Relatório especial da Agência Central de Inteligência (CIA)

SECRET ease 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 ~ bd Ed TL (a 16 August 1963 7. Vp 001 No. 0203/63 & ll / 1 xo. oy a Copy No: CY POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC TRENDS IN BRAZIL : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE Acrieed For RelossaiONOR/R ~CIARDETS.CO0ITAGOHOHIN00 

Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 

Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 : ~ ~ ! SECRET l- 16 August 1963 POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC TRENDS IN BRAZIL Brazilian President Goulart is continuing his efforts to increase his personal power, and appears to be maintaining his alliance with the extreme loft. He is tightening governmont control over news media, and is actively seeking to undermine Carlos Lacerda, Brazil's leading anti-Communist and governor of Guana- bara State (the city of Rio de Janeiro). Goulart's measures to neutralize the army's capacity to monitor bis government's political orientation appear also to have had significant effect. In the economic sphere, the tight foreign exchange situation--which has prompted Brazilian efforts to secure extensive US aid in recent years--remains critical. Goulart's Campaign point of view before the public “Riaiiot the Bross in response to a recent antigov- ernment attack by Lacerda. The Goulart government's | new effort to control news In addition, financial con- i media apparently is an attempt | trol is exerted over the prose to restrict the mancuverability | in several ways, Goulart thrent- of opposition elements and to | ened to demand immediate pay. swing public opinion in favor | ment of a large loan to the Bank of the government's proposed of Brazil by one magazine if it "basic reforms." Goulart is did not print an article by his also interested in indirectly | anti-US brother-in-law, Congroas- warning his opposition against | man Loonol Brizela, A’ latest any antigovermment moves. threat of which publishors are avare 1s that government sub- ! His administration is sidization of the newsprint in- using existing machinery to dustry puts the distribution of exert its new pressures. It newsprint under Goulart's cone has announced a policy of set- | troy . ing aside one half-hour per week for radio discussion of "basic The government is also reforns” by high-level offi exorting pressure by insisting cals, This program is under | on the collection of arrears on the supervision of the govern- | social security payments from ment's national communications | newspapers. A prime target of agency, headed by Josue Gui- this effort is Rio de Janeiro's maraes, who is not known to Tribuna da Inprensa, which is be a Communist although ho has | SonmGeTed wit Tamsrdn. ‘me frequent contacts with the So- | Brazilian military's arrest of | viet Embassy. The government | a leading newspaperman for Dube has also requisitioned consider- | lishing a secrot military cable able additional time to put its | has contributed to the press intimidation campaign. 1 SECRET | Approved For Release 2006/09/28 ol 

Approved For Release 2006109128 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 - - SECRET pertalisn, are engaged in a § campaign of bribery and lies 1 with the object of justifying foreign loans direct to munici- palities. ass In contrast, Governor 5 Aluisio Alves——who has a single- a minded drive toward economic 5 <a developnent of his state of Be “PL Rio Grande do Norte--appears to be calling the bluff of the | oxtrome leftists with respect to the Alliance for Progress. At a meoting in Recife of the Northeast Development Agency GOULART (Sudenc), Alves presented Gou- Tart with a memorandum signed Goulart as Champion by almost all northeast govern- SF "Baste WeTorms™ ors except Arracs. Tho memo randun asked the federal gov- The antipress campaign has | ernment to define its position been complemented by the govern- | toward the Alliance for Prog. i ment's return, after a period ress, either by declaring it | of relative quiet, to a tech- desirable and beneficial and nique of appealing for mass sup- | cooperating wich it fully in | port for "basic reforms." The the interest of development, nost pertinent example of this or branding 1t as an instru appeal is the appearance of nent of imperialism and re- Goulart and his entire cabinet | Jecting Lt entirely. on 29 and 30 July in Recife, capital of pro-Communist Governor Arracs’ state of Pernambuco. Goulart and Arraes both seized the opportunity to make dena gogic appeals which were designed to give the pression that the foderal and state authorities / are doing everything possible 5 to institute agrarian reform, Za and leaving the clear implica- = tion that Congress now 15 a bot- tleneck to effective action on this front. Arracs made a thinly veiled pubiic attack on the Al- liance for Progress, charging that the largo landholders, backed by the resources of im- LACERDA 2 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28 ol 

Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 - ww 1 SECRET Goulart apparently chose continues to be the defiant re- Pernambuco as the scene of his | sistance and counterattack by performance because of the rel- | Lacerda. Lacerda's leadership ative ease with which a large has had the effect of stiffening crowd sympathetic to the ex- the centor and right opposition treme left can be mobilized to Goulart. there. Goulart visited Bahia in early August and again pub- Despite Lacerda's opposi- | licly emphasized that reforms tion, Goulart seems clearly to were the alternative to violent | be making significantly more rovolution, mentioning Prosi- concessions to the left, Re- dent Kennedy's recent state- cent army promotions and key ments on the same theme. Gou- | command assiguments, for ex- lart is reportedly planning an | ample, have strengthened the excursion to his home state of | leftist ultranatlonalist net- Rio Grande do Sul in the near work in the army, despite the future, in what will apparently | retirement in July of extreme bo a further effort to present | leftist First Army Commander himself as the sincere reformer | Osvino Alves. The extreme left combating reaction. is likely to be benofited, more- over, by the federal government's Pressures on Goulart efforts to federalize at least —_— some of Governor Lacerda's The tactics of the extreme | militarized police in Guanabara leftists and the leftist ultra- | State. nationalists suggest that they believe they can force Goulart The Brazilian Semate's ap- to make major concessions to proval on 7 August of the nomina- their points of view. Extrem | tion to the Supreme Court of ist clements of Goulart's Bra- | extreme leftist Foreign Minister zilian Labor Party (PTB) have Evandro Lins o Silva is a further thus far blocked PTB efforts stop toward giving President Gou- to come to an agreement with lart a sympathetic court majority. the centrist Social Democrats The increase of extreme leftist on an agrarian reforn bill. influence in the court is likely Extreme leftists are also threat-| to assist Goulart's apparent am- ening that their recently formed | bition to intervene in Guanabara Popular Mobilization Front will | and depose Lacerda. break with Goulart, This threat may prove effective. The Military Relatively conservative Goulart has made consider- groups, such as congressmen able progress in neutralizing from the two major centrist the military as a check on his parties, are oxerting less vo- | political actions. Possibly cal and possibly less effec- remembering the military's in- tive pressure. The sharpest Sistence that he be dismissed form of pressure in this sector | as labor minister in 1954 when 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28 I 

Approved Fogelease 2006/09/28 : ClA-RDP79-00924004100100004-4 s BRAZIL TERRITORIAL COMMANDS AND MAJOR TROOP DISPOSITIONS — FEN ~ ae Peru on - i A: ors 7: A aziL >, ran fey re Ri mi ses cons) Fe vemmiaon = Ef gn 1 re fey pr — 2851 1 CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE ————————————_—————————————————— Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 

Approved For Release 2006/09/28 : CIA-RDP79-00927A004100100004-4 ~ - SECRET he had advocated raising the to a relatively able anti-Com- wage for common laborers above munist, General Alves Bastos, that for enlisted mon, Goulart who is’ considered more pro-Gou- has moved cautiously, although lart than his predecessor. This steadily, to build support among | army has been used by Goulart key officers. as a depository for able anti- Communists who might give him His first minister of war, trouble if more strategically | for example, was Nelson de Melo | located. ——anti-Conninist and allied with i moderate ex-Prosident Kubitschek | rather than with Goulart. De Goulart appears to be Melo was followed by General using his power over promo- Amaury Kruel, who is also an tions to improve the position anti-Communist but who had strong | of his supporters and to in- loyalty to Goulart because of hibit other officers in thelr their common origin in Rio Grande | expressions of opposition to do sul, Brazil's Texas. Most him, Of 16 officers promoted recently, Goulart has appointed to the rank of brigadier gen- i to the post Jair Dantas Ribeiro, | eral or higher on 26 July, who apparently believes that it | eight have leftist ultrana- is the duty of an army officer tionalist connections while to carry out the directives of the others are known as "legal- elected officials without re- ists," like War Minister Ri- gard to the political implica beire. Goulart's promotion tions. policy is strengthening pro- Communist influence in the army since the officers with Com- Under General Ribeiro, the | munist sympathies are usually four key army commands havé been | pro-Goulart. Among the of- changed. The Brazilian Army ficers promoted on 26 July is does mot have four strongly pro- | Argemiro de Assis Brasil, an Goulart generals of appropriate | extreme leftist who is de- rank for these posts. General scribed by the US army attaché | Peri Bevilagua, Who was allowed | as probably controlled by the to retain his command of the Communist Party. Assis Brasil Second Army in Sao Paulo, is was far down the list of of- widely considered to be extremely | ficers eligible for promotion, erratic, and possibly close to a fact which suggests his promo- insane.’ Officers recognized Sion resulted fiom Goulart's as weak in haracter were given | intervention. ‘the important First Army (Gen- eral Armando Ancora) and Third Anong the sweeping changes Army (General Benjamin Galhardo) | made in key posts on 6 August commands in Rio de Janeiro and vas the assignment of pro-Gou- Porto Alegre. The small Fourth | lart General Bandeira de Moraes Army in Recife--remote from Bra- | as commander of the important Zil's center of power--was given | second military region (Sao 1 SECRET Approved For Release 2006/09/28 I 

- - SECRET Paulo). He replaces General foreign exchange position counts ‘The government has also nancing. There appears to be announced the transfer of no objective justification for Ei Ean EAE | een Eni nT | asm | the capital may be aimed at dicated in June had been brought bringing pressure on the con- under control--came to 30.8 iE Ed EERE me we mee | Tr y——— ESRI | pT A BEIT |i half of 1963 are yet available, | cially noted in retail and EE hAERE. EET | Ee a deficit of 250 to 300 mil- zil's automobile industry has IEE ERE, | dn January-June 1963, A deficit in most other lines. Even in of similar proportions is in this industry, however, there fie EAT EF SRE The Brazilian Government's rently are to be . 2811 | . SECRET 

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