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Small Footprint Operations 2/13
Oct. 15 2015 — 7:56 a.m.

ISR Support to
Small Footprint CT Operations Somalia Yemen
ISR Task Force
Requirements and Analysis Division
February 2013
Overall classi?cation of this document is

Introduction and Background
Factors Impacting ISR Support to Operations
Significant ISR Contributors
Issues and Recommendations

SECRE l'//NOl ORN
Study Overview
(U) Previous studies* of Counterterrorism (CT) Kill Capture operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have detailed the role and impact of Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) for those missions
(U) This study extends that previous analysis and reports on ISR performance and
requirements for CT operations in Somalia and Yemen and should inform ISR planning
and investments for potential small footprint operations elsewhere
From Jul Oct 2012, the study team interviewed Task Force (TF) 48-4 personnel
and collected extensive data on CT operations conducted from Jan 2011 Jun 2012
(U) Analytic results satisfy three linked objectives:
Highlight key factors in smaller-footprint operating environments that have the most
significant impact on ISR employment needs
Identify capabilities that are most effective critical when operating in these environments
Describe issues and make recommendations for resourcing and longer term investment
Purose: Study ISR contributions to CT operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) East
Africa and Arabian Peninsula to inform ISR planning and investments for potential
future small footprint operations
2007 Iraq HVI ISR Study; 2008 Ms. HVI ISR Study; 2012 Global F3EA Study
(Studies conducted by ISR TF, 15/12 and 3

TF 48-4 is organized into two main branches: East Africa (EA) in Nairobi, Kenya
and Arabian Peninsula (AP) in Sana?a, Yemen
TF 48-4 EA and AP are further subdivided geographically into teams
TF 48-4 forward support element is at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti
TF 48-4 Theater Footprint
ISR is based at three regional
airfields, supplemented with sea-based 301"" mam?
. 3? TF 484.2 AP
Scan Eagles or MCI-8 Fire Scouts ?ammo Asmara, San'
. . We Ma am.
Djibouti (Camp Lemonier) .Simh FWD HQ
Arba Munch om
Djibouti .1
MolakalMQ-9
TF 48-4 counterterrorlsm 6x Ethiopia ?434.3
operations are focused on violent 'Rumbek 2" ?mad?
. . Arba Minch 8X F-ISE Somalia Sweep
ex remis organiza Ions Wm Mm GOCO
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula .n . . ..
a Maritime ISR
Al Qaida in East Africa/Al Shaabab Kampalae 9 1x on
TF 48-4 CT operations are only a
part of a broader whole-of-government no Manda Bay 0 TF48-4 Sites
approach to regional security stability om; 0
Subsequent to data collection and interviews for this study,
Some; 7; 43.4 Command Brie; flight operations are being shifted from Camp Lemonier 4

Introduction and Background
Factors Impacting ISR Support to Operations
Significant ISR Contributors
Issues and Recommendations
5

Summary of Factors Impacting ISR Support to Ops
HVI operations in HOA highlight several key factors impacting ISR support to CT
operations in a small-footprint environment
These factors differentiate CT in HOA from similar operations in Afghanistan or Iraq
Key Factors Description Implications
Not an Operations are ?Outside a Defined Theater of Active Armed Con?ict" (ODTAAC)
Active Limits footprint, allowable US activities, penetration of comms networks
Warzone Impacts operations and intel collection and exploitation activities
HVIs are approved for targeting by President of the United States under Authorization
to Use Military Force (AUMF) provisions
?322; AUMF process requires significant intel ISR to justify (and maintain) approvals
Relatively few, high-level terrorists meet criteria for targeting under the provisions
Approved are usually OPSEC and savvy; limits intel and finishing chances
Strict A high level of assurance is required before a strike is approved
. Must establish Positive Identification (PID) of HVI with "near certainty?
. . . . .
Assurances Only fInISh In a confirmed low Collateral Damage Envnronment (CDE)
?Near certainty? increases ISR work factor, reduces targeting opportunities
Tyranny of Long distances to operating areas complicate the ?fixing? and ?finishing? of
Distance Most objectives In Yemen are "500km away, Somalia can be over 1000 km
Long transits consume "50% of ISR flight time and complicate strike planning
5

.
Introduction and Background
Factors Impacting ISR Support to Operations
Significant ISR Contributors
Issues and Recommendations
7

ISR Contribution to perations
FMV and Aerial Precision Geolocation (APG) dominate Find-Fix-Finish part of F3EA
APG tips narrow aperture FMV during Find
During Fix and Finish, FMV and APG are used together, to maintain HVI location and PID
SIGINT including Computer Network Operations (CNO) also contribute to Find and Fix
FINISH
HOA kill capture operations
require input from other sources to
drive the next ?find?
?75% of finishes in HOA are kinetic strikes
DOMEX So. Very little ?finish-based? intel (DOMEX or
a Ops AUMF interrogation) to drive next cycle
FIX HVI ops EXPLOITI PROCESS
PROCESS NF) In HOA, analysis-intensive
6. intelligence replacestactical site
m, explortatlon, disrupting slowmg the
cycle
Source Ops F) This intelligence also feeds the
D: FMV AUMF process which authorizes for
D: SIGINT (Aerial Precision Geolocation, SIGINT internals/CNO) kl? C8 th re
El= HUMINT Source Operations AUMF approval usually requires several
El: (Tactical Interrogation Report, Document/Media Exploitation) months of intel ISR target development
8

?Exploit/Analyze? Replaced by ?All-Source Analysis?
2 an
Target Package Sources - HOA 2012
use other HUMINT and
SIGINT sources to fill in for missing 7% 3%
when building target
packages (Baseball Cards
SIGINT, often from foreign partners,
provides 57% of the BBC references
HUMINT, primarily CIA source reporting,
I NSA- Serialized SIGINT
Report
I NSA- Partner SIGINT
Report
r: TD - CIA Source
Report
IIR - Intelligence
Information Report
provides almost all other references IOther
These sources .are [je'th'er as tlmely SIGINT, HUMINT is gap-filler for absent
nor as focused as tactical Intelligence
Target Package Sources - Iraq 2007
Therefore not as immediately relevant to
the next cycle of Find, Fix, Finish 100% IIR-Intelligence
80% Information Report
In Iraq and Afghanistan, DOMEX 60%
and interrogation from Finishing actions INSA-SerializedSIGlNT
'd the bulk of hone numbers Rm?
prov' - DOMEX-Document/Media
locations and terrorist names . 7
20%
Exploitation
0" I TIR - Tactical Interrogation
This intelligence fueled the next F3 cycle, Locations Phone Names Report
with objectives often actioned within days Numbers
Finish-based intel immediately useful to next Find
PORN Source: 48-4 Baseball Cards; IBM Analysis

A
Find and Fix Operations
Q.
F) SIGINT provided two-thirds of the ISR Support for ?Find?
?hand-holds? used for HVI Finds
Overwhelmingly, single sources were used
to successfully Find top
FMV and Computer Network Operations ?t
(CNO) also contributed to some Finds FMV
I APG
I VID (Voice ID)
FMV support becomes more CNO
important in the Fix phase, typically in
I OTHER
combination with SIGINT
Two-thirds of Fixes involved FMV Two-Thirds of Finds are based on SIGINT
SIGINT, in various forms, continued to be a Support for ?Fix?
dominant contributor in Fix I
FMV maintains Fix on initial Find location
to enable the TF to keep eyes on the HVI
while building up to "near certainty?
FMV, especially HD, is also used to build
near certainty via identification of
distinguishing physical characteristics
I FMV APG
I FMV COMINT
FMV
I VID (Voice ID) APG
I APG
HUMINT
Finishes are largely the same--
every Finish was supported by FMV
Source: rr 48-4 ISR Logs, SITREPs, Intel Summaries Oct 2011 -$ep 2012,- IBM Analysis 10
Combining FMV and SIGINT is key to successful Fixes

Introduction and Background
Factors Impacting ISR Support to Operations
Significant ISR Contributors
ISSUES 80d Recommendations
11

Summary of Issues and Recommendations
Key Findings and Recommendations
Finding: Critical shortfall of capabilities providing PID and HVI location information
ReqUirementS Recommendation: Continue to develop/field HD FMV and COMINT sensors
Findings: Advance Force Operations (AFO) enable ?capture? vice "kill" finishes.
National intelligence partners often have the best information and access. This can
EprOit/Ana'yze be completed remotely by COMINT and CNO
Alternatives . .
Recommendations: Leverage AFO to Increase ?capture? operations. Pre-plan for
rapid sharing of IC information and increase COMINT and CNO collection ops
Findings: Long distances in A0 is a significant planning factor complicated by basing
. and over-flight planning issues
Long Distances . .
Recommendations: Increase range and endurance for all ISR platforms.
Consider sea-based ISR as a necessary complement to land-based ISR
Finding: A key factor in' Find/Fix failures is the frequent inability to maintain 24/7
persistent stare on active mission areas, especially when ISR is massed for Finishes
HOA ISR Orbits
Recommendation: Support Combatant Command (CCMD) requnrements for
additional ISR orbits to help prevent ?blinking? on HVIs during demand surges
F) Also note: Addressing ISR issues will improve rate of operations (and successes), but
expectations should be calibrated for realities of HVI ops outside of active war zone
Constraining factors mean OPTEMPO will be significantly lower than previously seen in Iraq and Afghanistan
12

Requirements
Unsuccessful Find-Fix-Finish sequences most often were due to issues with:
Transition from Find to Fix: Primarily due to inability to acquire positive identification (PID)
Transition from Fix to Finish: Combination of difficulty maintaining "near certainty? level PID and
need to avoiding collateral damage areas
Prosecution of Top EAAP HVIs Failure modes for ISR collections
3? FAILED TO N0
25 . - Detected (SIGINT)
I SIGINT
2? ?til?? m? I
. Uncertain PID
15 I PID: Weather (2), I Not
1o FINISH Sensor Fall, Enemy OPSEC . High CDE
To Lost PID
Unique HVIs
VarIous
AUMF FIND FIX FINISH
Occurrences
I TF Ops 3: Other Killed/Captured I Active
Key Finding and Recommendation
Finding: Critical shortfall of capabilities such as HD FMV, Voice Identification, Single-
Use Determination that provide PID and support HVI location and CDE determination
ReqUirememS Recommendation: Continue to develop/field critical ISR sensors such as HD FMV and
COMINT systems (Voice ID, Single-Use ID, Geolocation)
JP (Jackpot): A con?rmed Objective kill
13
51/ NOFORN Source: TF 48-4 ISR Logs, SITREPS, Intel Summaries Oct 2011 - Aug 2012; IBM Analysis

Alternatives to Exploit/Analyze
F) Lack of ?Finish? intel to Exploit/Analyze and FiniShes HOA 2011'?
cue ISR is probably the most significant reason for
the low rate of finishes
. Narrow gap" I. I
Reconnecting the F3EA cycle would likely f;
yield significant improvements to results was
I $lrikC
Strike (nonTFl
I (OTHER)
Efforts should focus on expanding 1
Cl 0(
where possible through partner engagement will.)
Improved remote airborne collection and
I, Fill in gap" with
broadened IC engagement can also fill the EA gap collectionand IC partnering
Key Finding and Recommendation
Finding: Small teams of special force advisors can assist the partner nation under Advance Force
Host/partner Operations (AFO) which enables ?capture? vice ?kill? ?nishes
Engagement Recommendation: Whenever possible, leverage Advance Force Operations (AFO) to increase
?capture? operations - tying previous finishes to future ?nds by generating more TIR DOMEX
Fin?ding: In the reduced access environment, national intelligence partners often have the best
[c Engagement information and access
Recommendation: Pre-plan for rapid sharing of this information to minimize time delays
Finding: Identifying information can often be obtained remotely through COMINT and CNO
Recommendation: Increase airborne and remote COMINT and CNO collection and exploitation
capabilities to make up for lack of access on the ground
5 ECR 0 F0 Scarce: TF 48?4 Storyboards, Baseball Cards Jan 2011 - Aug 2012; IBM Analysis 14

Long Distance Implications
In Iraq 80% of finishing operations occurred within 150km of airfields
The equivalent distance is 450km for Yemen and over 1000km for Somalia
ISR platforms spend half their mission flight 5"
time in transit-generating 38% fewer orbits
per sortie than in other theaters
sscaerl
The issue of distance is magnified
when translated to all of northern Africa
MFW aircraft with a range of 450km will
only reach about 5% of north Africa
The range of land-based RPA aircraft allows
them to reach 25% of the area
450km range for land-
based aircraft
. . 450kmrangeforsea- .
Sea-basmg allows short-range aircraft to basedaircraft
reach 35% of the land mass Transit Ranges from Bases*
Key Finding and Recommendation
Finding: Long distances from air?elds to operating areas is a signi?cant planning factor
LONG
ENDURANCE Recommendation: Consider ways to increase mission range and endurance for all ISR platforms;
when satisfying airborne ISR requirements, key metric should be ?orbits? not or ?lines?
Finding: Political and developmental issues complicate basing and over-?ight planning
Recommendation: Even with shorter ranges, sea-based ISR may be a valuable complement to long
endurance land-based ISR
Some, ARGGIS Dam 59? Dec 2012,. Analysis Includes ISR coverage out of Djibouti, but not Niamey, Arba, or Agadez 15

Additional ISR Will Prevent ?Blinking?
r? "i
Shortfall in TF 48-4 ISR capacity is a contributor to ?fail to .1. I, 1 .
find? and "fail to fixprevent ?blinking? during F3, operations in Yemen 3:321;
require a minimum of 3 full orbits of ISR while Somalia
operations require at least 1 full orbit
Per TF, one orbit is equal to 24/7 on-station coverage .. .
Additional capacity would be required to ensure ongoing 3 3?
development of one target is not sacri?ced when massing ISR .
for Finish of another I 90"
Per TTPs, optimal ISR employment is three orbits per actioned 0 Mission Areas
objective, which would equate to 3 (Somalia) and 9 (Yemen) orbits .. . r? -
When ISR is massed in the Finish, coverage on other HVIs is lost .: .
CAO: 301 2012 - at
an ISR Actual ISR Req Per SN 3 1.
Yemen 2.8 orbits 6.0 orbits 9.0 orbits -
. Source: TF 48-4 ISR Logs, SITREPS, Intel
Somalia 0.9 orbits 3.0 orbits 3.0 orbits Summaries Oct2011- Aug 2012;I8MAnonsrs
Key Findings and Recommendations
Finding: A key factor in Find/Fix failures is the frequent inability to maintain 24/7 persistent
HOA ISR stare on active mission areas, especially when ISR is massed to support Finishing actions
Orbits
Recommendation: Support CCMD requirements for additional ISR orbits to help prevent
?blinking? on HVIs during demand surges
Approved requirements are now 8 (Yemen) and 5 (Somalia). Actual
orbits delivered has also increased to 3.9 (Yemen) and 1.9 (Somalia) 16

Appendix A. Study Background
Appendix B. Find-Fix-Finish
Appendix C. ISR Orbit Analytics
Appendix D. AFRICOM Distances
Appendix E. Additional Materials
17

SECRET
Study Framework
and ISR-TF CT studies are shaped to complement each other. Study teams are
coordinating with each other and mission owners to minimize impact on operations
SECRET
Focus Area) Approach
Future
NW Africa 17 PACOM 17 Syria 17 Afghanistan 17 team
construct Future
Vignettes with J5
Case Studies: HOA deep dive Afghanistan BOTH teams
C0nd-UCt Case
Today AQIM Studies Data
Pl? (ISR TF FOCUS Area) Driven AnaIySis
with
Recent Afghanistan 08
Focus Area) ISR-TF HOA
Past Iraq 07/08
AFG ROW
LOW Level of Supporting Case Studies
CT Ops in highly Small Footprint Large Footprint
austere locations CT Ops CT Ops
SECRET 18

SURET
.
Analytic Approach and Methodology
Analytic Approach: The Study of ISR Contribution in the Horn of Africa
Understand the organization, Qualitativg
mission, and map out Direct Observation
processes and roles 30" lnterviews
Understand the HOA
Environment
a . Quantitative Analysis
Capacity VS. Determine the level ofactuvrty Corremion of capabilitie?
3 - or OPTEMPO to Identify how (assets) to potential capaCIty
Capability .
(missions) to determine
well its achieved
throughput
I Identify all the causal factors Mixed Analysis
. that impacts or limits Quantitative Analysis,
Root cause Analys's performance to define the Qualitative Analysis, and
"ga p? Stakeholder Coordination
Determine how various ISR Quantitative Anamsis
. . capabilities perform within Correlation of ISR collection
ISR Contnbunon the F3EA cycle and define With Operational application
effectiveness based on performance data
Id zoo 7- Compare and contrast results
.AFG 2008 in HOA with those of AF and
Mixed thod Anal sis
. Compare HOA, IZ, AF results
0
HOA ?01 1 l2 to understand the bigger and discuss with SMES
sm- 20>? context of future operations
Final
SECRET
SECRET 19

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO
Study Schedule
Oct 12 Nov 12 Dec 12/ 2013
Key Events
- - Study Kick-Off 3 I
1. Preliminary Brie?ng
8- Coordination A
b. Research/Orient.
. Interviews
CONUS Visits
a. Fort Bragg, NC
b. Damneck, VA
c. Tampa, FL
4. Theater Visits 3
3. Germany 3
b. Djibouti
c. Kenya . .
d. Ethiopia (TBD)
5. Data Collection
6. Draft Report Production
a. Re?ned Production 3 3 3
A0 Go Study iGck- Off Pie-Trip Prep Pre-Tnp Prep; Pos?Trnp Executive Summary
Briefing (CONUS) (OCON US) I 2 Brief (CKONUS) Brie?ngs
7. Brief/Review A A A A A
FOUO 20

Appendix A. Study Background
Appendix B. Find-Fix-Finish
Appendix C. ISR Orbit Analytics
Appendix D. AFRICOM Distances
Appendix E. Additional Materials
21

Timeline: Objective Peckham Case Study
2009
A
FIFIF Find
HUMINT
SIGINT
APG
FMV
.-
Activity Description Summary Iii-2Intelligence collection on target to establish pattern of life lg loo I
FIX
2006: 08] Peckham attended ?8th AI-Jinn?, a specialized training 8 FIX ?x I
program - including explosives training
2006 - 2009.- OBJ Peckham returned to the UK and provided .2 I
financial support to AQ allied elements in East Africa '75 .o .
- Oct 2009: OBJ Peckham returned to Somalia after his second :0 I
attempt; Travel was coordinated by 08] LOCKHART ?Dec 2009: 08] Peckham coordinated with Kenyan based facilitatar I . 311/201 . 9mm. . tun/:01!
to facilitate money, equipment, and ?ghters through the UK to
OBJ PECKHAM MOVEMENT
Target has been located for kinetic/non-kinetic engagement
.
- 23 June 2011: Strike failed
Problems with Approval Authorities, NAVAF C2, and AC malfunction
I
. NF) 12 January 2012: Fix during a vehicle follow No Strike "t
Kill/Capture or neutralization of an enemy Target ;*a"ed stnke
(23 Jun 11)
21 Jan 2012: 081 PECKHAM was eliminated via kinetic strike
- 0359: White SUV enters CEL-012 (OBJ PECKHAM NAI)
0502: Adult with heavy strides and slight limp (OBJ PECKHAM) t'ave'
no Finish (12 Jan 12)
Early Jan 2012 OBJ relocated to Afgooye
0811: Vehicle follow begins
- 1039: Full Register/Match (SI)
:Lrlilkgeg (SI) 12 Jan OBJ traveled to Merca
lzsazcominue to monitorthe scene 14-21 Jan OBJ returned to Af900yei'Ceelasha
ECR ll/ NO F0 RN Source: TF 4841 Baseball Cards, Oct 2006 - June 2012; EA ISR Logs, Jan 2011 June 2012; IBM Analysis 22

Timeline: Objective Rhodes Case Study
FIFIF
HUMINT
SIGINT
APG
FMV
Activity Description Summary no
no
Intelligence collection on target to establish pattern of life I 200 m" I
I75
Jan 2009: Yemeni NSB assessed Anjaf as a trusted deputy to I g? isoPOL . I
031 Canton and responsible for transporting extremists I FIX ?mgr F'ms?l
- Mar 2009: Classified as one of eight main AQAP facilitators; I pm, .
Identified as 828 on ROYG's Most Wanted Terrorist List 2 so I
Sep 2010: ROYG assessed Anjaf and 081 Canton preparing useaVBlED against unspecified US interests 9?9r? 441? 3? 0e 0&ch I
2010: Favorable AUMF ruling mby Office of General I- .. .. ..
Counsel under Jupiter Garrett CONOP OBJ RHODES MOVEMENT
Target has been located for kinetic/non-kinetic engagement . . .4
3 July 2012 3n?
- 23 Apr 2012: Unsuccessful Strike I i;
2 Enemy Killed In Action 5.
2 Enemy Wounded In Action (Including OBJ Rhodes)
FINISH Kill/Capture or neutralization of an enemy Target
- 3 Jul 2012: 081 RHODES was eliminated via kinetic strike
0713: Multiple VID (RHODES) and Geo-located at MAI-064
0825: Vehicle follow begins
- 0908: 08] Rhodes correlated to vehicle; Near Certainty established
- 1251: Strike
- 1301: Continue to monitor the scene - . . 23 Ap, 12
- 1500: 08] buried near MAI-125 's .v Attempth FINISH
N0 FORN Source: rr 48-4 Baseball Cards, Oct 2006 - June 2012,- YM ISR Logs, lan 2011 - July 2012,- IBM Analysis 23

Previous analyses show that the
Find phase is typically characterized by
a mix of APG, FMV vehicle follows, and
HUMINT exploitation
APG handholds from the Find
phase then lead to many hours of
HUMINT or FMV surveillance to
maintain a fix on a bed-down location
In HOA, Find and Fix work
somewhat differently
Lack of HUMINT puts more
demands on SIGINT to cue FMV in
Find
High CDE at bed-down locations
means FMV doesn?t watch to
ensure the objective stays, but
watches for the objective to leave
Despite these differences, FMV
and APG continue to be mainstays of
the Find and Fix steps
L.
Afghanistan ?Find? Afghanistan ?Fix?
Intel tips to FMV ?vehicle follows? until ?Finish? force arrives
FMV ?stares? at bed-down location
Find Fix Comparison
HOA ?Find? HOA ?Fix?
Saurce: TF 48-4 TFO and TF 3-10 TFD Databases; IBM Analysis

_f
TF 48-4 SI Geolocation Comparison
It} a
NF) Unlike in Afghanistan in 2008, delays in target development cannot be attributed to a
shortage of SI
2008 Afghanistan HVI operations were characterized by a significant drop in geolocations
during the evening, which was attributed to ISR switching to FMV prime to support assaults
NF) On the contrary, analysis of SI geolocations and vehicle follows (FMV) in AP shows a
high degree of correlation and does not support the hypothesis that target development
delays are due to a shortage of
(count of logged ISR reports)
ISR Activity by Time of Day (L)
1800 ?Orbits
- 1600
a
1400
3
. 1200 ?g Vehicle
Follows
1000
.Gcc?oc3
1400 :g
i
200 ?9
-- 0
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
0100
0200
0300
0400
0500
0600
0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
0000
Source: TF 48-4 TFD, Orbit Tracker; IBM Analysis 25

Target Development Duration Comparison
Target Development Duration for Actioned AF Selectors
(S) In 2008 Afghanistan HVI ops, 25.0% -- - SECRET
actioning of targeted SI selectors (cell '3 200%
phone indicators associated with HVI 8 150%
took a median of 11 days 100% .
anda mean of 30 days ?336longer In AFthan In IZ 0.0% I I I
(S) When compared to previous
operations, the amount oftime ?0?8?39?90?0required to action objectives is
literally orders of magnitude higher MEd'a" ?me to Adm" Objemves
Eleven out of fourteen HVIs on the IZ 2007 AF 2008 HOA 2012
AUMF approved HVI list on January Median ?aways until
15t 2012 t'll th - 7 11
were 5 I on IS a amoned
end of the stud eriod
Me-an of days until 19 30
. . actioned
(S) Obvuously, the requnrement for Over 60 days until
0 0 0
FMV time increases substantially actioned 1% 936
under these circumstances 13? days UNK UNK 79%
actioned
26
NO F0 RN Source: RTF Summaries and Iraq 2007, Afghanistan 2008 CT Studies; IBM Analysis

SECRET
(S) Compared to Iraq and Afghanistan, the pace of ?nishing actions in and Yemen(AP) is
extremely low
In 07-08, Iraq averaged around 8 finishing actions per day, while Afghanistan averaged around
1.5
Currently, Afghanistan averages around 6 finishing actions per day
In AP the average (including mission partners) is around .2 per day (roughly 1 every two weeks)
In EA the pace is so low that it cannot be meaningfully measured (only three finishes in the past
18 months)
Moving Average of Finishing Operations Tempo
12
3 10
8 8
5 11-12
4
,8
2 1142
. ?91011121314151617
Month of Study Period
SECRET
SECRET SourceJuly 2012,- IBM Analysis 27

Appendix A. Study Background
Appendix B. Find-Fix-Finish
Appendix C. ISR Orbit Analytics
Appendix D. AFRICOM Distances
Appendix E. Additional Materials
28

ISR Allocation
Over the study period, AP has averaged 15
sorties per day, while EA has averaged only four
Those sorties have generated an average of
2.9 orbits of ISR for AP and .9 orbits for EA
(S) AP has averaged three times the allocation and
on station hours compared to EA
(S) APs on-station time is larger than EAs allocation
N0 FOR Source: HOA Orbit Tracker, as of June 201 2; IBM Analysis
Allocated and On-Station Sortie Hours
90,000
60,000
30,000
On Station
0
Allocated
unmanned orbits with manned U-28 orbits
However, the U-28 is very inefficient
at generating an unmanned orbit
It requires over 4.5 times the number of
sorties to create an orbit
Although RPA still deliver more on-
station time per sortie, EA shows a more
even mix of manned and unmanned
platforms
This is plausibly due to basing short
duration manned aircraft closer to operating
areas than the longer legged MQs
29

Requirements
Per TF 48-4 AP JZ, AP requires a minimum of 1 manned and 2 unmanned ISR sortie
(three total) to prosecute one HVI and conduct TADS related network development
Actual SOCOM approved requirement to enable multiple HVI missions is six orbits
The TF has mitigated shortfalls in unmanned orbits with the manned U-28
- Referred to as the "Chiclet" line, this practice compounded Djiboutian air control issues
As the number of MQ?l?s at DJ has risen from 3 to 4 in Feb 2012, and finally to 6 in May
2012, 48-4 has been able to meet the minimums
AP Orbit Meets minimum orbit
requirements
4 .. . ..
Unmanned Orbits
Manned Orbits
Orbits
Total Orbits
Unmanned Reqt
- - Manned Reqt
- - MinRequired
.5124
ECR 0 F0 Source: HOA Orbit Tracker, as of June,2012 IBM Analysis 30

?rd-Kud-
EA Minimum Orbit Requirements
'7
A.
Per TF 48-4 EA JZ, EA requires a minimum of 1 manned and 1 unmanned ISR sortie
(two total) to prosecute one HVI
Actual SOCOM approved requirement to enable mission is three orbits
NF) EA has never been allocated their minimum orbit requirements
EA has never consistently meet even half their minimum requirement
EA did meet their unmanned requirements in July of 2012 with the addition of GOCO
lines at Arba Minch and Fire Scout
..
EA orbit AnalYSiS Far below minimum orbit
requirements
2.5
Minimrn Betterment. - -
1 Unmanned Orbits
Manned
- - UnmannedReqt
- - MannedR
0.5 c-q
- - Min Required
"Source: HOA Orbit Tracker, June 2012; IBM Analysis 3 1

Additional ISR Wi
llPreve
We found a positive correlation between Finishes and ISR clustering
- Looked at a one year period (July 2011 June 2012) to see if the
clustering patterns of ISR observed during normal operations changed
during Finishes 3;
Normal operations show about 2 orbits per day in the top cluster, about
.85 orbits in the second cluster, and the remainder scattered
- During the day of 3 Finish, there are about 2.5 orbits in the top cluster
(a gain of .5 orbits) and the second cluster dwindles to about .4 orbits.
The day preceding a Finish also shows a bump in
not as significant as the day of 3 Finish. The day following 3 Finish
shows even more decentralization than the average day
This implies that normal Ops for the TF are to put two orbits on the
priority objective and one orbit on a secondary objective
- As ops go from Find to Fix and then Finish, the TF starts to mass ISR.
This massing peaks during the Finish and quickly dissipates
When taken in context of actual orbits we conclude that even during
normal ops, the TF is ?blinking? a bit on the secondary objective. When
ISR is massed in a Finish, there would be a significant loss of SA on a_l
other targets, hence the ISR post-Finish is scattered to try to pick up the
loose threads
Main Effort Secondary Effort Other Efforts
Normal 2.0 orbits .85 orbits .35 orbits
Finish 2.5 orbits .40 orbits .30 orbits
Post-Finish 1.9 orbits .70 orbits .60 orbits
5 0 F0 Scarce: r; 43-4 ISR Logs, SITREPs, Intel Summaries Oct 2011 - Aug 2012,- IBM Analysis
Normal Ops
Other Efforts
?Blinking?
32

SECRET
Orbit Sufficiency
2012 ISR Activity by Day in Somalia 2012 ISR Activity by Day in Yemen
TIME 9 . . TIME
. . .
PorLazea E775 :35. [wan
Ratlines 7: - - . .
between I I. i I 1. .
Ethlopla .- 4 - . -.
and l! .274: 25:1 -
5 Somalia 5 Ninjlb?"Mogadishu 'Marka?IMercarouts?dmatf?f?t;
. Q. i . .-
ISR activity clustering indicates Somalia operations are clustered around one op area at a
time, while Yemen operations are routinely dispersed across 3-5 op areas
SECRET Source: Somalia -SI Tracker Yemen -Sl mIRCTracker IBM Analysis

?1.4
Appendix A. Study Background
Appendix B. Find-Fix-Finish
Appendix C. ISR Orbit Analytics
Appendix D. AFRICOM Distances
Appendix E. Additional Materials
34

- 7?r'f?
on.
CLDJ Distances to HOA NAls
Djibouti airfield to Yemen NAIs
NF) Somali NAls are more distant and (km)
. . 80 100%
more dispersed than Yemeni NAIs 80% Meme" NAB WI 1.
2 so are greater than 500 80%
km from Djibouti 60% '3
In Yemen there "6 40
are 225 NAls 40%
20
spread over space with an rt? 69? 59? 9? 9 90? 89?
average distance - Djibouti Airfield to Yemen NAIs ?Cumulative
0f km Djibouti Air?eld to Somalia NAI distances
200 (km) 100%
. 80% of Somali NAIs 9,
In Somalia there are 150 I are greater than 1000 80%
362 NAIs spread over a ?5 mo . km from Djibouti 60% .5
1550 space With an 3 50 20%
Average distance 0 - - 0%
Of 1065 ?Somalia NAIs ?Cumu ative
For Iraq - 80% of OBJs are within 150 km hr round-trip transit for
For Afghanistan - 80% of OBJs are within 400 km hr round?trip transit for MQ-1)
NOFORN Source: TF 48-4 Data, VI Campaign - Afghanistan ISR Assets, 2008 slide 9; IBM Analysis

SECRET
Factors affecting ISR Orbits
(S) TF orbits are defined as 24 hour on-station coverage
- a reduction in on-station time is a reduction in orbit
requirement satisfaction
(S) On station time is affected by sortie impacts
(weather, maintenance, and transit time) that subtract
from sortie duration
(S) In a large AOR like Yemen and Somalia, transit time (mu'tip'ied by the number of somesi
most significantly impacts on-station time
?On-Station? Calculus
Time On-Station
Sortie Duration - (Transit Distance Transit Speed)
'sr'cnrr
Reduction of On-Station Time per Causal Factori of Mission in Transit
or.
who 2?0 0
70";
36,392 hours spent in transit
I (almost 3 orbits per day lost)
Transit 40v:
I ant/[qunp . 30%
Weather 20%
I Operations 10% I I
I Other 0% I
MQ
u-zs MQ-9 MCI-9 9-3 DJ- Scan rm: - MQ-
DJ-AP DJ-AP DJ-AP DJ-EA Eagle Scout AFG '2'07
?08
Preferred
HOW to Swap short-legged aircraft like U-28 with longer Swap out with faster options to
mitigate long legged aircraft like airframes like MQ-9 Consider
transit Develop bases closer to target areas (slow and Add airframes (impacted by
?costs?? politically challenging process) limited basing)
SECRET
SECRET Source: Predator Times Data IBM Analysis 35

Long Distance Implications
In Iraq 80% of finishing operations occurred within 150km of airfields
The equivalent distance is 450km for Yemen and over for Somalia
ISR platforms spend half their mission flight
time in transit--generating 38% fewer orbits
per sortie than in other theaters
3* ssca'cr
The issue of distance is magnified
when translated to all of northern Africa
MFW aircraft with a range of 450km will ago? San-safarme
only reach about 5% of north Africa based aircraft . .
- The range of land-based RPA aircraft allows Vlosom?ransetr?
KW.
a '5
- 85:93::
them to reach 25% of the area roirgamgf
Sea-basing allows short-range aircraft to based W, 7 I A
reaCh 35% 0f the land mass Transit Ranges from Bases
Key Finding and Recommendation a;
Finding: Long distances from air?elds to operating areas is a signi?cant planning factor
LONG
ENDURANCE W: Consider ways to increase mission range and endurance for all ISR platforms;
when satisfying airborne ISR requirements, key metric should be ?orbits? not or ?lines?
Finding: Political and developmental issues complicate basing and over-?ight planning
Recommendation: Even with shorter ranges, sea-based ISR may be a valuable complement to long
endurance land-based ISR
NOFORN Source: rr ISR data 2012,- IBM Analysis 37

Appendix A. Study Background
Appendix B. Find-Fix-Finish
Appendix C. ISR Orbit Analytics
Appendix D. AFRICOM Distances
Appendix E. Additional Materials
38

T-v
ISR Platforms and Capabilities
Current ISR Systems used in HOA Small-Footprint Operations
it of Aircraft Armed for Manned (M)
Time On Time On
DNR Station Station Cruise Max 0'
FMV HD-FMV COMINT COMINT APG (hours) (hours) Speed Endurance (35 0f 30 unmanned
Mogadishu SanaMedium Fixed
Wing (MFW) 4 n/a unk 8 2
U-28 2 -- 3 270 6
Predator 1 6 12 70-90 20 6
MQ-9 Reaper 1 9 10 175 14 4
Scan Eagle 13 n/a 55 15 1 USN Det
MC-12 Liberty
(Ext?d Range) 1 2(4) 4 (6) 300 6 (8)
Red text denotes capabilities not in theater
The PlD-providing phenomenologies, HD-FMV and DNR COMINT, are largely
absent from ISR systems operating in HOA
Not all MQ-95 have HD-FMV
MFW platforms currently only fly in Somalia
P-3 MS is a low-density/ high-demand platform currently not in Theater
F0 RN Source: HOA Orbit Tracker, as of June,2012 aircraft spec sheets IBM Analysis 39

AUMF CONOPS Approval Process Timeline
'mxr "rs: vino"
(S) 24 AUMF CONOPS approval times could be fully measured
Other CONOPS were either not submitted (14) or were already approved/in staffing (21)
Submitted AUMF CONOPS Results
i Vt.)
Day 54 AveDrzg: 79 Avegzg: 196 Statistic
I ly ly Summary p.p
times
Submitted Disapproved Approved In Staf?ng
(24 CONOPS) (4 CONOPS) (1o CONOPS) (1o CONOPS) Max 274
.34. -
?:M55v . . - - . .
120 150 180 210 240 270 300 Med'an 35-5
Days
-.. 2. ass-x4: . -- - Luz(S) While it takes ~79 days to approve an AUMF CONOP, over half of the CONOPS were
approved within 36 days
Removing the single highest data point would reduce the average approval time to 58 days
Adding in those CONOPS still in staffing would double or triple these times
(S) These times do not account for the effort expended to collect and analyze intelligence
to develop these CONOPS
NOFO RN Source: rr 48-4 RTF Files; AUG 2011 - ocr 2012,- IBM Analysis 41

HOA HVI Life Cycle
(S) HOA require national intelligence resources and years of developmental work
(S) Once identified as a target, HOA AUMF approval utilizes ISR
intelligence to develop POL and CONOPS
(S) Additional time is then required to attain near certainty and low CDE requirements
for the process
HOA HVI in-process time
4to 8+ 1 Ta'get
AUMF Months ?19."qu
1 to 3
. th
Target . Target Development 0" 5
18 Months to 6+ Years
Data
Summary
Max 22.2 Years 9 Months 14.2 Months
Min 0.4 Year 0.9 Month 1 Month
Median 4.8 Years 1.2 Months 7.2 Months
Mean 6.0 Years 2.6 Months 8.3 Months
. 1. FMV SI
Conceptual Intel . 1. National Intel
Contribution 1.Natlonal Intel 2. FMV I SI 2. HUMINT
3.
SECRETNNOFORN 50urce: TF 48-4 RTF Files; AUG 2011 - ocr 2012; IBM Analysis 42

HD FMV Impact on Fix
Successful Fixes Unsuccessful Fixes
Detected SIGINT
Other 3 2 0 1 Located Successful
11 5 3 3
Fixes Unsuccessful 17 2 15 I
Fixes
i
45% 72% Involved 88% No HD FMV Involvement
FMV in
HD FMV is involved in many if not most
successful fixes successful fixes involved HD FMV
Possible/Probable systems were MQ-9s
highly likely to have HD
I +Poss HD
HD
Successful Fixes
U'l
Most of the unsuccessful fixes did not "anon-o
involve HD FMV
- In the two failure cases involving HD FMV, cloud
cover and bed-down location monitoring likely 0 10 20
decreased its utility Unsuccessful Fixes
43
NOFORN $0urce: rr 48-4 ISR Logs, SITREPs, Intel Summaries Oct 201 1 - Aug 2012; IBM Analysis

Key Ta ke-Aways
Strategic
Operational
Tactical
Operations in the small/medium footprint theater are fundamentally
different from what we?ve experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Political
constraints, long distances and ISR limitations make this a challenging
future
There is a critical shortfall of capabilities providing and HVI location
information. We need to continue to develop/field HD FMV and COMINT
sensors that provide this information
A key factor in Find/Fix failures is the frequent inability to maintain 24/7
persistent stare on active mission areas, especially when ISR is massed to
support Finishing actions. Supporting CCMD requirements for additional
ISR orbits will help prevent ?blinking? on during demand surges