After more than two weeks of what began as peaceful protests in Iran and devolved into calls by many protesters for an end to the regime, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, on a visit to India, said he believes we are witnessing the “final days and weeks” of the Iranian government.

“If a regime can only keep itself in power by force, then it’s effectively at the end,” he said.

It is true that Iran has deployed massive force against many protests, at least since January 10. According to various reports — some credible eyewitness accounts and some from the government — hundreds and possibly thousands of Iranians have lost their lives in this most recent outbreak of unrest.

In Washington and other Western capitals, members of Congress, parliamentarians, experts, pundits, analysts, and think tankers have variously argued for regime change in Iran, some promoting military action by the Trump administration to bring it about.

It was not, however, their only dire prescription for Iranians.

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Many, if not most, of these self-appointed arbiters of wisdom also chose to promote Reza Pahlavi — son of the deposed shah and Israel’s favorite Iranian — as a potential leader to form a government that would replace the theocracy.

Presumably, Merz, who during Israel’s war against Iran in June 2025 declared approvingly that it was doing the world’s “dirty work,” would cheer such an outcome.

Pahlavi has certainly taken on the mantle of leader for himself, making grandiose proclamations on behalf of the Iranian people.

“Now, relying on your million-strong response to the calls of the past days, and with the legitimacy and popularity I have received from you, I announce another stage of the national uprising to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” he wrote in a long tweet with an accompanying Persian-language video message.

He continues to insist that revolution is at hand and urges Iranians not to give up on their struggle — presumably, their struggle to bring him to power. He also supports — no, implores President Donald Trump to take action, including military strikes, to bring about regime change in Iran.

“This Is a War”

With the mounting death toll and images of body bags in warehouses in Tehran, CBS News asked Pahlavi on January 12 if it was responsible to demand Iranians take to the streets in the face of mortal danger. Did Pahlavi, the anchor asked, bear any responsibility for the deaths of his fellow Iranians?

“This is a war, and war has casualties,” the former crown prince responded.

Yet what is unfolding in Iran now is not quite the civil war that Pahlavi is invoking. Iranian protesters had come out to streets peacefully — their grievances recognized as valid by the government — not to start a “war.” A civil war is something many Iranians have dreaded ever since witnessing the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Syria’s civil strife, which both saw destructive sectarian fighting and, eventually, the atrocities of the Islamic State.

In his long tweet, Pahlavi also got into thornier rhetoric of war. He suggested state-run media buildings were “legitimate targets,” adding, “Government employees, and the armed and security forces, have the opportunity to join the people.”

At least one state broadcaster building was torched by protesters, but this is a far cry from making “targets” out of them. What’s more, government employees who are not directly participating in hostilities are the opposite of “legitimate targets” in the context of war: Attacking civilian infrastructure, even state propaganda organs, is a war crime.

Who Supports Pahlavi?

Even if we are watching the throes of what is to become a civil war — a similar pattern emerged in Syria, for instance, where a peaceful popular uprising morphed into a civil war after the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown — there’s little evidence that what’s happening on the streets of cities across Iran is a war to restore the monarchy.

This is not to say no Iranians, however, support Pahlavi.

Pahlavi, who has now lived — mostly quietly — in the U.S. for 48 of his 66 years and raised an American family, would be likely be welcomed by many pro-democracy and anti-Islamic Republic types who live in the West.

Many of these Iranians abroad are Pahlavi’s most ardent supporters. While he has denied he is seeking to restore the Peacock Throne, arguing he is simply “leading the transition” to a different political system, his followers in the West have been crystal clear that he is their “shah,” and fully expect him to rule over Iranians in a resurrected dynasty.

It is difficult to gauge how much support Pahlavi has inside Iran, but it is clear it is not insignificant.

Some ordinary citizens are so fed up with the regime — its social and political restrictions, its inability to provide any real solutions to their international isolation, and its miserable economic situation — that they would welcome any change.

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Others, nostalgic for the rule of Pahlavi’s father which provided their parents and grandparents with societal liberalism, a place on the world stage, and relative economic prosperity — though not, notably, political freedoms — would welcome a return to Pahlavism, whether in the person of a shah or leader of a new republic.

Yet others might chant his name in protests because he is the most familiar and visible of the opposition leaders in exile, given that the only other major figure is Maryam Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq group, or MEK, which is reviled by the vast majority of Iranians for having fought alongside Saddam Hussein in the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

Pahlavi’s profile as an alternative to the regime was significantly boosted during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death in 2022. He became very vocal in his denunciations of the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters and began — for the first time, really, since he lacked confidence during previous rounds of significant unrest like the 2009 Green Movement — to present himself as the only person who could lead a movement to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic.

After Iran was successful in squashing the women’s protests, Pahlavi continued his campaign to overthrow the theocracy. He held rallies, met with politicians in the U.S. and Europe, and spoke at conferences. He argued against attempts by both President Joe Biden and Trump to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran and implored the Europeans to break off any diplomacy with Iran.

Embracing Israel

In 2023, when it appeared that the U.S. and European countries were politely declining his entreaties, Pahlavi accepted an invitation by then-Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel to visit Israel. During the trip, he also took a met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other dignitaries.

For many Iranians, both in Iran and in the West, his embrace of Israel at a time it was threatening Iran was unbecoming, if not downright traitorous. His supporters, however, were unmoved by objections. Perhaps they hoped that Israel’s patronage could help restore the monarchy.

In pro-Pahlavi rallies ever since, Iran’s former flag of Iran — the imperial flag, bearing a crown in addition to the lion and sun — is waved alongside the Israeli flag. Even Farah Pahlavi, the former queen and crown prince’s mother, whose reputation across the political spectrum remained relatively benign, was photographed holding the Israeli flag in her apartment in Paris.

After the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 7, 2023, and the ensuing genocide in Gaza, Pahlavi and his supporters maintained their support of Israel. Even as the world largely objected to the massive Israeli bombing campaign that was killing thousands of innocent Palestinians, they never wavered. (Notably, Pahlavi’s notion of civilian state-media employees as legitimate targets is the same logic that animated Israel’s widely denounced attacks on Palestinian journalists during the genocide in Gaza, which has become the deadliest war on record for reporters.)   

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Then Israel attacked Iran. In June 2025, in what became known as the 12-Day War, Israel bombed from the air to destroy the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities, assassinated senior military leaders and nuclear scientists, and bombed infrastructure and apartment buildings, killing more than 1,000 Iranians, including children.

Not only did Pahlavi fail to condemn the attack on his country and compatriots, but he also called on Iranians to seize this “Berlin Wall” moment and rise up against the regime. He subsequently claimed that he had recruited, through a secure web-based channel, some 50,000 members of the armed forces and security forces to his side ready to defect at the appropriate time.

One would imagine that today, with security forces firing on demonstrations, would be the “appropriate” time. There has been no evidence, however, that a single member of the armed forces, police, or Basij militia has defected despite his continued calls for an uprising.

If anything, the unified security forces is what has prevented the protests from turning into a revolution. Since the end of December when the first protests erupted, Pahlavi has been the most vocal opposition figure urging citizens to march, first giving times and dates — which were followed by protesters in large numbers — and then directing the people to “take over” streets and city centers.

The marches were largely peaceful, but there was also some violence and rioting on the part of some protesters, including the burning of mosques and the killing of security forces. The government used the violence to justify its massive show of force and the deaths of hundreds of civilians.

Interference From Abroad

It is hard to say whether Iranians inside Iran, especially those who didn’t want to start a war with security forces or their military, are disappointed in Pahlavi’s position. Has he lost some support owing to his overt backing of Israel or his open entreaties for Trump to attack Iran? In the absence of regular, reliable polling, it is for now difficult to tell.

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What seems clear is that very few Iranians — and hardly any activists inside Iran and inside prisons — support foreign interference in their affairs or a foreign-imposed regime change. Pahlavi’s grandfather was deposed by the Allies in World War II, his father was brought back to the throne with the help of the U.S. and U.K. in 1953, and the memory of foreign meddling in Iran is very long.

At this point, it seems unlikely that the regime will fall any day soon. And, short of a prolonged war and occupation, Pahlavi will probably have to continue his campaign for leadership of a new Iran from the safety of the West.

The post Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

Wars have been distinctly out of fashion as of late, especially since the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether those quagmires are to be blamed on “dumb, politically correct wars” in the eyes of War Secretary Pete Hegseth or not, the idea of putting boots on the ground, doing regime change, occupying a country, and putting American lives in danger is political suicide.

By now, President Donald Trump isn’t shying away from calling the war he launched against Iran a “war” as he seeks the trappings of what a powerful president is meant to be doing. But Trump was more obfuscating in his speech to the nation announcing the beginning of the conflict, instead using the phrase George W. Bush used in his infamous 2003 “Mission Accomplished” speech, saying the U.S. had launched “major combat operations” against Iran, before obliquely referring to it later on as a “war” to prepare the viewers at home for “courageous American heroes” being killed in the fighting to come.

Trump has since gleefully argued that “wars can be fought ‘forever’” to those worried about America running low on munitions to use against Iran. When asked whether Americans should be concerned about retaliatory strikes on the homeland, Trump responded, “I guess,” and added, “When you go to war, some people will die.”

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After American stealth bombers struck Iranian nuclear facilities last June, Vice President JD Vance claimed the United States was not at war with Iran, or even Iran’s government, but only with “Iran’s nuclear program.” Absent the ability to split such fine hairs, Republicans have by and large stuck to calling the war a “decisive action,” an “extraordinary mission,” or an “intervention” — but have faltered under basic scrutiny when asked what those phrases mean in an effort not to trip wires with the American people, a majority of whom do not support the war.

Some have been slightly more agile, with House Speaker Mike Johnson insisting Operation Epic Fury is just that, an “operation” that is “limited in scope, limited in objective.” Some have taken the line that Iran has in fact been the one waging the forever war, against the United States, with the House Republican Foreign Affairs Committee publishing an image boasting that “President Trump is ending the forever war that Iran has waged against America for the last 47 years.” Others have simply tripped over themselves, with Sen. Markwayne Mullin declaring “This is war,” before correcting himself after being pressed by a journalist, saying “They’ve called it war” and “We haven’t declared war,” and that him saying it was a war “was a misspoke.” Mullin has since been nominated to lead the Department of Homeland Security.

Strangely, though, this allergy has also been exhibited by many of the war’s ostensible critics, though these lines rarely go much further. Certain Democratic members of Congress, like Sen. John Fetterman, D-Pa., and Rep. Greg Landsman, D-Ohio, have outright supported the war, borrowing language from the Republicans — the latter called it a “military intervention” — and saying targeting “missile systems and core infrastructure” apparently does not count as a war.

Others attempted some sort of bizarre middle ground, with Rep. Jared Golden, D-Maine, warning the “hostilities” against Iran were “not an illegal war — but could become one.” Even those straightforwardly against the war have made bizarre missteps, with Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., still borrowing Trump’s preferred framing in the headline of her statement condemning the war, calling it “combat operations” against Iran.

The root of this hesitation by both Republicans and Democrats stems from the memory of Iraq and Afghanistan, and how estimates of operations stretched from weeks and months to years and years, in which thousands of American soldiers died and hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed. Already the estimated duration of the war with Iran has stretched from four weeks to six to even potentially eight, according to Hegseth.

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Barack Obama understood Americans’ fears about reentering open-ended conflicts, choosing instead to greatly expand the drone program that has informed how this war is now being executed. It also led him to describe his military interventions against the Islamic State as being explicitly nothing like Bush’s open-ended wars, where “ground troops” for combat purposes would not be returning to Iraq after the much-heralded withdrawal. Of the thousands of U.S. troops Obama ended up sending to Iraq, 2,500 still remain, with the Trump administration rejecting votes in the Iraqi Parliament that declared the U.S. military must withdraw, threatening to seize 90 percent of Iraq’s national budget (in oil revenues held at the Federal Reserve) if such measures were taken, and again threatening the country with similar punishment if it includes anti-American parties in its next government.

The war against Iran is being talked about in similar terms, of an operation that will involve no ground troops, will involve no “nation-building quagmires,” and in the words of Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., will be a “conflict that should be very short and sweet.” As Iran proves it is not willing to immediately capitulate, reports have emerged of preparations being made for potentially months of bombardment. Ground troops, once off the table, were almost immediately put back on the table. Trump at one point saw an off-ramp within only a few days, and now demands Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” with the White House as the decider of Iran’s next leader after their assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His son Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader of Iran as elected by the Assembly of Experts, is apparently “unacceptable,” according to Trump.

In another echo of recent history, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used similar language about Iraq. He insisted troops were not bogged down in a “quagmire” like Vietnam and said Saddam Hussein should only be discussing “unconditional surrender” with the United States, with no other type of deal being acceptable. Rumsfeld, however, said the latter at the beginning of April 2003, days after the war against Iraq was launched, where American troops were rapidly advancing toward Baghdad.

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Trump is making these pronouncements as his allies conversely insist that this not-at-all-a-war will be brief, targeted, precise, and still sink the “mothership of terrorism,” as Sen. Lindsey Graham has put it. Trump has signaled he wants to “go in and clean out everything,” to wipe out Iran’s leadership structure, and install a new leader to his liking. The only way this was possible in Iraq was after the U.S. invaded with hundreds of thousands of ground troops and built a new administration from the ground up with an American viceroy, himself on the ground in Baghdad in a militarily-secured compound, constantly battling with the populace.

The promise of an airpower-only regime change war, innately at odds with reality, is dissolving. Trump is reportedly considering a ground operation, potentially even with Israeli special forces, to seize the enriched uranium in Isfahan that was buried after America’s strikes last June.

Just as soon as such talk floated in the air, reports began to emerge of a potentially much larger operation to seize Kharg Island, where thousands of Iranians live, and which 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports run through. Reports continue to oscillate between plans for such expansions, including being open to assassinating the younger Khamenei, and Trump’s renewed insistences that the war is “very complete, pretty much” and that they are “very far” ahead of schedule (while in the same breath proposing a military operation to take over the Strait of Hormuz).

Despite these claims of already decimating Iran’s military, Iranian missiles continue to strike Israel with only hours, sometimes even minutes, between attacks, even as its barrages have become smaller. Every indication suggests war against Iran will not be quick like removing Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The country’s resolve is clear: When NBC News anchor Tom Llamas asked Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi last week if he feared a potential American invasion, Araghchi replied, “No, we are waiting for them.”

The post It’s a War With Iran, Not an “Intervention” appeared first on The Intercept.

This week, U.S. forces bombarded Iran after the downing of an American Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded with strikes on targets across the Middle East and threats to “turn the entire region into hell.” Trump told Fox News’s Trey Yingst on Wednesday night that the U.S. fired 49 Tomahawk missiles at targets inside Iran, in addition to bombing raids by fighter jets. Yingst reported that Trump also said, “We’ll bomb the S out of them tomorrow night'” if Iran did not sign a peace agreement. Trump followed this on Thursday by declaring the U.S. would be “hitting Iran … VERY HARD TONIGHT.”

The burgeoning forever war contradicts months of reassurances by Trump that a peace deal with Iran is imminent.

An Intercept analysis of Trump’s claims about the Iran war, stated objectives, and supposed achievements finds the U.S. has fallen short or flamed out on all counts. The public record shows an administration that has consistently scaled back its goals and downgraded its claimed successes, without nearing anything resembling the victory Trump has touted. 

A Promise of World Peace

On the first day of the conflict, Trump laid out, with complete clarity, his most ambitious objectives. Claiming Iran was already “very much destroyed and, even, obliterated,” Trump said his war would bring peace to the region and, somehow, the globe. “The heavy and pinpoint bombing … will continue, uninterrupted … as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on February 28.

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The bombing campaign was, indeed, “heavy.” The “pinpoint” attacks included a strike on an elementary school that killed between 150 and 175 civilians, most of them children. And thousands more civilians died in other strikes. Almost 149,000 civilian infrastructures, including homes, hospitals, and schools, have been damaged in the U.S.–Israel war, according to an April report from the Iranian Red Crescent Society. An estimated 400,000 people have been affected by damage to houses and apartments. But Iran was not “very much destroyed,” much less “obliterated.”

Peace in the Middle East, it goes without saying, never came to pass. The U.S.–Israeli strikes actually kicked off a regional war that grew to include more than a dozen countries, including Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Beyond this, the inability of the self-proclaimed “peace president,” head of the world’s newly created Board of Peace, and recipient of the first FIFA Peace Prize to achieve “peace throughout … the world” may stand as Trump’s grandest failure.

Just two days after setting out his topline goals, Trump began publicly vacillating and dramatically scaling back U.S. aims. “Our objectives are clear. First, we’re destroying Iran’s missile capabilities,” he said during a March 2 White House ceremony. “Second, we’re annihilating their navy. … Third, we’re ensuring that the world’s number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon. … And finally, we’re ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.”

Months later, these objectives remain unmet.

Eliminating Missiles

While the United States claims to have struck more than 13,000 targets in Iran, leaked U.S. intelligence assessments found evidence that Iran restored 30 of the 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz to operational status, and retained 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile and 70 percent of its mobile launchers. Reports emerged that in April and May, Iran began efforts to repair its Yazd Missile Base. In just one day last week, Kuwait says it was targeted by an Iranian barrage of “13 hostile ballistic missiles.” On Sunday, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel. And on Thursday, Iran attacked multiple countries in the region, including Jordan which said it shot down 20 Iranian missiles.

During an aborted interview with NBC News that aired on Sunday, even Trump admitted he had failed. “They have some missiles left,” he said. “I would say, percentage-wise, maybe 21, 22 percent of their missiles. It’s a lot of missiles.” 

Annihilating the Navy

While the U.S. sunk many Iranian ships, the Iranian Navy has not been annihilated. In fact, U.S. Central Command, which is overseeing the war effort, has repeatedly referred to actions by Iran’s Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in the months since Trump laid out his aims, demonstrating that both still exist, upending Trump’s frequent boasts to the contrary.

Just last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “there is no Iranian Navy,” and in the next breath admitted there was, referencing Iran’s “Boston Whalers with machine guns on them.”

Ending the Nuclear Program

Iran also still maintains its stockpile of enriched uranium. And there is no evidence that nuclear sites that were not attacked during Trump’s 2025 Iran war, such as Pickaxe Mountain, were ever damaged. Last week, in fact, Rubio confirmed that Iran’s “nuclear program” still exists. And during his recent NBC interview, Trump acknowledged that Iran still possessed its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and “they can get it, I guess, with years of work.”

Last week, Rubio even suggested Iran might be allowed to continue enrichment at some later date, noting it would need to accept “severe and long-term limitations, and/or cancellation, of enrichment.”

Halting Funding of Militias

The Trump administration has also failed to ensure “that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.” Days after Trump declared this war aim, House Republicans introduced legislation stating that “Iran remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and provides substantial financial and military support to groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.” In the months since, even the Trump administration says the president’s goals haven’t been achieved.

In mid-April, the State Department said that Iran still “funnels the wealth of the Iranian people to Hizballah and other terrorists in the Middle East.” That same month, the Treasury Department took action against a “constellation of Iran-backed terrorist militias,” specifically “seven Iraqi militia commanders responsible for planning, directing, and executing attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq,” including leaders of Kata’ib Hizballah, Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Harakat Al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq. In May, the Treasury Department again targeted “Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq,” sanctioning “leaders of Iran-aligned terrorist militias Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq” and referencing still “other Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq.”

Unconditional Surrender

This assemblage of failures has been compounded by other unmet war aims. On March 6, Trump set the terms for an agreement with Iran. “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” he wrote on Truth Social. In the months since, that hard-line stance has turned to mush.

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“There is the prospect before us — which could happen today,” Rubio said last week of a potential peace deal, in a weak-kneed explanation to lawmakers. “We’re hopeful that something like that could happen in which the straits would reopen, we would enter into a period of negotiations on very specific topics — delineated negotiations in the hope of reaching an outcome that’s acceptable to us, and something they would be able to do as well.”

Reopening the Strait

The “straits” in question have become another sticking point and catastrophe. After failing to achieve all his initial war aims, Trump added another that was nothing more than a return to the status quo antebellum in the Strait of Hormuz: opening the waterway to traffic after Iran imposed a wartime blockade.

Before the war, the average number of vessels crossing the strait — a critical artery for the world’s oil, fertilizer, helium, critical materials for microchips, and numerous other goods — was more than 120 per day. It has never been close to that level again.

“I gave Iran ten days to MAKE A DEAL or OPEN UP THE HORMUZ STRAIT. Time is running out,” Trump declared on April 4. When the U.S. and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 7, Trump wrote on social media that he would “suspend the bombing and attack of Iran” on the condition that Tehran agree to the “COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.”

The next day, the White House declared: “Iran has now agreed to a ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz as the Trump Administration negotiates a broader peace agreement — once more proving Peace Through Strength victorious.” But that same day, Iran closed the strait, following continued Israeli attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. 

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In response to Iran’s blockade, the U.S. imposed its own blockade of the strait on April 13, barring commercial vessels from entering or leaving Iranian ports. Then on April 15, Trump posted: “I am permanently opening the Strait of Hormuz.” Two days later, Trump claimed, “Iran has agreed to never close the Strait of Hormuz again.” On April 19, Trump said Iran had launched attacks in the strait and noted Iran had announced a blockade. On April 23, Trump ordered the Navy to attack Iranian ships laying mines in the strait. On May 6, Trump teased that the war might be “at an end, and the highly effective Blockade will allow the Hormuz Strait to be OPEN TO ALL, including Iran.” A day later, Trump said U.S. warships came under Iranian fire in the strait. The situation was still dragging on when Trump wrote, on May 29: “The Hormuz Strait must be immediately open, no tolls, for unrestricted shipping traffic, in both directions.” On Monday, a U.S. Army Apache helicopter gunship patrolling the strait was downed by Iran. 

The Strait of Hormuz remains functionally closed, except for a tiny trickle of traffic. “Last month, I directed our Great U.S. Military to execute a secret mission to support Oil Tankers and other Commercial Ships through the Strait of Hormuz,” Trump posted on Wednesday. “More than 200 Commercial Ships have safely traveled through the Strait.” (About 3,000 ships normally traverse it every month.) On Thursday, Iran announced that it, again, closed the strait to oil tankers and commercial ships.

Oil industry analysts say that global oil reserves are dwindling and that if the war doesn’t wrap up in the near term, petroleum prices could skyrocket to $150 a barrel. “The oil will go down,” Trump said on NBC, but acknowledged the war had driven up prices. “We’re going to have higher gasoline. We’re going to have a little higher fertilizer,” he admitted, before equivocating further when asked if gasoline prices had peaked. “Well, it depends. I mean, it depends where the war goes. It could be,” he waffled. “If we sign an agreement, it’ll go down now. Otherwise, it’ll go down after we’re finished.”

Oil prices rose to about $95 a barrel on Thursday as the U.S. and Iran continued to launch attacks. Trump said on Wednesday that the price of oil would have been at $250 a barrel had the U.S. government not been siphoning off “millions of barrels” of Iran’s oil over the course of the war. On Thursday, Trump posted that the U.S. would also soon seize Iran’s “oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their Oil and Gas Markets.” Despite the rampant oil theft and threats of more to come, U.S. inflation accelerated for a third straight month in May, driven by energy prices which rose 3.9 percent over the month.

A Peace Deal

The “agreement” in question is still another failed aim. On March 23, Trump told reporters about supposed peace talks and cited “major points of agreement, I would ​say — almost all points of agreement.” Iran denied negotiations had taken place. Two days later, Trump claimed Iran wanted to “make a deal so badly.” On March 26, he said Iran was “begging to make a deal.” On April 15, he said the war was “very close to over.” On April 17, Trump claimed that Iran had “agreed to everything” and that “we will get a deal in the next day or two.” 

“An Agreement has been largely negotiated, subject to finalization,” Trump announced on May 23. On June 2, Trump wrote: “as I told Iran, ‘It’s time, one way or another, for you to make a Deal.’” Then Trump told NBC late last week: “We’re very close to having a deal.” But on Monday, Trump said a “Final Deal” has yet to be “reached.”

What such a “deal” will end shines a bright light on another flip-flop failure by the president. Trump went from claiming, in early March, that the U.S. won the war with Iran, to attempting to convince Americans that he never even went to war in the first place. “We don’t call it a war,” he said before the end of that month. “We call it a military operation.” By early May, Trump was calling it a “mini war” or “a little detour.”

Just Give Him Two Weeks

The deadline for when this “mini-war” will finally end may be the most telling of Trump’s failed aims and achievements. It’s well known that Trump’s lying and laziness coalesce around one simple phrase: two weeks. “We’ll have something in two weeks,” Trump said in January of an agreement with Europe to extend U.S. control over Greenland, to take one example.

Trump has long used this two-week delaying tactic when faced with vexing questions about anyone and everything, from Russian President Vladimir Putin and the war on ISIS to international trade and the Covid-19 pandemic. Two weeks really means later. Except when it means never.

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The ceasefire with Iran, announced on April 7, was initially supposed to last “two weeks” while the two countries inked a deal to end the war, according to Trump. He claimed at the time that they were already “very far along with a definitive Agreement concerning Longterm PEACE with Iran, and PEACE in the Middle East.”

On Monday evening, Trump held a tele-rally for South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham where he addressed his failed war with Iran. “We’re negotiating now, and they want to make a very good deal. They’re willing to give us everything,” Trump claimed, noting, “It’ll happen very soon.” The president then added in his favorite faux time frame: “I think we are winning that battle, but you’re really going to win it over the next two weeks when we declare total victory.”

The post A Point-by-Point Breakdown of Trump’s Failed Iran War Objectives appeared first on The Intercept.

With a commitment to a ceasefire and the scheduled signing of a “framework” later this week, Iran is expected to agree to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days. Negotiations over an agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program are expected to take place in the 60 days following Friday’s signing ceremony.

If the deal is signed on this week, it will mark a return to the status quo antebellum when the Strait of Hormuz was open and no nuclear deal with Iran was in place. Aside from killing top regime leaders, thousands of civilians — including more than 150, most of them children, on a strike on an elementary school — and damaging almost 149,000 civilian infrastructures, the United States has functionally achieved nothing. The same regime is in power and it maintains missile capabilities, still has a navy, and still supports regional proxies.

Trump also teased the prospect of a U.S. protection racket under which Middle Eastern nations would be forced to pay monetary tribute to America if the U.S. and Iran do not finalize a nuclear accord.

On Monday, Iran’s government declared victory and appeared to vow revenge on the U.S. for the war.

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“The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on Sunday, his 80th birthday. “I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz.” An hour later, Trump offered a caveat, stating the strait would only be opened “upon the signing of the Deal on Friday.”

“This victory was achieved through absolute national cohesion, under the wise guidance of the Supreme National Security Council and all state pillars,” Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei announced on Monday, claiming that the conflict “cost the aggressors heavily.”

“Moving toward diplomacy does not mean we will ever forgive or forget the crimes against the Iranian nation; the pursuit of justice for our martyrs is permanent,” said Baghaei.

The White House did not reply to a request by The Intercept for comment on Iran’s declaration of victory and apparent vow of revenge for its dead.

The new “deal” is a complete capitulation for Trump who claimed, on March 6: “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” No such surrender occurred.

Nor is it the first ceasefire Trump has claimed would result in a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

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“Iran has now agreed to a ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” the White House announced on April 8, essentially the same agreement publicized on Sunday.  That original ceasefire collapsed months ago, but the fiction was observed by the administration and mainstream news media outlets alike, until the new agreement was rolled out.

Pakistan says it will oversee a formal signing of a memorandum of understanding on Friday in Geneva, Switzerland. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told the National Assembly session in Islamabad “the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations has been announced across all fronts, including Iran, America, and Lebanon.”  

Self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth claimed on Sunday that the agreement guarantees “Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, won’t seek one, won’t buy one, won’t have one.” Iran previously agreed to those terms when it first ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and reaffirmed that agreement on the first page of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, negotiated by former President Barack Obama’s administration. Trump unilaterally withdrew from that pact during his first term.

Trump indicated Hegseth was lying or uniformed in an interview with the New York Times on Sunday. The president said the U.S. was still negotiating whether Iran would suspend its enrichment for 20 years but hinted that he might settle for a 15-year suspension.

Trump has consistently criticized the JCPOA. “Barack Hussein Obama gave them 1.7 Billion Dollars in ‘Green” Cash,’” he wrote during a social media rant in April. Iran’s Mehr news agency reported that the U.S. would release $12 billion in frozen assets to Iran before the start of nuclear negotiations. “The accord secures the unfreezing of all Iranian assets and addresses compensation for wartime damages,” said Baghaei.

Trump said that if the U.S. does not sign a final nuclear agreement with Iran, the United States might assume the role of “the guardian of the Middle East” in return for 20 percent of the region’s revenues. The proposed extortion scheme appears akin to the 19th-century Barbary States, which practiced state-supported piracy to exact tribute from other nations. The United States fought two separate wars against two of these North African states: Tripoli from 1801 to 1805, and Algiers from 1815 to 1816.

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A recent Intercept analysis of Trump’s claims about the Iran war, his stated objectives, and supposed American achievements found the U.S. has fallen short or flamed out on all counts. The public record shows an administration that has consistently scaled back its goals and downgraded its claimed successes, without nearing anything resembling the victory Trump has touted.

On the first day of the conflict, Trump laid out his most ambitious objectives. “The heavy and pinpoint bombing … will continue, uninterrupted … as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on February 28.

Since April, the White House has not replied to requests for further information about Trump’s inability to achieve world peace. Trump has also failed to accomplish even his more modest goal, as the region remains mired in conflict. Israel continued its war on Lebanon on Sunday and said it was not involved in the new pact. “Trump’s agreement does not bind us. … We are not party to this agreement,” Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir wrote on Telegram on Sunday.

“He’s a very difficult guy,” Trump said of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday. “He should be very thankful to us for doing this,” he said of the war, lapsing into typical hyperbole. “Because if Iran had a nuclear weapon, Israel wouldn’t be around for two hours.”

The post Trump Celebrates Achieving Absolutely Nothing in Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

Maybe.

“To me, I think it’s over,” President Donald Trump said on Wednesday, referring to a preliminary truce inked in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June. That ceasefire, an American capitulation intended to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a key oil and gas shipping route whose closure by Iran was wreaking havoc on the global economy — never quite took effect. The price of oil spiked to its highest level in weeks following Trump’s Wednesday remarks.

“I don’t want to deal with them anymore. They’re scum,” said Trump, referring to Iran’s leaders, as he wrapped up his trip to the NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey. “They’re cuckoo.” At one point in his remarks, the 80-year-old president claimed that a U.S. warship was attacked by the “the Islamic Republic of Japan.”

The June agreement between the United States and Iran, designed to usher in further negotiations toward permanently ending the war that Trump began on February 28, echoed another faux ceasefire, signed in April, which was also largely a fiction.

Trump’s statement that he “thinks” the ceasefire has concluded surprised one U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “Shouldn’t he know?” the source said.

That official said the Trump administration had mismanaged the conflict and been repeatedly outmaneuvered by Iran, leading to a “twilight state” between war and peace, which has allowed Tehran to fortify its defenses and reconsolidate power. “He must be trying for the record of how many times you can lose the same war.”

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An Intercept analysis found that, despite celebrating the June agreement as a victory, the Trump administration failed to achieve any of its war aims. For weeks, the White House has failed to respond to repeated requests for confirmation that the June ceasefire had collapsed and no goals of the war were reached. The White House did not reply to a question on Wednesday concerning the collapse of the ceasefire nor Trump’s claim of an attack by “the Islamic Republic of Japan.”

The United States attacked Iran on Tuesday, after reimposing sanctions on Iranian oil sales. U.S. Central Command said that it had struck “over 80 targets with precision munitions as an immediate response to Iran’s latest attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.” Iran did not claim responsibility for Tuesday’s attacks on commercial ships, including a Saudi oil tanker and a Qatari ship carrying liquefied natural gas in waters off Oman’s coast.

CENTCOM also claimed to have attacked “more than 60 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps small boats in and near the strait.” U.S. officials have previously claimed to have completely annihilated Iran’s naval forces. “Their Navy is gone,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on April 11, just after the first ceasefire was announced and fell apart.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s top negotiator and Parliament speaker, accused the United States of multiple violations of the June ceasefire agreement, in a Tuesday post. “The era of bullying and extortion is over. It leads nowhere. We don’t fold,” he wrote. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps said in a statement published on state media on Wednesday, that in response to U.S. violations of the ceasefire, it had attacked 85 U.S. military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait and also shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone.

“They’re vicious, violent people,” Trump said during his remarks in Ankara.

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During the president’s war of choice on Iran, the U.S. and Israel struck more than 17,000 separate targets in 40 days — a rate of strikes almost unprecedented in modern conflict, according to the civilian harm-monitoring group Airwars. On the first day of the war, the U.S. attacked the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school in Minab, killing more than 150 people, most of them children. In the weeks that followed, tens of thousands more civilians would be killed or wounded in U.S.–Israeli strikes, according to World Health Organization estimates. 

The official number of dead and wounded U.S. personnel stands at 426, an almost 11 percent increase since the first ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was struck on April 8. For months, The Intercept has reported that the Pentagon’s official tally of dead and wounded military personnel from the Iran war is a gross undercount, stemming from what another U.S. government official called a “casualty cover-up.” The Defense Casualty Analysis System, which tracks “deceased, wounded, ill or injured” service members for Congress and the president, is missing hundreds of known American casualties. The true number exceeds 625.

Trump vowed more attacks on Iran at the NATO summit. “I’ll give them a little warning we’re going to hit them hard tonight,” he said. On Monday, Trump threatened attacks on Iran’s civilian infrastructure that would “affect 91 million people,” almost all of them civilians.

“The child-killing and terrorist U.S. military in the early hours of this morning openly violated the ceasefire and violated the Islamabad understanding by launching an airstrike on a number of coastal bases and civilian stations,” the IRGC said in its statement.

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CENTCOM claimed to have struck Iranian air defense systems, “command and control networks,” coastal radar sites, and other targets and threatened further attacks. “CENTCOM forces remain postured and prepared to hold Iran accountable when the agreement is not adhered to or obeyed,” the command posted on X.

After previously failing to make good on his pledge to ensure Iran “can never obtain a nuclear weapon,” since Tehran still maintains its stockpile of enriched uranium, Trump said on Wednesday that the U.S. would “de-nuke it.”

The U.S. official laughed when appraised of Trump’s pledge. “What is that supposed to mean?” he asked of Trump’s denuclearization statement. The official said Trump had painted himself into a corner. “There is one word that describes this man and this war: a trainwreck.”

The post Another Trump Ceasefire With Iran Crumbles appeared first on The Intercept.

Vice President JD Vance is set to lead renewed negotiations with Iran this weekend to bring an end to the U.S.–Israel war on the country that stretched into a second month. The talks come after a roller coaster of a week, which began with President Donald Trump threatening genocidal war crimes against Iran. 

“A whole civilization will die tonight,” he wrote on social media, “never to be brought back again.” 

Trump urged Iran to make a deal with the U.S. and fully open the Strait of Hormuz by Tuesday at 8 p.m. ET. Then, shortly before the deadline, Trump took to social media again to say Iran and the U.S. had reached a two-week ceasefire agreement brokered by Pakistan. Trump said the U.S. received a workable 10-point plan from Iran to begin negotiations on a durable ending to the war. In the meantime, Iran said it would allow for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Israel, however, immediately intensified its attacks on Lebanon, jeopardizing the already tenuous ceasefire. More than 300 people were killed in Lebanon by Israeli airstrikes the day after the ceasefire was announced. 

The terms of the plan are not yet clear but there are some key factors for Iran, says Narges Bajoghli, a professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University. 

“One is that Iran is asking for non-aggression from the United States into the future. It won’t take the United States’s word for it. It’s already been burned by the U.S. multiple times,” Bajoghil tells The Intercept Briefing. “Then the other big thing is sanctions relief.” But “Iran’s biggest red line is its sovereignty and independence.”

This week on the podcast, Bajoghil speaks to senior Intercept editor Ali Gharib about the path that led the U.S. back to the negotiating table with Iran. This war has proven, Bajoghil says, “both to the decision-makers in Iran, to the Iranian population, and then more importantly to the international world, is that Iran’s real deterrence actually doesn’t come from a potential nuclear bomb, but it comes from the ability to be able to stop or regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.” 

She notes, “In many ways, what actually has potentially led to this ceasefire is the fact that Iran is able to create a chokehold over 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas trade. That is an extremely powerful weapon that they have in their hands and in many ways can force shifts to happen geopolitically in a much faster way than a nuclear bomb can.”

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you listen.

Transcript

Ali Gharib: Welcome to The Intercept Briefing. I’m Ali Gharib, a senior editor at The Intercept.

Akela Lacy: And I am Akela Lacy, senior politics reporter at the Intercept and co-host of the Intercept Briefing.

AG: Akela, how are you doing? It’s been a pretty wild week. We’ve had genocidal threats. We’ve had ceasefire agreements. Now we have a shaky ceasefire agreement. Traffic opened up in the Strait of Hormuz. It closed back down. How are you viewing all this?

AL: I am struggling to keep up with the fast-changing developments, but my overall takeaway this week has been thinking about what, if any, recourse our institutional democracy provides for this kind of thing, or is supposed to provide? We have a lot of Democrats coming out and talking about invoking the 25th Amendment and instituting articles of impeachment. It feels like we’ve seen all of this before.

So it’s kind of like, yeah, we have a crazy genocidal maniac running the country. People keep telling me the checks and balances are working. I’m not convinced that the checks and balances are working.

AG: Well, tell it to the people in Tehran and all over Iran and in central Beirut that these checks and balances aren’t working, and the madman theory of conducting foreign policy seems like a much bigger gamble when it’s an actual madman.

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OK, well, let’s talk a little bit about that. Obviously, we had this last-minute ceasefire agreement on Tuesday night between Iran and the U.S. through Pakistani mediation that came just on the precipice of the deadline expiring for Trump’s threat to, let’s call it what it is, commit genocide against Iran.

Almost immediately, the ceasefire came under strain by a few residual tit-for-tat attacks. The Iranians said that they faced a couple Israeli attacks on energy infrastructure, and the Emirates said that the Iranians were still hitting them with drones and missiles. And in short order, however, those attacks slowed down, and by all accounts, the Americans have stopped bombing Iran.

What seems to be the biggest strain on the ceasefire at this point is an incredible, almost mind-numbing level of assault that the Israelis launched against Lebanon. Can you talk a little bit about what happened there and how this has played out in public bickering between Iran and the U.S.?

AL: Something that I think has been not lost in the coverage, but under-appreciated about this war is that while the U.S. and Israel have been bombing Iran, Israel has been waging war around the world basically since October 7, pretty unchecked. Multiple acts of aggression that we covered on this podcast — obviously the latest of which is razing Southern Lebanon.

On Wednesday, there were more than 200 people killed in just one day. That’s a small fraction of the total number of people who have been killed in all of these strikes that we’re talking about.

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But my reaction to this is that it feels like Israel is able to get away with this aggression, particularly against Lebanon, because we write it off because of Hezbollah, or we don’t consider the retaliation against regional countries as part of the war, even though people are being killed every single day with the implicit approval of the U.S.

AG: Yeah, with U.S. bombs as part of the U.S. war. That has been the key sticking point. When the Pakistani prime minister announced the ceasefire, or rather made the request of the Trump administration for a ceasefire — with a tweet that the New York Times later reported had been approved in advance by the Trump administration — we saw that he included Lebanon in the ceasefire. Of course, the Israelis quickly came out and said Lebanon was not involved in the ceasefire and kept going.

JD Vance immediately sided with the Israelis, and now he’s going to be the guy who’s going to be going to Pakistan along with our two favorite real estate agent Trump aides: Steve Witkoff, who was involved in the original Iran talks that were interrupted by this war, and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who has no official role in the administration, but is extremely close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and could very easily allow Netanyahu and Israeli aggression to play spoiler in these talks.

AL: The other thing that I found maddening was that this week, I mean the day that Trump sent this tweet calling for genocide in Iran, where was JD Vance? In Hungary trying to help Viktor Orbán not lose his election this upcoming weekend.

Then there was this huge puff piece in the Times centering JD Vance as the person who really tried to stop the president from dragging us into war with Iran. Now he’s being put forth as the negotiator in these ongoing talks. I mean, when you have a Cabinet full of evil villainous characters, these are the people who are running the world.

I don’t even know the word to describe it — the fact that he’s being upheld as this person who was trying to keep Trump from going to war with Iran, while he’s halfway across the world trying to save another far-right authoritarian figure from losing because he is so unpopular, and yet we’re praising him at home in the paper of record. The framing of this was that he did something huge and valorous, when really it was showing modest opposition and, at the end of everything, agreeing to go along with it. So what are we celebrating here?

AG: Yeah, there’s a tiny bit of room to be optimistic in a world where every option is like a complete pile of crap. It’s like, maybe this is our one shining pile of crap that we can look to. It might be that he was the only guy that said something. But yeah, it doesn’t inspire much confidence that he has been like every other official who’s gotten anywhere near Trump’s circle of power: a complete sycophant of the president, has gone along and agreed with what the president says, and in the end, we still have this complete madman calling the shots. 

So I spoke this week with Narges Bajoghli about the ceasefire, about the 10-point plan, and what this looks like for regional dynamics going forward. Narges is an associate professor of anthropology and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University. She’s written several books including “Iran Reframed” and “How Sanctions Work in Iran.” Her upcoming book is called “Weapons Against Humanity.” It’s about how the Middle East became the physical, political, and moral workshop for the global weapons industry.

AL: That sounds fascinating. Let’s hear that conversation.

AG: Narges, welcome to the Intercept Briefing.

Narges Bajoghli: It’s lovely to be with you.

AG: The pleasure is all ours. 

So before we get started, I just wanted to note that we’re speaking on Wednesday morning. This is the day after Iran and the U.S. reached a temporary ceasefire agreement following Trump’s threats to annihilate the whole civilization of Iran. So let’s jump right in from there.

OK, just to quickly recap the week. On Tuesday morning, Trump threatened this genocidal war against Iran. Basically said he wanted to do war crimes and wipe out the whole civilization of Iran. He said, “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” The warning came hours before a deadline that Trump had put on Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

That deadline was set for Tuesday at 8:00 p.m. About an hour and a half before that Trump announced this ceasefire. The terms of it aren’t exactly clear, but it does seem that it was brokered by Pakistan. Iran had introduced this 10-point plan. The ceasefire is to last for two weeks. The straits are to be reopened. Those are some basic things we know. 

So in this 10-point plan, as far as we can tell, and in the ceasefire agreement, what’s Iran asking for and how likely is it that they can get there from the Trump administration? What does the Trump administration want from them?

NB: Two key things. One is that Iran is asking for non-aggression from the United States into the future. It won’t take the United States’ word for it. It’s already been burned by the U.S. multiple times. This is potentially where China’s involvement in this Pakistan-mediated ceasefire might play a big role. And it’s been reported that it has.

Then the other big thing is sanctions relief. If Iran ends this and goes back to its sanctions pre-war status quo, that’s going to be unacceptable to Iran. So a big component of this is going to be lifting of at least a very large number of sanctions against Iran.

AG: We should just say that this is a sanctions program that’s been on since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but really kicked into high gear about 15 years ago. Then when Trump came into his first term, started this program of “maximum pressure” that totally crippled Iran — impoverished it.

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The sanctions have been over Iran’s nuclear program. That’s also part of what the Trump administration says that it’s getting from Iran as part of this plan, though that didn’t appear in Iran’s readout of the 10-point plan. I saw in the FT on Wednesday morning that a diplomat had told the paper that the version of the 10-point plan that they were getting wasn’t exactly the version that Iran had put out publicly.

How likely is it that Iran would be willing to compromise on its nuclear program? For example, remove it entirely, which has been a red line for them this entire time — especially given as you said, that they’re not likely to trust a U.S. non-aggression guarantee.

NB: Iran’s biggest red line is its sovereignty and independence. Within that, the nuclear program is part and parcel of it. Will it concede to certain kinds of negotiations on the nuclear program? Yes, of course. This was also part of the negotiations that were ongoing prior to the start of this war. But will it give up its high-enriched uranium completely and give it up to the United States? I find that to be a very difficult thing to be happening after this war.

It’s important to note that from the Iranian perspective, in many ways its infrastructure has been really battered. Its residential buildings, its economic hubs have been really battered throughout all of this bombing of the past 40 days.

But from Iran’s perspective and many Iranians themselves, they see that they are coming out of this victorious simply because no real regime change has taken place, Iran’s territory has not been shifted, and Iran’s state has not collapsed, nor has Iran fractured. These are all of the things that at different points in time, the Israelis or the Americans were saying were a part of this war effort.

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In the face of that, Iranians and the Islamic Republic understands that they can continue to withstand extreme amounts of pain in order to sustain Iran’s sovereignty and independence. They will not give up things, whether it is complete control over the Strait of Hormuz or the nuclear program in order to please Trump at this stage.

AG: This obviously has been one of the hairiest issues here. I want to talk about the government’s resilience in a moment, but just to get back to this nuclear issue.

When we’re talking about the nuclear issue, of course, the U.S. and Israel have maintained for decades that Iran is building nuclear programs. Iran says that this is an energy program, but that terrain seems to be shifting throughout the course of this war with the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who is the cleric in charge of the government, who had issued a fatwa — a religious declaration — saying that nuclear bombs were not permitted. But Iranian officials have seemed to be reconsidering that, according to some news reports.

When we talk about the nuclear program and what Iran’s willing to give up — can you just give us a little brief primer on how that became such a point of tension, and where you think things might be likely to go from this point as far as what Iran might have its eyes on? Is there something to the fact that they think that they might need a nuclear weapon to defend their sovereignty, which as you said is the top priority? Is that going to become a non-starter because of whatever negotiations happen from here forward?

NB: First of all, Iran began developing the infrastructure for nuclear energy prior to even the revolution, during the shah’s time. Then after the revolution, especially after the Iran–Iraq War, it began to invest again in the development of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

As you stated, the main purpose of it was for internal scientific and energy reasons. As I think many people now realize, even though Iran has been under all of these severe sanctions for upwards to close to five decades, investment in science in Iran, investment in medical advancement, in engineering — all of this has been very important for not just the Islamic Republic, but I think the Iranian nation as a whole.

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The way that they have talked about the nuclear program and the way that even it has been verified over and over by U.N. agencies and others is that there has not been evidence of it moving toward a weaponization of this. Netanyahu himself has been, obviously, for close to 30 years now, keeps saying that Iran is weaponizing and is just a little while away from the bomb. But all of the inspectors seem to disagree with this.

Now, in this war, as you said, and also during the 12-Day War last June, there has been increased conversations within both Iranian decision-making circles as well as the general population that maybe Iran needs to go for a bomb in order to establish real deterrence against Israel and the United States. That is very much a debate that is alive right now. 

However, I think one thing that this war — that currently we are under potentially a ceasefire on — has proven both to the decision-makers in Iran, to the Iranian population, and then more importantly to the international world, is that Iran’s real deterrence actually doesn’t come from a potential nuclear bomb, but it comes from the ability to be able to stop or regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

So in many ways, what actually has potentially led to this ceasefire is the fact that Iran is able to create a chokehold over 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas trade. That is an extremely powerful weapon that they have in their hands and in many ways can force shifts to happen geopolitically in a much faster way than a nuclear bomb can.

Iran’s decision makers have also studied very, very closely what happened in Iraq and Libya and other countries, Syria, around the region that attempted to go toward building of potential nuclear energy. So Iran, especially from 2003 onward, has utilized the nuclear program as a lever that they could bring onto the international stage, especially with the United States, to negotiate.

So the nuclear program for Iranian decision-makers — yes, it has importance for development of scientific knowledge within the country and energy infrastructure. But more importantly, it was really used as a thing that could bring the United States to the negotiation table. 

Today, what is becoming apparent is that, in many ways, the nuclear program before this war hit was a dead end. It actually became a bigger liability for Iran then the ability to be able to bring the United States to the table. Today, what they’re faced with is the fact that actually the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s control over it is what is not only bringing the United States to the table, but has the ability actually to bypass U.S. sanctions and be able to force other countries to deal directly with Iran economically than to even have to worry about the U.S. sanctions.

So I think in many ways the calculation here about the utility of the nuclear program for international diplomacy is beginning to lessen, as Iran is beginning to realize that the biggest card they have in their hands is the Strait of Hormuz.

AG: Fascinating. That also would seem to open the door exactly to a compromise on the nuclear issue in order to get the relief that they’ve been pushing for from this sanctions regime.

Now I want to talk about the idea of the Strait of Hormuz and the regional picture, because you wrote a great piece in Foreign Affairs called “Iran’s Long Game,” about the history of the Islamic Republic over about the past half decade or so, has proven to the country that it’s on its own and that they won’t be able to compete on conventional grounds with foreign militaries.

That’s especially true of course, in this war, we see Israel and the U.S. have this overwhelming firepower. And Iran, after years of sanctions, has been hobbled, both its economy, but also to some extent its ability to large-scale industrial mass production — but that hasn’t affected so much the weapons program. Of course, we’ve seen that one of the goals of this war for Israel and the U.S. has been to degrade Iran’s missile program, and while the amounts of missiles being fired has certainly been reduced, Iran clearly has some material left in its arsenal that have still been hitting Israel, Gulf countries, U.S. installations, and some of that has begun to slip through more and more missile defense systems.

Can you just talk about what the after-effect of this war and whatever has happened to Iran’s industrial capacity might mean for that long game going forward? Is this going to become a thing that becomes more focused on the strait? Or is this going to continue to be the broad-based regional program for Iran that is going to be small missile drone attacks on regional installations to heighten the cost for its neighbors of their alliance with the U.S.?

NB: The lessons Iran took from the Iran-Iraq War was that the way that it was viewed in Iran was that this was a war by the United States and the West using Iraq in order to weaken the new revolutionary state at that time.

AG: We should say this was a nearly a decade[long] war between a young Islamic Republic and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where Iran was fighting on its own, and Saddam Hussein was backed by the West, basically, had the conventional edge, and Iran, very improbably, with great sacrifices, held on and preserved the Islamic Republic.

NB: Exactly, and that’s really important background to have. So how did Iran fight that war was that it was forced in many ways to fight it asymmetrically. And Iran then made the decision that it could not invest and create an air force that would be equal to Israel or the United States.

That in many ways how Iran could move forward in its defense posture was to create asymmetric warfare as central to their defense posture and central to their strategy militarily. That then became tested again once the global war on terror started after September 11, when the United States invaded Iraq. Very famously, they said that next on the book would be Iran.

In order to prevent that attack from happening, Iran’s Quds Forces or the IRGC — the Revolutionary Guards’ extraterritorial forces — which at the time were later led by Qassim Suleimani, they developed also then asymmetric warfare to deal with the Americans in Iraq, later in Syria, later also, and obviously throughout all this time with Lebanon and Israel.

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So asymmetric warfare is really cemented within how the IRGC has developed its weapons program, as well as its strategy moving forward. It has realized that these missiles and these drones are an effective way of, yes, Iran will sustain a lot of damage — as it has this past month and moving forward — but it is also able to inflict damage whether to its neighbors or to Israel or, importantly, to America’s military bases.

What it has also done is taken that idea of asymmetrical defense of the country, as we see in like this mosaic defense that they have created throughout the country where they have decentralized decision-making. The way in which, for example, Iran’s electricity — even though Trump was threatening to hit these power plants — the reality is, even if Trump had hit the largest power plants in Iran, that only supplies a little bit above 2.3 percent of the population because they have decentralized how electricity is run in the country. Because they understand that an Iran that demands sovereignty and independence is a threat to the United States and the U.S. posture in the Middle East.

So it has decentralized and taken that asymmetric warfare across all kinds of planning. That also includes the manufacturing of its drones and its missiles, which are deep underground in Iran’s mountains. So in essence, no foreign intel agency really knows how many missiles and drones Iran has. It doesn’t know where all of the different manufacturing sites of these are in these mountains.

This, again, is something that Iran has developed in order to be able to have a long fight of attrition against the United States and Israel. Because the way that Iran will fight any of these wars going into the future, if it continues, is that it knows that time is on its hands. Time is in its favor. And that by being able to do all of these things in an underground fashion, it has a particular kind of power, in a conventional sense, it would not have.

[Break] 

AG: On Tuesday, we had this threat to annihilate Iranian civilization, and leading up to that the threat had been all about these broad-based attacks on power, on bridges, on infrastructure. And as we’ve seen from a decade and a half of these extremely stringent sanctions, and also in the aftermath of last June’s war and the continued Israeli and American pressure put on Iran, that the ones who’ve always seemed to suffer from this were Iranian people before any of the Revolutionary Guard, the government suffered.

Then you had this big [New York] Times story the other day and which had come out in bits and pieces before that about how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu really pitched this war to Trump as, I don’t want to say a cakewalk, but that it would be a relatively assured effort to take out Iran’s nuclear program, its missile program, and especially to foment some revolution that would overthrow the Islamic order. That has not played out.

So if I can ask you with apologies for the two-sided question in two parts, how the government has survived and how they remain so strong despite what Israel and the U.S. had hoped to do? And what that might mean for Iranian people going forward in terms of repression, and what it means to have a government that has now survived this assault?

NB: So one thing to understand is that Iran’s infrastructure, and importantly its governmental systems, have been on the books for a little bit over a century. It predates the Islamic Republic.

You are dealing with an infrastructure and a bureaucracy and systems of power that regenerate and have been regenerating for close to a century now. Many of that has nothing to do with just the political establishment. You are also dealing with a civilizational state here that has a very clear understanding of itself and its history, and that despite the threats that Trump may make of obliterating this civilization, the fact of the reality is it’s millennia long. Iranians know that. They take huge amounts of pride in that. 

Now, the Islamic Republic also has been institutionalized very deeply within Iranian society. It has also fought these wars across the Middle East for over four decades now. It knows that one of the biggest ways in which, especially Israel, but also increasingly the United States, fight these wars across the region, is through assassination of leaders at the top. It has watched this happen. It has happened to its own commanders as well. So Iran has established four to five successors for each major role within both its military and political establishment. That’s one part. 

The other thing that I think is really important for people to understand is that Iranians have been struggling for over a century now for the independence and sovereignty of the country vis-a-vis both the West and, at the time that the Soviet Union existed, the East. For Iranians writ large, across political and social lines, to have Iran remain sovereign and independent — that is not a demand of the Islamic Republic, that’s a demand of the Iranian population. It has been a demand of the Iranian population for many decades now.

So when we saw this war begin, and also in the June war, many Iranians are extremely angry at their governing establishment for a whole slew of very valid reasons. But they also have seen the way that the United States and Israel have acted these past three years in particular, but also over the past many decades on Iraq, which is their neighbor on Afghanistan, which is their other neighbor, and they do not want to be succumbed to that.

So rallying around the flag is not rallying around the flag of the Islamic Republic. It is rallying around this idea that Iran as a territory and as a nation stays sovereign and independent. That means that in essence, and the Islamic Republic also repeats this often, is that their biggest deterrence is its population.

The fact that the population is resilient and will not give in to saying, “OK, we don’t like our governing establishment, so therefore let’s welcome what comes from the outside” — that is just incongruent with any understanding of modern Iranian history. This is why Bibi Netanyahu’s strategy has failed.

This is also why, actually, before we even got Trump and [Pete] Hegseth, much of the top brass of the American military understood this. Both understood any real war with Iran is almost impossible because of Iran’s size and because of its topography; it’s surrounded by mountains. But then the other fact is that you’re dealing with a civilizational state. And that is a very different war to fight than a war that America has been used to fighting in the Middle East, which is with states that have been carved out by colonial powers over just the past century. So that makes it very different. 

Then what do we see in the aftermath of all of this moving forward? The Islamic Republic has proved now in three wars — from the 1980s to the 12-day War to today’s war — that it is able to defend Iran’s territory. That means that coming out of this war, it is coming out in a position of victory and in a position of strength. That does not bode well for a lot of civil society actors inside of the country. Because you now have an emboldened military and IRGC, you also have a new generation of them, which has come to power because many of their fathers have now been assassinated throughout this war.

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This is one of the reasons why Iranian civil society actors have been so against both sanctions and war because they understand that those only create further internal repression. But at the same time, the same way that I’ve been saying that Iranians have been demanding sovereignty and independence, they’ve also been demanding dignity from their governing establishment for over 150 years. Those demands will continue, but they will shift in how they make these demands now because they are now dealing with, in many ways, a younger and more entrenched and victorious Revolutionary Guard and governing establishment that has come out of this war.

AG: Part of Netanyahu’s plan was to foment this regime change, and it seems that there were some efforts to instigate more street protests and even to arm protesters, and that would seem to, as you said, even give more reason to the security establishment to clamp down on protesters, more propaganda justifications for its internal population, and justifications for the regime to itself for doing this.

I also want to talk about this related issue of Iran’s regional push. Part of Netanyahu’s pitch to the Trump administration was to degrade Iran’s ability to project its power. This has been both through its weapons program, obviously its relationships. It seems to me that this has really backfired. What Iran’s war strategy has done is really shake the Arab Gulf states’ relationship with the world economy and especially with the U.S. It’s created fissures in the NATO alliance that even we saw that Israel’s war in Gaza wasn’t able to create.

It’s really broken things up and I don’t know how much we can say it has a direct bearing on it, but a part of that certainly has been this intense online propaganda campaign, which you just wrote about for New York Magazine, fascinating article about these videos that Revolutionary Guard-linked production houses have been putting out that are AI-generated videos.

They often use Lego characters for the main players. There’s been a couple that used AI to project the faces of popular Western actors on American politicians that was like a political suspense movie trailer. And it’s been really fascinating to watch Iran bring out these contradictions — the hypocrisies. One of the themes that they kept hitting was [Jeffrey] Epstein. Certainly they’ve hit a lot on the idea of Israel controlling the U.S., of dragging the U.S. into war. That’s been a narrative that’s really caught on with good reason in U.S. political discourse.

Part of what you wrote about was exactly the concept of, as the more stodgy, older old guard of Islamic Republic figures, especially the IRGC, that had this very reserved demeanor and took everything extremely seriously, has started to pass away, it’s the younger generation that’s come through and recognized that the old propaganda was sort of a flop, and they needed to really be able to speak to the world on the world’s terms. If you could talk about how that happened and the effect that you think it’s had, and what that might mean going forward for how Western populations especially but also in the region view Iran and their own relationships with the U.S.?

NB: Those of us who have studied Iran in the United States very closely, I had hoped this war would never come, but I assumed it would one day come, just because of the trajectory of everything.

But I thought that when this war would happen, the regularly scheduled program was something that was created from 1979 onwards with the Iran hostage crisis and Ted Koppel and “Nightline.” This idea that Iran is this really irrational theocratic state run by these old school mullahs who want to take Iran back to the seventh century. Iran actually broke through that and really went viral across the internet. 

For anyone who spends any time on any platform on the internet these past 40 days, they have been seeing Iran’s Lego videos or any other AI content and short-form videos that they’re putting out. It has shifted the way that people are thinking about Iran, and it has also shifted what they think Iran now stands for. 

Wars are fought, yes, on the battlefield. Another big part of the way that wars are fought is in the communication sphere and the narrative war. And in the narrative war, Iran has really come out on top.

Why and how did this happen? The IRGC has created, for 40 years now, a really robust media sphere. It contains different kinds of production studios, university programs. It’s humongous. But one of the biggest things that I always saw doing field work in these sites was that there was a huge generational clash between older generations of the IRGC and pro-regime media makers, who, as you said, wanted very serious films about what Iran stands for and what martyrdom means, but they didn’t even work within the Iranian population. They definitely did not work internationally. 

These younger media makers really wanted to use humor in what they were doing. They wanted to do faster cuts. They wanted to do away with forefronting martyrdom, and their elder generations kept saying no. What we saw happen in this war is, again, because of these decapitation strikes, you had many of that older generation be assassinated. So in that space — in that vacuum — these younger people came in and they began to really fill in what their fathers would not let them do.

Now here’s what the important thing is. These younger folks, they’re millennials, and they’re Gen Z. They have lived their lives online just like many of us who are their generational cohorts around the world. So why has Iran’s stuff gone viral in this moment? It’s because they’re not inventing anything new. 

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Anyone who spends any time online knows that in order to make your content go viral, you don’t say something new. You add things into the conversation that is already being had, that is already being had online. So when this war started, much of the conversation across the political spectrum and across the world was about the Epstein files. Iran tapped into that; this is not a conversation Iran created. Iran tapped into that by essentially tapping into this idea that Trump is starting this war in order to prevent further Epstein files from coming out. That resonated with the MAGA world very quickly.

It also then began to say, and this again, it picked up from the MAGA world because it’s paying attention — just like anyone else who’s online all the time is paying attention to different discourses. It picked up on the fact that there’s a big contingency within that world that is saying that these are not America’s wars. These are Israel’s wars, and that this is not an America-first presidency, it’s an Israel first presidency. Again, Iran didn’t create this narrative, but it began to play into that narrative and show how this is playing out in this war. 

Then most importantly, instead of using real-life people — which Iranians have been depicted and Muslims in general have been depicted in a particular way for about 50 years in America’s political imagination and popular imagination — instead, they chose to use cartoons. They chose to use Lego videos. The Lego movie franchise is all about the creation of a resistance movement against tyrants and oligarchs. So it tapped also into that. These are Gen Z filmmakers in Iran who grew up on these Legos movies just like they did across the world.

So they are now utilizing all of these in order to further their message. Then importantly, their message is not about the importance of Shia martyrdom, which was what their fathers were creating. Their message is about imperialism, it’s about the Epstein class, it’s about the raping of women and children, it’s about a genocidal state — meaning Israel —going forward with settler colonialism, not just across Palestine, but attempting to do so across the Middle East. So it is tapping into a 21st-century language that anyone who has been paying any attention, especially since the genocide in Gaza over the past three years — that is the language of the internet.

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Then the way that I really think about this is that the United States and Israel have failed in their communications. Throughout this war, mainly because for the most part, the U.S. and Israel’s legitimacy came through — for many years — traditional media outlets. But traditional media outlets failed Gaza. They failed to be able to really explain what was happening in those past three years, and there was a huge disconnect over mainstream media’s coverage and then what everyone was seeing on their phones through a livestreamed genocide. 

Gaza shattered the way in which we understand what is going on in the world and the type of trust that we put into media institutions. Into those cracks is where Iran’s younger media makers came, and then they are now up against, in essence, older forms of media makers from Israel and the United States where that generational shift has not yet taken place. So in my understanding, it’s like 20th-century leaders trying to compete with these young millennials and Gen Z leaders in Iran at this moment in the media war living in 2026. Twentieth-century media just doesn’t work anymore.

Ali Gharib: Yeah, it’s funny when you watch the Trump administration’s AI-generated, jingoistic movies. It’s still AI-generated, but it’s a totally different language, and they do seem like they’re all made to get the retweet from one guy, which is Donald Trump. In sharp contrast, like the Islamic Republic, these Lego videos are clearly not made for Iran’s ayatollah leadership. 

I want to ask about, and this is something that you’ve written about — that is, as an Iranian has been certainly one of my hobby horses — which is the Iranian opposition politics. It’s funny that one of the few audiences with which Netanyahu’s message and his plan have really resonated, which he seems to have vastly overestimated, was that royalist faction in exile and its support inside Iran.

To be fair, the frustrations of living under the Islamic Republic for many Iranians and young Iranians — who, like their IRGC-oriented young counterparts, don’t remember the early days of the Islamic Republic. They don’t remember certainly pre-revolutionary Iran and have this nostalgia for the mini-dresses and cocktails at the Key Club that I know my parents grew up with in Tehran, and really latched on to Reza Pahlavi, who’s the exiled former crown prince of Iran. His father was the last shah. He really is a product of the U.S. He grew up there and has lived there for many years. And only in the past few years when he began meeting with the Israelis was propped up as this potential opposition leader. We have to say that he did gain some support.

I think the Israelis were absolutely way off base when they posited him as a potential leader for a new regime in Iran. Obviously, none of that has anywhere close to come to fruition yet. But one thing you’ve written about a lot was the sentiments of people more so inside Iran, but also I would add that in the diaspora as well, who have also latched onto this royalist fever dream of reinstalling the shah.

We’ve seen reports in the Western media about these views shifting. The New York Times did an article the other day, the FT had a pretty good one a couple weeks ago. So I just wondered how much you’ve been picking up inside Iran on disillusionment with this program? Have people changed their minds now that the war has continued and this gambit has failed? What does this mean for opposition politics inside Iran and in exile going forward?

NB: The first maybe 10 days of the war, there was still hope among those who were supporters of Pahlavi that the Americans and Israelis would hit just military installments or things belonging to the Islamic Republic. They even went so far — similar to what happened early on in Gaza — to say that the strike on the Iranian school in Minab that killed over 170 children at school was IRGC’s doing, which later proved out to not be true. But it began to really shift when Israel hit multiple oil depots surrounding Tehran and it created this really toxic air. It was this mass chemical campaign in many ways because of all the petrochemicals that went up into the air and then there was acid rain the next day. At around that same time, Trump then began to say that Iran’s territory and its map might shift during this war. 

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Then as the war continued, then Americans and Israelis were hitting critical infrastructure, and really importantly, Iran’s universities. That began to shift folks’ feelings because that then started to become a war against the Iranian nation and not just the Islamic Republic. 

It began to brew a certain “We want to change, but this is destroying the country and this is destroying the future of the country.” Then the other fact of the matter is that Reza Pahlavi and all the bets that they were making actually did not turn out to be true. The Islamic Republic turned out to be much more resilient than they thought that it would be. And with now the ceasefire — and we’ll see if it holds — but the fact of the matter is, it seems like the Trump administration wants to have negotiations with the Islamic Republic. You also have the younger son of Khamenei now in charge, and that the Islamic Republic feels that it is coming out of this victorious. So in many ways, in all the ways, I would say the Pahlavi gambit failed. 

Then there’s also a bigger story to this. Other forms of Iran’s opposition movements in the 1980s, namely the Mojahedin, which was a big organization at the time, and had a lot of support within Iran in the revolutionary period. Their leadership also sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War, and that became their death knell within [the] Iranian population. They were seen as being traitors to the country during a time of war.

The same thing is happening right now, which is that the more that Iranians were getting killed, the more that Iran’s universities and critical infrastructure was being targeted, Pahlavi was not out there condemning this. In many ways, he kept asking for more help from the Israelis and the Americans.

Again, Iran is a civilizational state, and Iranians have a lot of sense of patriotism across the political spectrum. This has nothing to do even with the governing establishment. So now increasingly, Pahlavi is being seen as being a traitor to the nation. No other Iranian leader, especially ones connected to past rule, have ever called for foreign powers to invade Iran. This is a new thing in Iranian history. That stigma is going to stick with him.

What does that mean moving forward? It means that I think any opposition tied to bringing back the former monarchy in essence is done. But I think he has also really done a huge disservice to opposition movements in Iran because now they will be targeted and stamped with this idea that you are playing with or playing good with foreign powers in order to bring change in Iran.

This is something that I think various forms of civil society actors and opposition movements in Iran are going to have to contend with and are going to have to work past. This episode in many ways has pushed back opposition movements in Iran. It’s going to be an uphill battle, unfortunately.

AG: Narges, thanks so much for speaking with us today. I’ve been a fan of your work for a long time. I can’t recommend enough that everybody follow your writings. They’re always fascinating, and you cover so many different topics, and it’s just such an interesting picture of what’s going on in both international relations and the geopolitics of Iran as well as inside the country itself.

Thanks again for joining us on The Intercept Briefing.

NB: Thanks so much for having me, and I love the work that you guys do, so thank you.

AG: We’re going to leave it there. 

But before we go, we’d love it if you helped The Intercept Briefing win its first Webby Award for best news and politics podcast. So please vote for us. 

We’ll add a link to vote in our show notes. Thanks so much! 

And that does it for this episode. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief and Maia Hibbett is the managing editor of The Intercept. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer, and Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is our copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. And the legal review was done by the illustrious David Bralow. 

Slipstream provided our theme music. 

This show and our reporting at The Intercept doesn’t exist without you. Your donation, no matter the amount makes a real difference. Keep our investigations free and fearless at theintercept.com/join. 

And if you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing, wherever you listen to your podcasts, and please leave us a rating or review. It really helps other listeners find us. Let us know what you think of this episode, or leave a general comment. You can email us at podcast@theintercept.com.

Until next time, I’m Ali Gharib.

The post Putting Fuel on a Ceasefire: Israel Tries to Kill U.S.–Iran Talks appeared first on The Intercept.

The White House has been desperate to find a way out of the quagmire of its own making in Iran, leading to the remote signing on June 15 of a memorandum of understanding that promises extraordinary concessions to the Islamic Republic. Stipulations once deemed a “nightmare for Israel” by American politicians and dismissed by President Donald Trump as “not acceptable” — such as total sanctions relief and the unfreezing of billions of dollars of funds held abroad — are now reality. Despite attempts by the Trump administration to spin this as an achievement of all of America’s goals and an “unconditional surrender” by Iran, the deal has been met with skepticism, derision, anger, and mockery by Democrats and even some Republicans, pushing close Trump allies such as Fox News host Mark Levin and Texas Sen. Ted Cruz to admonish the president for doing the “unthinkable” by capitulating to Iran.

In Israel, the deal has been seen far more uniformly across the political spectrum as an immense and almost incomprehensible betrayal by the United States, an unforeseen cruelty by Trump, and an incalculable failure by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Only 11 percent of Israelis say that their country won the war against Iran, and a whopping 71 percent do not expect Trump to look out for Israeli interests in future negotiations. One Likud member of the Knesset expressed his frustration by filming himself taking off his “Make America Great Again” hat and instead putting on a “Total Victory” hat, a phrase invoked by Netanyahu to justify the wholesale destruction of the Gaza Strip.

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In Iran, the atmosphere is still not entirely jubilant. Much of Iran’s media and many officials have indeed taken a triumphant attitude: The front page of Javan, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-aligned newspaper, depicted a crowd of Iranians breaking through a wall of threats made by the Trump administration, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, claimed that “everything we wanted to achieve through military action, we achieved many times over through negotiation.” But past betrayals are, after all, far too recent to forget.

It was only in April, for instance, when Israel unilaterally insisted it wasn’t party to the ceasefire in Lebanon and continued its war there. Previous negotiations with America only served as a cover for war preparations in June 2025 and February 2026. This has resulted in a national mood that is much more cautious than the elation that many felt after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal negotiated under Barack Obama and agreed to by the Rouhani administration, was adopted in 2015.

While an overwhelming majority of the country has backed the diplomatic track, criticism of the efforts of the team lead by Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has burned subtly in the background since early April. Supporters of the coalition known as the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, representing the largest faction of the conservatives in the Iranian Parliament, have begun making their objections known, countering previous attempts by those in power to present a united front and to dispense with hardliner-versus-reformist politicking amid the war.

Criticism of current diplomatic efforts on the Iranian state television program “Soraya” in late May led to the suspension of the program days later. In response, its host, Mohsen Maqsoodi, held live conversations in Tehran’s Valiasr Square, where political commentator Ali Abdi criticized the state for not striking Israel as its army continues to bulldoze Lebanon, which led to that series’ cancellation as well. Rumors swirled online that the cancellation was owed to an intervention by an adviser to Ghalibaf.

After Araghchi gave an interview on state TV on June 12 saying that Iran would have to make concessions in its dealings, angry demonstrators who were attending nightly state-sponsored rallies demanded the diplomatic corps remember the “blood of the Leader [Khamenei],” with one speaker in Tehran’s Enghelab Square leading marchers in chants of “Death to the compromiser,” against those who think “America has something to offer [Iran].”

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In Parliament, conservatives affiliated or allied with the Front have made their criticism vocal, with members calling for Araghchi to be barred from contacting Trump administration negotiator Steve Witkoff and demanding Parliament see the deal before it is signed. One representative called the agreement worse than “the JCPOA and [the Treaty of] Turkmenchay,” referring to the 1828 treaty that ceded swathes of Iranian territory to the Russian Empire. 

Tehran representative Mahmoud Nabavian has been arguably the most prominent member of Parliament criticizing the government’s diplomats, castigating Araghchi for leaving gaps in the memorandum of understanding that America could exploit, namely the immediate reopening of the Strait of Hormuz erasing Iran’s economic leverage, and the lack of clarity in the document about timelines for the lifting of sanctions and the exit of American forces from the region.

The public criticism has less so outlined how exactly Iran could extract more concessions. But it appears such sentiment is now being expressed at the highest level of government: Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. In a statement announcing his approval of the deal, Mojtaba raised the eyebrows of some analysts by saying that he “had a different view” than what was agreed to by his negotiators, but nevertheless acceded to the wishes of President Masoud Pezeshkian on the condition that Iran rejects “excessive demands” made by the United States, remarking that the nation “await[s] the realization of the aforementioned conditions.”

This kind of public and immediate skepticism of a deal agreed to by the elected government was not the type of messaging made by Mojtaba’s father, Ali Khamenei, who reserved public criticism of the red lines crossed in JCPOA negotiations until the deal had been torn up years later by the Trump administration. Coverage in Axios from an Israeli analyst speculated that Mojtaba means to place any failure of the deal firmly on the shoulders of the Iranian president.

While the deal has yielded extraordinary concessions for Iran, there are already dark clouds looming. Concerns are emerging among other members of Parliament about the agreement requiring cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was suspended last year by the elected legislature. More importantly, the first clause of the agreement — which requires an immediate and permanent end to the war in Lebanon — is already being shattered. 

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Israel, as it did when the ceasefire was initially achieved in early April, has again argued that it must remain in southern Lebanon for as long as Israel’s national security demands it. A ceasefire apparently brokered between Hezbollah and Israel on Friday was broken within minutes as Israel continued to bombard the Lebanese south. An order has apparently come down on Saturday from Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz for the Israeli military to cease firing in Lebanon, but not withdraw from any of its positions and respond to any Hezbollah attack on its occupying forces. This leaves open the question of how Israeli military doctrine in southern Lebanon is actually supposed to change.

The United States has also taken active steps to secure more concessions from Iran outside of the explicit directives of the deal, with Vice President JD Vance saying that the $300 billion in reconstruction funds would not be released to Iran unless the nation stopped funding “terrorist organization[s]” like Hezbollah. The memorandum of understanding includes no mention of Iran’s support for allied organizations abroad, nor its ballistic missile program, both of which were primary targets of the Israeli–American war.

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Iran, for its part, closed the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday in response to Israel’s refusal to stop the war. While it is still sending negotiators to Switzerland to speak with Vance, Iran is apparently not going there to negotiate a final deal just yet but instead demand U.S. compliance with the terms of the agreement. There is, as of now, still little indication at this time that the U.S. will agree to the demand for a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, despite surprising recent criticism from Trump and Vance of Israel’s scorched-earth tactics in the country. 

For the moment, Israeli officials continue to dig in their heels, demanding further and further action, and stirring tension on other fronts like the West Bank, in an attempt to divert attention and lessen the blow that the majority of Israeli society agrees the country has suffered. For National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, there is no possibility of acceptance of the diplomatic track, remarking on Friday: “For every tear of an Israeli mother, a thousand Lebanese mothers must weep. All of Lebanon must burn!”

The post The Surprising Reaction Inside Iran to Its War Victory appeared first on The Intercept.

The ceasefire announced Tuesday night by President Donald Trump and confirmed by Iranian officials is on life support. If Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu gets his way, it may soon be dead. 

Over the first 36 hours of the supposed ceasefire, hundreds have been killed and thousands injured in Israeli strikes on Lebanon. The attacks extended beyond Israeli’s traditional targets in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s outskirts into the central parts of the capital — and may mark the heaviest bombardment of the country since Israel’s 1982 invasion.

Trump suggested the ceasefire remains intact because Israel’s attacks are “a separate skirmish,” but the official announcement of the agreement described “an immediate ceasefire everywhere including Lebanon.” The language was put forward by Pakistan’s prime minister, who had brokered the deal and, according to the New York Times, the U.S. had seen the text before it was publicly released.

The words “including Lebanon,” however, lasted no longer than it took for Netanyahu to talk to Trump immediately before the ceasefire announcement. Trump confirmed Thursday that he told Netanyahu to “low-key it,” appearing to give Israel a green light to immediately violate the ceasefire and put it at risk of collapse.

In response, Iran says it will not open the Strait of Hormuz so long as Israel is violating the ceasefire. And planned talks in Islamabad for the U.S. and Iran to hammer out a longer-term agreement during the two-week ceasefire window have been thrown into doubt.

For his part, Netanyahu sought to dispel any notion that the Iran war was ending, emphasizing that the ceasefire is temporary and “a way station on the way to achieving all of our goals.”

When it comes exerting Israeli influence on the U.S., Netanyahu once infamously said, “America is a thing you can move very easily.” Indeed, according to reports, it was Netanyahu who convinced Trump to launch this war in the first place.

Now, potentially upending U.S. efforts to disentangle itself from conflict with Iran, the Israeli prime minister finds himself on familiar footing: playing the role of spoiler against any form of U.S.–Iran détente.

Decades of Détente-Busting

America’s supposed junior partner has worked ceaselessly to prevent any off-ramp from confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. In 1995, when Iran and the U.S. flirted with economic rapprochement by opening the Iran oil industry to American investment and development, Israel and AIPAC lobbied Congress and President Bill Clinton to block it.

In 2002, as Iran worked directly with the U.S. on Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, seeking a grand bargain, Israel interdicted a weapons shipment it said was bound for Palestinian forces, making questionable claims about the shipment’s Iranian provenance. The seizure helped tank the exploratory talks on Afghanistan and convinced President George W. Bush instead to infamously cast Iran as part of the “axis of evil.”

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Over the course of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear talks from 2013 to 2015, Israel worked to block a deal — with Netanyahu engaging in unprecedented efforts to sabotage diplomacy. He even addressed a joint session of Congress against a nuclear deal over the White House’s objections. Ultimately, Netanyahu succeeded with Trump’s ascension: Under intense lobbying, Trump tore up the deal and nearly brought the countries to war before his first term ended.

Joe Biden campaigned on reentering the deal, but that aim was prematurely dispatched during Biden’s transition when Israel assassinated Iran’s top nuclear scientist in 2020, prompting Iranian hard-liners to pass legislation that blew up talks. When negotiations finally began in earnest in 2021, Israel launched an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. Iran responded by announcing it would, for the first time, enrich uranium to nearly weapons-grade. The talks, predictably, failed.

Trump’s Second Term

Though Trump has proved to be a willing partner in Netanyahu’s push to increase tensions with Iran, Israel nonetheless now found ways to play the spoiler — much in the same manner it did with Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Biden.

The Israelis successfully turned two round of nuclear talks during Trump’s second term into cover for surprise attacks. Both the war on Iran in June 2025 and the current one were initiated not amid great diplomatic impasses, but when Iran put forward workable proposals. In both cases, U.S. officials said Israel was going to act regardless of the American position — and so the U.S. had to join the wars.

These were not wars to defeat Iran, but rather wars to defeat U.S. diplomatic efforts. They are the kinetic manifestation of Israel’s long efforts to keep the U.S. in a permanent state of war with Iran, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.

If U.S.–Iran talks do move forward and there actually is progress toward hammering out a sustainable cessation of hostilities, Israel will remain a wildcard. Any long-term ceasefire will require Israel’s acquiescence.

If Netanyahu tanks the ceasefire and the U.S. and global economy continues to suffer, Israel’s already plunging support among Americans is likely to falter even further. At this point, however, Netanyahu seems more concerned with his domestic political welfare than his credibility with American voters.

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Netanyahu is widely thought to benefit from wars — from Gaza to Iran and now, most critically, in Lebanon — to shore up his political fortunes. He faces an election in October and losing could lead to the revival of corruption charges that might land him in prison.

The question now may unfortunately not be whether Iran and the U.S. can find a compromise. Instead, the fate of the global economy and, not least, Iranians themselves, could rest between Netanyahu and Trump, who faces his own political challenges in midterm elections this year.

It may once again be a question of whether it is America or Israel who blinks first.

The post The Forever Spoiler: Netanyahu Has Been Blowing Up Diplomacy With Iran for Decades appeared first on The Intercept.

The military personnel, clad in a mix of combat fatigues and gym attire, piled into a bunker, huddling in the darkness. “Guys, off the walls if we can,” a woman, likely a medic, advised, warning about the danger of traumatic brain injuries.

The footage, reportedly from Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, where three U.S. troops were killed during Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks on July 17 and 18, offers a glimpse of the dangers faced by U.S. forces across the Middle East.

The attacks are continued demonstrations of Iran’s ability to target U.S. bases across the Middle East and kill U.S. troops, despite months of claims by President Donald Trump and self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth that Iran’s military was annihilated. As this fiction has collapsed, U.S. Central Command has refused to discuss the number and scale of the strikes. “I have nothing for you on that,” Maj. Emma Thompson, the command’s media operations chief, told The Intercept.

Iran has attacked at least nine U.S. outposts across the Middle East since July 9, according to a U.S. official who spoke to The Intercept on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak with the press. Several of these bases suffered “significant” damage in the attacks, the source said.

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Iran’s military managed to overwhelm U.S. air defense systems using a mix of attack drones and advanced ballistic missiles, according to the official. Numerous factors make the missiles difficult to defeat, the source said: They travel at hypersonic speeds, have complex navigational capabilities including methods to circumvent jamming, and some can be guided or steered.

Stocks of advanced air-defense missiles, like Patriot and THAAD interceptors, are so depleted that U.S. forces are not shooting down all Iranian missiles and drones aimed at U.S. and allied targets across the Middle East, the official said, referencing a Friday report by NBC News that revealed the tactic. The official told The Intercept that the U.S. allows missiles through its defenses only in cases where a strike is judged not to imperil U.S. lives.

The U.S. and its allies burned through more than 11,000 munitions, including large amounts of defensive missiles, in the first 16 days of the war alone, according to a March analysis by the Royal United Services Institute. The report predicted then that U.S. forces were about a month away from running out of THAAD interceptors. An April report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that “diminished munitions stockpiles have created a near-term risk.” A follow-up report the next month warned that it would “take three or more years from today to return to prewar inventory levels” of Patriot and THAAD missiles.

Brig. Gen. Hossein Mohebbi, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps spokesperson, said that “Patriot systems have been weakened to such an extent that Iranian missiles and drones are reaching their targets without being intercepted.” He said that during a flurry of attacks from July 8 to July 22, Iran struck numerous air defense and radar installations, including six “Patriot air-defense radars.”

CENTCOM did not reply to a request for comment on the claims by the U.S. official or Mohebbi.

The official confirmed that Iran also recently attacked Tower 22, a U.S. military outpost on the northern Jordanian border with Syria. Satellite images as well as photos and videos circulating online indicate the base suffered extensive damage. (In 2024, a drone attack on Tower 22 by an Iran-backed militia killed three U.S. troops.) 

Iran says it also attacked U.S. military facilities at Jordan’s Prince Hassan Air Base, King Faisal Air Base, and Al-Azraq Air Base; Kuwait’s Al-Adiri base, Ahmed Al-Jaber Air Base, Camp Doha, Ali Al Salem Air Base, and Camp Arifjan; Naval Support Activity Sheikh Isa in Bahrain; and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Thompson refused to confirm Iranian attacks on various U.S. bases across the Middle East. “We don’t comment on battle damage assessments,” she said.

Iran has fired between 8,000 and 9,000 drones and missiles at targets across the Middle East since the U.S.–Israeli war began in February, according to the official. Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps recently warned residents of countries that host American forces to keep at least 1,650 feet away from any buildings housing U.S. personnel. The group is also fielding crowdsourced information on “new locations of the American occupying forces” from people in these countries.

The IRGC specifically mentioned “covert and secret” facilities in a statement posted on their website. CIA sites in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the region were reportedly struck, possibly with Russian assistance, according to Reuters. A former Pentagon consultant with ties to the defense industry told The Intercept that Russia has certainly provided “targeting support” to Iran during the conflict but did not comment directly on attacks on CIA facilities.

Despite Trump’s insistence that Russia and China are “not participating” in the Iran war, Hegseth recently said both are “enabling some of the things Iran is doing.” In March, CIA Director John Ratcliffe told senators that the “Iranians are requesting intelligence assistance from Russia, from China and from other adversaries of the United States,” but said he would only talk about what they might have provided in a classified setting.

The lethal strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan killed Pvt. Isabella Gonzales, 19, of Carrollton, Texas; Lt. Tyler James Feehan, 25, of Ewa Beach, Hawaii; and Sgt. Angel S. Rampersad, 28, of Ozone Park, New York. All three soldiers were from air defense units. They were “not actively engaged in anti-aircraft activity” during the attacks, according to a different “defense official” who spoke on background because they were not authorized to disclose the information.

An Iranian drone attack on Erbil Air Base, Iraq, on July 18 led to the death of Army Sgt. Michael Emmanuel Swinton, 30, of Fayetteville, North Carolina, and left another soldier injured during what CENTCOM called a “controlled detonation” of the downed aircraft.

In April, Hegseth told the Senate Armed Services Committee that “CENTCOM had every possible measure they could to ensure that our troops are protected.” The U.S. official would not address possible failures of force protection measures that led to the most recent deaths, due to operational security. But the official said that Hegseth’s claims “obviously were not true.” They noted that it was no secret that earlier casualties were caused by a lack of sufficient overhead protection, referencing a March 1 drone attack on the U.S. base at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, that killed six troops.

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“Cover-Up” Unravels as Pentagon Admits Nearly 100 Injured in Iran Strikes

Hundreds of U.S. personnel have been killed or wounded in the war. Months of reporting by The Intercept found the Pentagon’s official casualty tally is a gross undercount, which another U.S. government official called a “casualty cover-up.”

Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Qatar said they intercepted attack drones on Monday, two days after the United States abruptly suspended a two-week campaign of airstrikes against Iran amid concern over the dwindling stocks of air defense missiles and a reported dearth of Iranian targets. Trump insisted on Tuesday that there had been some “very good talks” with Iran but failed to offer evidence when confronted with Iranian denials.

Saudi Arabia said on Monday that the drone attacks it suffered were “carried out by Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq.” On Tuesday, Jordanian authorities said they downed a drone in the east of the country, near its border with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The post Iran Has Figured Out How to Overwhelm U.S. Air Defenses appeared first on The Intercept.

The U.S. and Iran have agreed to a second ceasefire and the eventual reopening the Strait of Hormuz under a preliminary deal scheduled to take effect on Friday. “Iran has taken a major step toward final victory,” Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, said on Monday, one of several Iranian leaders taking a victory lap after outlasting the Trump administration.

Trump’s war has already killed thousands of Iranian civilians — including more than 150, most of them children –  in a strike on an elementary school. The official number of dead and wounded U.S. personnel stands at 426, an almost 11 percent increase since the first ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran was struck on April 8. This tally, however, is missing hundreds of casualties, including two soldiers wounded in action earlier this month.

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For months, The Intercept has reported that the Pentagon’s official tally of dead and wounded military personnel from the Iran War is a gross undercount, stemming from what another U.S. government official called a “casualty cover-up.” The Defense Casualty Analysis System, or DCAS, which tracks “deceased, wounded, ill or injured” service members for Congress and the president, is missing hundreds of known casualties. The true number exceeds 625.

When the first ceasefire was struck between the Trump administration and Iran, the tally of U.S. casualties was 385. Despite a pause in hostilities, the number slowly rose to 428, according to Pentagon statistics.

On April 21, however, the number of wounded-in-action troops declined by 15 without public comment from the War Department, dropping the casualty total to 413. Despite repeated questions over almost two months, the Pentagon has not explained the disparity in its casualty count. A defense official told The Intercept that it was impossible to tell whether Pentagon casualty analysts were “grossly incompetent” or had been ordered to manipulate the figures.    

Since the 15 wounded vanished in April, the DCAS casualty count has steadily crept upward to top out at 413, where it stood on Tuesday morning. This includes one sailor wounded in action this month. Central Command did not reply to a request for further information about the injury.

The official figures appear to be missing two soldiers who were recently wounded in action. CENTCOM spokesperson Capt. Tim Hawkins told NBC News last week that two crew members from a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopter downed by an Iranian drone on June 8 were receiving medical care. And a CENTCOM social media post said they were in “stable condition.” But DCAS lists no Army personnel wounded in action this month.

The official tally of war dead also appears to be an undercount. For weeks, DCAS listed 13 hostile and non-hostile U.S. deaths during the war. DCAS briefly raised the total to 14 last month before dropping it back to 13, without any explanation on the fluctuation.

The Pentagon list of the names of the dead is still missing Maj. Sorffly Davius, a signals and communication officer with the New York Army National Guard who was assigned to the headquarters of the 42nd Infantry Division and reportedly died of sudden illness while on duty in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, on March 6. Davius’s death was widely acknowledged even as it was excluded from the official count: Rep. Mike Lawler, R-N.Y., spoke about him during a memorial service that month, and Gen. Dan Caine, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Davius while “honoring our fallen.”

While DCAS provides a running tally of “non-hostile” deaths — meaning those who died from accidents or by illness — it doesn’t include “non-hostile” injuries. The DCAS figures show that 65 Navy personnel have been wounded in action. Missing, however, are the more than 200 sailors treated for smoke inhalation or lacerations due to a March 12 fire that raged aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford. The aircraft carrier had been conducting round-the-clock flight operations to, in Caine’s words, “project combat power” in the Middle East. The ship returned to its home port in Norfolk, Virginia, last month after 326 days at sea, the longest deployment of any U.S. aircraft carrier since the Vietnam War.

The casualty numbers also don’t include a sailor who suffered a non-combat-related injury aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln as it was involved in “strike missions in support of Operation Epic Fury” on March 25.

On April 21, two Pentagon spokespersons said they were unable to field questions about why more than a dozen casualties had been disappeared by the War Department, claiming only the “duty officer” could answer the question but that person was not at their desk. “As soon as the duty officer comes back to their desk, I can get this to them,” said one of them. After almost two months, The Intercept has yet to receive a response from the duty officer.

The Pentagon did not reply to a request for clarification on Monday about whether the duty officer ever returned to their desk.

The post U.S. Casualties in Iran Are Still Rising appeared first on The Intercept.

America’s latest gunboat diplomacy gambit comes as Trump’s two main envoys, his friend Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, have engaged in indirect talks with Iranian diplomats in Geneva. The talks are taking place even though Trump previously said no agreement with Iran was necessary. “I don’t care if I have an agreement or not,” he announced last June. “I could get a statement that they’re not going to go nuclear.” Trump added: “They’re not going to be doing it anyway.”

Trump reversed himself late last month imploring Iran to “quickly ‘Come to the Table’” or face more strikes. On Thursday, at a gathering of his self-styled Board of Peace in Washington, Trump reiterated his call for a deal. “Now is the time for Iran to join us on a path that will complete what we’re doing,” he said. “If it doesn’t happen, it doesn’t happen. But bad things will happen if it doesn’t.”

“A massive Armada is heading to Iran,” Trump announced on Truth Social.

The United States has, in fact, spent weeks moving military assets into place for a potential resumption of the war on Iran. The Ford alone can carry more than 75 aircraft, including F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters and F/A-18 Super Hornets, as well as EA-18 Growler radar-jamming jets. The Lincoln is accompanied by three warships that are equipped with Tomahawk missiles, which were used to strike two of Iran’s nuclear facilities last June. In addition to destroyers, cruisers, and submarines at sea, the U.S. has moved additional air assets needed for sustained conflict across the Atlantic including a U-2 Dragon Lady spy plane, dozens of refueling tankers, scores of additional fighter jets, and critical E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System jets, which can provide advanced radar, communications, and sensors to track and thwart planes, drones, and cruise missiles.

The massive accumulation of military forces in preparation for a potential war with Iran dwarfs even the monthslong build-up that proceeded the U.S. coup in Venezuela that saw its leader Nicolás Maduro deposed and power transferred to a U.S.-backed puppet regime.

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Three U.S. officials with long experience in the Middle East told The Intercept that they do not believe Trump has made a final decision to launch a new attack on Iran but the chances of it are high. All said that the U.S. attacks could possibly destabilize the Iranian regime, spur a grave humanitarian crisis, and have major impacts across the region. None thought the Trump administration had anything but vague plans to deal with such blowback.

All three officials believed that sufficient U.S. military assets were in place for a sustained military campaign. One said that Tehran may see the second major U.S. attack in a year as an existential crisis and respond by launching a more formidable counterattack than its ineffectual strikes on America’s Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in 2025.

Over the past month, the U.S. military has moved critical air defense equipment — including Patriot missile batteries and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, also known as THAAD — to the region to protect U.S. troops and allies from Iranian ballistic missiles.

Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., said he believes reports that Trump administration officials think there’s a 90 percent chance the president will order strikes on Iran. He said that such a war would be “catastrophic” and lead to counterattacks that put U.S. troops in the region at risk.

Iran has repeatedly warned of retaliatory strikes on U.S. troops and allies in response to any American attack. Iran shut down the Strait of Hormuz earlier this week to conduct military exercises. 

Khanna announced on Thursday that he and Rep. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., would attempt to force a vote on a war powers resolution regarding Iran next week. “I am confident we can win this vote and assemble a bipartisan coalition,” Khanna told The Intercept. Khanna believes they can force the vote before Trump attacks Iran, but one of the government officials expressed concern that strikes could come as early as Sunday or Monday. Another speculated that Trump might be convinced not to conduct an attack during Ramadan — the Muslim holy month that began Wednesday — or at least wait for a “decent interval” in deference to other U.S. allies in the Middle East.

Trump is also delivering his annual State of the Union address on Tuesday with a reported focus on messaging around domestic issues ahead of fall midterm elections, which may impact his decision. The conclusion of the Winter Olympics on Sunday might also play a role in the timing of the attacks as the notion of an Olympic truce, or “Ekecheiria,” dates back millennia.

The White House did not reply to a request for comment.

For a president who ran for office promising to keep the United States out of wars, came into office claiming to be a “peacemaker, and has consistently campaigned for a Nobel Peace Prize, Trump has proven to be a warmonger. During his second term Trump has already launched attacks on Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and on civilians in boats in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The Trump administration also claims to be at war with at least 24 cartels and criminal gangs it will not name and has also threatened Colombia, Cuba, Greenland, Iceland, and Mexico.

The post Trump Menaces Iran With Massive Armada Capable of Prolonged War appeared first on The Intercept.

Over the weekend, the U.S. and Israel bombarded two universities in Iran, the Isfahan University of Technology and the Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran.

These are not, of course, the first attacks on civilian infrastructure in President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s illegal war on Iran; hospitals, desalination facilities, power plants, and an elementary school have all been hit.

The U.S. and Israel claimed that the attacks on the universities were justified, because they said the schools were connected to Iran’s weapons programs.

In response, Iranian authorities said on Sunday that American university facilities in the region would be considered legitimate targets, should the U.S. not condemn the strikes on Iranian educational institutions.

In a statement, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned “all employees, professors and students of American universities in the region to stay at least a kilometer away.”

Iranian students and educators received no such warning. Iran’s university campuses have been closed since the U.S.–Israeli war began last month; the weekend strikes nonetheless severely damaged buildings and reportedly wounded at least four staff members.

Cynical Justification

Leaving aside the fact that nothing in Trump’s war of choice against Iran is justified, the U.S. and Israel’s purported grounds for targeting Iranian universities are hollow and cynical. It is true that both universities had ties to military research. Would American and Israeli leaders consider their own equivalent institutions fair game? Of course not.

By stated U.S. and Israeli rationale, however, were Iran able to launch airstrikes on American soil, direct ties to the U.S. and Israeli military-industrial complex would make valid targets of at least the University of California, Berkeley; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Johns Hopkins University, among dozens of other schools.

Numerous Israeli universities, including Technion and Tel Aviv University, have research institutes dedicated to military technologies. And the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has a military base on campus for training intelligence soldiers.

Asymmetric warfare offers powerful aggressors the privilege of hypocrisy. It has long been pointed out that Israel’s justifications for mass slaughtering civilians — that Hamas uses civilian infrastructure — would in turn justify strikes on civilian areas in Israel. The Israeli government, after all, has facilities and even military installations within and near major cities and towns, not to mention the integration of the military into vast swaths of civilian Israeli life.

This is true almost everywhere that commercial and military technologies become intractably integrated, but that integration is especially robust in Israel.

Indeed, in this grim conjuncture, the idea that any site related to military research and development is a justified target could be used to attack any industrial, educational, and technological hub — which is precisely what the U.S. and Israel are doing in Iran. The U.S. and Israel’s own justifications for the Iranian university strikes de facto legitimize strikes against an MIT or a Technion, but American and Israeli leadership know that Iran and its allies don’t have the firepower to flatten whole campuses.

This is not to say that Iran will not retaliate and attempt to extract a cost from its enemies; this has been the pattern since the U.S. and Israel launched their illegal offensive in late February.

Universities including New York University, Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, and others have lucrative campuses in the Persian Gulf monarchies, primarily in Abu Dhabi and Qatar. These schools have all already moved to online instruction and most international students and faculty have left countries facing retaliatory Iranian strikes.

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These international campuses are not known for housing advanced research labs connected to military and surveillance research, but, as the student-led Gaza solidarity movement made clear, U.S. academia at large is deeply invested in multinational arms manufacturers and U.S. and Israeli military industries. Dozens of American institutions of higher education are deeply involved in the government-funded weapons research that helps make the U.S. military the most potentially destructive force in the world.

“Systematic” Targeting

Let’s not pretend, however, that the ongoing war on Iran follows any sort of valid justificatory reasoning.

According to Helyeh Doutaghi, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Tehran who spoke to Al-Jazeera, the university bombings reflect a “consistent and clear pattern, and that is the systemic de-industrialization and underdevelopment” of Iran’s capabilities.

“The targeting is very systematic,” she said, “and very designed to make Iran incapable of defending its sovereignty by relying on its iedingeounous development and indigenous industries.”

Strikes against civilian infrastructure follow the same genocidal logic that saw every university in Gaza razed to rubble within 100 days of October 7, 2023. In a video shared by members of the Israeli military on social media in 2024, a soldier walked through the rubble of Al-Azhar University.

“To those who say, ‘There is no education in Gaza,’” he says, “we bombed them all. Too bad, you’ll not be engineers anymore.”

The point, that is, is the devastation of a place and a people, foreclosing their capacity to rebuild.

The post What Would We All Say If Iran Razed MIT Because of Military-Related Research? appeared first on The Intercept.

Days before embarking America on another foreign war, Donald Trump spent more than 90 minutes speaking endlessly about America being back during his State of the Union, leveling racist accusations of Somali American fraud, and expounding on the beauty of America’s raid to arrest Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. It was a master class in testing the attention span of Americans hoping to hear anything at all about the danger that has loomed in the background now for months: the threat of armed conflict with Iran. Those who made it to the finale — and who have conscious memories of the George W. Bush years — would have noticed a similar tenor to the State of the Union in 2003, the one which paved the way for the justification of the invasion of Iraq less than two months later.

In that speech, Bush outlined the alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the myriad ways in which Iraq had supposedly deceived international investigators, and the staggering human rights abuses committed by Saddam Hussein against his own countrymen. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the president boasted, would soon outline to the United Nations the threat the United States, and indeed the world, was up against in Baghdad.

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However, while many of the claims made by Bush were spurious at best and outright deceptions at worst, the claims Trump made in his speech were even less believable — and much more scattershot. Trump claimed that Iran would “soon” have intercontinental ballistic missiles that would “reach the United States of America,” that more than 32,000 Iranians had been killed in recent protests (NGOs estimated the number to be much lower, and an Iranian human rights group put the death toll at 6,488), and that the Iranian military had somehow killed “millions,” somewhere in history, with roadside bombs it pioneered. Perhaps most plainly false of all, Trump contended he just wanted the Iranians to say “those secret words, ‘We will never have a nuclear weapon,’” despite Iranian officials constantly making such insistences.

Before the U.S. and Israeli military launched strikes Saturday, the specter of an Iranian war has become something of a national miasma, the build-up having gone on now so long that its cause is imperceptible, yet perhaps everything at once. The build-up to the Iraq War was similarly argued under many causes, with Saddam’s authoritarian governance very much part of the discussion, but the aftermath of 9/11 and the supposed threat Iraq posed to the homeland was chief among them — the fire that led Americans to line up front and center behind the cause. While Iran has been on the wish list for American neoconservatives and foreign policy wonks for decades, this escalation has happened over a much shorter time frame, much more suddenly, and much more obvious in how the government is desperately in search of a compelling cause.

Stretching back into December, the cards were being laid out. Benjamin Netanyahu had made plans to meet with Trump at the White House to discuss what he saw as the threat posed by Iran’s conventional ballistic missile program, seeking a green light to initiate another devastating war, with hoped-for American support. Israel’s reasoning was not based on Iranian human rights abuses or about threats to the American homeland, but threats to Israel and “U.S. interests,” according to NBC News. Netanyahu had wanted a post-war situation similar to Lebanon’s, where Israel has been able to continue striking that country daily with Hezbollah unable to respond. Iran still retained deterrent military capacity to prevent this from happening. A greater threat, however nonexistent, needed to be communicated.

The rollout of news stories to back up Netanyahu’s claim was well-telegraphed, with reports suddenly emerging in the Israeli press that Iran was planning to use an imminent military exercise as a diversion to strike Israel. At the same time that Netanyahu was meeting with Trump, reports again suddenly emerged that Iran was seeking to develop and purchase “biological and chemical warheads” for its missiles, eerily echoing the false claims Powell made before the U.N. about Iraq.

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As attention shifted to the burgeoning protests in Iran, suddenly the United States and Israel had a much stronger casus belli: supporting anti-government demonstrators to overthrow the government. Only a few days after the protests began, Trump promised the “United States of America will come to their rescue” if the Iranian government killed protesters, “which is their custom.” As the death toll mounted, far exceeding the toll of previous protest movements, the threats of intervention continued but never actually materialized. Western officials brought in Starlink satellites to keep protesters connected (SpaceX’s CEO Elon Musk has joked that he supports Secretary of State Marco Rubio becoming the shah of Iran), and unnamed foreign intelligence agencies allegedly brought in firearms used to kill over 200 members of government security forces. Yet Trump continued to promise that he was planning something, saying “help is on the way,” and demanding protesters “take over institutions” even as protests dissipated.

Trump wanted war, as did Netanyahu, but there was no conception of when it should happen, for what cause it should exactly be waged, and what would even be done. There was want, but there was no will, and there was no way. Everything had to be cobbled together in the background, sometimes to seemingly even get Trump on board with the plan he himself put into motion.

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Reports of considering strikes on “symbolic military targets” were followed by Trump commending Iran for supposedly halting hundreds of planned executions. Declarations of an “armada” being sent to Iran’s shores were accompanied by demands to stop killing protesters, even though the protests had ceased days earlier. More reports poured in of plans for special ops raids and strikes to assassinate Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (and perhaps also his son), with reports of imminent attacks being just as suddenly thrown out as more and more military assets moved in to allow for greater and greater operations, a build-up not seen since Bush’s full-scale invasion of Iraq 23 years ago.

With attacks underway, the plan now seems to revolve around a complete decapitation of the Islamic Republic’s leadership and the overthrow of the entire system via the air — followed by a populist uprising Trump hopes will topple the regime. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take,” Trump said in a video address. “This will be probably your only chance for generations.”

The campaign of airstrikes comes only hours after the United States insisted it wanted to have a civil diplomatic conversation.

As with the diplomatic talks that preceded Iran’s war with Israel in June, these negotiations are set up to fail, and the scope of demands is now far wider and even more contradictory. Reports emanating from the discussions seem to oscillate between a willingness to resurrect some version of the Obama-era nuclear deal and a demand for what amounts to complete capitulation — with Rubio demanding restrictions on ballistic missile range and ending of support to Hamas and Hezbollah; Israel demanding the full dismantling of said ballistic missile arsenal; and Trump plainly stating “no nuclear weapons, no missiles, no this, no that, all the different things you’d want.”

There is also no consensus about what the threat from Iran is even supposed to be in the American imagination. Trump’s accusation of near-imminent ICBM production is a recent invention, clearly meant to steer things in a familiar, concrete direction. But the Trump administration cannot seem to agree on whether or not Iran is even developing its nuclear program at all — with Rubio telling reporters there is no enrichment happening, even as special envoy Steve Witkoff told Fox News that Iran was merely “a week away from having industrial-grade bomb-making material.”

Bush administration officials infamously claimed they did not want “the smoking gun” to be “a mushroom cloud,” but officials had always kept that estimate in months — the way the threat of Iran making a nuclear bomb has often been phrased as “months away” for the better part of two decades. Now, the threat is somehow both days away and barely off the ground.

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While opposition figures like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, as well as Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Maryam Rajavi, have jostled for the attention of Trump’s circle, there seems to be little attention paid to their efforts, with the president dismissing Pahlavi as “very nice, but I don’t know how he’d play within his own country.” Those who remember Ahmed Chalabi and the motley crew of Iraqi opposition cronies may rest easy, as there seems to be little care at all about what would even come next. Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of the brewing war’s strongest supporters, scorned the idea of even considering the day after in an interview with an Emirati newspaper, saying: “You gotta quit saying we. It’s not we, it’s them. It’s not my job to construct a new Iran. It’s my job to give them the opportunity to construct a new Iran.”

The feeling at home, despite oversaturation in the media, could not be more different than it was before Iraq. Just before the bombs fell, 64 percent of the country supported the invasion; more than two decades later, only 21 percent of Americans currently favor an attack on Iran, with only 40 percent of Republicans supporting it. The Trump administration is apparently so concerned about the optics of the scenario they have walked themselves into that, according to reporting from Politico, officials were hoping Israel would attack Iran first, leading Iran to attack American troops, thereby rallying the country behind the war effort after the fact.

One would think that such a drive toward an unpopular war-in-the-making would galvanize Democrats, but so far, anti-war voices have been limited. Lawmakers like Rep. Ro Khanna have found themselves drowned out by demands from Democratic leaders that the Trump administration simply provide a clear explanation, apparently seeking to avoid the embarrassment of pundits and politicians after the disaster of Iraq, who blamed their initial support on buying the Bush administration’s flimsy case.

It is an unshakeable belief that consistency of logic is the primary issue with a war to cement Israel’s military hegemony, one that may cost thousands of lives. While some prominent progressives like Sen. Bernie Sanders attempted to hamper Trump’s funding to execute the war without congressional approval in June, Sanders has not made any public comments on the march to war in over a month, and other progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren, who have also supported anti-war initiatives, were seen applauding as Trump railed against Iran this week at the State of the Union.

The world is now watching a devastating war rage with no real reasoning, already no end in sight, and its chief belligerent making promises it cannot keep to a population it will surely massacre in the process. Unpopularity has not stopped the Trump administration before, whether it be in Venezuela or in Minneapolis, but the United States finds itself in a uniquely baffling position, where its opposition party, much like how it goes in Israel, instead begs for a better execution of the government’s evil plan.

The post Fool Me Twice: The Case for War With Iran Is Even Thinner Than It Was for Iraq appeared first on The Intercept.

The increase of 60 wounded last week was called “an accounting trick,” by one U.S. government official who accused the Pentagon of “slow-walking” the total for weeks. “They wanted the heat on them to slow down after the really devastating attacks,” that source told The Intercept, referencing airstrikes on U.S. bases last month that exposed the vulnerability of U.S. troops to Iranian attacks.

The office of self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth did not respond to multiple requests for comment, including when and where the injuries occurred.

Since the beginning of the Trump administration’s war with Iran, Hegseth’s department has posted the official count of casualties on the website of the Defense Casualty Analysis System, or DCAS, which tracks “deceased, wounded, ill or injured” service members for Congress and the White House. Casualties since July 7 are now counted separately on a webpage with a generic title: “Overseas Operations.” Combined with totals for Operation Epic Fury — the military’s official designation for the initial months of the Iran war — 18 service members have died and 758 have been wounded since the U.S. launched the war against Iran on February 28, according to DCAS. This official total of dead and wounded personnel, as documented over months of reporting by The Intercept, has been a gross undercount, stemming from what that same official previously called a “casualty cover-up.”

In the face of the increasing number of dead and wounded troops, the military has been seeking a range of services related to personnel who are killed or wounded, according to new contracting documents analyzed by The Intercept. While the military regularly awards such contracts, the commands involved have not replied to questions concerning the possible relationship to the current conflict.

On Friday, for example, the Air Force announced it awarded a new contract for a full range of mortuary services at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. This includes transportation and refrigeration of remains, embalming, dressing, casketing or cremation, as well as funeral services. Last week, the Air Force also began looking into local firms that could fulfill a wide-ranging contract — including “mortuary services” — at Italy’s Aviano Air Base, a key hub for the war with Iran.

The public affairs offices at Robins Air Base and Aviano Air Base did not return requests for comment prior to publication.

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Last week, the Army also announced it “desires to procure” casualty administrative support, including casualty case management services, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for the Army’s Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Division. Over 90 percent of the latest casualties are Army soldiers, and its storied Fort Knox base has been intimately involved in the conflict with Iran. The body of 26-year-old Sgt. Benjamin Pennington — who died of injuries resulting from an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia in March and was the first Kentuckian to die in the war — was sent home via Godman Army Airfield at Fort Knox. Six soldiers killed in an Iranian strike in Kuwait that same month were operating under the 1st Theater Sustainment Command which is headquartered at the base. 

Fort Knox did not respond to a request for comment and further information about the contract and the losses from the war prior to publication.

The recent casualty spike resulted from Iranian attacks on around 10 U.S. outposts across the Middle East since July 9, according to a second U.S. official who previously spoke to The Intercept. Iran’s military managed to overwhelm U.S. air defense systems using a mix of attack drones and advanced ballistic missiles, despite months of claims by President Donald Trump and Hegseth that Iran’s military was annihilated.

Last month, the tally of wounded personnel fluctuated by the day in the wake of increased Iranian attacks. On July 21, the casualty count on DCAS for Operation Epic Fury stood at 500. Now, it has shrunk to 431.

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For months, The Intercept found anomalies with the counts offered on the DCAS website. On April 21, for example, the number of wounded-in-action troops declined by 15 without public acknowledgment by the War Department. Despite repeated questions for months, the Pentagon has not commented on the disparities in its casualty count.

Prior reporting by The Intercept also found DCAS is missing hundreds of wounded or dead personnel from the Iran war. The Pentagon’s list of the names of the dead is still missing Maj. Sorffly Davius, a signals and communication officer with the New York Army National Guard who was assigned to the headquarters of the 42nd Infantry Division and reportedly died while on duty in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, on March 6. Davius’s death was widely acknowledged even as it was excluded from the official count. Gen. Dan Caine, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, recognized Davius while “honoring our fallen.”

While DCAS provides a running tally of “non-hostile” deaths — meaning those who died from accidents or by illness — it doesn’t include “non-hostile” injuries. The DCAS figures for Epic Fury show that 65 Navy personnel were wounded in action. Missing, however, are the more than 200 sailors treated for smoke inhalation or lacerations due to a March 12 fire that raged aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford. The aircraft carrier had been conducting round-the-clock flight operations to, Caine said, “project combat power” in the Middle East.

CNN was the first to report a significant increase in wounded troops last week.

The World Health Organization puts the Iranian casualty toll at an estimated 37,181, including 3,375 deaths. Iranian state and semi-official media reported similar figures — just under 3,500 killed by U.S.-Israeli air strikes. Last week, The Intercept reported on a family of eight, including five children, killed in one of those attacks.

The post Sixty More U.S. Soldiers Reported Injured in Iran War appeared first on The Intercept.

The war in Iran has entered its first ceasefire — a two-week break from hostilities brokered largely by Pakistan that all sides have agreed to, with negotiations on a permanent end to the war to follow starting in a few days.

It’s hard to say who has emerged a “winner” in the war so far, but certainly when one examines what has been accomplished and what has not, the U.S. cannot claim a resounding victory, even as it demonstrated formidable military prowess.

Iran may, in fact, be the country that can claim the victory. It’s not just that the Islamic Republic of Iran survived, it’s also that the country demonstrated its control over the Strait of Hormuz — an outcome that establishes Iran’s position as both an influential regional force and a player able to exert sway over the entire world economy.

After the ceasefire announcement, Iran’s first vice president posted on social media: “Today, a page of history has been turned; the world has welcomed a new pole of power, and the era of Iran has begun.”

It sounds like Trumpian hubris, but it can’t immediately be dismissed as a far-fetched fantasy.

Survival — and More

First, the regime had to survive. And it did: Despite President Donald Trump’s self-serving claim, the regime in Iran hasn’t changed. In fact, the Iranian government may have become even more hard-line and less accommodating than before.

Iran took a beating. Despite the depletion of some of its strategic assets, however, the country has maintained many of its strategic capabilities.

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The war hasn’t, for instance, eliminated the uranium stockpile Iran still possesses, though it is buried deep underground — leaving unmet another of the demands that the Trump administration. It is unclear if any of Iran’s thousands of advanced centrifuges survived the bombings in June of last year, but Iran’s ability to manufacture new ones has not been eradicated, despite the loss of some of its nuclear scientists over the past year.

Neither have Israel and the U.S. eliminated all of Iran’s missile launchers or its production lines, as evidenced by the ongoing attacks against Israel and neighboring Persian Gulf states with direct hits up to the ceasefire taking effect. Iran’s drone supply and production line also don’t appear to have been eliminated.

The war, in other words, hasn’t prevented Iran from being a threat to U.S. allies in the region — a threat that has shaken the Arab Persian Gulf states’ faith in U.S. security guarantees, to say nothing of investors’ confidence in the Emirates as a financial capital.

The Gulf is not the only region where the U.S. will suffer international consequences. The war also stoked tensions between Iran and Western nations — some of which assailed the U.S., while even staunch allies in Europe refused to cave to Trump’s admonishments to join the war.

Iran may remain one of the most geopolitically isolated states in the world, but U.S. isolation is rapidly on the rise as well.

The Clincher

Scoring the war and the previous attack on Iran’s nuclear sites like a boxing match, one might argue that Iran has “won” the second round, despite being bruised and bloodied in the fight.

Surviving intact after more than five weeks of intensive day and night bombing by two nuclear powers, the assassination of its supreme leader and some of its top leadership, and the destruction of infrastructure will itself be viewed by the regime and its supporters as victory.

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The regime’s ability to keep fighting against arguably the greatest military power the world has ever seen will be viewed in Tehran and abroad as a remarkable show of strength, potentially establishing a deterrent against future rounds of fighting.

Ultimately, though, it is Iran’s demonstration of its ability to control the flow of oil, gas, and goods through the Strait of Hormuz that would clinch the match. It became evident that Iran’s sway over the strait, creating a toll booth of sorts, was virtually impossible to undo, short of a major ground invasion — something Trump and even his most reckless advisers were loath to authorize.

Leaving aside the bonus Iran received from the jump in prices as it continued to sell oil during the conflict, the toll it began charging — which amounts to about $2 million per ship — will fill its almost empty coffers in short order.

In his remarks to the press, Trump did not seem to be especially concerned with the toll, even suggesting that he, like any mafia boss, would like a piece of it. Iran may, in the event a permanent peace deal is achieved, even agree to pay the protection money if it guarantees the safety of the regime.

Stronger Position in Talks

From the perspective of many in the West and certainly in Iran, the claim that Iran “won” the second round of the match rings truer than the U.S. claim of having accomplished its goals.

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The U.S. and Israel’s assassinations and destruction of military and civilian infrastructure were never contestable; Iran was never a match for the two countries’ conventional forces. To what end, though, was the question.

Whether there is a final peace deal or not, the ends of the war can hardly justify the U.S. and Israel’s means. It may be enough to dissuade military action even absent a deal.

And looking forward, in terms of a longer peace deal and nuclear agreement, Iran is arguably in a stronger position than the days before the war.

At the announcement of the ceasefire, Trump said the Iranian 10-point plan was a workable start to negotiations. Though there are some disputes about whether the proposal Iran presented publicly matched what was transmitted privately, many of the new plan’s pillars matched those presented and what Omani mediators had described as a workable proposal for a diplomatic solution.

By surviving a war and inflicting real pain — physical and financial — on both the aggressors and their enablers, Iran can probably extract more concessions from Trump than it could before.

With his eye on the markets, the price of gasoline, the unpopularity of the war, and the realization in the wake of his apocalyptic threats that there is universal opposition to actually taking Iran back to the Stone Age, it should be obvious by now that Trump wants to put the Iran issue behind him as soon as possible.

In this way, too, the Iranians have shown that they have the upper hand. While Trump and Israel have demonstrated that they don’t understand the Iranian political system, the Iranians have a solid grasp of U.S. politics. They know about the upcoming midterm elections. Perhaps now they think the survival of the Trump regime is actually what’s at stake.

The post How the War Strengthened Iran’s Hand Against the U.S. and Israel appeared first on The Intercept.

The Pentagon on Thursday said the U.S. spent about $11.3 billion in just one week of its war on Iran; Trump economic adviser Kevin Hassett similarly put the figure at $12 billion on Sunday.

But these sums are dwarfed by estimates offered by experts in the costs of war, lawmakers experienced with the Pentagon budget, and two government officials briefed on Operation Epic Fury who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

At the very least, they say the war is burning through between $1 billion and $2 billion per day — or roughly $11,500 to $23,000 per second. The cost, the officials told The Intercept, could rise to a quarter trillion dollars or more over the coming months.

Even that is a drop in the bucket compared to the long-term expenses, which could cost the U.S. trillions of dollars in the decades to come. One of the officials lamented that Americans would be paying off the war for generations.

“If this war takes months rather than weeks, the costs will become astronomical,” said Gabe Murphy, a policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a nonpartisan budget watchdog advocating for an end to wasteful spending,

Jules Hurst III, the War Department’s acting comptroller and chief financial officer, called the Pentagon’s initial $11.3 billion estimate a “ballpark number,” speaking at the Reagan Institute’s National Security Innovation Base Summit. Hurst said a more comprehensive figure would be provided with a supplemental budget request, which he said the Pentagon plans to soon submit to the White House and Congress.

Democratic lawmakers believe the true number is far higher because the Pentagon estimate did not include many expenses, including the massive buildup of military assets, weapons, and personnel in the Middle East ahead of the conflict. Lawmakers have said they expect the Iran War supplemental request to reach at least $50 billion — on top of a $1.5 trillion War Department budget request for 2027.

When he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee recently, Elbridge Colby, the under secretary of war for policy, said that the military campaign against Iran had been “scoped out” for up to five weeks, but that the president could extend it. He was, however, unable to tell Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., the cost. “I can’t give you an answer at this point,” he said. The Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson were no more forthcoming with The Intercept.

Jacobs told The Intercept that Americans had been conned into an open-ended conflict, with unclear goals and no exit plan.

“We haven’t gotten sufficient details in public or behind closed doors about the strategy, the objectives, the length of the operation, or how much this will cost taxpayers,” she told The Intercept. “The American people are demanding an end to this illegal war to prevent more killings of children, retaliation against U.S. service members, skyrocketing costs to U.S. taxpayers, and yet another endless war.”

Hassett, the director of Trump’s National Economic Council, said the war was still expected to take four to six weeks. But without accurate information from the Pentagon on the cost of the war, experts, lawmakers, and government officials have stepped into the breach with estimates of the financial burden of Trump’s war with Iran — his second war on the country within the span of a year.

The numbers are immense.

A three-week conflict could cost taxpayers between $60 billion and $130 billion, according to the two government officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to speak freely, with both stressing that the estimates were speculative. “It’s a back of the napkin estimate,” said one official.

A five-week war could top out at $175 billion. Eight weeks could put the total at $250 billion. “They really have no idea of the real cost,” said one of the officials, noting that bookkeeping is not a Pentagon strong suit. The self-styled War Department has never passed an audit, despite almost a decade of attempts.

The Pentagon’s pre-war military buildup — which is missing from the $11.3 billion estimate — had already cost taxpayers an estimated $630 million, according to Elaine McCusker, a former senior Pentagon budget official now at the American Enterprise Institute. (McCusker said those costs are likely to be absorbed within the Pentagon’s existing $839 billion 2026 budget.) Initial estimates of the first 100 hours of the war tacked on around $3.7 billion in operational costs, munitions, and damaged or destroyed equipment, according to a cost breakdown by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS. This and other estimates turned out to be drastic undercounts as Pentagon officials, in classified briefings, disclosed that the military burned through $5.6 billion worth of munitions in just the first two days of the war. An updated analysis by CSIS now estimates that Epic Fury cost $16.5 billion by its 12th day. 

Estimates by Linda Bilmes, the co-author of “The Three Trillion Dollar War,” are in line with the government officials’ projections. Bilmes, a former assistant secretary and chief financial officer of the U.S. Department of Commerce under Bill Clinton and currently a public policy professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, says that the price tag of the war will exceed $50 billion if the conflict stretches into its third or fourth week. “Probably higher,” she added.

Bilmes cautioned that enormous short-term expenses — like spent munitions, the deployments of aircraft carrier strike groups, and aircraft shot down — will be eclipsed by even more significant expenditures like the long-term costs of veterans’ benefits and interest on the debt to pay for the war. The ultimate cost, Bilmes says, may reach into the trillions of dollars.

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Bilmes first called attention to the immense hidden costs of America’s wars in her groundbreaking analyses of the Iraq War. The George W. Bush administration initially put the likely cost of the Iraq War at $40 billion. By 2008, Bilmes and economist Joseph Stiglitz discovered that the real cost would be at least $3 trillion. By 2021, that figure had ballooned to around $8 trillion.

Asked about the analogous long-term costs of the Iran war by The Intercept, the Office of the Secretary of War clammed up. “We have nothing to provide,” a spokesperson told The Intercept.

Bilmes notes that around 50,000 U.S. troops are deployed around the Middle East as the United States and Israel, as well as Iran and its proxies, strike fuel depots, oil facilities, and military sites — all of which release noxious substances shown to negatively affect human health. “The majority are being exposed to toxins, contamination, acid rain, dust from infrastructure destruction, and burning oil fumes, so we can estimate that at least one-third will be claiming disability benefits under the PACT Act,” she said, referring to a landmark 2022 law expanding health care and benefits for veterans exposed to burn pits, Agent Orange, and other toxic substances. “That is a major long-term cost that almost nobody looks at.” Bilmes said that if veterans claim benefits at the rate of the extremely short 1990 Gulf War — 37 percent of whom receive compensation today — this alone would add around $600 billion in costs over their lifetimes. 

The Iran war also increases the likelihood that Congress will approve a larger Pentagon budget than Trump would have secured without it, Bilmes said. “If the budget would have increased by $100 billion, this war might bump it to $200 billion,” she told The Intercept. “That becomes the base budget and, over a decade, it’s another trillion dollars added to the defense budget.”

Bilmes explained that these long-term costs are exacerbated by the fact that all the money is borrowed. “Back in 2004, the public debt was below $4 trillion. Now the gross debt is $38 trillion — and about 30 percent of that is due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,” she said. A key contributor to that spike is the fact that the United States went to war in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 while simultaneously cutting taxes — increasing spending while reducing revenues. “This combination had never happened before in the history of U.S. wars,” she said. With interest rates almost double what they were in the 2010s, Bilmes notes that 14 percent of the federal budget already goes to interest payments, which are destined to rise further with the Iran war.

Hurst, the War Department comptroller, declined to specify exactly how much money the War Department would ask for in the supplemental request. Most sources say it will top $50 billion. Asked about the likelihood the Iran war supplemental request would pass, given Democrats’ opposition to the conflict, Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., was optimistic due to bipartisan concerns about weapons stockpiles. “There is a need that was there before the Iran conflict,” said Wittman, the vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee, at the Reagan Institute summit last week. “There’s a need there to build our weapons magazine depth. There’s a need there to make sure we’re building more expendable and attritable platforms. So those things extend even beyond the Iran conflict. This just makes it more immediate.”

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y., pushed back on talk of additional funding. “The administration has not even made the case to the American people as to why we are spending billions of dollars and dropping bombs every day in Iran,” he said during a Monday press conference. “So the notion that they would come up here and ask for additional money is beyond the pale at this moment.”

Murphy, the policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, noted that the reconciliation bill enacted last summer included over $60 billion for munitions, missile defense, and low-cost weapons. The lack of specificity in the bill would allow the Pentagon to easily utilize that, plus the remaining $90 billion from reconciliation, for Trump’s war of choice with Iran, he said.

“Billions of taxpayer dollars have already been spent on this unauthorized war. We’re facing a spiraling debt crisis, skyrocketing health care premiums, dire food insecurity, and natural disasters that are growing more frequent, extreme, and costly. These are national security issues,” Murphy told The Intercept. “If Congress believes this war is a good use of taxpayer dollars, it should vote on an authorization for the use of military force. Congress has a duty to consider any supplemental funding requests, but absent an AUMF, Congress shouldn’t approve additional funding.”

The Pentagon, Murphy said, “got a boatload of extra cash, more than $150 billion, in last summer’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act.”

With the goals of the war undefined, there is no way to project how long the war on Iran will rage on. “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on March 6, following a statement that the war could go on “forever.” 

Murphy told The Intercept that the White House needed to provide far more clarity. “Taxpayers deserve answers on the precise costs and timeline for this war,” he said. “‘Indefinitely’ isn’t an answer.”

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More recently, the president seemed to indicate that there has been no reason to fight since the first day of the war. “Let me say, we’ve won,” Trump said last week. “You know, you never like to say too early you won. We won. We won, in the first hour it was over, but we won,” Trump said. Jacobs highlighted this uncertainty underlying the conflict, noting that Americans have been “misled into another regime-change war in the Middle East under false pretenses and with fairy tale ideas about what will happen next.”

The Intercept presented Bilmes’s long-term cost estimates to one of the government officials who offered the more immediate quarter-trillion-dollar estimate. That official agreed that Americans would be paying massive sums of money for generations to finance Trump’s second war with Iran. “These costs aren’t known to the American people. You’re never going to hear about them from the White House or the DoD,” said the official of the long-term expenses highlighted by Bilmes. “My kids’ kids, and probably their kids, are going to be paying for this.”

Correction: March 17, 2026, 5:06 p.m. ET
The article has been updated to correct the year Laura Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz determined the cost of the Iraq War would be at least $3 trillion; it was 2008, not 2015.

The post Trump’s War on Iran Could Cost Trillions appeared first on The Intercept.

That day, the U.S. attacked the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school in Minab, killing more than 150 people, most of them children. In the weeks that followed, tens of thousands more would be killed or wounded in U.S.–Israeli strikes, according to World Health Organization estimates. Since a June ceasefire collapsed and the U.S. resumed attacks, Iran’s Health Ministry says U.S. strikes have killed or wounded more than 650 people.

Mohammad’s parents — Fatemeh Rostami, known to her family as Hannaneh, and Ali, her husband — brought him home to their apartment in eastern Tehran’s Pirouzi neighborhood. Despite the danger, Hannaneh’s mother, Tahereh Sarbaz, traveled almost 100 miles from the city of Qazvin to meet her newborn grandson, as Trump lobbed threats and missiles at Tehran. “Today Iran will be hit very hard! Under serious consideration for complete destruction and certain death, because of Iran’s bad behavior, are areas and groups of people that were not considered for targeting up until this moment in time,” he wrote on Truth Social on March 7. Sarbaz witnessed the destruction that week and felt a blast wave firsthand while driving through the capital. “I was in Tehran. I saw what happened there,” she recalled. “People were being bombed every night. Families everywhere were losing their children.”

Pirouzi, a crowded working- to middle-class residential area, with a major shopping mall, hospital, sports complex, and several transit hubs, is home to around 600,000 people. When the war erupted, it was hit hard. As U.S. and Israeli munitions laid waste to buildings there, people flooded into the streets — Hannaneh’s family among them — seeking safety. Ali was still going to work each day but suggested that Hannaneh and the children decamp for the relative safety of Qazvin, which was not attacked nearly as much as the capital. “My daughter refused,” Sarbaz recalled. “She told him, ‘I will not leave you here alone.’” 

Sarbaz eventually headed across town, to northern Tehran, where her son, Mehdi Rostami, lived with his wife and their three children, thinking it would be safer. After a short visit, she returned, alone, to Qazvin.

On March 17, Sarbaz checked in with Hannaneh by phone. “I called her and asked how she and the baby were doing,” Sarbaz said. “I asked whether the fighter jets were still coming. Whether she was afraid. Whether there was a lot of noise. And I told her to be careful.”

The next day, Rostami’s whole family traveled across Tehran to visit Hannaneh and her children. Not long after, Sarbaz received a call from another daughter-in-law. “She sounded extremely distressed. She was trying to prepare me for something,” Sarbaz recalled. “Finally, I asked her, ‘What happened? Why are you so worried?’” The daughter-in-law said: “Mother, the thing you were afraid of has happened.”

Sarbaz was initially so stunned that she couldn’t process the news. It wasn’t until other family members broke down in tears that she could comprehend the enormity of her loss. An airstrike hit Hannaneh’s apartment building while her brother’s family was visiting. The attack killed Rostami; his wife, Manzar al-Sadat Zarrabadi; and their three children: Ali, 13; Fatemeh, 9; and Zeynab, 7. Also slain were Hannaneh and her two children: Mohammad Hassan Kialha, 7, and Mohammad Ali Kialha, who was just 20 days old. Ali, Hannaneh’s husband, survived; he was out at the time of the attack.

“They told me that my family in Tehran had been killed,” Sarbaz said. “Inside, I was heartbroken.”

Dr. Nader Azadeh, a high-ranking official with the Tehran Fire Department, was coordinating emergency response and rescue operations in the capital following airstrikes and deployed to the Pirouzi neighborhood just after the attack on the family’s apartment building. Amid all the carnage he witnessed over weeks of war in Tehran, the toll on the Rostami family — eight dead — had a lasting impact on him. He said he could not forget the scale of their loss.

A rescue worker who participated in the response said that the entire building was demolished by the strike. He estimated that 30 people, in total, died. It took hours to unearth what was left of the family and other victims from the rubble. Most of the dead had been exhumed when neighbors explained that an infant was still somewhere under the debris, prompting the search to begin anew. Hours later, they finally located the tiny body, he recalled.

No one knows how many survivors in Iran are grieving over loved ones killed in Trump’s war. Global attention has focused on Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school — almost to the exclusion of the other schools, homes, hospitals, apartment buildings, and other civilian sites damaged or destroyed in other U.S.–Israeli strikes. The U.S. military has used this tunnel vision to its advantage, advancing the farcical claim that the elementary school strike is the only incident of civilian harm during the entire conflict. “There is one active civilian casualty investigation from the 13,629 munitions,” Adm. Brad Cooper, the chief of U.S. Central Command, told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee in May.

CENTCOM has continued these claims in response to queries from The Intercept. “We have no new updates at this time pertaining to current investigations or munitions that were expended during Operation Epic Fury,” a spokesperson said.

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Asked if CENTCOM was aware of any allegations of civilian harm in Iran on or about March 18, the command dodged the question. “The U.S. military takes all reports of civilian harm seriously,” a defense official told The Intercept. “All allegations of civilian harm reported to CENTCOM have been reviewed.”

While CENTCOM was tight-lipped, Sarbaz refused to stay silent. “I want people around the world to know that civilians died in this conflict. I want people around the world to know that the president of the United States, a man mired in corruption and scandal, came and took my children from me,” she told The Intercept. “What crime had my 20-day-old grandchild committed?”

It’s unclear if Hannaneh and Ali’s apartment building was the intended object of a U.S. or Israeli strike, a targeting error, or so-called collateral damage. The family says it knows of no regime officials who resided in the building or military uses of the site.

The Israel Defense Forces announced it killed “Mehdi Rostami Shamastam, one of the key commanders in Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence” in Tehran on the same day that Mehdi Rostami and his family lost their lives in Hannaneh’s apartment. Sarbaz said her son was an academic, not an intelligence official. “I deny this,” she said of the assertion. “My son was a university professor. But if what Israel claims were true, I would be very glad.”

Sarbaz said that if her son was, in fact, a top intelligence chief, killing him alongside his family, including a baby, would make it an even graver atrocity. “The presence of a 20-day-old infant among the victims, and the killing of eight members of one family, is such an enormous crime,” she said. “Why didn’t they target him in the street?”

Following the attack, the Iranian regime did not treat Mehdi Rostami as it often does senior commanders or influential figures killed in enemy strikes, making no public acknowledgment of his service to the state. Mehdi and Rostami are also common names. The Israeli military did not respond to multiple requests for clarification if the Mehdi Rostami Shamastam it referenced and Mehdi Rostami were the same person. CENTCOM did not respond to multiple requests for comment on whether it or Israeli forces had conducted airstrikes in Tehran’s Pirouzi neighborhood on March 18.

The strike that killed the Rostami family was part of an unrelenting blitz. The U.S. and Israel struck more than 17,000 separate targets in 40 days — a rate of strikes near unprecedented in modern conflict, according to the civilian harm monitoring group Airwars. In the first 24 hours of the war alone, the U.S. said it had struck more than 1,000 targets, and Israel 500. A May 18 report by Human Rights Activists in Iran counted 12,798 “unique attacks” by the U.S. or Israel, 77 percent of them involving civilian harm or damage to civilian infrastructure.

The U.S. bears some responsibility for all attacks as the chief of the coalition attacking Iran. “Only the United States of America could lead this,” self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth said on March 4. “But when you add the Israeli Defense Forces, a devastatingly capable force, the combination is sheer destruction for our radical Islamist Iranian adversaries. … Fighting shoulder to shoulder with such a capable ally is a true force multiplier and a breath of fresh air.”

After initially striking Iranian military assets in the opening rounds of the war, the U.S. shifted to targeting civilian infrastructure, Sina Toossi, a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy specializing in U.S.–Iran relations, told The Intercept. Targets included oil facilities; steel and pharmaceutical plants; universities; and even the headquarters of Iran’s space program. He noted that bridges were targeted, killing civilians as well as first responders.

This summer, as a second ceasefire imploded and Iran stepped up attacks on U.S. bases causing large numbers of casualties, Trump has increasingly unleashed unhinged rants, including threats to attack civilian infrastructure such as bridges and power plants, that would “affect 91 million people.”

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In July, Sen. Jeff Merkley, D-Ore., cajoled chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine into what seemed like a half-hearted pledge to “not target, even in retaliatory sense, infrastructure that is generally considered to be primarily for civilian survival.” The very next day, Trump announced that “any time the Islamic Republic of Iran shoots at a ship in the Strait of Hormuz … the United States will bomb and destroy ONE BRIDGE OR POWER PLANT, including those located next to, or in, the Capital City of Tehran.”

Harrison Mann, a former U.S. Army officer and intelligence official and now the associate director for campaigns and policy at Win Without War, drew specific attention to the attacks on the bridges and water reservoirs. It is “quite dangerous to be conditioning the U.S. military to carry out orders that are clearly war crimes,” he warned.

The World Health Organization puts the Iranian casualty toll at an estimated 37,181, including 3,375 deaths. Iranian state and semi-official media reported similar figures, just under 3,500 killed. Mansoureh Mills, a regional researcher with Amnesty International, noted that earlier government figures put the civilian toll at roughly 45 percent of the total, including 383 children. 

The total number of U.S.–Israeli strikes on apartment buildings is unknown, but certainly significant. Reports of civilian harm were recorded every day from the beginning of the war on February 28 to the first ceasefire on April 8, according to Airwars. This includes six strikes on March 18, the day that the Rostami family was killed. Airwars found that civilians were frequently slain in attacks on residential areas, with such strikes accounting for 147 out of the 297 — almost 50 percent — of the civilian harm incidents it tracked. Eighty-seven of these took place in Tehran province. A Washington Post investigation, relying on data from the Institute for the Study of War, counted 285 attacks across Tehran with strikes “blanket[ing] almost a third of all neighborhoods, some with upward of 11 strikes.”

Azadeh, the fire department official, recalled chaotic and emotionally overwhelming nights of bombardment that killed untold numbers of civilians. In one attack on an apartment building in central Tehran, on the first day of the war, he recalled the death of a mother, her daughter, and the child’s grandmother. In another strike on a 10-unit apartment building in the Pirouzi neighborhood, he recounted the slaying of most of its residents, including seven children and teenagers. “When our rescue teams arrived, the force of the explosion had thrown many of the bodies into the street,” Azadeh said.

Azadeh drew specific attention to the death of Saeed Shamghadri, an academic killed with his son and daughter in an attack on their home in northern Tehran in March. “To kill one person, they bombed a 14-story residential building and killed somewhere between 50 and 200 people living there,” Azadeh said. “To eliminate one person, many civilians were attacked.”

When asked how many civilians have been killed in U.S. strikes and, if the military did not know the answer, to explain why, CENTCOM told The Intercept: “The U.S. military does not deliberately target civilians.” After being told that response didn’t address the question, Maj. Emma Thompson, the command’s media operations chief, said CENTCOM had “nothing additional to add.”

The WHO estimates that 229 healthcare centers, 49 hospitals, and 78 pharmaceutical facilities, laboratories, and warehouses were damaged in U.S.–Israeli strikes. “While I was on my way to my son’s house, Gandhi Hospital came under attack,” said Sarbaz of the medical facility in northern Tehran that saw its entire front facing torn off in a March 1 strike. Sarbaz said that the massive shockwave from the explosion rocked the car she was in. “The media are lying when they say ordinary people were not targeted. Gandhi Hospital, where pregnant women were present, was also attacked.” Videos of the private hospital, known for fertility treatments, show it sustained significant damage, and government sources noted it had to evacuate patients, including babies in incubators.

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These attacks came after Hegseth’s Pentagon spent a year slashing measures to prevent civilian casualties, including firing the military’s top lawyers, who advise leaders on international laws of armed conflict. “U.S. strikes on civilian infrastructure in Iran, including the elementary school in Minab, have been absolutely devastating and completely inexcusable,” Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y., told The Intercept. “I continue to have deep concerns about how the school in particular was targeted, especially as the strike was deliberately planned for the first day of the conflict and did not occur amid the fog of war. Secretary Hegseth’s catastrophic cuts to civilian harm mitigation efforts at the Department of Defense and his disdain for the rules of engagement will only continue to put innocent men, women, and children in danger.”

A group of Democratic lawmakers told Hegseth in a July letter that his “gutting civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR) efforts” has left the Pentagon unable to “comply with the law and its congressionally-mandated CHMR responsibilities.” They added: “The Trump administration — potentially in violation of federal law — has defunded and impeded civilian protection efforts.”

That letter, sent by Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Gillibrand, and eight other lawmakers, echoed concerns raised by a War Department inspector general report that described civilian protection efforts as largely “inactive.” The May report by the Pentagon’s top watchdog says cuts to civilian harm mitigation and response efforts have been so severe under Hegseth that the United States cannot adequately protect civilians in conflict zones or track harm when it occurs.

These criticisms were echoed in an as-yet-unreleased official report revealed by The Intercept that found Hegseth’s Pentagon gutted its premier center devoted to preventing civilian casualties in war zones. The War Department’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence reduced its staff from 40 personnel in January 2025 to just nine by the end of the year, according to the report. And cuts have been even more catastrophic at the tip of the spear.

When questioned by lawmakers about U.S. attacks on civilian targets in Iran, Caine dismissed the concerns. “We have a robust process which considers a target. It goes through a system that looks at a variety of considerations, to include what you’re alluding to around both purely civilian or dual-use targets,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff chair said. “I have trust and confidence in CENTCOM that they’re looking at the range of those things on a daily basis.”

There are good reasons not to trust that system. The 10-person civilian harm mitigation team at CENTCOM has been reduced to just one individual, according to Cooper, the CENTCOM commander. Another recent yet-to-be-released Pentagon report on civilian casualties noted that 15 attacks in Yemen from early 2025 are still under review by CENTCOM. “How will they get through hundreds of cases for Iran if their one civilian harm person still hasn’t finished Yemen?” a U.S. official lamented to The Intercept. Both current and former government officials told The Intercept that the massive cuts have left the Pentagon unable to protect civilians in war zones like Iran.

Asked if anyone would be held accountable for the February strike on the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school, Trump replied in June: “No. If it was a fault — and as you know that’s under investigation. It’s such a strange question to be asked at this date. You’re talking about a long time ago.”

The Rostami family was large and close-knit. Sarbaz said that 16 children and grandchildren made a pilgrimage from Tehran to Qazvin every Friday. “We would spread a large tablecloth and eat together,” she said. After the bodies of her children and grandchildren were pulled from the rubble, the eight deceased made a last trip to their ancestral home for a funeral procession and burial.

A large crowd gathered outside Sarbaz’s home on March 23. “They were crying,” she recalled. “People came from everywhere. They were chanting ‘Death to America’ and mourning my children.” Azadeh, who accompanied the bodies back to Qazvin, recalls being deeply affected as Sarbaz received the corpses. “When we returned the bodies, I saw the mother arrive carrying an Iranian flag. She was the only surviving immediate family member there,” he said of Sarbaz. “She said the reason she was crying was because she herself had not been martyred alongside them.” 

Footage from Iranian state television of the martyrs’ procession shows a huge crowd with women pushing children in strollers, men waving Iranian flags, and others carrying poster-sized photos of the dead, behind decorated funeral trucks bearing the bodies of the victims. Photos from the Iranian Students’ News Agency show crowds carrying coffins wrapped in the green, red, and white of the Iranian flag and a cleric clad in a black robe and turban holding the body of a white-shrouded baby aloft.

The funeral was attended by thousands of people, Sarbaz remembered.

In June, just after agreeing to a ceasefire that quickly collapsed, Trump returned to threatening to kill Iranians. “If they ​don’t behave,” he said, “we’ll go right back to dropping bombs ​right smack in the middle of their head.” Attacks followed. “We can knock down their bridges in one hour. We can knock out their energy supply,” he said in July. “We can knock out their electricity and power generating plants. … Every plant will be gone.” Later that month, Trump posted: “Every time Iran kills an American Soldier, they will pay for that killing many times over!”

Sarbaz now lives with the fallout of Trump’s war of choice and his disregard for civilian lives. “After three sons, God gave me this daughter, and she was all my hope. We had named her Fatemeh, but because her father loved the name Hannaneh, we used to call her that,” she explained. “But today, I no longer say Hannaneh or Fatemeh.”

As his war in Iran has imploded, Trump has increasingly lashed out, calling for cataclysm, slaughter, and even genocide. “We’re knocking the hell out of it,” he said of Iran earlier this month. “I do not want to kill people. But at some point we’re gonna.” But Trump has already killed many thousands of Iranians — including school children, hospital patients, the elderly, and, in Tehran’s Pirouzi neighborhood on March 18, most of a family, including its youngest member. “Knocking the hell out of them,” said Trump as he continued to rant about his attacks on Iranians last week. Mohammad Ali Kialha was one of those people; perhaps the youngest killed by Trump’s war.

And Sarbaz wants an answer from Trump about why he had to die: “What sin had my 20-day-old grandchild committed that he had to be martyred?”

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.

The post The Short Life of a Newborn During the Iran War appeared first on The Intercept.

Since the start of the conflict, the Department of War has posted the official count of casualties on the website of the Defense Casualty Analysis System, or DCAS, which tracks “deceased, wounded, ill or injured” service members for Congress and the president. This official total of dead and wounded personnel, as documented over months of reporting by The Intercept, has been a gross undercount, stemming from what that same official previously called a “casualty cover-up.”

But after a series of Iranian strikes on U.S. facilities in the Middle East in July, the Pentagon last week rolled out a new approach. Casualties since July 7 are now counted separately on a new webpage with a generic designation: “Overseas Operations.”

Two hundred and seventy-three U.S. troops were killed or wounded since July 7, according to the Monday total on the new Overseas Operations page.

When combined with the existing DCAS page for the Iran war, the official count stands at 704, an 83 percent increase in casualties since April 8, the day the first ceasefire deal was struck between the Trump administration and Iran. When counting known casualties overlooked by the DCAS page, the total exceeds 900 personnel.

For months, the Pentagon has failed to comment on DCAS anomalies reported by The Intercept nor the reason for the change in the way it now counts casualties, which was first reported by the New York Times. Last week, the Pentagon told the newspaper that “since Operation Epic Fury has concluded, the department classifies casualties as overseas operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.” Central Command oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East.

“This is certainly designed to conceal the count of the wounded,” the official said, while noting that “incompetence” has also caused confusion in the casualty count.

The change comes after a July 20 rant by Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell who claimed reports of a Pentagon effort to withhold news of dozens of U.S. casualties were “baseless and malicious” and a U.S. official’s disclosure to The Intercept that same day that recent attacks on U.S. bases by Iran had wounded “far more” personnel than the Pentagon had acknowledged.

The casualty spike resulted from Iranian attacks on at least nine U.S. outposts across the Middle East since July 9, according to a second U.S. official who spoke to The Intercept on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak with the press.

Iran’s military managed to overwhelm U.S. air defense systems using a mix of attack drones and advanced ballistic missiles, despite months of claims by President Donald Trump and self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth that Iran’s military was annihilated.

Last month, the tally of wounded personnel fluctuated by the day in the wake of increased Iranian attacks. On July 21, the casualty count on DCAS for Operation Epic Fury, the military’s official designation for the Iran war, stood at 500. Now, it has shrunk to 431.

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For months, The Intercept found anomalies with the counts offered on the DCAS website. On April 21, for example, the number of wounded-in-action troops declined by 15 without public acknowledgment by the War Department. Despite repeated questions for months, the Pentagon has not commented on the disparities in its casualty count.

Prior reporting by The Intercept also found DCAS is missing hundreds of dead and wounded personnel from Epic Fury. The Pentagon list of the names of the dead is still missing Maj. Sorffly Davius, a signals and communication officer with the New York Army National Guard who was assigned to the headquarters of the 42nd Infantry Division and reportedly died of sudden illness while on duty in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, on March 6. Davius’s death was widely acknowledged even as it was excluded from the the official count: Rep. Mike Lawler, R-N.Y., spoke about him during a memorial service that month, and Gen. Dan Caine, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Davius while “honoring our fallen.”

While DCAS provides a running tally of “non-hostile” deaths — meaning those who died from accidents or by illness — it doesn’t include “non-hostile” injuries. The DCAS figures for Epic Fury show that 65 Navy personnel were wounded in action. Missing, however, are the more than 200 sailors treated for smoke inhalation or lacerations due to a March 12 fire that raged aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford. The aircraft carrier had been conducting round-the-clock flight operations to, Caine said, “project combat power” in the Middle East.

Recent reporting by the War Horse, using Pentagon records obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, found more than 400 casualties were recorded between February 28 and April 8. Seventy occurred on March 18 alone, but this huge single-day toll was never reported by the Pentagon.

The records provide more granular detail than DCAS, revealing that at least 17 troops sustained life-threatening injuries. They show that U.S. troops suffered shrapnel wounds, broken bones, smoke inhalation, and other injuries. The most common injury recorded, however, was head trauma — which affected at least 170 troops, according to the data.

President Donald Trump has long dismissed brain injuries as “headaches” and “not serious.” 

The post The Pentagon Found a New Way to Undercount U.S. Casualties in Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

The increase in casualties came as Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said in a written statement that the war had exposed the vulnerability of U.S. military bases across the Middle East and as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps threatened to respond to any U.S. strikes.

“The hands of time do not turn backward, and the nations and lands of the region will no longer serve as shields for American bases,” Khamenei said in his statement. “America, in addition to no longer having a safe place for aggression and military bases in the region, is moving further away from its former status day by day.”

The U.S. has been clinging to a rickety ceasefire with Iran for more than a month, as President Donald Trump — who previously threatened to commit genocide in that country — has oscillated between claims that a peace agreement is imminent and talk of renewed hostilities.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Tuesday that talks to end the war were continuing but that a peace agreement could take “a few days.” 

Reporting by The Intercept found that the Pentagon’s official tally of dead and wounded military personnel from the Iran War is a gross undercount, stemming from what one U.S. government official called a “casualty cover-up.” The Defense Casualty Analysis System, or DCAS, which tracks “deceased, wounded, ill or injured” service members for Congress and the president, is missing hundreds of known casualties.

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On April 8, the day the ceasefire deal was struck between the Trump administration and Iran, the tally of U.S. dead and wounded was 385. Despite a pause in hostilities, the number slowly rose to 428, according to Pentagon statistics.

On April 21, however, the number of wounded-in-action troops declined by 15 without public comment from the War Department, dropping the casualty total to 413. Despite repeated questions over the last month, the Pentagon has not commented on the disparity in its casualty count.

Since then, the casualty count has crept upward, with the number of dead increasing by one and the number of wounded topping out at 409 on Tuesday, yielding a combined total of 423 dead and wounded U.S. personnel.

On Thursday, CENTCOM told The Intercept, “13 service members were killed in action and one service member passed due to a non-combat related medical emergency during Operation Epic Fury” — the military’s name for the campaign.

For weeks, DCAS listed 13 hostile and non-hostile U.S. deaths during the war. Most DCAS webpages still claim 13 U.S. deaths but one put the tally at 14 as of Tuesday.

The Pentagon list of the names of the dead is still missing Maj. Sorffly Davius, a signals and communication officer with the New York Army National Guard who was assigned to the headquarters of the 42nd Infantry Division and reportedly died of sudden illness while on duty in Camp Buehring, Kuwait, on March 6. Davius’s death was widely acknowledged even as it was excluded from the the official count: Rep. Mike Lawler, R-N.Y., spoke about him during a memorial service that month, and Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized Davius while “honoring our fallen.”

CENTCOM did not reply to a request for comment on whether Davius was the recently referenced non-combat fatality.

While DCAS provides a running tally of “non-hostile” deaths — meaning those who died from accidents or by illness — it doesn’t include “non-hostile” injuries. The DCAS figures show that 64 Navy personnel have been wounded in action.

Missing, however, are the more than 200 sailors treated for smoke inhalation or lacerations due to a March 12 fire that raged aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford. The aircraft carrier had been conducting round-the-clock flight operations to, Caine said, “project combat power” in the Middle East. The ship returned to its home port in Norfolk, Va., this month after 326 days at sea, the longest deployment of any U.S. aircraft carrier since the Vietnam War.

The numbers also don’t include a sailor who suffered a non-combat-related injury aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln as it was involved in “strike missions in support of Operation Epic Fury” on March 25.

For weeks, the Pentagon has failed to reply to repeated requests for comment on why DCAS provides counts of non-hostile war zone deaths but not non-hostile injuries or illnesses. CENTCOM did not immediately respond on Tuesday to requests for clarification concerning the casualty figures.

The post U.S. Casualties in Iran War Rise as Military Strikes Begin Again appeared first on The Intercept.

Company records show that Israel petitioned Meta to take down Facebook and Instagram posts expressing support for Iran, opposition to Israel, and even depictions of Iranian missile impacts.

The government flagged a variety of materials related to the war, including posts mourning the death of Ayatollah Khamenei following his assassination by the U.S. and Israel on the opening day of the conflict, content supportive of Iran’s retaliatory attacks, and Iranian accounts that shared military analysis and propaganda sympathetic to the Iranian regime’s perspective.

In some cases, Meta complied with the censorship requests, the records show, though it is unclear on what grounds. Meta maintains that it only removes content as required by law or materials that violate its speech policies.

When asked how many Iran-related takedown requests had been granted to date since the war began, the company did not answer. The Israeli Ministry of Justice, which submits takedown requests to social media platforms, did not respond to a request for comment.

Israel’s social media lobbying is not new; for years the nation has leaned on its close relationship with Meta to push for targeted enforcement of the company’s content moderation rulebook.

Israel’s Office of the State Attorney routinely lodges complaints to social media platforms on behalf of state security agencies about content deemed illegal or said to promote “terrorism,” according to its website. In the documents reviewed by The Intercept, the office in some cases made no claim that the social media content violated Israeli law. Instead, the office asked that posts or accounts should be removed because they were in violation of Meta’s content moderation rulebook.

Meta, for instance, designates Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a “Dangerous Organization,” and prohibits users from engaging in many forms of positive speech about its actions. This means posts supportive of retaliatory missile launches by the IRGC, for instance, could run afoul of the company’s rules. No such prohibition exists for users who post favorably about the U.S. or Israeli militaries.

Meta did not respond to questions about the Iran war requests, but spokesperson Daniel Roberts provided a statement to The Intercept. “Anyone is able to report content they think violates our rules. Regardless of who or how a piece of content is flagged, we assess it based on our policies, which govern what is and isn’t allowed on our platform. It is wrong and irresponsible to imply that these requests are in any way unusual or improper.”

Meta has faced scrutiny, specifically in the Middle East, for removing content that doesn’t violate the company’s rules. A 2022 audit commissioned by the company itself found discrepancies in its content moderation practices between Arabic and Hebrew content. “Arabic content had greater over-enforcement (e.g., erroneously removing Palestinian voice) on a per user basis.” the company found. A 2023 report by the company’s inhouse Oversight Board described the “over-enforcement” of the company’s Dangerous Organizations and Individuals blacklist, disproportionately composed of Muslim and Middle Eastern entities.

Meta has long claimed that as an American company, it is legally required to sometimes remove content pertaining to certain entities sanctioned by the U.S., such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But legal scholars say that has little to no precedent or basis in existing sanctions law, which focus on matters of material support rather than political speech. It’s a policy that has created an immense ideological slant: A company headquartered in California can determine what is or is not permissible speech for billions of users across the world, only a fraction of whom are American.

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Further adding to the imbalance when it comes to Middle East crises is the fact that Meta has granted Israel privileged access to its content moderation policy teams. In 2024, The Intercept reported how Meta employee Jordana Cutler, a former aide to Benjamin Netanyahu, served as a dedicated liaison to the Israeli government, advocating for the country’s interests and helping facilitate the removal of unwanted speech. Few other countries in the world have a dedicated representative within Meta — in 2020, a similar policy head for India market resigned after revelations she had lobbied for rule enforcement that favored India’s ruling Hindu nationalist party. Asked if Cutler has had a role in facilitating Israeli takedown requests of content relating to the war, Meta did not respond.

“Meta’s close relationship with the Israeli government for takedown requests has been a long-standing issue,” Evelyn Douek, a Stanford Law School professor and scholar of digital speech policies, told The Intercept. “Meta’s acquiescence in lots of takedown requests has been a long-standing practice.”

These asymmetries of censorship power are particularly sensitive during times of war, said Douek.

“Governments wanting to suppress speech that is critical of their war efforts is as old as time,” she said. “Allowing governments to claim national security reasons to suppress speech willy-nilly would obliterate the value of speech protections.”

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According to a source familiar with the matter, Israel lobbied Meta to implement a blanket rule restricting imagery of war damage within its territory, mirroring an Israeli news media censorship policy that bars journalists from documenting weapon impacts without military approval. Meta has so far declined to implement such a policy for its billions of global users, the source said. Meta did not respond to questions about the status of this request.

The U.S. and Iran signed on Friday a ceasefire agreement, though Israel has suggested it would not abide by the terms of a deal. While many of the censorship requests directly addressed the war, others were tangential to the conflict itself. The records show Israel has pushed to remove content expressing outrage over last month’s storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque by far-right government minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. It also sought to stifle posts critical of rhetoric by Israel that linked Israel’s recent closure of Al-Aqsa with the ongoing war.

In general, Meta grants the vast majority of Israeli governmental takedown requests. The State Attorney’s Office boasted a 92 percent compliance rate in 2023, and a 2025 report by Drop Site News said the overall rate has climbed to 94 percent since the October 7 attack by Hamas.

Records reviewed by The Intercept show Israel asked for Iran war takedowns using the exact same language evoking Hamas’s October 7 attack that it submitted when requesting the censorship of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli speech across the globe during Israel’s war on Gaza.

“It suggests that they don’t expect their requests are being reviewed very carefully,” Douek said.

Douek argued that the wartime censorship requests underscore the danger of policing speech entirely out of public view through “opaque processes” like governmental backchannels.

“These platforms have always maintained that they are neutral, or that they are just a platform for people to express their views, but it has long been true that these companies have always presented a particular view of the world and have been responsive to their own geopolitical and commercial interests, and have always been more responsive to powerful governments,” Douek said.

This creates a deeply lopsided dynamic when it comes to the Iran war: The two arguably best-represented governments in the world within Meta — the U.S. and Israel — are allied belligerents in a conflict against a state deeply sanctioned by the company’s speech rules. “You’re going to end up with a skewed debate,” Douek said.

The post Israel Asked Facebook to Censor Iran War Content, Internal Documents Show appeared first on The Intercept.