Regional Command Southwest Intelligence Report June 23 2011

SEE FLETHFGI GBFIHREI. TD LISA. ISAF. Regional Command Southwest W) - Afghanistan in Summary Periad Covered 18000 23 June ta 11'590 24 June 2011 The overall classificatian at this INTSUM is SECRETHFGI TD USA, ISAF, POE: Fusiun??icer: I'u'lajar at .usmc.srnil.mi at n.:ent:am CE Classi?ed by: ultiple Sau rces Sump: Dada 55m}. an: 25? l'Human Praduced by: Southwest Analysis Center zit"- and Anal-{sis Camps ml 2d Intelligence Battalian. MEF Sauthw est Analysis Center Website: Sauthwest Analysis Center Website: Page 1 of 23 SEE Ta use. 2011

SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO *** AREA/NAD ‘ALI*** SERIAL: 110623 2 S REL ISAF NOT REL GCTF NOT REL GIROA INTREP UKTF SECRET//REL TO ISAF, NOT REL GCTF, NOT REL GIROA DOI: 22 JUN 11 SUBJ: NAD ‘ALI TALIBAN SECURITY SITUATION IN SHIN KALAY AS OF 22 JUN 11, DCC CHAIRMAN HAJI BARAKZAI (KHAROTI) (P64495) AND TALIBAN (TB) COMMANDER HAJI MAHMAT KHAN (NYPI) INTEND TO CREATE AN AFFILIATION BETWEEN THE ALP AND THE TB IN SHIN KALAY (41R PR 158 016). APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO BARAKZAI SENT THREE KHAROTI TRIBAL ELDERS TO QUETTA (42R UU 08 42) TO REPRESENT HIM IN A MEETING WITH HAJI MAHMAT KHAN. DURING THE MEETING A PLAN WAS DISCUSSED TO CREATE AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ALP AND THE TB. BARAKZAI AND KHAN PLAN A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE TB AND ALP OFFICERS IN SHIN KALAY. THE INTENTION IS TO CREATE A PERCEPTION OF A SECURE DISTRICT, DEMONSTRATING TO ISAF THAT THE ALP CAN PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR LOCAL NATIONALS (LNS). WHEN THE ALP HAVE GAINED CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SHIN KALAY, MAHMAT KHAN AND HIS SUBORDINATES INTEND TO RETURN TO THE AREA WHERE THEY FEEL THEY WILL BE SAFE FROM ISAF. (C/S ) (OBJ INDIA), C/S AND OTHER TB FIGHTERS HAVE BEGUN MOVING BACK TO SHIN KALAY AS A RESULT OF THIS AGREEMENT. BARAKZAI’S LONG TERM AIM IS TO GAIN INFLUENCE AND WEALTH FROM GIROA. TO ACHIEVE THIS BARAKZAI NEEDS TO APPEASE BOTH THE TB AND LNS. LNS IN SHIN KALAY NO LONGER FEEL SAFE UNDER ISAF SECURITY SINCE THE DEATH OF TWO LNS SHOT BY ISAF APPROXIMATELY 15 DAYS AGO. BARAKZAI HAS ENCOURAGED LNS TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM ISAF AND IN RETURN HE WILL ENSURE THE ALP PROVIDES A SECURE DISTRICT. BARAKZAI PLANS TO ALLOW TB USE OF SHIN KALAY AS A SAFE HAVEN TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN NAD ‘ALI (NDA) (41R PR 177 014). TB WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE COMPOUNDS AS BDLS AND WEAPON CACHES DUE TO THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AFFORDED BY BARAKZAI’S ARRANGEMENTS. THE SHIN KALAY ALP IS CURRENTLY IN THE FINAL STAGES OF TRAINING AND IS AWAITING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS. BARAKZAI AND NEWLY APPOINTED ALP REPRESENTATIVE GHULAM JILANI ARE INVOLVED IN THE RECEIPT OF THE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FROM GIROA. JILANI IS ALSO AWARE OF THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN BARAKZAI AND KHAN AND FULLY SUPPORTS IT. TALIBAN CONTINUING TO EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTIES IN MUSA QAL’AH, TALIBAN MEMBERS REPORTEDLY ATTACKED AND KILLED TWO OF THEIR OWN TO COVER UP THE FACT THEY WERE CONDUCTING AN UNSANCTIONED TALIBAN CHECKPOINT TO ROB PASSERS BYE DUE TO THEIR LACK OF FUNDS. SUPPLY ISSUES AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ARE CAUSING DISCORD BETWEEN SOME INSURGENTS AND THEIR COMMANDERS. TO THE SOUTH IN NAHR E SARAJ, AN INSURGENT KILLED A LOCAL NATIONAL DURING A FIST FIGHT OVER THE LOCAL POPULACES’ REFUSAL TO PROVIDE FOOD TO THE TALIBAN. THE LOCAL NATIONALS RETALIATED BY KILLING ONE INSURGENT AND WOUNDING ANOTHER. THIS INCIDENT IS FURTHER EXAMPLE OF THE LOSS OF LOCAL NATIONAL SUPPORT, WHICH HAS REDUCED THE TALIBAN’S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (FoM). IN SOUTHERN GARM SER, THE ASSOCIATES OF (OBJ HASTINGS) AND ANOTHER TALIBAN COMMANDER ARE REPORTEDLY UNABLE TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS EFFECTIVELY. PREVIOUS REPORTING INDICATES INSURGENTS IN SOUTHERN GARM SER SUFFER FROM A LACK OF COMPETENT COMMANDERS AND LOGISTICAL ISSUES. THESE ISSUES ARE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECREASED KINETIC ACTIVITY IN THE REGION THIS YEAR COMPARED TO LAST. *** AREA/MUSA QAL’AH*** SERIAL: IIR 6 224 2154 11 SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO DOI: 20110617 SUBJ: EVIDENCE OF TALIBAN SUPPLY SHORTAGES EMBODIED BY THE MURDER OF TWO IED SUB COMMANDERS BY UNIDENTIFIED INSURGENTS DURING A ROBBERY IN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG Page 18 of 23 SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 2011

SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO SUMMARY: ON OR AROUND 12 JUNE 2011, CALL SIGNS KAMYAB AND MINAWAL WERE KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED TALIBAN DURING AN ATTEMPTED ROBBERY IVO TIZNI, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG. SUCH ACTIVITY REVEALS SUPPLY SHORTAGES AND FRUSTRATIONS AMONG SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS, WHICH HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED BY THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN. OVERVIEW. ON OR AROUND THE AFTERNOON OF 12 JUNE 2011, TALIBAN SUB-COMMANDERS AND WELL-KNOWN IED MAKERS, CALL SIGN (C/S) KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WERE KILLED BY TWO UNIDENTIFIED (UID) TALIBAN MEMBERS IN BAYGHAZ VILLAGE //CNA//, IVO TIZNI VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PS 572 196//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, HELMAND PROVINCE, AFG (SOURCE COMMENT THE TRUE NAMES OF C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL ARE UNKNOWN). SOME LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN MEMBERS IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT, SUCH AS THE TWO WHO KILLED C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL, ARE ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLEMENT MONETARY AND RESOURCE SHORTAGES, NOW COMMON TO THE INSURGENCY ACROSS MUCH OF NORTHERN HELMAND PROVINCE SINCE LATE 2010 WITH PETTY THEFT. INFIGHTING AMONG SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS FROM AFG, AND PAK //MGRS: 42R UU 095 445//, STEADILY MORE PRONOUNCED SINCE MID-2010, CONTINUES TO DISRUPT TALIBAN SUPPLY CHAINS. SUCH DISSENT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN LADEN (OBL) ON OR ABOUT 2 MAY 2011. ELABORATION OF THE KILLING. THE TWO UID TALIBAN WHO KILLED KAMYAB AND MINAWAL WERE STAGED ALONG AN UNKNOWN, RURAL ROUTE BETWEEN QATS VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PR 637 933//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL’AH DISTRICT, AND TIZNI VILLAGE, LYING IN WAIT TO ROB PASSERSBY. UPON RECOGNIZING KAMYAB AND MINAWAL, WHO WERE HEADING NORTH TO THE TIZNI BAZAAR //MGRS: 41S PS 571 199//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL’AH DISTRICT ON A MOTORCYCLE, THE TWO UID TALIBAN REALIZED THEY WOULD BE PUNISHED IF THE SUB-COMMANDERS LATER REPORTED AN UNSANCTIONED CHECKPOINT TO SENIOR TALIBAN COMMANDERS (SOURCE COMMENT IT IS UNCERTAIN WHERE THE SUB COMMANDERS BEGAN THEIR DRIVE. IT IS LIKELY THEY RODE ON A PAMIR BRAND MOTORCYCLE). RATHER THAN FACE UNKNOWN PUNISHMENT FROM MORE SENIOR TALIBAN COMMANDERS, THE TWO UID TALIBAN QUICKLY DETERMINED IT WAS BEST TO KILL C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL. ONE OF THE UID TALIBAN SHOT C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WITH AN AK 47, LEAVING THEIR BODIES BEHIND (SOURCE COMMENT IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH MAN FIRED ON KAMYAB AND MINAWAL). THE UID TALIBAN DROVE OFF WITH THE MOTORCYCLE USED BY THE TWO SUB COMMANDERS, AND ALSO STOLE AN AK 47 CARRIED BY EITHER C/S KAMYAB OR C/S MINAWAL (NFI). C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL WERE LIKELY BURIED SOMETIME DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 13 JUNE 2011 IN SAREE WALI //CNA//, A VILLAGE LOCATED NORTH OF SARBESHA VILLAGE //MGRS: 41S PR 626 973//, NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT. NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH TALIBAN SUPPLIES. SUPPLIES REMAINING IN ABUNDANCE TO THE TALIBAN IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL'AH DISTRICT INCLUDE AK 47, PKM, AND RPG ROUNDS. THE AVAILABILITY OF IED COMPONENTS; MORE COSTLY THAN SMALL-ARMS, MEDIUM MACHINEGUN, AND RPG ROUNDS; IS DECLINING IN NORTHERN MUSA QAL’AH DISTRICT DUE TO CONTINUED DISRUPTIONS OF TALIBAN FINANCING, SOME OF WHICH IS RELATIVE TO SENIOR TALIBAN LEADER INFIGHTING. NFI. SENIOR TALIBAN INFIGHTING. FEW AFGHAN OR PAKISTANI SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS TRULY BELIEVED OBL WAS MAINTAINING A HUMBLE, PIOUS LIFESTYLE AS WAS OFTEN PUBLICIZED. UNTIL HIS DEATH, EVEN FEWER SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS WERE LIKELY TO VERBALIZE SUCH SKEPTICISM FOR FEAR OF APPEARING UNFAITHFUL TO AL QAIDA IDEALS, SOME OF WHICH ARE SHARED BY THE TALIBAN. SOME SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS FROM AFG VIEW REVELATIONS REGARDING THE EXTRAVAGANT NATURE OF OBL’S LIVING CONDITIONS AS INDICATIVE OF HIS SELFINTEREST AND AS A TRUE, LOW MEASURE OF HIS ALLEGIANCE TO AL-QAIDA. SINCE OBL’S DEATH, SOME AFGHAN SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS HAVE CANDIDLY DENOUNCED TIES TO OBL, BLAMING HIS DECADENCE FOR A LACK OF FUNDING TO BOTH AL QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN. MOREOVER, SOME SENIOR TALIBAN LEADERS IN AFG BLAME PAKISTANI TALIBAN FOR MISJUDGING OBL’S SUPPOSEDLY AUSTERE LIFESTYLE, SEEDING MISGIVINGS RELATIVE TO HOW TALIBAN LEADERS IN PAK ARE FUNDING THE WAR AGAINST COALITION FORCES (CF) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG. THE CONFLUENCE OF SUCH DOUBTS RESULTS IN FURTHER SUPPLY AND FINANCIAL SHORTAGES TO LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN FIGHTERS, CAUSING SOME, AS IN THE CASE OF THE TWO UID TALIBAN WHO KILLED C/S KAMYAB AND C/S MINAWAL, TO ACT ON THEIR OWN ACCORD TO SURVIVE. PRIVATELY, SOME LOW-LEVEL TALIBAN FIGHTERS VIEW THE DEDICATION OF THEIR MID AND SENIOR-LEVEL COMMANDERS WITH HESITATION, PROMPTING THE FEELING EVERY MAN IS FIGHTING AND ACCOUNTABLE ONLY FOR HIMSELF (SOURCE COMMENT OF COURSE IN GROUPS OR MEETINGS, NONE OF THE FIGHTERS WOULD EXPRESS SUCH DOUBTS). Page 19 of 23 SECRET//FGI GBR//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO 2011