Documents
White House Briefing Document for Jan. 12 Counterterrorism Summit With Tech Leaders
Jan. 20, 2016
Problem #1: How can we make it harder for terrorists to leverage the internet to recruit,
radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence?
Background: Terrorist groups are exploiting the internet to spread messages of violence. These
groups use the internet to recruit those sympathetic to their cause, radicalize those not yet drawn
to violent extremism, and inspire terrorist attacks, both here as well as abroad. ISIL, in
particular, has proven adept at exploiting the internet’s ability to carry its message worldwide,
combining slick production of magazines and videos with well-coordinated social media
campaigns and direct, targeted outreach to those vulnerable to radicalization to violence. The
widespread availability of violent and hateful content online makes it easy for an individual to
engage with relevant material, find like-minded individuals with whom to interact, and move
along the radicalization spectrum toward violence.
Key Questions:
• Should we explore ways to more quickly and comprehensively identify terrorist content
online so that online service providers can remove it if it violates their terms of service?
Some governments have undertaken efforts to flag terrorist content online or other terms
of service violations for service providers for removal. How effective have these efforts
been, since content is easily reconstituted? Is there value in creating something similar
here, respecting U.S. First Amendment commitments to human rights such as freedom of
expression that does not violate U.S. law, in which a governmental or non-governmental
entity could rapidly raise awareness for relevant private sector companies about material
that appears to provide support for terrorist activities that may violate their terms of
service or otherwise be considered for companies’ voluntary suspension or removal?
•
To facilitate removing terrorist content that violates terms of service, are there other areas
where online providers have used technology to identify harmful content and remove it?
We recognize that identifying terrorist content that violates terms of service is far more
difficult than identifying images of child pornography, but is there a way to use
technology to quickly identify terrorist content? For example, are there technologies
used for the prevention of spam that could be useful? Or something like Facebook’s
suicide process flow? If this technology were clearly independent from government
involvement, would that increase its viability?
•
Is the right approach to confronting online radicalization to violence the presentation of
alternative content, such as Google’s and others’ use of targeted advertising grants, or
other means? How do we improve alternative content, in particular by credible, nongovernment, voices? Or should the focus be on reporting violent extremist content that
meets appropriate U.S. legal and other thresholds and rely on companies to remove
voluntarily other objectionable content that violates their terms of service?
•
Is there information that the government—or non-government sources—could provide or
actions the government could take that would make private action easier?
Problem #1: How can we make it harder for terrorists to leverage the internet to recruit,
radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence?
Background: Terrorist groups are exploiting the internet to spread messages of violence. These
groups use the internet to recruit those sympathetic to their cause, radicalize those not yet drawn
to violent extremism, and inspire terrorist attacks, both here as well as abroad. ISIL, in
particular, has proven adept at exploiting the internet’s ability to carry its message worldwide,
combining slick production of magazines and videos with well-coordinated social media
campaigns and direct, targeted outreach to those vulnerable to radicalization to violence. The
widespread availability of violent and hateful content online makes it easy for an individual to
engage with relevant material, find like-minded individuals with whom to interact, and move
along the radicalization spectrum toward violence.
Key Questions:
• Should we explore ways to more quickly and comprehensively identify terrorist content
online so that online service providers can remove it if it violates their terms of service?
Some governments have undertaken efforts to flag terrorist content online or other terms
of service violations for service providers for removal. How effective have these efforts
been, since content is easily reconstituted? Is there value in creating something similar
here, respecting U.S. First Amendment commitments to human rights such as freedom of
expression that does not violate U.S. law, in which a governmental or non-governmental
entity could rapidly raise awareness for relevant private sector companies about material
that appears to provide support for terrorist activities that may violate their terms of
service or otherwise be considered for companies’ voluntary suspension or removal?
•
To facilitate removing terrorist content that violates terms of service, are there other areas
where online providers have used technology to identify harmful content and remove it?
We recognize that identifying terrorist content that violates terms of service is far more
difficult than identifying images of child pornography, but is there a way to use
technology to quickly identify terrorist content? For example, are there technologies
used for the prevention of spam that could be useful? Or something like Facebook’s
suicide process flow? If this technology were clearly independent from government
involvement, would that increase its viability?
•
Is the right approach to confronting online radicalization to violence the presentation of
alternative content, such as Google’s and others’ use of targeted advertising grants, or
other means? How do we improve alternative content, in particular by credible, nongovernment, voices? Or should the focus be on reporting violent extremist content that
meets appropriate U.S. legal and other thresholds and rely on companies to remove
voluntarily other objectionable content that violates their terms of service?
•
Is there information that the government—or non-government sources—could provide or
actions the government could take that would make private action easier?
Problem #2: How can we help others to create, publish, and amplify alternative content
that would undercut ISIL?
Background: ISIL is adept at generating and amplifying content and using this propaganda to
expand its ranks and encourage global attacks. ISIL has strategically developed its messaging
and brand based on classic charismatic themes of strength and warmth—i.e., that it is a potent
group of true believers effectively fighting the illegitimate powers of the world and that joining
their ranks brings a sense of camaraderie and belonging that may be missing in the home
environments of recruits. Indeed, a sampling of ISIL’s online media shows a full range of
content under these themes: grotesque execution of ISIL’s enemies, conventional military
victories, the supposedly utopian life inside the ISIL-led caliphate, images of friendship and
brotherhood among ISIL followers, ideological tomes against the West. As has been widely
noted, ISIL also brings a production quality to its content and a strategic approach to its online
propagation efforts that has not previously been seen from other terrorist groups.
The United States recognizes the need to empower credible non-governmental voices that would
speak out against ISIL and terrorism more broadly both overseas and at home. However, there is
a shortage of compelling credible alternative content; and this content is often not as effectively
produced or distributed as pro-ISIL content and lacks the sensational quality that can capture the
media’s attention. Content creation is made difficult by ISIL’s brutal rule and near total control
of communications infrastructure in its territory in Iraq and Syria, which can make it dangerous
for citizens to speak out or provide video or images. Further, many of the leading and credible
voices that might counter ISIL lack the content-generation and social media prowess that would
be required to counter ISIL online. There is also a need for more credible positive messaging
and content that provides alternatives to young people concerned about many of the grievances
ISIL highlights.
In parallel with ongoing U.S. Government efforts, we invite the private sector to consider ways
to increase the availability alternative content. Beyond the tech sector, we have heard from other
private sector actors, including advertising executives, who are interested in helping develop and
amplify compelling counter-ISIL content; and we hope there are opportunities to bring together
the best in tech, media, and marketing to work with credible non-government voices to address
this shared challenge.
Key Questions:
• How would you approach increasing the availability of alternative content in areas of the
world where ISIL content dominates? Are there products that would be effective in
getting more content from these territories without huge risk? What types of strategies
have you pursued to help local communities and organizations develop content in other
areas of the world where the communities face challenges in creating content and in
having their voices heard?
•
Besides content, how can we improve the effectiveness of credible voices in reaching the
most people with the most targeted messages across the social media channels?
Problem #2: How can we help others to create, publish, and amplify alternative content
that would undercut ISIL?
Background: ISIL is adept at generating and amplifying content and using this propaganda to
expand its ranks and encourage global attacks. ISIL has strategically developed its messaging
and brand based on classic charismatic themes of strength and warmth—i.e., that it is a potent
group of true believers effectively fighting the illegitimate powers of the world and that joining
their ranks brings a sense of camaraderie and belonging that may be missing in the home
environments of recruits. Indeed, a sampling of ISIL’s online media shows a full range of
content under these themes: grotesque execution of ISIL’s enemies, conventional military
victories, the supposedly utopian life inside the ISIL-led caliphate, images of friendship and
brotherhood among ISIL followers, ideological tomes against the West. As has been widely
noted, ISIL also brings a production quality to its content and a strategic approach to its online
propagation efforts that has not previously been seen from other terrorist groups.
The United States recognizes the need to empower credible non-governmental voices that would
speak out against ISIL and terrorism more broadly both overseas and at home. However, there is
a shortage of compelling credible alternative content; and this content is often not as effectively
produced or distributed as pro-ISIL content and lacks the sensational quality that can capture the
media’s attention. Content creation is made difficult by ISIL’s brutal rule and near total control
of communications infrastructure in its territory in Iraq and Syria, which can make it dangerous
for citizens to speak out or provide video or images. Further, many of the leading and credible
voices that might counter ISIL lack the content-generation and social media prowess that would
be required to counter ISIL online. There is also a need for more credible positive messaging
and content that provides alternatives to young people concerned about many of the grievances
ISIL highlights.
In parallel with ongoing U.S. Government efforts, we invite the private sector to consider ways
to increase the availability alternative content. Beyond the tech sector, we have heard from other
private sector actors, including advertising executives, who are interested in helping develop and
amplify compelling counter-ISIL content; and we hope there are opportunities to bring together
the best in tech, media, and marketing to work with credible non-government voices to address
this shared challenge.
Key Questions:
• How would you approach increasing the availability of alternative content in areas of the
world where ISIL content dominates? Are there products that would be effective in
getting more content from these territories without huge risk? What types of strategies
have you pursued to help local communities and organizations develop content in other
areas of the world where the communities face challenges in creating content and in
having their voices heard?
•
Besides content, how can we improve the effectiveness of credible voices in reaching the
most people with the most targeted messages across the social media channels?
•
Is there a way to jump-start the education of content creators? Are there proven
techniques to amplify those types of voices? Could advertising or marketing techniques
play a role? How could we ensure that content creators have access to the best
technology and approaches to ensure that people on their way to radicalization to
violence get to engage with some of this alternative content? Is there a direct role that
companies could play in amplifying alternative voices?
•
How might we bring together on a regularized or standing basis interested parties such as
groups in the private sector—including Silicon Valley but also others with relevant
expertise, such as advertising and marketing professionals—and civil society, social
scientists, and community groups who are focused on developing and amplifying
effective content? Would such a group be useful and productive? Are we the right
conveners?
•
Is there a way to jump-start the education of content creators? Are there proven
techniques to amplify those types of voices? Could advertising or marketing techniques
play a role? How could we ensure that content creators have access to the best
technology and approaches to ensure that people on their way to radicalization to
violence get to engage with some of this alternative content? Is there a direct role that
companies could play in amplifying alternative voices?
•
How might we bring together on a regularized or standing basis interested parties such as
groups in the private sector—including Silicon Valley but also others with relevant
expertise, such as advertising and marketing professionals—and civil society, social
scientists, and community groups who are focused on developing and amplifying
effective content? Would such a group be useful and productive? Are we the right
conveners?
Problem #3: In what ways can we use technology to help disrupt paths to radicalization to
violence, identify recruitment patterns, and provide metrics to help measure our efforts to
counter radicalization to violence?
Background: ISIL recruits online using an integrated strategy that seeks to move curious
bystanders or disaffected individuals to sympathizers to supporters and finally to foreign fighters
or homegrown violent extremists. There is no single path to radicalization. And this process can
take place over months or in as little as a few weeks. Individual recruits, often already aggrieved
for a range of reasons, may start by primarily reading about ISIL in major press outlets and
learning more about the group’s ideology and vision, its purported strength in combating the
coalition attacking it, the supposedly utopian life under ISIL rule, and the claimed deep feelings
of kinship and affection among ISIL members. They may eventually become part of ISIL’s
online communities, and ultimately may form a personal connection with a member of ISIL, who
engages the would-be recruit by providing more information on life in the Islamic State and
addressing concerns that the recruit may have—before exhorting the recruit to action.
A number of organizations in the government, as well as some in private industry and academia,
have researched techniques to detect and measure radicalization. Some have suggested that a
measurement of level of radicalization could provide insights to measure levels of radicalization
to violence. While it is unclear whether radicalization is measureable or could be measured,
such a measurement would be extremely useful to help shape and target counter-messaging and
efforts focused on countering violent extremism. This type of approach requires consideration of
First Amendment protections and privacy and civil liberties concerns, additional front-end
research on specific drivers of radicalization and themes among violent extremist populations,
careful design of intervention tools, dedicated technical expertise, and the ability to iteratively
improve the tools based on experience in deploying them.
Industry certainly has a lot of expertise in measuring resonance in order to see how effective and
broad a messaging campaign reaches an audience. A partnership to determine if resonance can
be measured for both ISIL and counter-ISIL content in order to guide and improve and more
effectively counter the ISIL narrative could be beneficial.
Key Questions:
• Does a measure of radicalization make sense? How much of its ideal component material
would be public data versus private data only available to the specific platform?
•
What experiences have you had in understanding media consumption patterns and
changing those patterns? How would you respond to de-escalating radicalization to
violence given the technological tools you know about? For a given user, what are the
public and private ways of trying to understand the type of alternative content that would
resonate?
•
How could we understand better the types of themes and content that ISIL uses and
judging their effectiveness? How much of that would involve public versus private data?
Problem #3: In what ways can we use technology to help disrupt paths to radicalization to
violence, identify recruitment patterns, and provide metrics to help measure our efforts to
counter radicalization to violence?
Background: ISIL recruits online using an integrated strategy that seeks to move curious
bystanders or disaffected individuals to sympathizers to supporters and finally to foreign fighters
or homegrown violent extremists. There is no single path to radicalization. And this process can
take place over months or in as little as a few weeks. Individual recruits, often already aggrieved
for a range of reasons, may start by primarily reading about ISIL in major press outlets and
learning more about the group’s ideology and vision, its purported strength in combating the
coalition attacking it, the supposedly utopian life under ISIL rule, and the claimed deep feelings
of kinship and affection among ISIL members. They may eventually become part of ISIL’s
online communities, and ultimately may form a personal connection with a member of ISIL, who
engages the would-be recruit by providing more information on life in the Islamic State and
addressing concerns that the recruit may have—before exhorting the recruit to action.
A number of organizations in the government, as well as some in private industry and academia,
have researched techniques to detect and measure radicalization. Some have suggested that a
measurement of level of radicalization could provide insights to measure levels of radicalization
to violence. While it is unclear whether radicalization is measureable or could be measured,
such a measurement would be extremely useful to help shape and target counter-messaging and
efforts focused on countering violent extremism. This type of approach requires consideration of
First Amendment protections and privacy and civil liberties concerns, additional front-end
research on specific drivers of radicalization and themes among violent extremist populations,
careful design of intervention tools, dedicated technical expertise, and the ability to iteratively
improve the tools based on experience in deploying them.
Industry certainly has a lot of expertise in measuring resonance in order to see how effective and
broad a messaging campaign reaches an audience. A partnership to determine if resonance can
be measured for both ISIL and counter-ISIL content in order to guide and improve and more
effectively counter the ISIL narrative could be beneficial.
Key Questions:
• Does a measure of radicalization make sense? How much of its ideal component material
would be public data versus private data only available to the specific platform?
•
What experiences have you had in understanding media consumption patterns and
changing those patterns? How would you respond to de-escalating radicalization to
violence given the technological tools you know about? For a given user, what are the
public and private ways of trying to understand the type of alternative content that would
resonate?
•
How could we understand better the types of themes and content that ISIL uses and
judging their effectiveness? How much of that would involve public versus private data?
•
How might technology empower an effective one-on-one intervention program that
would serve as an effective counter to ISIL’s one-on-one recruitment efforts? Are there
analogues to campaigns you have undertaken for other purposes?
•
Are there any analogues in efforts to automatically connect mental health professionals,
educators, and religious leaders through advertisements, search results, etc.? What can be
learned from non-government efforts to use social media to combat human trafficking,
child predators, and cyber bullying?
•
How might technology empower an effective one-on-one intervention program that
would serve as an effective counter to ISIL’s one-on-one recruitment efforts? Are there
analogues to campaigns you have undertaken for other purposes?
•
Are there any analogues in efforts to automatically connect mental health professionals,
educators, and religious leaders through advertisements, search results, etc.? What can be
learned from non-government efforts to use social media to combat human trafficking,
child predators, and cyber bullying?
Problem #4: How can we make it harder for terrorists to use technology to mobilize,
facilitate, and operationalize attacks, and make it easier for law enforcement and the
intelligence community to identify terrorist operatives and prevent attacks?
Background: In addition to using technology to recruit and radicalize, terrorists are using
technology to mobilize supporters to attack and to plan, move money for, coordinate, and
execute attacks. The roles played by terrorist leaders and attack plotters in this activity vary,
ranging from providing general direction to small groups to undertake attacks of their own
design wherever they are located to offering repeated and specific guidance on how to execute
attacks. To avoid law enforcement and the intelligence community detecting their activities,
terrorists are using encrypted forms of communications at various stages of attack plotting and
execution. We expect terrorists will continue to use technology to mobilize, facilitate, and
operationalize attacks, including using encrypted communications where law enforcement cannot
obtain the content of the communication even with court authorization. We would be happy to
provide classified briefings in which we could share additional information.
Key Questions:
• We are interested in exploring all options with you for how to deal with the growing
threat of terrorists and other malicious actors using technology, including encrypted
technology, to threaten our national security and public safety. We understand that there
is no one-size-fits-all solution to address this problem and that each of you has very
different products and services that work in different ways. Are there high-level
principles we could agree on for working through these problems together? And are
there technologies that could make it harder for terrorists to use the internet to mobilize,
facilitate, and operationalize? Or easier for us to find them when they do? What are the
potential downsides or unintended consequences we should be aware of when
considering these kinds of technology-based approaches to counter terrorism? For
example, terrorist groups often prepare to capitalize on their attacks by ensuring that they
can actively spread messages that take credit for those attacks and use them to enlist
recruits and raise funding; such preparatory efforts may be associated with indicators that
could be discerned and used as early warning of a likely attack.
•
Are there types of unencrypted data that could be useful to uncovering terrorists that we
are not making good use of? Are there better ways for the government to understand the
implications of leading-edge technology and new product changes and how they might
affect and provide opportunities for our investigations?
•
With respect to unencrypted data, how do we improve collaboration when legal process is
provided? For example, is there information that you need but are not getting from us to
ensure that we receive the full and appropriate scope of information called for by court
orders? Are there things we can do to assist with speeding up the response time to court
order requests? Are there ways that we can work together to ensure that you have a
mechanism or process in place to provide metadata in the most timely and efficient
manner in response to a court order? A mechanism or process to preserve critical data?
What information do you need from us to ensure that the information that we request is
Problem #4: How can we make it harder for terrorists to use technology to mobilize,
facilitate, and operationalize attacks, and make it easier for law enforcement and the
intelligence community to identify terrorist operatives and prevent attacks?
Background: In addition to using technology to recruit and radicalize, terrorists are using
technology to mobilize supporters to attack and to plan, move money for, coordinate, and
execute attacks. The roles played by terrorist leaders and attack plotters in this activity vary,
ranging from providing general direction to small groups to undertake attacks of their own
design wherever they are located to offering repeated and specific guidance on how to execute
attacks. To avoid law enforcement and the intelligence community detecting their activities,
terrorists are using encrypted forms of communications at various stages of attack plotting and
execution. We expect terrorists will continue to use technology to mobilize, facilitate, and
operationalize attacks, including using encrypted communications where law enforcement cannot
obtain the content of the communication even with court authorization. We would be happy to
provide classified briefings in which we could share additional information.
Key Questions:
• We are interested in exploring all options with you for how to deal with the growing
threat of terrorists and other malicious actors using technology, including encrypted
technology, to threaten our national security and public safety. We understand that there
is no one-size-fits-all solution to address this problem and that each of you has very
different products and services that work in different ways. Are there high-level
principles we could agree on for working through these problems together? And are
there technologies that could make it harder for terrorists to use the internet to mobilize,
facilitate, and operationalize? Or easier for us to find them when they do? What are the
potential downsides or unintended consequences we should be aware of when
considering these kinds of technology-based approaches to counter terrorism? For
example, terrorist groups often prepare to capitalize on their attacks by ensuring that they
can actively spread messages that take credit for those attacks and use them to enlist
recruits and raise funding; such preparatory efforts may be associated with indicators that
could be discerned and used as early warning of a likely attack.
•
Are there types of unencrypted data that could be useful to uncovering terrorists that we
are not making good use of? Are there better ways for the government to understand the
implications of leading-edge technology and new product changes and how they might
affect and provide opportunities for our investigations?
•
With respect to unencrypted data, how do we improve collaboration when legal process is
provided? For example, is there information that you need but are not getting from us to
ensure that we receive the full and appropriate scope of information called for by court
orders? Are there things we can do to assist with speeding up the response time to court
order requests? Are there ways that we can work together to ensure that you have a
mechanism or process in place to provide metadata in the most timely and efficient
manner in response to a court order? A mechanism or process to preserve critical data?
What information do you need from us to ensure that the information that we request is
provided to us in a usable format? Are there technological approaches that can be of
assistance here?
•
Our foreign counterparts share common concerns regarding terrorists’ use of technology
to incite, mobilize, and facilitate terrorist activity as well as to plan attacks and evade law
enforcement. We understand that they are seeking ways to ensure that they can obtain
what they see as necessary information in a timely manner. Have you had any interaction
with foreign law enforcement on these matters, and how would you characterize these
interactions? Are there ways we can collaborate in this area? Would it be useful to
convene a similar meeting to the one we are having today with a selected group of
Interior Ministers from foreign countries?
•
We are interested in exploring all options to better identify terrorist networks, or
indications of impending plots. What experiences or technologies have you explored in
other contexts that might be useful? What types of analysis could we explore using
online activity of terrorists and terrorist networks?
•
Are there ways to glean from changes in patterns of use of these platforms involvement
in preparations for violence?
•
While an attack is underway, terrorists make use of the web and other digital
communications platforms to call attention to their violence. Are there spikes or patterns
in use of technology that might be used to disrupt attacks as they unfold as well as to
prevent second-wave plotting? Technologists have done great work, in particular,
supporting victims of natural disasters. Is there anything that can be learned from those
focused efforts here? Should there be a focused effort on terrorist attacks while in
progress and associated communications so that we have a better opportunity to prevent
second-wave attacks?
provided to us in a usable format? Are there technological approaches that can be of
assistance here?
•
Our foreign counterparts share common concerns regarding terrorists’ use of technology
to incite, mobilize, and facilitate terrorist activity as well as to plan attacks and evade law
enforcement. We understand that they are seeking ways to ensure that they can obtain
what they see as necessary information in a timely manner. Have you had any interaction
with foreign law enforcement on these matters, and how would you characterize these
interactions? Are there ways we can collaborate in this area? Would it be useful to
convene a similar meeting to the one we are having today with a selected group of
Interior Ministers from foreign countries?
•
We are interested in exploring all options to better identify terrorist networks, or
indications of impending plots. What experiences or technologies have you explored in
other contexts that might be useful? What types of analysis could we explore using
online activity of terrorists and terrorist networks?
•
Are there ways to glean from changes in patterns of use of these platforms involvement
in preparations for violence?
•
While an attack is underway, terrorists make use of the web and other digital
communications platforms to call attention to their violence. Are there spikes or patterns
in use of technology that might be used to disrupt attacks as they unfold as well as to
prevent second-wave plotting? Technologists have done great work, in particular,
supporting victims of natural disasters. Is there anything that can be learned from those
focused efforts here? Should there be a focused effort on terrorist attacks while in
progress and associated communications so that we have a better opportunity to prevent
second-wave attacks?