Documents
NSA Japan cyber briefing
Apr. 24, 2017
SECRETUSWNOFORN
To USA, JPN) Topic: NSA Assistance to Japanese Directorate for SIGINT in
Developing Capabilities to Provide SIGINT Suppon to CND.
(U) Background:
The Japanese Directorate for SIGINT (DFS) has been tasked to start providing SIGINT
support to CND. They have approached NSA for help in developing such a capability. The
impetus for this comes from the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Organization (c1110) which
has been designated the Japanese lead for cyber. IAD will need to engage CIRO and craft an
MOU covering responsihilities/agreements on both sides. -- head of CR0, visited
NSA on 10 Sep 2012 for cyber related discussions. Cyber was also a significant topic of
discussion during the visit of DIR DPS. in November 2012 and other recent
seniorJapanese visits. The major focus of and his delegation is cyber related.
TO USA) JPN) Recem Actions:
- At the June 2012 USsJapan Strategic Planning Conference (SPC) in Japan. we briefed the
DPS about Chinese cyber activities and on how we produce foreign intelligence on those
same activities.
- DFS has already assigned two career SIGINT professionals to focus fullslime on Chinese
cyber activities.
- We provided DFS with a list selectors that we use to collect information about
Chinese cyber actors. DFS feedback states that these have so far not produced any useful
collection. We are discussing with the DPS ways to improve this.
- At the we also offered to a. st DFS in identifying platform training which would
benefit their newly assigned cyber analys .
- During his January 2013 visit to Japan briefed both CIRO and the DFS
leadership on how we develop reportab SIGINT In ormation on Chinese cyber
activities. Following the briefing to DPS. --ohserved that he now
understands how his organization should tackle the task of SIGINT collection analysis
and reporting on Chinese cyber actors.
(U) Talking Points:
- Direclor's Talking Points:
(U) Key Points:
- TO USA, JPN) Assure --that we will do what we can to
support the DPS in standing up a SIGINT support to CND capability.
- TO USA. JPN) Solicit -- comments on Japan's cyber
architecture. organizations. and authorities and ask for feedback on
discussions held in Japan in January.
Derived From: 1752
Dated 20070108
DeclassifyOn 20380101
SECRETUSWNOFORN
SECRETUSWNOFORN
To USA, JPN) Topic: NSA Assistance to Japanese Directorate for SIGINT in
Developing Capabilities to Provide SIGINT Suppon to CND.
(U) Background:
The Japanese Directorate for SIGINT (DFS) has been tasked to start providing SIGINT
support to CND. They have approached NSA for help in developing such a capability. The
impetus for this comes from the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Organization (c1110) which
has been designated the Japanese lead for cyber. IAD will need to engage CIRO and craft an
MOU covering responsihilities/agreements on both sides. -- head of CR0, visited
NSA on 10 Sep 2012 for cyber related discussions. Cyber was also a significant topic of
discussion during the visit of DIR DPS. in November 2012 and other recent
seniorJapanese visits. The major focus of and his delegation is cyber related.
TO USA) JPN) Recem Actions:
- At the June 2012 USsJapan Strategic Planning Conference (SPC) in Japan. we briefed the
DPS about Chinese cyber activities and on how we produce foreign intelligence on those
same activities.
- DFS has already assigned two career SIGINT professionals to focus fullslime on Chinese
cyber activities.
- We provided DFS with a list selectors that we use to collect information about
Chinese cyber actors. DFS feedback states that these have so far not produced any useful
collection. We are discussing with the DPS ways to improve this.
- At the we also offered to a. st DFS in identifying platform training which would
benefit their newly assigned cyber analys .
- During his January 2013 visit to Japan briefed both CIRO and the DFS
leadership on how we develop reportab SIGINT In ormation on Chinese cyber
activities. Following the briefing to DPS. --ohserved that he now
understands how his organization should tackle the task of SIGINT collection analysis
and reporting on Chinese cyber actors.
(U) Talking Points:
- Direclor's Talking Points:
(U) Key Points:
- TO USA, JPN) Assure --that we will do what we can to
support the DPS in standing up a SIGINT support to CND capability.
- TO USA. JPN) Solicit -- comments on Japan's cyber
architecture. organizations. and authorities and ask for feedback on
discussions held in Japan in January.
Derived From: 1752
Dated 20070108
DeclassifyOn 20380101
SECRETUSWNOFORN
SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(S//NF) Potential Landmine: None.
(U) Date of Material: 29 January 2013
(U//FOUO) Originator: Mr.
S2B Office of China and Korea,
, Senior China Strategist and Mission Advisor,
(U//FOUO) Alt. POC:
Korea,
, Foreign Affairs Officer, S2B Office of China and
(U//FOUO) Classification Review by:
SECRET//SI//NOFORN
, CAO, S2B,
SECRET//SI//NOFORN
(S//NF) Potential Landmine: None.
(U) Date of Material: 29 January 2013
(U//FOUO) Originator: Mr.
S2B Office of China and Korea,
, Senior China Strategist and Mission Advisor,
(U//FOUO) Alt. POC:
Korea,
, Foreign Affairs Officer, S2B Office of China and
(U//FOUO) Classification Review by:
SECRET//SI//NOFORN
, CAO, S2B,