Documents
Nunes Letter
June 15, 2016
Davin Nunes. Calalornil
Jail Milier Her (38
It Michael Conawny Tunas
Peter King New York
Frank A. La?londo. New Jarsoy
A. Westmoraland. Gecrpi?
Thomas Rooney Flor dc
Joseph Heck. Nevada
Mike Pumped Kenn:
Hanna Ros thtman, Honda
Michu Turner Onto
Brad Wat-tattoo Ohm
Stewart. Utah
Adam 5:111? Caliiurn a
Hummer He
Luna Gut error. a
James A. HimaI.Connocticut
TarrlA. Small Alabama
andr? Carson. ind ans
Jackie Sealer California
Mile Ouiqiay ll inaia
Eric Swelwetl Calilom 3
Patrick Murphy Florida
Paul D. Ryan. Since: or 1142 House
Nancy Felon Dsuocnmc LEADER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
June 15, 2016
THE
WASHINGTON. DC 20515
[202 I 225-4121
Damn Nthort
Surr- Daemon
Moran BAHAH
Marran SIAFF Dinettes
The national security threats to the United States and its allies are greater today than at any point
since 9/ I. To keep Americans safe, our Intelligence Community needs to fully employ every tool
available to it. We cannot be lulled into a false sense of security. As recent events in Orlando have made
tragically clear, terrorists will continue to attack the U.S. homeland.
Despite the threats that face us, Congressman Massie and Congresswoman Lofgren's amendment
to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (HR. 5293) would end the use of a vital tool for
identifying and disrupting terrorist plots at home and abroad. If this amendment were enacted, the
Intelligence Community would not be able to look through information lawfully collected under FISA
Section 702 to see if Omar Siddiqui Mateen, the Orlando attacker, was in contact with any
terrorist groups outside the United States.
Enclosed you will ?nd a two short summaries of the damage the MassieELofgren amendment
would cause to national security, as well as a background paper from the Heritage Foundation on the
importance of Section 702.
We ask you to oppose the Massie/Lofgren amendment and give our Intelligence Community all of
the authorities it needs to detect and stop terrorist attacks. As always, Intelligence Committee members
and staff are available to answer any questions you have on this or any other intelligence issue.
Best Regards,
LYNN WESTMORELAND
Chairman NSA and Cyber
Subcommittee Chairman
Davin Nunes. Calalornil
Jail Milier Her (38
It Michael Conawny Tunas
Peter King New York
Frank A. La?londo. New Jarsoy
A. Westmoraland. Gecrpi?
Thomas Rooney Flor dc
Joseph Heck. Nevada
Mike Pumped Kenn:
Hanna Ros thtman, Honda
Michu Turner Onto
Brad Wat-tattoo Ohm
Stewart. Utah
Adam 5:111? Caliiurn a
Hummer He
Luna Gut error. a
James A. HimaI.Connocticut
TarrlA. Small Alabama
andr? Carson. ind ans
Jackie Sealer California
Mile Ouiqiay ll inaia
Eric Swelwetl Calilom 3
Patrick Murphy Florida
Paul D. Ryan. Since: or 1142 House
Nancy Felon Dsuocnmc LEADER
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
June 15, 2016
THE
WASHINGTON. DC 20515
[202 I 225-4121
Damn Nthort
Surr- Daemon
Moran BAHAH
Marran SIAFF Dinettes
The national security threats to the United States and its allies are greater today than at any point
since 9/ I. To keep Americans safe, our Intelligence Community needs to fully employ every tool
available to it. We cannot be lulled into a false sense of security. As recent events in Orlando have made
tragically clear, terrorists will continue to attack the U.S. homeland.
Despite the threats that face us, Congressman Massie and Congresswoman Lofgren's amendment
to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act (HR. 5293) would end the use of a vital tool for
identifying and disrupting terrorist plots at home and abroad. If this amendment were enacted, the
Intelligence Community would not be able to look through information lawfully collected under FISA
Section 702 to see if Omar Siddiqui Mateen, the Orlando attacker, was in contact with any
terrorist groups outside the United States.
Enclosed you will ?nd a two short summaries of the damage the MassieELofgren amendment
would cause to national security, as well as a background paper from the Heritage Foundation on the
importance of Section 702.
We ask you to oppose the Massie/Lofgren amendment and give our Intelligence Community all of
the authorities it needs to detect and stop terrorist attacks. As always, Intelligence Committee members
and staff are available to answer any questions you have on this or any other intelligence issue.
Best Regards,
LYNN WESTMORELAND
Chairman NSA and Cyber
Subcommittee Chairman
Why the U56 should be able to query its 702 holdings with USP identifiers
When the iC acquires the communications of CT or Cl targets abroad, among the most critical issues is to
determine if they are communicating with persons in the United States. Once the K: identifies that a
party to the communications is In the United States, a determination needs to be made regarding
whether that person is a threat to the national security. One of the most valuable ways to do so is to
conduct a query using that person's selectors to see if he is communicating with other suspected CT or
Cl targets abroad. If so, that is signi?cant threat Intelligence that we would pass as a Ci' or Cl lead to the
for follow-up.
- These queries help protect the security of the nation by allowing the Intelligence Community to
property prioritize its review of Section 702 collection and identify threats to national security as
quickly as possible.
- The purpose of Section 702 authority is to enable the government to acquire communication of
certain foreigners located abroad .
- Having an array of communications of the non-U.S. person located abroad provides important
contextual and operational value to the IC.
- For example: it enables to identify potential terrorist plots and identify the participants
and track the activities of foreign nations seeking to hack into our networks and locate foreign
intelligence of?cers engaging in clandestine intelligence collection in the U.S., among other
important such as allowing the government to identify potential victims or hostages and alert
them, if possible.
I Communications between individual foreign intelligence targets and U.S. persons can have
signi?cant intelligence value.
1
I The it must be able to review its Section 702 collection in a manner that will allow it to identify
threat information and neutralize that threat before national security Is harmed.
- Allowing the IC to query its 702 coiiection with USP identifiers is therefore critical to the it:
mission to protect the national security
- Court approved minimization procedures already limit how queries are concluded, to include
U.S. person queries.
0 Not only are the queries limited in scope but they are also subject to oversight.
UNCLASSIFIED
Why the U56 should be able to query its 702 holdings with USP identifiers
When the iC acquires the communications of CT or Cl targets abroad, among the most critical issues is to
determine if they are communicating with persons in the United States. Once the K: identifies that a
party to the communications is In the United States, a determination needs to be made regarding
whether that person is a threat to the national security. One of the most valuable ways to do so is to
conduct a query using that person's selectors to see if he is communicating with other suspected CT or
Cl targets abroad. If so, that is signi?cant threat Intelligence that we would pass as a Ci' or Cl lead to the
for follow-up.
- These queries help protect the security of the nation by allowing the Intelligence Community to
property prioritize its review of Section 702 collection and identify threats to national security as
quickly as possible.
- The purpose of Section 702 authority is to enable the government to acquire communication of
certain foreigners located abroad .
- Having an array of communications of the non-U.S. person located abroad provides important
contextual and operational value to the IC.
- For example: it enables to identify potential terrorist plots and identify the participants
and track the activities of foreign nations seeking to hack into our networks and locate foreign
intelligence of?cers engaging in clandestine intelligence collection in the U.S., among other
important such as allowing the government to identify potential victims or hostages and alert
them, if possible.
I Communications between individual foreign intelligence targets and U.S. persons can have
signi?cant intelligence value.
1
I The it must be able to review its Section 702 collection in a manner that will allow it to identify
threat information and neutralize that threat before national security Is harmed.
- Allowing the IC to query its 702 coiiection with USP identifiers is therefore critical to the it:
mission to protect the national security
- Court approved minimization procedures already limit how queries are concluded, to include
U.S. person queries.
0 Not only are the queries limited in scope but they are also subject to oversight.
UNCLASSIFIED