment UV Ultraviolet WCO World Customs Organization WTMD Metal Detector Capabilities Assessment Mali December 2013 Sensitive But Unclassified This report may not be Shared with the partner nation assessed without the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance.

Sensitive But Unclassi?ed REPORT REVIEWERS This report has been reVieflved 33y: Program Manager 1/23/2014 '2/5/2014 ARE Deputy Chief 2/6/2014 2/12/2014 ARE Chief 2/6/2014 2/12/2014 Deputy Of?ce Director 2/12/2014, 2/18/2014 I 2/19/2014, 2/26/2014 law?s 2/26/2014 2/27/2014 2/26/2014 2/28/2014 2/23/2014 3/4/2014 2/26/2014 3/4/2014 :3 2/26/2014 3/5/2014 2/26/20'14 3/1 1/2014 Director 6 3/12/2014 3/20/2014 3/12/2014 3/18/2014 13/02: Capabilities Assessment This report may not be shared with the partner nation assessed Sensitive But Unclassified withOll?t the express written approval of Diplomatic Security?s Of?ce of Antiterrorism Assistance. Mali December 2013