NSA Cuban Missile Crisis Classification Guide

TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE Cuban Missile Crisis, 10-18 (U) PUBLICATION DATE: 30 July 2008 (U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Information Security Policy, DJP2 POC: DJ P2 (U) PHONE- (U) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: Associate Director for Community Integration, Policy and Records (U) Unless otherwise indicated, the information included in this guide addresses activity during and related to the Cuban lVIissile Crisis ONLY. Description of Information lassi?cationMarkings Reason Declass Remarks (U) The following guidance (items 1-8) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1959 through 31 December 1963. 1. (ID The fact that the UNCLASSIFIED following entities were SIGINT targets during and related to the crisis: a. The USSR b. Soviet Forces in Cuba c. Soviet Merchant Shipping d. Cuba. to include Cuban Military Forces. 2. (U) Information derived from. UNCLASSIFIED or pertaining to. unenciphered Soviet military conmlunications during and related to the crisis. 3. (U) Information derived from. UNCLASSIFIED or pertaining to. Soviet air-to- ground and grormd-to-air GC I communications in Cuba during and related to the crisis. 4. (U) Direction-?nding results UNCLASSIFIED when applied to Cuban and Soviet Forces during and related to the crisis. to include merchant shipping involved in aid to Cuba. 5. (U) Information derived from. UNCLASSIFIED SECRETHREL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL or pertaining to. unenciphered Cuban internal military and govenmlental communications during and related to the crisis. 6. (U) Information derived from or pertaining to Cuban air-to- grormd and ground-to-air GCI communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED 7. (U) Infomlation derived from category product reports pertaining to Soviet and Cuban communications during and related to the crisis. including Soviet Merchant Shipping communications. UNCLASSIFIED 8. (U) Information derived from category II product reports pertaining to unenciphered Cuban internal military and governmental communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED following guidance (items 9-10) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis during the time period 1 January 1960 through 31 December 1962. 9. (U) The fact that UNCLASSIFIED Czechoslovakia was a SIGINT target during and related to the crisis. 10. (U) Information derived UNCLASSIFIED from. or pertaining to. Czech air and air defense communications during and related to the crisis. and ELINT related to those communications. (U) The following guidance (items 11-16) pertains to information related to the Cuban Missile Crisis for all time periods. 11. (U) The fact targeting/collecting diplomatic and International Commercial (ILC) communications during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED Details regarding this targeting/collection shall remain classi?ed. to include identi?cation of the speci?c diplomatic entity communicating or identi?cation of the entity communicating using ILC communications. Information from product reports derived from diplomatic and ILC communications shall not be released without approval from the Of?ce of Policy and TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL Records. 12. The fact of 1.4 25 years* targeting Soviet General Staff REL TO USA. AUS. CAN. conmrunications. GBR. NZL 13. (U) Information contained in TOP 1.4 25 years* Category SIGINT reports COMINT related to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. 14. (U) Information re?ecting 1.4 25 years* US. relationships with Second or Third party partners. At a minimum. Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. 15. (U) Identi?cation of SIGINT CONFIDENTIAL 1.4 25 years* collection systems and teclmiques. At minimum. Releasability determined on a case-by-case basis. 16. (U) Information contained in CONFIDENTIAL 1.4 25 years* high-level summaries that contain substantial amounts of At a minimum. material or high- level all-source conclusions Releasability determined on relating to Soviet im'olvement. a case-by-case basis. (U) ELINT 17. (U) The fact of UNCLASSIFIED ELINT targeting during and related to the crisis of any entities described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. 18. (U) The fact 1.4 25 years* ELINT targeting any countries REL TO USA. AUS. CAN. or entities during and related to GBR. NZL the crisis other than those described as UNCLASSIFIED in this guide. 19. (U) The fact of ELINT UNCLASSIFIED (U) The association of an collection during and related to ELNOT with its related the crisis of signals ?our a system nickname or other specific ripe of radar, identi?ed: system identi?er is - by ELNOT (ELINT classi?ed. notation). or - by nickname. or - by identi?cation of the associated system. 20. (U) The fact of ELINT 1.4 25 years* collection during and related to REL TO USA. AUS. CAN. the crisis of signals ?ow a GBR. NZL specific type of radar, identi?ed: - by ELNOT and by nickname. or T0 USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL - by ELNOT and by identification of the associated system. 21. (U) The fact of land-based ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 22. (U) The fact of airborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 23. (U) The identification of types of aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 24. (U) The identification of a specific aircraft used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 25. (U) The fact of shipborne ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 26. (U) The identification of types of ships used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 27. (U) The identification of a specific ship used for ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 28. (U) The fact of satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 29. (U) Details regarding satellite/overhead ELINT collection during and related to the crisis. 30. (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis with a specific type of collection. 31. (U) The association of a Circular Error of Probability (CEP) or a confidence ellipse with an ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. 32. (U) Parametric data derived from ELINT intercept during and related to the crisis. UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A Classification determined on a case-by-case basis. CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 1.4 (c) 25 years* UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A UNCLASSIFIED N/A N/A CONFIDENTIAL// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL 1.4 (c) 25 years* 1.4 (c) 25 years* 1.4 (c) 25 years* 1.4 (c) 25 years* At a minimum. SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL At a minimum. SECRET// REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL At a minimum. SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL (U) Details relating to specific airborne platforms and systems used during the crisis should be treated according to applicable guidance. (U) Regardless of how identified. (U) The association of a specific ELINT intercept with satellite/overhead collection is classified.

SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL (U) * 25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later. SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL