After more than two weeks of what began as peaceful protests in Iran and devolved into calls by many protesters for an end to the regime, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, on a visit to India, said he believes we are witnessing the “final days and weeks” of the Iranian government.

“If a regime can only keep itself in power by force, then it’s effectively at the end,” he said.

It is true that Iran has deployed massive force against many protests, at least since January 10. According to various reports — some credible eyewitness accounts and some from the government — hundreds and possibly thousands of Iranians have lost their lives in this most recent outbreak of unrest.

In Washington and other Western capitals, members of Congress, parliamentarians, experts, pundits, analysts, and think tankers have variously argued for regime change in Iran, some promoting military action by the Trump administration to bring it about.

It was not, however, their only dire prescription for Iranians.

Related

Israel Is Cynically Capitalizing on the Iranian Protests for Its Own Ends

Many, if not most, of these self-appointed arbiters of wisdom also chose to promote Reza Pahlavi — son of the deposed shah and Israel’s favorite Iranian — as a potential leader to form a government that would replace the theocracy.

Presumably, Merz, who during Israel’s war against Iran in June 2025 declared approvingly that it was doing the world’s “dirty work,” would cheer such an outcome.

Pahlavi has certainly taken on the mantle of leader for himself, making grandiose proclamations on behalf of the Iranian people.

“Now, relying on your million-strong response to the calls of the past days, and with the legitimacy and popularity I have received from you, I announce another stage of the national uprising to overthrow the Islamic Republic,” he wrote in a long tweet with an accompanying Persian-language video message.

He continues to insist that revolution is at hand and urges Iranians not to give up on their struggle — presumably, their struggle to bring him to power. He also supports — no, implores President Donald Trump to take action, including military strikes, to bring about regime change in Iran.

“This Is a War”

With the mounting death toll and images of body bags in warehouses in Tehran, CBS News asked Pahlavi on January 12 if it was responsible to demand Iranians take to the streets in the face of mortal danger. Did Pahlavi, the anchor asked, bear any responsibility for the deaths of his fellow Iranians?

“This is a war, and war has casualties,” the former crown prince responded.

Yet what is unfolding in Iran now is not quite the civil war that Pahlavi is invoking. Iranian protesters had come out to streets peacefully — their grievances recognized as valid by the government — not to start a “war.” A civil war is something many Iranians have dreaded ever since witnessing the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and Syria’s civil strife, which both saw destructive sectarian fighting and, eventually, the atrocities of the Islamic State.

In his long tweet, Pahlavi also got into thornier rhetoric of war. He suggested state-run media buildings were “legitimate targets,” adding, “Government employees, and the armed and security forces, have the opportunity to join the people.”

At least one state broadcaster building was torched by protesters, but this is a far cry from making “targets” out of them. What’s more, government employees who are not directly participating in hostilities are the opposite of “legitimate targets” in the context of war: Attacking civilian infrastructure, even state propaganda organs, is a war crime.

Who Supports Pahlavi?

Even if we are watching the throes of what is to become a civil war — a similar pattern emerged in Syria, for instance, where a peaceful popular uprising morphed into a civil war after the Assad regime’s brutal crackdown — there’s little evidence that what’s happening on the streets of cities across Iran is a war to restore the monarchy.

This is not to say no Iranians, however, support Pahlavi.

Pahlavi, who has now lived — mostly quietly — in the U.S. for 48 of his 66 years and raised an American family, would be likely be welcomed by many pro-democracy and anti-Islamic Republic types who live in the West.

Many of these Iranians abroad are Pahlavi’s most ardent supporters. While he has denied he is seeking to restore the Peacock Throne, arguing he is simply “leading the transition” to a different political system, his followers in the West have been crystal clear that he is their “shah,” and fully expect him to rule over Iranians in a resurrected dynasty.

It is difficult to gauge how much support Pahlavi has inside Iran, but it is clear it is not insignificant.

Some ordinary citizens are so fed up with the regime — its social and political restrictions, its inability to provide any real solutions to their international isolation, and its miserable economic situation — that they would welcome any change.

Related

The Other Giant Crisis Hanging Over the Islamic Republic of Iran

Others, nostalgic for the rule of Pahlavi’s father which provided their parents and grandparents with societal liberalism, a place on the world stage, and relative economic prosperity — though not, notably, political freedoms — would welcome a return to Pahlavism, whether in the person of a shah or leader of a new republic.

Yet others might chant his name in protests because he is the most familiar and visible of the opposition leaders in exile, given that the only other major figure is Maryam Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq group, or MEK, which is reviled by the vast majority of Iranians for having fought alongside Saddam Hussein in the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

Pahlavi’s profile as an alternative to the regime was significantly boosted during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death in 2022. He became very vocal in his denunciations of the regime’s violent crackdown on protesters and began — for the first time, really, since he lacked confidence during previous rounds of significant unrest like the 2009 Green Movement — to present himself as the only person who could lead a movement to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic.

After Iran was successful in squashing the women’s protests, Pahlavi continued his campaign to overthrow the theocracy. He held rallies, met with politicians in the U.S. and Europe, and spoke at conferences. He argued against attempts by both President Joe Biden and Trump to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran and implored the Europeans to break off any diplomacy with Iran.

Embracing Israel

In 2023, when it appeared that the U.S. and European countries were politely declining his entreaties, Pahlavi accepted an invitation by then-Israeli Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel to visit Israel. During the trip, he also took a met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other dignitaries.

For many Iranians, both in Iran and in the West, his embrace of Israel at a time it was threatening Iran was unbecoming, if not downright traitorous. His supporters, however, were unmoved by objections. Perhaps they hoped that Israel’s patronage could help restore the monarchy.

In pro-Pahlavi rallies ever since, Iran’s former flag of Iran — the imperial flag, bearing a crown in addition to the lion and sun — is waved alongside the Israeli flag. Even Farah Pahlavi, the former queen and crown prince’s mother, whose reputation across the political spectrum remained relatively benign, was photographed holding the Israeli flag in her apartment in Paris.

After the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 7, 2023, and the ensuing genocide in Gaza, Pahlavi and his supporters maintained their support of Israel. Even as the world largely objected to the massive Israeli bombing campaign that was killing thousands of innocent Palestinians, they never wavered. (Notably, Pahlavi’s notion of civilian state-media employees as legitimate targets is the same logic that animated Israel’s widely denounced attacks on Palestinian journalists during the genocide in Gaza, which has become the deadliest war on record for reporters.)   

Related

Did Israel Just “Blow Up” Trump’s Bid for an Iran Nuclear Deal?

Then Israel attacked Iran. In June 2025, in what became known as the 12-Day War, Israel bombed from the air to destroy the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities, assassinated senior military leaders and nuclear scientists, and bombed infrastructure and apartment buildings, killing more than 1,000 Iranians, including children.

Not only did Pahlavi fail to condemn the attack on his country and compatriots, but he also called on Iranians to seize this “Berlin Wall” moment and rise up against the regime. He subsequently claimed that he had recruited, through a secure web-based channel, some 50,000 members of the armed forces and security forces to his side ready to defect at the appropriate time.

One would imagine that today, with security forces firing on demonstrations, would be the “appropriate” time. There has been no evidence, however, that a single member of the armed forces, police, or Basij militia has defected despite his continued calls for an uprising.

If anything, the unified security forces is what has prevented the protests from turning into a revolution. Since the end of December when the first protests erupted, Pahlavi has been the most vocal opposition figure urging citizens to march, first giving times and dates — which were followed by protesters in large numbers — and then directing the people to “take over” streets and city centers.

The marches were largely peaceful, but there was also some violence and rioting on the part of some protesters, including the burning of mosques and the killing of security forces. The government used the violence to justify its massive show of force and the deaths of hundreds of civilians.

Interference From Abroad

It is hard to say whether Iranians inside Iran, especially those who didn’t want to start a war with security forces or their military, are disappointed in Pahlavi’s position. Has he lost some support owing to his overt backing of Israel or his open entreaties for Trump to attack Iran? In the absence of regular, reliable polling, it is for now difficult to tell.

Related

Blowback: How a CIA-Backed Coup Led to the Rise of Iran’s Ayatollahs

What seems clear is that very few Iranians — and hardly any activists inside Iran and inside prisons — support foreign interference in their affairs or a foreign-imposed regime change. Pahlavi’s grandfather was deposed by the Allies in World War II, his father was brought back to the throne with the help of the U.S. and U.K. in 1953, and the memory of foreign meddling in Iran is very long.

At this point, it seems unlikely that the regime will fall any day soon. And, short of a prolonged war and occupation, Pahlavi will probably have to continue his campaign for leadership of a new Iran from the safety of the West.

The post Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

Wars have been distinctly out of fashion as of late, especially since the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether those quagmires are to be blamed on “dumb, politically correct wars” in the eyes of War Secretary Pete Hegseth or not, the idea of putting boots on the ground, doing regime change, occupying a country, and putting American lives in danger is political suicide.

By now, President Donald Trump isn’t shying away from calling the war he launched against Iran a “war” as he seeks the trappings of what a powerful president is meant to be doing. But Trump was more obfuscating in his speech to the nation announcing the beginning of the conflict, instead using the phrase George W. Bush used in his infamous 2003 “Mission Accomplished” speech, saying the U.S. had launched “major combat operations” against Iran, before obliquely referring to it later on as a “war” to prepare the viewers at home for “courageous American heroes” being killed in the fighting to come.

Trump has since gleefully argued that “wars can be fought ‘forever’” to those worried about America running low on munitions to use against Iran. When asked whether Americans should be concerned about retaliatory strikes on the homeland, Trump responded, “I guess,” and added, “When you go to war, some people will die.”

Related

U.S. Military Refuses to Endorse Trump Claim That Iran Bombed Girls’ School

After American stealth bombers struck Iranian nuclear facilities last June, Vice President JD Vance claimed the United States was not at war with Iran, or even Iran’s government, but only with “Iran’s nuclear program.” Absent the ability to split such fine hairs, Republicans have by and large stuck to calling the war a “decisive action,” an “extraordinary mission,” or an “intervention” — but have faltered under basic scrutiny when asked what those phrases mean in an effort not to trip wires with the American people, a majority of whom do not support the war.

Some have been slightly more agile, with House Speaker Mike Johnson insisting Operation Epic Fury is just that, an “operation” that is “limited in scope, limited in objective.” Some have taken the line that Iran has in fact been the one waging the forever war, against the United States, with the House Republican Foreign Affairs Committee publishing an image boasting that “President Trump is ending the forever war that Iran has waged against America for the last 47 years.” Others have simply tripped over themselves, with Sen. Markwayne Mullin declaring “This is war,” before correcting himself after being pressed by a journalist, saying “They’ve called it war” and “We haven’t declared war,” and that him saying it was a war “was a misspoke.” Mullin has since been nominated to lead the Department of Homeland Security.

Strangely, though, this allergy has also been exhibited by many of the war’s ostensible critics, though these lines rarely go much further. Certain Democratic members of Congress, like Sen. John Fetterman, D-Pa., and Rep. Greg Landsman, D-Ohio, have outright supported the war, borrowing language from the Republicans — the latter called it a “military intervention” — and saying targeting “missile systems and core infrastructure” apparently does not count as a war.

Others attempted some sort of bizarre middle ground, with Rep. Jared Golden, D-Maine, warning the “hostilities” against Iran were “not an illegal war — but could become one.” Even those straightforwardly against the war have made bizarre missteps, with Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., still borrowing Trump’s preferred framing in the headline of her statement condemning the war, calling it “combat operations” against Iran.

The root of this hesitation by both Republicans and Democrats stems from the memory of Iraq and Afghanistan, and how estimates of operations stretched from weeks and months to years and years, in which thousands of American soldiers died and hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed. Already the estimated duration of the war with Iran has stretched from four weeks to six to even potentially eight, according to Hegseth.

Related

Facing Years in Prison for Drone Leak, Daniel Hale Makes His Case Against U.S. Assassination Program

Barack Obama understood Americans’ fears about reentering open-ended conflicts, choosing instead to greatly expand the drone program that has informed how this war is now being executed. It also led him to describe his military interventions against the Islamic State as being explicitly nothing like Bush’s open-ended wars, where “ground troops” for combat purposes would not be returning to Iraq after the much-heralded withdrawal. Of the thousands of U.S. troops Obama ended up sending to Iraq, 2,500 still remain, with the Trump administration rejecting votes in the Iraqi Parliament that declared the U.S. military must withdraw, threatening to seize 90 percent of Iraq’s national budget (in oil revenues held at the Federal Reserve) if such measures were taken, and again threatening the country with similar punishment if it includes anti-American parties in its next government.

The war against Iran is being talked about in similar terms, of an operation that will involve no ground troops, will involve no “nation-building quagmires,” and in the words of Sen. Tommy Tuberville, R-Ala., will be a “conflict that should be very short and sweet.” As Iran proves it is not willing to immediately capitulate, reports have emerged of preparations being made for potentially months of bombardment. Ground troops, once off the table, were almost immediately put back on the table. Trump at one point saw an off-ramp within only a few days, and now demands Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” with the White House as the decider of Iran’s next leader after their assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His son Mojtaba Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader of Iran as elected by the Assembly of Experts, is apparently “unacceptable,” according to Trump.

In another echo of recent history, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used similar language about Iraq. He insisted troops were not bogged down in a “quagmire” like Vietnam and said Saddam Hussein should only be discussing “unconditional surrender” with the United States, with no other type of deal being acceptable. Rumsfeld, however, said the latter at the beginning of April 2003, days after the war against Iraq was launched, where American troops were rapidly advancing toward Baghdad.

Related

With World’s Eyes on Iran, Israel Locks Down the West Bank

Trump is making these pronouncements as his allies conversely insist that this not-at-all-a-war will be brief, targeted, precise, and still sink the “mothership of terrorism,” as Sen. Lindsey Graham has put it. Trump has signaled he wants to “go in and clean out everything,” to wipe out Iran’s leadership structure, and install a new leader to his liking. The only way this was possible in Iraq was after the U.S. invaded with hundreds of thousands of ground troops and built a new administration from the ground up with an American viceroy, himself on the ground in Baghdad in a militarily-secured compound, constantly battling with the populace.

The promise of an airpower-only regime change war, innately at odds with reality, is dissolving. Trump is reportedly considering a ground operation, potentially even with Israeli special forces, to seize the enriched uranium in Isfahan that was buried after America’s strikes last June.

Just as soon as such talk floated in the air, reports began to emerge of a potentially much larger operation to seize Kharg Island, where thousands of Iranians live, and which 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports run through. Reports continue to oscillate between plans for such expansions, including being open to assassinating the younger Khamenei, and Trump’s renewed insistences that the war is “very complete, pretty much” and that they are “very far” ahead of schedule (while in the same breath proposing a military operation to take over the Strait of Hormuz).

Despite these claims of already decimating Iran’s military, Iranian missiles continue to strike Israel with only hours, sometimes even minutes, between attacks, even as its barrages have become smaller. Every indication suggests war against Iran will not be quick like removing Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The country’s resolve is clear: When NBC News anchor Tom Llamas asked Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi last week if he feared a potential American invasion, Araghchi replied, “No, we are waiting for them.”

The post It’s a War With Iran, Not an “Intervention” appeared first on The Intercept.

Iran — according to the Israeli government — was dangerously close to producing a nuclear weapon, and Israel needed to carry out a series of assassinations of military leadership, bombings in residential neighborhoods, and attacks on nuclear production sites to stop them.

The U.S. has been providing direct military support in the days since, using its defensive weapons systems to shoot down ballistic missiles that Iran launched in retaliation for Israel’s surprise attack.

Related

Netanyahu and Trump Are Trying to Have It All

Israel wants more. Only the U.S. is in possession of the 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs that Israel says can punch through and destroy Iran’s underground nuclear enrichment facility in Fordow. Israel is calling on the U.S. to join the war and launch a series of attacks end Iran’s nuclear threat.

But according to the U.S. intelligence community, that threat is not real.

“We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that [Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so,” reads the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, the intelligence community’s official evaluation of threats to U.S. citizens, “the Homeland,” and U.S. interests which was published in March.

On Saturday, Susan Miller, the former CIA station chief in Israel who retired from the agency in 2024, told SpyTalk that current officials maintained that assessment.

Iran has repeatedly said it does not intend to build a nuclear weapon but insists on being allowed to develop nuclear power for the country’s needs. Israel is estimated to possess 90 nuclear warheads and may have the ability to launch attacks with them by land, sea, and air.

That has not stopped the Trump administration from underwriting Israel’s war with Iran and running the risk of getting drawn further into the conflict, according to experts.

Trump himself has adopted the Israeli framing of needing to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear weapon. “What a shame, and waste of human life,” Trump wrote on TruthSocial on Monday. “Simply stated, IRAN CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON. I said it over and over again! Everyone should immediately evacuate Tehran!”

Related

How Much Does Israel’s War Cost the U.S.? Don’t Ask the State Department.

The U.S. has already poured billions into Israel’s war machine, supplying it with advanced weaponry from fighter aircraft and tank ammunition to tactical vehicles and air-to-air missiles. The U.S. is also the primary supplier of all of Israel’s combat aircraft and most of its bombs and missiles. These weapons are provided at little or no cost to Israel, with American taxpayers primarily picking up the tab. The U.S. has also consistently protected Israel at the United Nations, shielding it from international accountability. 

“The Trump administration has basically lost control of its foreign policy. Israel is now dictating U.S. policy in the Middle East. They are clearly in the driver’s seat,” Stephen Semler, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, told The Intercept. “This makes Trump look incredibly weak. It should be a personal embarrassment. He’s looking like a real chump.”

Israel’s war began on Friday with a surprise attack that killed almost the entire top echelon of Iran’s military commanders and its foremost nuclear scientists. Israel has since expanded its targets, attacking energy infrastructure and Iran’s government news agency. The attacks have killed hundreds of civilians. 

On Monday night, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced the deployment of “additional capabilities to the Middle East” and said “these deployments are intended to enhance our defensive posture.” The Pentagon refused to provide further clarification about the U.S. military build-up in the region.

The Israeli strikes have prompted waves of retaliatory ballistic missiles and drones from Iran. Israel said at least 24 people have been killed with about 600 injured. The U.S. military has repeatedly helped defend Israel from Iranian attacks. The Pentagon did not respond to questions about what American assets were used or how many interceptor missiles were employed to defend Israel.

Semler pointed out that even ignoring the tremendous ancillary costs associated with stationing a carrier group in the Middle East, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and Patriot missile batteries; operating the equipment; wear and tear; extra deployments; and bonus pay for troops — among many other costs — the price tag of just the interceptor missiles is immense. Each THAAD interceptor, for example, costs around $21 million.

“Imagine it, that’s like blasting a bundle of 10 Bugatti Veyrons into the sky to shoot down just one missile coming from Iran,” said Semler referring to the $2 million supercar, one of the most expensive automobiles on the planet. “Is it really worth it? Under Trump, just as under Biden, there is apparently no cost too high for the United States.”

Related

Israel and Israel Alone Kicked Off This Escalation — In a Bid to Drag U.S. Into War With Iran

An analysis by Brown University’s Costs of War Project tallied up around $18 billion in military aid to Israel in the year following the start of Israel’s war on Gaza on October 7, 2023. This represented far more than any other year since the U.S began providing military aid to Israel in 1959.

While Israel has crippled much of the Iranian nuclear program in its bombing campaign, it appears unable to destroy Iran’s Fordow nuclear enrichment facility without America’s Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or GBU-57, which is so heavy it can only be carried by a U.S. B-2 bomber. Since Israel has neither, and the facility is buried deep underground, the U.S. would need to carry out waves of attacks on the site on Israel’s behalf.

“Using our bunker buster bombs would mean a direct war with Iran. We shouldn’t be doing that. Iran already has the know-how to rebuild its program. It has the centrifuges,” said Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., who is working to introduce a bipartisan War Powers Resolution to prevent President Donald Trump from plunging the U.S. into war with Iran. “Trump needs to make it clear to Netanyahu that this is inflaming the region and risking more conflict without a solution because the Iranian capacity at Fordow is still there.”

Experts say that Israel launched its war on Iran having been emboldened by the laissez-faire attitude of the Biden and Trump administrations, which allowed unlimited escalations of the Gaza war — killing tens of thousands of civilians — without accountability or consequence. They also say that Israel could not fight its wars without heavy U.S. involvement.

“Israel’s military capacity is dependent on the high levels of military aid it has received from the United States for the last five decades – including $17.9 billion in support since October 2023,” Stephanie Savell, the director of the Costs of War Project, told The Intercept. “That aid has ramped up over the last year allowing Israel to wage this war.”

Neither the Pentagon nor the White House would offer comment on how much the war is costing the American people. The costs, in human lives and U.S. dollars, of a full-blown U.S. war with Iran would be astronomical.

The post U.S. Intel Says Iran Isn’t a Nuclear Threat. Israel Wants the U.S. to Bomb It Anyway. appeared first on The Intercept.

Vice President JD Vance is set to lead renewed negotiations with Iran this weekend to bring an end to the U.S.–Israel war on the country that stretched into a second month. The talks come after a roller coaster of a week, which began with President Donald Trump threatening genocidal war crimes against Iran. 

“A whole civilization will die tonight,” he wrote on social media, “never to be brought back again.” 

Trump urged Iran to make a deal with the U.S. and fully open the Strait of Hormuz by Tuesday at 8 p.m. ET. Then, shortly before the deadline, Trump took to social media again to say Iran and the U.S. had reached a two-week ceasefire agreement brokered by Pakistan. Trump said the U.S. received a workable 10-point plan from Iran to begin negotiations on a durable ending to the war. In the meantime, Iran said it would allow for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Israel, however, immediately intensified its attacks on Lebanon, jeopardizing the already tenuous ceasefire. More than 300 people were killed in Lebanon by Israeli airstrikes the day after the ceasefire was announced. 

The terms of the plan are not yet clear but there are some key factors for Iran, says Narges Bajoghli, a professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University. 

“One is that Iran is asking for non-aggression from the United States into the future. It won’t take the United States’s word for it. It’s already been burned by the U.S. multiple times,” Bajoghil tells The Intercept Briefing. “Then the other big thing is sanctions relief.” But “Iran’s biggest red line is its sovereignty and independence.”

This week on the podcast, Bajoghil speaks to senior Intercept editor Ali Gharib about the path that led the U.S. back to the negotiating table with Iran. This war has proven, Bajoghil says, “both to the decision-makers in Iran, to the Iranian population, and then more importantly to the international world, is that Iran’s real deterrence actually doesn’t come from a potential nuclear bomb, but it comes from the ability to be able to stop or regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.” 

She notes, “In many ways, what actually has potentially led to this ceasefire is the fact that Iran is able to create a chokehold over 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas trade. That is an extremely powerful weapon that they have in their hands and in many ways can force shifts to happen geopolitically in a much faster way than a nuclear bomb can.”

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you listen.

Transcript

Ali Gharib: Welcome to The Intercept Briefing. I’m Ali Gharib, a senior editor at The Intercept.

Akela Lacy: And I am Akela Lacy, senior politics reporter at the Intercept and co-host of the Intercept Briefing.

AG: Akela, how are you doing? It’s been a pretty wild week. We’ve had genocidal threats. We’ve had ceasefire agreements. Now we have a shaky ceasefire agreement. Traffic opened up in the Strait of Hormuz. It closed back down. How are you viewing all this?

AL: I am struggling to keep up with the fast-changing developments, but my overall takeaway this week has been thinking about what, if any, recourse our institutional democracy provides for this kind of thing, or is supposed to provide? We have a lot of Democrats coming out and talking about invoking the 25th Amendment and instituting articles of impeachment. It feels like we’ve seen all of this before.

So it’s kind of like, yeah, we have a crazy genocidal maniac running the country. People keep telling me the checks and balances are working. I’m not convinced that the checks and balances are working.

AG: Well, tell it to the people in Tehran and all over Iran and in central Beirut that these checks and balances aren’t working, and the madman theory of conducting foreign policy seems like a much bigger gamble when it’s an actual madman.

Related

With Trump Threatening Genocide in Iran, Military Must Disobey His Orders, Former Pentagon Officials Say

OK, well, let’s talk a little bit about that. Obviously, we had this last-minute ceasefire agreement on Tuesday night between Iran and the U.S. through Pakistani mediation that came just on the precipice of the deadline expiring for Trump’s threat to, let’s call it what it is, commit genocide against Iran.

Almost immediately, the ceasefire came under strain by a few residual tit-for-tat attacks. The Iranians said that they faced a couple Israeli attacks on energy infrastructure, and the Emirates said that the Iranians were still hitting them with drones and missiles. And in short order, however, those attacks slowed down, and by all accounts, the Americans have stopped bombing Iran.

What seems to be the biggest strain on the ceasefire at this point is an incredible, almost mind-numbing level of assault that the Israelis launched against Lebanon. Can you talk a little bit about what happened there and how this has played out in public bickering between Iran and the U.S.?

AL: Something that I think has been not lost in the coverage, but under-appreciated about this war is that while the U.S. and Israel have been bombing Iran, Israel has been waging war around the world basically since October 7, pretty unchecked. Multiple acts of aggression that we covered on this podcast — obviously the latest of which is razing Southern Lebanon.

On Wednesday, there were more than 200 people killed in just one day. That’s a small fraction of the total number of people who have been killed in all of these strikes that we’re talking about.

Related

The Forever Spoiler: Netanyahu Has Been Blowing Up Diplomacy With Iran for Decades

But my reaction to this is that it feels like Israel is able to get away with this aggression, particularly against Lebanon, because we write it off because of Hezbollah, or we don’t consider the retaliation against regional countries as part of the war, even though people are being killed every single day with the implicit approval of the U.S.

AG: Yeah, with U.S. bombs as part of the U.S. war. That has been the key sticking point. When the Pakistani prime minister announced the ceasefire, or rather made the request of the Trump administration for a ceasefire — with a tweet that the New York Times later reported had been approved in advance by the Trump administration — we saw that he included Lebanon in the ceasefire. Of course, the Israelis quickly came out and said Lebanon was not involved in the ceasefire and kept going.

JD Vance immediately sided with the Israelis, and now he’s going to be the guy who’s going to be going to Pakistan along with our two favorite real estate agent Trump aides: Steve Witkoff, who was involved in the original Iran talks that were interrupted by this war, and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, who has no official role in the administration, but is extremely close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and could very easily allow Netanyahu and Israeli aggression to play spoiler in these talks.

AL: The other thing that I found maddening was that this week, I mean the day that Trump sent this tweet calling for genocide in Iran, where was JD Vance? In Hungary trying to help Viktor Orbán not lose his election this upcoming weekend.

Then there was this huge puff piece in the Times centering JD Vance as the person who really tried to stop the president from dragging us into war with Iran. Now he’s being put forth as the negotiator in these ongoing talks. I mean, when you have a Cabinet full of evil villainous characters, these are the people who are running the world.

I don’t even know the word to describe it — the fact that he’s being upheld as this person who was trying to keep Trump from going to war with Iran, while he’s halfway across the world trying to save another far-right authoritarian figure from losing because he is so unpopular, and yet we’re praising him at home in the paper of record. The framing of this was that he did something huge and valorous, when really it was showing modest opposition and, at the end of everything, agreeing to go along with it. So what are we celebrating here?

AG: Yeah, there’s a tiny bit of room to be optimistic in a world where every option is like a complete pile of crap. It’s like, maybe this is our one shining pile of crap that we can look to. It might be that he was the only guy that said something. But yeah, it doesn’t inspire much confidence that he has been like every other official who’s gotten anywhere near Trump’s circle of power: a complete sycophant of the president, has gone along and agreed with what the president says, and in the end, we still have this complete madman calling the shots. 

So I spoke this week with Narges Bajoghli about the ceasefire, about the 10-point plan, and what this looks like for regional dynamics going forward. Narges is an associate professor of anthropology and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University. She’s written several books including “Iran Reframed” and “How Sanctions Work in Iran.” Her upcoming book is called “Weapons Against Humanity.” It’s about how the Middle East became the physical, political, and moral workshop for the global weapons industry.

AL: That sounds fascinating. Let’s hear that conversation.

AG: Narges, welcome to the Intercept Briefing.

Narges Bajoghli: It’s lovely to be with you.

AG: The pleasure is all ours. 

So before we get started, I just wanted to note that we’re speaking on Wednesday morning. This is the day after Iran and the U.S. reached a temporary ceasefire agreement following Trump’s threats to annihilate the whole civilization of Iran. So let’s jump right in from there.

OK, just to quickly recap the week. On Tuesday morning, Trump threatened this genocidal war against Iran. Basically said he wanted to do war crimes and wipe out the whole civilization of Iran. He said, “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” The warning came hours before a deadline that Trump had put on Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

That deadline was set for Tuesday at 8:00 p.m. About an hour and a half before that Trump announced this ceasefire. The terms of it aren’t exactly clear, but it does seem that it was brokered by Pakistan. Iran had introduced this 10-point plan. The ceasefire is to last for two weeks. The straits are to be reopened. Those are some basic things we know. 

So in this 10-point plan, as far as we can tell, and in the ceasefire agreement, what’s Iran asking for and how likely is it that they can get there from the Trump administration? What does the Trump administration want from them?

NB: Two key things. One is that Iran is asking for non-aggression from the United States into the future. It won’t take the United States’ word for it. It’s already been burned by the U.S. multiple times. This is potentially where China’s involvement in this Pakistan-mediated ceasefire might play a big role. And it’s been reported that it has.

Then the other big thing is sanctions relief. If Iran ends this and goes back to its sanctions pre-war status quo, that’s going to be unacceptable to Iran. So a big component of this is going to be lifting of at least a very large number of sanctions against Iran.

AG: We should just say that this is a sanctions program that’s been on since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but really kicked into high gear about 15 years ago. Then when Trump came into his first term, started this program of “maximum pressure” that totally crippled Iran — impoverished it.

Related

Ghosts of Mossadegh: The Iran Cables, U.S. Empire, and the Arc of History

The sanctions have been over Iran’s nuclear program. That’s also part of what the Trump administration says that it’s getting from Iran as part of this plan, though that didn’t appear in Iran’s readout of the 10-point plan. I saw in the FT on Wednesday morning that a diplomat had told the paper that the version of the 10-point plan that they were getting wasn’t exactly the version that Iran had put out publicly.

How likely is it that Iran would be willing to compromise on its nuclear program? For example, remove it entirely, which has been a red line for them this entire time — especially given as you said, that they’re not likely to trust a U.S. non-aggression guarantee.

NB: Iran’s biggest red line is its sovereignty and independence. Within that, the nuclear program is part and parcel of it. Will it concede to certain kinds of negotiations on the nuclear program? Yes, of course. This was also part of the negotiations that were ongoing prior to the start of this war. But will it give up its high-enriched uranium completely and give it up to the United States? I find that to be a very difficult thing to be happening after this war.

It’s important to note that from the Iranian perspective, in many ways its infrastructure has been really battered. Its residential buildings, its economic hubs have been really battered throughout all of this bombing of the past 40 days.

But from Iran’s perspective and many Iranians themselves, they see that they are coming out of this victorious simply because no real regime change has taken place, Iran’s territory has not been shifted, and Iran’s state has not collapsed, nor has Iran fractured. These are all of the things that at different points in time, the Israelis or the Americans were saying were a part of this war effort.

Related

How the War Strengthened Iran’s Hand Against the U.S. and Israel

In the face of that, Iranians and the Islamic Republic understands that they can continue to withstand extreme amounts of pain in order to sustain Iran’s sovereignty and independence. They will not give up things, whether it is complete control over the Strait of Hormuz or the nuclear program in order to please Trump at this stage.

AG: This obviously has been one of the hairiest issues here. I want to talk about the government’s resilience in a moment, but just to get back to this nuclear issue.

When we’re talking about the nuclear issue, of course, the U.S. and Israel have maintained for decades that Iran is building nuclear programs. Iran says that this is an energy program, but that terrain seems to be shifting throughout the course of this war with the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who is the cleric in charge of the government, who had issued a fatwa — a religious declaration — saying that nuclear bombs were not permitted. But Iranian officials have seemed to be reconsidering that, according to some news reports.

When we talk about the nuclear program and what Iran’s willing to give up — can you just give us a little brief primer on how that became such a point of tension, and where you think things might be likely to go from this point as far as what Iran might have its eyes on? Is there something to the fact that they think that they might need a nuclear weapon to defend their sovereignty, which as you said is the top priority? Is that going to become a non-starter because of whatever negotiations happen from here forward?

NB: First of all, Iran began developing the infrastructure for nuclear energy prior to even the revolution, during the shah’s time. Then after the revolution, especially after the Iran–Iraq War, it began to invest again in the development of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

As you stated, the main purpose of it was for internal scientific and energy reasons. As I think many people now realize, even though Iran has been under all of these severe sanctions for upwards to close to five decades, investment in science in Iran, investment in medical advancement, in engineering — all of this has been very important for not just the Islamic Republic, but I think the Iranian nation as a whole.

Related

The Forever Spoiler: Netanyahu Has Been Blowing Up Diplomacy With Iran for Decades

The way that they have talked about the nuclear program and the way that even it has been verified over and over by U.N. agencies and others is that there has not been evidence of it moving toward a weaponization of this. Netanyahu himself has been, obviously, for close to 30 years now, keeps saying that Iran is weaponizing and is just a little while away from the bomb. But all of the inspectors seem to disagree with this.

Now, in this war, as you said, and also during the 12-Day War last June, there has been increased conversations within both Iranian decision-making circles as well as the general population that maybe Iran needs to go for a bomb in order to establish real deterrence against Israel and the United States. That is very much a debate that is alive right now. 

However, I think one thing that this war — that currently we are under potentially a ceasefire on — has proven both to the decision-makers in Iran, to the Iranian population, and then more importantly to the international world, is that Iran’s real deterrence actually doesn’t come from a potential nuclear bomb, but it comes from the ability to be able to stop or regulate traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

So in many ways, what actually has potentially led to this ceasefire is the fact that Iran is able to create a chokehold over 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas trade. That is an extremely powerful weapon that they have in their hands and in many ways can force shifts to happen geopolitically in a much faster way than a nuclear bomb can.

Iran’s decision makers have also studied very, very closely what happened in Iraq and Libya and other countries, Syria, around the region that attempted to go toward building of potential nuclear energy. So Iran, especially from 2003 onward, has utilized the nuclear program as a lever that they could bring onto the international stage, especially with the United States, to negotiate.

So the nuclear program for Iranian decision-makers — yes, it has importance for development of scientific knowledge within the country and energy infrastructure. But more importantly, it was really used as a thing that could bring the United States to the negotiation table. 

Today, what is becoming apparent is that, in many ways, the nuclear program before this war hit was a dead end. It actually became a bigger liability for Iran then the ability to be able to bring the United States to the table. Today, what they’re faced with is the fact that actually the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s control over it is what is not only bringing the United States to the table, but has the ability actually to bypass U.S. sanctions and be able to force other countries to deal directly with Iran economically than to even have to worry about the U.S. sanctions.

So I think in many ways the calculation here about the utility of the nuclear program for international diplomacy is beginning to lessen, as Iran is beginning to realize that the biggest card they have in their hands is the Strait of Hormuz.

AG: Fascinating. That also would seem to open the door exactly to a compromise on the nuclear issue in order to get the relief that they’ve been pushing for from this sanctions regime.

Now I want to talk about the idea of the Strait of Hormuz and the regional picture, because you wrote a great piece in Foreign Affairs called “Iran’s Long Game,” about the history of the Islamic Republic over about the past half decade or so, has proven to the country that it’s on its own and that they won’t be able to compete on conventional grounds with foreign militaries.

That’s especially true of course, in this war, we see Israel and the U.S. have this overwhelming firepower. And Iran, after years of sanctions, has been hobbled, both its economy, but also to some extent its ability to large-scale industrial mass production — but that hasn’t affected so much the weapons program. Of course, we’ve seen that one of the goals of this war for Israel and the U.S. has been to degrade Iran’s missile program, and while the amounts of missiles being fired has certainly been reduced, Iran clearly has some material left in its arsenal that have still been hitting Israel, Gulf countries, U.S. installations, and some of that has begun to slip through more and more missile defense systems.

Can you just talk about what the after-effect of this war and whatever has happened to Iran’s industrial capacity might mean for that long game going forward? Is this going to become a thing that becomes more focused on the strait? Or is this going to continue to be the broad-based regional program for Iran that is going to be small missile drone attacks on regional installations to heighten the cost for its neighbors of their alliance with the U.S.?

NB: The lessons Iran took from the Iran-Iraq War was that the way that it was viewed in Iran was that this was a war by the United States and the West using Iraq in order to weaken the new revolutionary state at that time.

AG: We should say this was a nearly a decade[long] war between a young Islamic Republic and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where Iran was fighting on its own, and Saddam Hussein was backed by the West, basically, had the conventional edge, and Iran, very improbably, with great sacrifices, held on and preserved the Islamic Republic.

NB: Exactly, and that’s really important background to have. So how did Iran fight that war was that it was forced in many ways to fight it asymmetrically. And Iran then made the decision that it could not invest and create an air force that would be equal to Israel or the United States.

That in many ways how Iran could move forward in its defense posture was to create asymmetric warfare as central to their defense posture and central to their strategy militarily. That then became tested again once the global war on terror started after September 11, when the United States invaded Iraq. Very famously, they said that next on the book would be Iran.

In order to prevent that attack from happening, Iran’s Quds Forces or the IRGC — the Revolutionary Guards’ extraterritorial forces — which at the time were later led by Qassim Suleimani, they developed also then asymmetric warfare to deal with the Americans in Iraq, later in Syria, later also, and obviously throughout all this time with Lebanon and Israel.

Related

Data Centers Are Military Targets Now

So asymmetric warfare is really cemented within how the IRGC has developed its weapons program, as well as its strategy moving forward. It has realized that these missiles and these drones are an effective way of, yes, Iran will sustain a lot of damage — as it has this past month and moving forward — but it is also able to inflict damage whether to its neighbors or to Israel or, importantly, to America’s military bases.

What it has also done is taken that idea of asymmetrical defense of the country, as we see in like this mosaic defense that they have created throughout the country where they have decentralized decision-making. The way in which, for example, Iran’s electricity — even though Trump was threatening to hit these power plants — the reality is, even if Trump had hit the largest power plants in Iran, that only supplies a little bit above 2.3 percent of the population because they have decentralized how electricity is run in the country. Because they understand that an Iran that demands sovereignty and independence is a threat to the United States and the U.S. posture in the Middle East.

So it has decentralized and taken that asymmetric warfare across all kinds of planning. That also includes the manufacturing of its drones and its missiles, which are deep underground in Iran’s mountains. So in essence, no foreign intel agency really knows how many missiles and drones Iran has. It doesn’t know where all of the different manufacturing sites of these are in these mountains.

This, again, is something that Iran has developed in order to be able to have a long fight of attrition against the United States and Israel. Because the way that Iran will fight any of these wars going into the future, if it continues, is that it knows that time is on its hands. Time is in its favor. And that by being able to do all of these things in an underground fashion, it has a particular kind of power, in a conventional sense, it would not have.

[Break] 

AG: On Tuesday, we had this threat to annihilate Iranian civilization, and leading up to that the threat had been all about these broad-based attacks on power, on bridges, on infrastructure. And as we’ve seen from a decade and a half of these extremely stringent sanctions, and also in the aftermath of last June’s war and the continued Israeli and American pressure put on Iran, that the ones who’ve always seemed to suffer from this were Iranian people before any of the Revolutionary Guard, the government suffered.

Then you had this big [New York] Times story the other day and which had come out in bits and pieces before that about how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu really pitched this war to Trump as, I don’t want to say a cakewalk, but that it would be a relatively assured effort to take out Iran’s nuclear program, its missile program, and especially to foment some revolution that would overthrow the Islamic order. That has not played out.

So if I can ask you with apologies for the two-sided question in two parts, how the government has survived and how they remain so strong despite what Israel and the U.S. had hoped to do? And what that might mean for Iranian people going forward in terms of repression, and what it means to have a government that has now survived this assault?

NB: So one thing to understand is that Iran’s infrastructure, and importantly its governmental systems, have been on the books for a little bit over a century. It predates the Islamic Republic.

You are dealing with an infrastructure and a bureaucracy and systems of power that regenerate and have been regenerating for close to a century now. Many of that has nothing to do with just the political establishment. You are also dealing with a civilizational state here that has a very clear understanding of itself and its history, and that despite the threats that Trump may make of obliterating this civilization, the fact of the reality is it’s millennia long. Iranians know that. They take huge amounts of pride in that. 

Now, the Islamic Republic also has been institutionalized very deeply within Iranian society. It has also fought these wars across the Middle East for over four decades now. It knows that one of the biggest ways in which, especially Israel, but also increasingly the United States, fight these wars across the region, is through assassination of leaders at the top. It has watched this happen. It has happened to its own commanders as well. So Iran has established four to five successors for each major role within both its military and political establishment. That’s one part. 

The other thing that I think is really important for people to understand is that Iranians have been struggling for over a century now for the independence and sovereignty of the country vis-a-vis both the West and, at the time that the Soviet Union existed, the East. For Iranians writ large, across political and social lines, to have Iran remain sovereign and independent — that is not a demand of the Islamic Republic, that’s a demand of the Iranian population. It has been a demand of the Iranian population for many decades now.

So when we saw this war begin, and also in the June war, many Iranians are extremely angry at their governing establishment for a whole slew of very valid reasons. But they also have seen the way that the United States and Israel have acted these past three years in particular, but also over the past many decades on Iraq, which is their neighbor on Afghanistan, which is their other neighbor, and they do not want to be succumbed to that.

So rallying around the flag is not rallying around the flag of the Islamic Republic. It is rallying around this idea that Iran as a territory and as a nation stays sovereign and independent. That means that in essence, and the Islamic Republic also repeats this often, is that their biggest deterrence is its population.

The fact that the population is resilient and will not give in to saying, “OK, we don’t like our governing establishment, so therefore let’s welcome what comes from the outside” — that is just incongruent with any understanding of modern Iranian history. This is why Bibi Netanyahu’s strategy has failed.

This is also why, actually, before we even got Trump and [Pete] Hegseth, much of the top brass of the American military understood this. Both understood any real war with Iran is almost impossible because of Iran’s size and because of its topography; it’s surrounded by mountains. But then the other fact is that you’re dealing with a civilizational state. And that is a very different war to fight than a war that America has been used to fighting in the Middle East, which is with states that have been carved out by colonial powers over just the past century. So that makes it very different. 

Then what do we see in the aftermath of all of this moving forward? The Islamic Republic has proved now in three wars — from the 1980s to the 12-day War to today’s war — that it is able to defend Iran’s territory. That means that coming out of this war, it is coming out in a position of victory and in a position of strength. That does not bode well for a lot of civil society actors inside of the country. Because you now have an emboldened military and IRGC, you also have a new generation of them, which has come to power because many of their fathers have now been assassinated throughout this war.

Related

Children Are Dying Because Companies Are Too Scared to Sell Medicine to Iran

This is one of the reasons why Iranian civil society actors have been so against both sanctions and war because they understand that those only create further internal repression. But at the same time, the same way that I’ve been saying that Iranians have been demanding sovereignty and independence, they’ve also been demanding dignity from their governing establishment for over 150 years. Those demands will continue, but they will shift in how they make these demands now because they are now dealing with, in many ways, a younger and more entrenched and victorious Revolutionary Guard and governing establishment that has come out of this war.

AG: Part of Netanyahu’s plan was to foment this regime change, and it seems that there were some efforts to instigate more street protests and even to arm protesters, and that would seem to, as you said, even give more reason to the security establishment to clamp down on protesters, more propaganda justifications for its internal population, and justifications for the regime to itself for doing this.

I also want to talk about this related issue of Iran’s regional push. Part of Netanyahu’s pitch to the Trump administration was to degrade Iran’s ability to project its power. This has been both through its weapons program, obviously its relationships. It seems to me that this has really backfired. What Iran’s war strategy has done is really shake the Arab Gulf states’ relationship with the world economy and especially with the U.S. It’s created fissures in the NATO alliance that even we saw that Israel’s war in Gaza wasn’t able to create.

It’s really broken things up and I don’t know how much we can say it has a direct bearing on it, but a part of that certainly has been this intense online propaganda campaign, which you just wrote about for New York Magazine, fascinating article about these videos that Revolutionary Guard-linked production houses have been putting out that are AI-generated videos.

They often use Lego characters for the main players. There’s been a couple that used AI to project the faces of popular Western actors on American politicians that was like a political suspense movie trailer. And it’s been really fascinating to watch Iran bring out these contradictions — the hypocrisies. One of the themes that they kept hitting was [Jeffrey] Epstein. Certainly they’ve hit a lot on the idea of Israel controlling the U.S., of dragging the U.S. into war. That’s been a narrative that’s really caught on with good reason in U.S. political discourse.

Part of what you wrote about was exactly the concept of, as the more stodgy, older old guard of Islamic Republic figures, especially the IRGC, that had this very reserved demeanor and took everything extremely seriously, has started to pass away, it’s the younger generation that’s come through and recognized that the old propaganda was sort of a flop, and they needed to really be able to speak to the world on the world’s terms. If you could talk about how that happened and the effect that you think it’s had, and what that might mean going forward for how Western populations especially but also in the region view Iran and their own relationships with the U.S.?

NB: Those of us who have studied Iran in the United States very closely, I had hoped this war would never come, but I assumed it would one day come, just because of the trajectory of everything.

But I thought that when this war would happen, the regularly scheduled program was something that was created from 1979 onwards with the Iran hostage crisis and Ted Koppel and “Nightline.” This idea that Iran is this really irrational theocratic state run by these old school mullahs who want to take Iran back to the seventh century. Iran actually broke through that and really went viral across the internet. 

For anyone who spends any time on any platform on the internet these past 40 days, they have been seeing Iran’s Lego videos or any other AI content and short-form videos that they’re putting out. It has shifted the way that people are thinking about Iran, and it has also shifted what they think Iran now stands for. 

Wars are fought, yes, on the battlefield. Another big part of the way that wars are fought is in the communication sphere and the narrative war. And in the narrative war, Iran has really come out on top.

Why and how did this happen? The IRGC has created, for 40 years now, a really robust media sphere. It contains different kinds of production studios, university programs. It’s humongous. But one of the biggest things that I always saw doing field work in these sites was that there was a huge generational clash between older generations of the IRGC and pro-regime media makers, who, as you said, wanted very serious films about what Iran stands for and what martyrdom means, but they didn’t even work within the Iranian population. They definitely did not work internationally. 

These younger media makers really wanted to use humor in what they were doing. They wanted to do faster cuts. They wanted to do away with forefronting martyrdom, and their elder generations kept saying no. What we saw happen in this war is, again, because of these decapitation strikes, you had many of that older generation be assassinated. So in that space — in that vacuum — these younger people came in and they began to really fill in what their fathers would not let them do.

Now here’s what the important thing is. These younger folks, they’re millennials, and they’re Gen Z. They have lived their lives online just like many of us who are their generational cohorts around the world. So why has Iran’s stuff gone viral in this moment? It’s because they’re not inventing anything new. 

Related

Netanyahu and Trump Are Trying to Have It All

Anyone who spends any time online knows that in order to make your content go viral, you don’t say something new. You add things into the conversation that is already being had, that is already being had online. So when this war started, much of the conversation across the political spectrum and across the world was about the Epstein files. Iran tapped into that; this is not a conversation Iran created. Iran tapped into that by essentially tapping into this idea that Trump is starting this war in order to prevent further Epstein files from coming out. That resonated with the MAGA world very quickly.

It also then began to say, and this again, it picked up from the MAGA world because it’s paying attention — just like anyone else who’s online all the time is paying attention to different discourses. It picked up on the fact that there’s a big contingency within that world that is saying that these are not America’s wars. These are Israel’s wars, and that this is not an America-first presidency, it’s an Israel first presidency. Again, Iran didn’t create this narrative, but it began to play into that narrative and show how this is playing out in this war. 

Then most importantly, instead of using real-life people — which Iranians have been depicted and Muslims in general have been depicted in a particular way for about 50 years in America’s political imagination and popular imagination — instead, they chose to use cartoons. They chose to use Lego videos. The Lego movie franchise is all about the creation of a resistance movement against tyrants and oligarchs. So it tapped also into that. These are Gen Z filmmakers in Iran who grew up on these Legos movies just like they did across the world.

So they are now utilizing all of these in order to further their message. Then importantly, their message is not about the importance of Shia martyrdom, which was what their fathers were creating. Their message is about imperialism, it’s about the Epstein class, it’s about the raping of women and children, it’s about a genocidal state — meaning Israel —going forward with settler colonialism, not just across Palestine, but attempting to do so across the Middle East. So it is tapping into a 21st-century language that anyone who has been paying any attention, especially since the genocide in Gaza over the past three years — that is the language of the internet.

Related

States Can’t Control the Narrative on Israel-Palestine Anymore

Then the way that I really think about this is that the United States and Israel have failed in their communications. Throughout this war, mainly because for the most part, the U.S. and Israel’s legitimacy came through — for many years — traditional media outlets. But traditional media outlets failed Gaza. They failed to be able to really explain what was happening in those past three years, and there was a huge disconnect over mainstream media’s coverage and then what everyone was seeing on their phones through a livestreamed genocide. 

Gaza shattered the way in which we understand what is going on in the world and the type of trust that we put into media institutions. Into those cracks is where Iran’s younger media makers came, and then they are now up against, in essence, older forms of media makers from Israel and the United States where that generational shift has not yet taken place. So in my understanding, it’s like 20th-century leaders trying to compete with these young millennials and Gen Z leaders in Iran at this moment in the media war living in 2026. Twentieth-century media just doesn’t work anymore.

Ali Gharib: Yeah, it’s funny when you watch the Trump administration’s AI-generated, jingoistic movies. It’s still AI-generated, but it’s a totally different language, and they do seem like they’re all made to get the retweet from one guy, which is Donald Trump. In sharp contrast, like the Islamic Republic, these Lego videos are clearly not made for Iran’s ayatollah leadership. 

I want to ask about, and this is something that you’ve written about — that is, as an Iranian has been certainly one of my hobby horses — which is the Iranian opposition politics. It’s funny that one of the few audiences with which Netanyahu’s message and his plan have really resonated, which he seems to have vastly overestimated, was that royalist faction in exile and its support inside Iran.

To be fair, the frustrations of living under the Islamic Republic for many Iranians and young Iranians — who, like their IRGC-oriented young counterparts, don’t remember the early days of the Islamic Republic. They don’t remember certainly pre-revolutionary Iran and have this nostalgia for the mini-dresses and cocktails at the Key Club that I know my parents grew up with in Tehran, and really latched on to Reza Pahlavi, who’s the exiled former crown prince of Iran. His father was the last shah. He really is a product of the U.S. He grew up there and has lived there for many years. And only in the past few years when he began meeting with the Israelis was propped up as this potential opposition leader. We have to say that he did gain some support.

I think the Israelis were absolutely way off base when they posited him as a potential leader for a new regime in Iran. Obviously, none of that has anywhere close to come to fruition yet. But one thing you’ve written about a lot was the sentiments of people more so inside Iran, but also I would add that in the diaspora as well, who have also latched onto this royalist fever dream of reinstalling the shah.

We’ve seen reports in the Western media about these views shifting. The New York Times did an article the other day, the FT had a pretty good one a couple weeks ago. So I just wondered how much you’ve been picking up inside Iran on disillusionment with this program? Have people changed their minds now that the war has continued and this gambit has failed? What does this mean for opposition politics inside Iran and in exile going forward?

NB: The first maybe 10 days of the war, there was still hope among those who were supporters of Pahlavi that the Americans and Israelis would hit just military installments or things belonging to the Islamic Republic. They even went so far — similar to what happened early on in Gaza — to say that the strike on the Iranian school in Minab that killed over 170 children at school was IRGC’s doing, which later proved out to not be true. But it began to really shift when Israel hit multiple oil depots surrounding Tehran and it created this really toxic air. It was this mass chemical campaign in many ways because of all the petrochemicals that went up into the air and then there was acid rain the next day. At around that same time, Trump then began to say that Iran’s territory and its map might shift during this war. 

Related

U.S. Military Refuses to Endorse Trump Claim That Iran Bombed Girls’ School

Then as the war continued, then Americans and Israelis were hitting critical infrastructure, and really importantly, Iran’s universities. That began to shift folks’ feelings because that then started to become a war against the Iranian nation and not just the Islamic Republic. 

It began to brew a certain “We want to change, but this is destroying the country and this is destroying the future of the country.” Then the other fact of the matter is that Reza Pahlavi and all the bets that they were making actually did not turn out to be true. The Islamic Republic turned out to be much more resilient than they thought that it would be. And with now the ceasefire — and we’ll see if it holds — but the fact of the matter is, it seems like the Trump administration wants to have negotiations with the Islamic Republic. You also have the younger son of Khamenei now in charge, and that the Islamic Republic feels that it is coming out of this victorious. So in many ways, in all the ways, I would say the Pahlavi gambit failed. 

Then there’s also a bigger story to this. Other forms of Iran’s opposition movements in the 1980s, namely the Mojahedin, which was a big organization at the time, and had a lot of support within Iran in the revolutionary period. Their leadership also sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War, and that became their death knell within [the] Iranian population. They were seen as being traitors to the country during a time of war.

The same thing is happening right now, which is that the more that Iranians were getting killed, the more that Iran’s universities and critical infrastructure was being targeted, Pahlavi was not out there condemning this. In many ways, he kept asking for more help from the Israelis and the Americans.

Again, Iran is a civilizational state, and Iranians have a lot of sense of patriotism across the political spectrum. This has nothing to do even with the governing establishment. So now increasingly, Pahlavi is being seen as being a traitor to the nation. No other Iranian leader, especially ones connected to past rule, have ever called for foreign powers to invade Iran. This is a new thing in Iranian history. That stigma is going to stick with him.

What does that mean moving forward? It means that I think any opposition tied to bringing back the former monarchy in essence is done. But I think he has also really done a huge disservice to opposition movements in Iran because now they will be targeted and stamped with this idea that you are playing with or playing good with foreign powers in order to bring change in Iran.

This is something that I think various forms of civil society actors and opposition movements in Iran are going to have to contend with and are going to have to work past. This episode in many ways has pushed back opposition movements in Iran. It’s going to be an uphill battle, unfortunately.

AG: Narges, thanks so much for speaking with us today. I’ve been a fan of your work for a long time. I can’t recommend enough that everybody follow your writings. They’re always fascinating, and you cover so many different topics, and it’s just such an interesting picture of what’s going on in both international relations and the geopolitics of Iran as well as inside the country itself.

Thanks again for joining us on The Intercept Briefing.

NB: Thanks so much for having me, and I love the work that you guys do, so thank you.

AG: We’re going to leave it there. 

But before we go, we’d love it if you helped The Intercept Briefing win its first Webby Award for best news and politics podcast. So please vote for us. 

We’ll add a link to vote in our show notes. Thanks so much! 

And that does it for this episode. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief and Maia Hibbett is the managing editor of The Intercept. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer, and Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is our copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. And the legal review was done by the illustrious David Bralow. 

Slipstream provided our theme music. 

This show and our reporting at The Intercept doesn’t exist without you. Your donation, no matter the amount makes a real difference. Keep our investigations free and fearless at theintercept.com/join. 

And if you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing, wherever you listen to your podcasts, and please leave us a rating or review. It really helps other listeners find us. Let us know what you think of this episode, or leave a general comment. You can email us at podcast@theintercept.com.

Until next time, I’m Ali Gharib.

The post Putting Fuel on a Ceasefire: Israel Tries to Kill U.S.–Iran Talks appeared first on The Intercept.

The ceasefire announced Tuesday night by President Donald Trump and confirmed by Iranian officials is on life support. If Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu gets his way, it may soon be dead. 

Over the first 36 hours of the supposed ceasefire, hundreds have been killed and thousands injured in Israeli strikes on Lebanon. The attacks extended beyond Israeli’s traditional targets in southern Lebanon and Beirut’s outskirts into the central parts of the capital — and may mark the heaviest bombardment of the country since Israel’s 1982 invasion.

Trump suggested the ceasefire remains intact because Israel’s attacks are “a separate skirmish,” but the official announcement of the agreement described “an immediate ceasefire everywhere including Lebanon.” The language was put forward by Pakistan’s prime minister, who had brokered the deal and, according to the New York Times, the U.S. had seen the text before it was publicly released.

The words “including Lebanon,” however, lasted no longer than it took for Netanyahu to talk to Trump immediately before the ceasefire announcement. Trump confirmed Thursday that he told Netanyahu to “low-key it,” appearing to give Israel a green light to immediately violate the ceasefire and put it at risk of collapse.

In response, Iran says it will not open the Strait of Hormuz so long as Israel is violating the ceasefire. And planned talks in Islamabad for the U.S. and Iran to hammer out a longer-term agreement during the two-week ceasefire window have been thrown into doubt.

For his part, Netanyahu sought to dispel any notion that the Iran war was ending, emphasizing that the ceasefire is temporary and “a way station on the way to achieving all of our goals.”

When it comes exerting Israeli influence on the U.S., Netanyahu once infamously said, “America is a thing you can move very easily.” Indeed, according to reports, it was Netanyahu who convinced Trump to launch this war in the first place.

Now, potentially upending U.S. efforts to disentangle itself from conflict with Iran, the Israeli prime minister finds himself on familiar footing: playing the role of spoiler against any form of U.S.–Iran détente.

Decades of Détente-Busting

America’s supposed junior partner has worked ceaselessly to prevent any off-ramp from confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. In 1995, when Iran and the U.S. flirted with economic rapprochement by opening the Iran oil industry to American investment and development, Israel and AIPAC lobbied Congress and President Bill Clinton to block it.

In 2002, as Iran worked directly with the U.S. on Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, seeking a grand bargain, Israel interdicted a weapons shipment it said was bound for Palestinian forces, making questionable claims about the shipment’s Iranian provenance. The seizure helped tank the exploratory talks on Afghanistan and convinced President George W. Bush instead to infamously cast Iran as part of the “axis of evil.”

Related

For Netanyahu and the Saudis, Opposing Diplomacy With Iran Was Never About Enrichment

Over the course of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear talks from 2013 to 2015, Israel worked to block a deal — with Netanyahu engaging in unprecedented efforts to sabotage diplomacy. He even addressed a joint session of Congress against a nuclear deal over the White House’s objections. Ultimately, Netanyahu succeeded with Trump’s ascension: Under intense lobbying, Trump tore up the deal and nearly brought the countries to war before his first term ended.

Joe Biden campaigned on reentering the deal, but that aim was prematurely dispatched during Biden’s transition when Israel assassinated Iran’s top nuclear scientist in 2020, prompting Iranian hard-liners to pass legislation that blew up talks. When negotiations finally began in earnest in 2021, Israel launched an attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. Iran responded by announcing it would, for the first time, enrich uranium to nearly weapons-grade. The talks, predictably, failed.

Trump’s Second Term

Though Trump has proved to be a willing partner in Netanyahu’s push to increase tensions with Iran, Israel nonetheless now found ways to play the spoiler — much in the same manner it did with Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Biden.

The Israelis successfully turned two round of nuclear talks during Trump’s second term into cover for surprise attacks. Both the war on Iran in June 2025 and the current one were initiated not amid great diplomatic impasses, but when Iran put forward workable proposals. In both cases, U.S. officials said Israel was going to act regardless of the American position — and so the U.S. had to join the wars.

These were not wars to defeat Iran, but rather wars to defeat U.S. diplomatic efforts. They are the kinetic manifestation of Israel’s long efforts to keep the U.S. in a permanent state of war with Iran, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.

If U.S.–Iran talks do move forward and there actually is progress toward hammering out a sustainable cessation of hostilities, Israel will remain a wildcard. Any long-term ceasefire will require Israel’s acquiescence.

If Netanyahu tanks the ceasefire and the U.S. and global economy continues to suffer, Israel’s already plunging support among Americans is likely to falter even further. At this point, however, Netanyahu seems more concerned with his domestic political welfare than his credibility with American voters.

Related

Fool Me Twice: The Case for War With Iran Is Even Thinner Than It Was for Iraq

Netanyahu is widely thought to benefit from wars — from Gaza to Iran and now, most critically, in Lebanon — to shore up his political fortunes. He faces an election in October and losing could lead to the revival of corruption charges that might land him in prison.

The question now may unfortunately not be whether Iran and the U.S. can find a compromise. Instead, the fate of the global economy and, not least, Iranians themselves, could rest between Netanyahu and Trump, who faces his own political challenges in midterm elections this year.

It may once again be a question of whether it is America or Israel who blinks first.

The post The Forever Spoiler: Netanyahu Has Been Blowing Up Diplomacy With Iran for Decades appeared first on The Intercept.

America’s latest gunboat diplomacy gambit comes as Trump’s two main envoys, his friend Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, have engaged in indirect talks with Iranian diplomats in Geneva. The talks are taking place even though Trump previously said no agreement with Iran was necessary. “I don’t care if I have an agreement or not,” he announced last June. “I could get a statement that they’re not going to go nuclear.” Trump added: “They’re not going to be doing it anyway.”

Trump reversed himself late last month imploring Iran to “quickly ‘Come to the Table’” or face more strikes. On Thursday, at a gathering of his self-styled Board of Peace in Washington, Trump reiterated his call for a deal. “Now is the time for Iran to join us on a path that will complete what we’re doing,” he said. “If it doesn’t happen, it doesn’t happen. But bad things will happen if it doesn’t.”

“A massive Armada is heading to Iran,” Trump announced on Truth Social.

The United States has, in fact, spent weeks moving military assets into place for a potential resumption of the war on Iran. The Ford alone can carry more than 75 aircraft, including F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters and F/A-18 Super Hornets, as well as EA-18 Growler radar-jamming jets. The Lincoln is accompanied by three warships that are equipped with Tomahawk missiles, which were used to strike two of Iran’s nuclear facilities last June. In addition to destroyers, cruisers, and submarines at sea, the U.S. has moved additional air assets needed for sustained conflict across the Atlantic including a U-2 Dragon Lady spy plane, dozens of refueling tankers, scores of additional fighter jets, and critical E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System jets, which can provide advanced radar, communications, and sensors to track and thwart planes, drones, and cruise missiles.

The massive accumulation of military forces in preparation for a potential war with Iran dwarfs even the monthslong build-up that proceeded the U.S. coup in Venezuela that saw its leader Nicolás Maduro deposed and power transferred to a U.S.-backed puppet regime.

Related

Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran

Three U.S. officials with long experience in the Middle East told The Intercept that they do not believe Trump has made a final decision to launch a new attack on Iran but the chances of it are high. All said that the U.S. attacks could possibly destabilize the Iranian regime, spur a grave humanitarian crisis, and have major impacts across the region. None thought the Trump administration had anything but vague plans to deal with such blowback.

All three officials believed that sufficient U.S. military assets were in place for a sustained military campaign. One said that Tehran may see the second major U.S. attack in a year as an existential crisis and respond by launching a more formidable counterattack than its ineffectual strikes on America’s Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in 2025.

Over the past month, the U.S. military has moved critical air defense equipment — including Patriot missile batteries and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, also known as THAAD — to the region to protect U.S. troops and allies from Iranian ballistic missiles.

Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Calif., said he believes reports that Trump administration officials think there’s a 90 percent chance the president will order strikes on Iran. He said that such a war would be “catastrophic” and lead to counterattacks that put U.S. troops in the region at risk.

Iran has repeatedly warned of retaliatory strikes on U.S. troops and allies in response to any American attack. Iran shut down the Strait of Hormuz earlier this week to conduct military exercises. 

Khanna announced on Thursday that he and Rep. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., would attempt to force a vote on a war powers resolution regarding Iran next week. “I am confident we can win this vote and assemble a bipartisan coalition,” Khanna told The Intercept. Khanna believes they can force the vote before Trump attacks Iran, but one of the government officials expressed concern that strikes could come as early as Sunday or Monday. Another speculated that Trump might be convinced not to conduct an attack during Ramadan — the Muslim holy month that began Wednesday — or at least wait for a “decent interval” in deference to other U.S. allies in the Middle East.

Trump is also delivering his annual State of the Union address on Tuesday with a reported focus on messaging around domestic issues ahead of fall midterm elections, which may impact his decision. The conclusion of the Winter Olympics on Sunday might also play a role in the timing of the attacks as the notion of an Olympic truce, or “Ekecheiria,” dates back millennia.

The White House did not reply to a request for comment.

For a president who ran for office promising to keep the United States out of wars, came into office claiming to be a “peacemaker, and has consistently campaigned for a Nobel Peace Prize, Trump has proven to be a warmonger. During his second term Trump has already launched attacks on Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and on civilians in boats in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. The Trump administration also claims to be at war with at least 24 cartels and criminal gangs it will not name and has also threatened Colombia, Cuba, Greenland, Iceland, and Mexico.

The post Trump Menaces Iran With Massive Armada Capable of Prolonged War appeared first on The Intercept.

Days before embarking America on another foreign war, Donald Trump spent more than 90 minutes speaking endlessly about America being back during his State of the Union, leveling racist accusations of Somali American fraud, and expounding on the beauty of America’s raid to arrest Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. It was a master class in testing the attention span of Americans hoping to hear anything at all about the danger that has loomed in the background now for months: the threat of armed conflict with Iran. Those who made it to the finale — and who have conscious memories of the George W. Bush years — would have noticed a similar tenor to the State of the Union in 2003, the one which paved the way for the justification of the invasion of Iraq less than two months later.

In that speech, Bush outlined the alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the myriad ways in which Iraq had supposedly deceived international investigators, and the staggering human rights abuses committed by Saddam Hussein against his own countrymen. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the president boasted, would soon outline to the United Nations the threat the United States, and indeed the world, was up against in Baghdad.

Related

Bush’s Iraq War Lies Created a Blueprint for Donald Trump

However, while many of the claims made by Bush were spurious at best and outright deceptions at worst, the claims Trump made in his speech were even less believable — and much more scattershot. Trump claimed that Iran would “soon” have intercontinental ballistic missiles that would “reach the United States of America,” that more than 32,000 Iranians had been killed in recent protests (NGOs estimated the number to be much lower, and an Iranian human rights group put the death toll at 6,488), and that the Iranian military had somehow killed “millions,” somewhere in history, with roadside bombs it pioneered. Perhaps most plainly false of all, Trump contended he just wanted the Iranians to say “those secret words, ‘We will never have a nuclear weapon,’” despite Iranian officials constantly making such insistences.

Before the U.S. and Israeli military launched strikes Saturday, the specter of an Iranian war has become something of a national miasma, the build-up having gone on now so long that its cause is imperceptible, yet perhaps everything at once. The build-up to the Iraq War was similarly argued under many causes, with Saddam’s authoritarian governance very much part of the discussion, but the aftermath of 9/11 and the supposed threat Iraq posed to the homeland was chief among them — the fire that led Americans to line up front and center behind the cause. While Iran has been on the wish list for American neoconservatives and foreign policy wonks for decades, this escalation has happened over a much shorter time frame, much more suddenly, and much more obvious in how the government is desperately in search of a compelling cause.

Stretching back into December, the cards were being laid out. Benjamin Netanyahu had made plans to meet with Trump at the White House to discuss what he saw as the threat posed by Iran’s conventional ballistic missile program, seeking a green light to initiate another devastating war, with hoped-for American support. Israel’s reasoning was not based on Iranian human rights abuses or about threats to the American homeland, but threats to Israel and “U.S. interests,” according to NBC News. Netanyahu had wanted a post-war situation similar to Lebanon’s, where Israel has been able to continue striking that country daily with Hezbollah unable to respond. Iran still retained deterrent military capacity to prevent this from happening. A greater threat, however nonexistent, needed to be communicated.

The rollout of news stories to back up Netanyahu’s claim was well-telegraphed, with reports suddenly emerging in the Israeli press that Iran was planning to use an imminent military exercise as a diversion to strike Israel. At the same time that Netanyahu was meeting with Trump, reports again suddenly emerged that Iran was seeking to develop and purchase “biological and chemical warheads” for its missiles, eerily echoing the false claims Powell made before the U.N. about Iraq.

Related

Israel Is Cynically Capitalizing on the Iranian Protests for Its Own Ends

As attention shifted to the burgeoning protests in Iran, suddenly the United States and Israel had a much stronger casus belli: supporting anti-government demonstrators to overthrow the government. Only a few days after the protests began, Trump promised the “United States of America will come to their rescue” if the Iranian government killed protesters, “which is their custom.” As the death toll mounted, far exceeding the toll of previous protest movements, the threats of intervention continued but never actually materialized. Western officials brought in Starlink satellites to keep protesters connected (SpaceX’s CEO Elon Musk has joked that he supports Secretary of State Marco Rubio becoming the shah of Iran), and unnamed foreign intelligence agencies allegedly brought in firearms used to kill over 200 members of government security forces. Yet Trump continued to promise that he was planning something, saying “help is on the way,” and demanding protesters “take over institutions” even as protests dissipated.

Trump wanted war, as did Netanyahu, but there was no conception of when it should happen, for what cause it should exactly be waged, and what would even be done. There was want, but there was no will, and there was no way. Everything had to be cobbled together in the background, sometimes to seemingly even get Trump on board with the plan he himself put into motion.

Related

The Bloody U.S. Legacy in Iraq

Reports of considering strikes on “symbolic military targets” were followed by Trump commending Iran for supposedly halting hundreds of planned executions. Declarations of an “armada” being sent to Iran’s shores were accompanied by demands to stop killing protesters, even though the protests had ceased days earlier. More reports poured in of plans for special ops raids and strikes to assassinate Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (and perhaps also his son), with reports of imminent attacks being just as suddenly thrown out as more and more military assets moved in to allow for greater and greater operations, a build-up not seen since Bush’s full-scale invasion of Iraq 23 years ago.

With attacks underway, the plan now seems to revolve around a complete decapitation of the Islamic Republic’s leadership and the overthrow of the entire system via the air — followed by a populist uprising Trump hopes will topple the regime. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take,” Trump said in a video address. “This will be probably your only chance for generations.”

The campaign of airstrikes comes only hours after the United States insisted it wanted to have a civil diplomatic conversation.

As with the diplomatic talks that preceded Iran’s war with Israel in June, these negotiations are set up to fail, and the scope of demands is now far wider and even more contradictory. Reports emanating from the discussions seem to oscillate between a willingness to resurrect some version of the Obama-era nuclear deal and a demand for what amounts to complete capitulation — with Rubio demanding restrictions on ballistic missile range and ending of support to Hamas and Hezbollah; Israel demanding the full dismantling of said ballistic missile arsenal; and Trump plainly stating “no nuclear weapons, no missiles, no this, no that, all the different things you’d want.”

There is also no consensus about what the threat from Iran is even supposed to be in the American imagination. Trump’s accusation of near-imminent ICBM production is a recent invention, clearly meant to steer things in a familiar, concrete direction. But the Trump administration cannot seem to agree on whether or not Iran is even developing its nuclear program at all — with Rubio telling reporters there is no enrichment happening, even as special envoy Steve Witkoff told Fox News that Iran was merely “a week away from having industrial-grade bomb-making material.”

Bush administration officials infamously claimed they did not want “the smoking gun” to be “a mushroom cloud,” but officials had always kept that estimate in months — the way the threat of Iran making a nuclear bomb has often been phrased as “months away” for the better part of two decades. Now, the threat is somehow both days away and barely off the ground.

Related

Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran

While opposition figures like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah, as well as Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Maryam Rajavi, have jostled for the attention of Trump’s circle, there seems to be little attention paid to their efforts, with the president dismissing Pahlavi as “very nice, but I don’t know how he’d play within his own country.” Those who remember Ahmed Chalabi and the motley crew of Iraqi opposition cronies may rest easy, as there seems to be little care at all about what would even come next. Sen. Lindsey Graham, one of the brewing war’s strongest supporters, scorned the idea of even considering the day after in an interview with an Emirati newspaper, saying: “You gotta quit saying we. It’s not we, it’s them. It’s not my job to construct a new Iran. It’s my job to give them the opportunity to construct a new Iran.”

The feeling at home, despite oversaturation in the media, could not be more different than it was before Iraq. Just before the bombs fell, 64 percent of the country supported the invasion; more than two decades later, only 21 percent of Americans currently favor an attack on Iran, with only 40 percent of Republicans supporting it. The Trump administration is apparently so concerned about the optics of the scenario they have walked themselves into that, according to reporting from Politico, officials were hoping Israel would attack Iran first, leading Iran to attack American troops, thereby rallying the country behind the war effort after the fact.

One would think that such a drive toward an unpopular war-in-the-making would galvanize Democrats, but so far, anti-war voices have been limited. Lawmakers like Rep. Ro Khanna have found themselves drowned out by demands from Democratic leaders that the Trump administration simply provide a clear explanation, apparently seeking to avoid the embarrassment of pundits and politicians after the disaster of Iraq, who blamed their initial support on buying the Bush administration’s flimsy case.

It is an unshakeable belief that consistency of logic is the primary issue with a war to cement Israel’s military hegemony, one that may cost thousands of lives. While some prominent progressives like Sen. Bernie Sanders attempted to hamper Trump’s funding to execute the war without congressional approval in June, Sanders has not made any public comments on the march to war in over a month, and other progressives like Sen. Elizabeth Warren, who have also supported anti-war initiatives, were seen applauding as Trump railed against Iran this week at the State of the Union.

The world is now watching a devastating war rage with no real reasoning, already no end in sight, and its chief belligerent making promises it cannot keep to a population it will surely massacre in the process. Unpopularity has not stopped the Trump administration before, whether it be in Venezuela or in Minneapolis, but the United States finds itself in a uniquely baffling position, where its opposition party, much like how it goes in Israel, instead begs for a better execution of the government’s evil plan.

The post Fool Me Twice: The Case for War With Iran Is Even Thinner Than It Was for Iraq appeared first on The Intercept.

Over the weekend, the U.S. and Israel bombarded two universities in Iran, the Isfahan University of Technology and the Iran University of Science and Technology in Tehran.

These are not, of course, the first attacks on civilian infrastructure in President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s illegal war on Iran; hospitals, desalination facilities, power plants, and an elementary school have all been hit.

The U.S. and Israel claimed that the attacks on the universities were justified, because they said the schools were connected to Iran’s weapons programs.

In response, Iranian authorities said on Sunday that American university facilities in the region would be considered legitimate targets, should the U.S. not condemn the strikes on Iranian educational institutions.

In a statement, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned “all employees, professors and students of American universities in the region to stay at least a kilometer away.”

Iranian students and educators received no such warning. Iran’s university campuses have been closed since the U.S.–Israeli war began last month; the weekend strikes nonetheless severely damaged buildings and reportedly wounded at least four staff members.

Cynical Justification

Leaving aside the fact that nothing in Trump’s war of choice against Iran is justified, the U.S. and Israel’s purported grounds for targeting Iranian universities are hollow and cynical. It is true that both universities had ties to military research. Would American and Israeli leaders consider their own equivalent institutions fair game? Of course not.

By stated U.S. and Israeli rationale, however, were Iran able to launch airstrikes on American soil, direct ties to the U.S. and Israeli military-industrial complex would make valid targets of at least the University of California, Berkeley; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Johns Hopkins University, among dozens of other schools.

Numerous Israeli universities, including Technion and Tel Aviv University, have research institutes dedicated to military technologies. And the Hebrew University of Jerusalem has a military base on campus for training intelligence soldiers.

Asymmetric warfare offers powerful aggressors the privilege of hypocrisy. It has long been pointed out that Israel’s justifications for mass slaughtering civilians — that Hamas uses civilian infrastructure — would in turn justify strikes on civilian areas in Israel. The Israeli government, after all, has facilities and even military installations within and near major cities and towns, not to mention the integration of the military into vast swaths of civilian Israeli life.

This is true almost everywhere that commercial and military technologies become intractably integrated, but that integration is especially robust in Israel.

Indeed, in this grim conjuncture, the idea that any site related to military research and development is a justified target could be used to attack any industrial, educational, and technological hub — which is precisely what the U.S. and Israel are doing in Iran. The U.S. and Israel’s own justifications for the Iranian university strikes de facto legitimize strikes against an MIT or a Technion, but American and Israeli leadership know that Iran and its allies don’t have the firepower to flatten whole campuses.

This is not to say that Iran will not retaliate and attempt to extract a cost from its enemies; this has been the pattern since the U.S. and Israel launched their illegal offensive in late February.

Universities including New York University, Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern, and others have lucrative campuses in the Persian Gulf monarchies, primarily in Abu Dhabi and Qatar. These schools have all already moved to online instruction and most international students and faculty have left countries facing retaliatory Iranian strikes.

Related

“Liberate Their Bodies From Their Souls”: The Lies That Sell the Iran War

These international campuses are not known for housing advanced research labs connected to military and surveillance research, but, as the student-led Gaza solidarity movement made clear, U.S. academia at large is deeply invested in multinational arms manufacturers and U.S. and Israeli military industries. Dozens of American institutions of higher education are deeply involved in the government-funded weapons research that helps make the U.S. military the most potentially destructive force in the world.

“Systematic” Targeting

Let’s not pretend, however, that the ongoing war on Iran follows any sort of valid justificatory reasoning.

According to Helyeh Doutaghi, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Tehran who spoke to Al-Jazeera, the university bombings reflect a “consistent and clear pattern, and that is the systemic de-industrialization and underdevelopment” of Iran’s capabilities.

“The targeting is very systematic,” she said, “and very designed to make Iran incapable of defending its sovereignty by relying on its iedingeounous development and indigenous industries.”

Strikes against civilian infrastructure follow the same genocidal logic that saw every university in Gaza razed to rubble within 100 days of October 7, 2023. In a video shared by members of the Israeli military on social media in 2024, a soldier walked through the rubble of Al-Azhar University.

“To those who say, ‘There is no education in Gaza,’” he says, “we bombed them all. Too bad, you’ll not be engineers anymore.”

The point, that is, is the devastation of a place and a people, foreclosing their capacity to rebuild.

The post What Would We All Say If Iran Razed MIT Because of Military-Related Research? appeared first on The Intercept.

The Pentagon on Thursday said the U.S. spent about $11.3 billion in just one week of its war on Iran; Trump economic adviser Kevin Hassett similarly put the figure at $12 billion on Sunday.

But these sums are dwarfed by estimates offered by experts in the costs of war, lawmakers experienced with the Pentagon budget, and two government officials briefed on Operation Epic Fury who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

At the very least, they say the war is burning through between $1 billion and $2 billion per day — or roughly $11,500 to $23,000 per second. The cost, the officials told The Intercept, could rise to a quarter trillion dollars or more over the coming months.

Even that is a drop in the bucket compared to the long-term expenses, which could cost the U.S. trillions of dollars in the decades to come. One of the officials lamented that Americans would be paying off the war for generations.

“If this war takes months rather than weeks, the costs will become astronomical,” said Gabe Murphy, a policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a nonpartisan budget watchdog advocating for an end to wasteful spending,

Jules Hurst III, the War Department’s acting comptroller and chief financial officer, called the Pentagon’s initial $11.3 billion estimate a “ballpark number,” speaking at the Reagan Institute’s National Security Innovation Base Summit. Hurst said a more comprehensive figure would be provided with a supplemental budget request, which he said the Pentagon plans to soon submit to the White House and Congress.

Democratic lawmakers believe the true number is far higher because the Pentagon estimate did not include many expenses, including the massive buildup of military assets, weapons, and personnel in the Middle East ahead of the conflict. Lawmakers have said they expect the Iran War supplemental request to reach at least $50 billion — on top of a $1.5 trillion War Department budget request for 2027.

When he appeared before the House Armed Services Committee recently, Elbridge Colby, the under secretary of war for policy, said that the military campaign against Iran had been “scoped out” for up to five weeks, but that the president could extend it. He was, however, unable to tell Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., the cost. “I can’t give you an answer at this point,” he said. The Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson were no more forthcoming with The Intercept.

Jacobs told The Intercept that Americans had been conned into an open-ended conflict, with unclear goals and no exit plan.

“We haven’t gotten sufficient details in public or behind closed doors about the strategy, the objectives, the length of the operation, or how much this will cost taxpayers,” she told The Intercept. “The American people are demanding an end to this illegal war to prevent more killings of children, retaliation against U.S. service members, skyrocketing costs to U.S. taxpayers, and yet another endless war.”

Hassett, the director of Trump’s National Economic Council, said the war was still expected to take four to six weeks. But without accurate information from the Pentagon on the cost of the war, experts, lawmakers, and government officials have stepped into the breach with estimates of the financial burden of Trump’s war with Iran — his second war on the country within the span of a year.

The numbers are immense.

A three-week conflict could cost taxpayers between $60 billion and $130 billion, according to the two government officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to speak freely, with both stressing that the estimates were speculative. “It’s a back of the napkin estimate,” said one official.

A five-week war could top out at $175 billion. Eight weeks could put the total at $250 billion. “They really have no idea of the real cost,” said one of the officials, noting that bookkeeping is not a Pentagon strong suit. The self-styled War Department has never passed an audit, despite almost a decade of attempts.

The Pentagon’s pre-war military buildup — which is missing from the $11.3 billion estimate — had already cost taxpayers an estimated $630 million, according to Elaine McCusker, a former senior Pentagon budget official now at the American Enterprise Institute. (McCusker said those costs are likely to be absorbed within the Pentagon’s existing $839 billion 2026 budget.) Initial estimates of the first 100 hours of the war tacked on around $3.7 billion in operational costs, munitions, and damaged or destroyed equipment, according to a cost breakdown by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS. This and other estimates turned out to be drastic undercounts as Pentagon officials, in classified briefings, disclosed that the military burned through $5.6 billion worth of munitions in just the first two days of the war. An updated analysis by CSIS now estimates that Epic Fury cost $16.5 billion by its 12th day. 

Estimates by Linda Bilmes, the co-author of “The Three Trillion Dollar War,” are in line with the government officials’ projections. Bilmes, a former assistant secretary and chief financial officer of the U.S. Department of Commerce under Bill Clinton and currently a public policy professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, says that the price tag of the war will exceed $50 billion if the conflict stretches into its third or fourth week. “Probably higher,” she added.

Bilmes cautioned that enormous short-term expenses — like spent munitions, the deployments of aircraft carrier strike groups, and aircraft shot down — will be eclipsed by even more significant expenditures like the long-term costs of veterans’ benefits and interest on the debt to pay for the war. The ultimate cost, Bilmes says, may reach into the trillions of dollars.

Related

Over Two Decades, U.S. Global War on Terror Has Taken Nearly 1 Million Lives and Cost $8 Trillion

Bilmes first called attention to the immense hidden costs of America’s wars in her groundbreaking analyses of the Iraq War. The George W. Bush administration initially put the likely cost of the Iraq War at $40 billion. By 2008, Bilmes and economist Joseph Stiglitz discovered that the real cost would be at least $3 trillion. By 2021, that figure had ballooned to around $8 trillion.

Asked about the analogous long-term costs of the Iran war by The Intercept, the Office of the Secretary of War clammed up. “We have nothing to provide,” a spokesperson told The Intercept.

Bilmes notes that around 50,000 U.S. troops are deployed around the Middle East as the United States and Israel, as well as Iran and its proxies, strike fuel depots, oil facilities, and military sites — all of which release noxious substances shown to negatively affect human health. “The majority are being exposed to toxins, contamination, acid rain, dust from infrastructure destruction, and burning oil fumes, so we can estimate that at least one-third will be claiming disability benefits under the PACT Act,” she said, referring to a landmark 2022 law expanding health care and benefits for veterans exposed to burn pits, Agent Orange, and other toxic substances. “That is a major long-term cost that almost nobody looks at.” Bilmes said that if veterans claim benefits at the rate of the extremely short 1990 Gulf War — 37 percent of whom receive compensation today — this alone would add around $600 billion in costs over their lifetimes. 

The Iran war also increases the likelihood that Congress will approve a larger Pentagon budget than Trump would have secured without it, Bilmes said. “If the budget would have increased by $100 billion, this war might bump it to $200 billion,” she told The Intercept. “That becomes the base budget and, over a decade, it’s another trillion dollars added to the defense budget.”

Bilmes explained that these long-term costs are exacerbated by the fact that all the money is borrowed. “Back in 2004, the public debt was below $4 trillion. Now the gross debt is $38 trillion — and about 30 percent of that is due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,” she said. A key contributor to that spike is the fact that the United States went to war in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 while simultaneously cutting taxes — increasing spending while reducing revenues. “This combination had never happened before in the history of U.S. wars,” she said. With interest rates almost double what they were in the 2010s, Bilmes notes that 14 percent of the federal budget already goes to interest payments, which are destined to rise further with the Iran war.

Hurst, the War Department comptroller, declined to specify exactly how much money the War Department would ask for in the supplemental request. Most sources say it will top $50 billion. Asked about the likelihood the Iran war supplemental request would pass, given Democrats’ opposition to the conflict, Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., was optimistic due to bipartisan concerns about weapons stockpiles. “There is a need that was there before the Iran conflict,” said Wittman, the vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee, at the Reagan Institute summit last week. “There’s a need there to build our weapons magazine depth. There’s a need there to make sure we’re building more expendable and attritable platforms. So those things extend even beyond the Iran conflict. This just makes it more immediate.”

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y., pushed back on talk of additional funding. “The administration has not even made the case to the American people as to why we are spending billions of dollars and dropping bombs every day in Iran,” he said during a Monday press conference. “So the notion that they would come up here and ask for additional money is beyond the pale at this moment.”

Murphy, the policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, noted that the reconciliation bill enacted last summer included over $60 billion for munitions, missile defense, and low-cost weapons. The lack of specificity in the bill would allow the Pentagon to easily utilize that, plus the remaining $90 billion from reconciliation, for Trump’s war of choice with Iran, he said.

“Billions of taxpayer dollars have already been spent on this unauthorized war. We’re facing a spiraling debt crisis, skyrocketing health care premiums, dire food insecurity, and natural disasters that are growing more frequent, extreme, and costly. These are national security issues,” Murphy told The Intercept. “If Congress believes this war is a good use of taxpayer dollars, it should vote on an authorization for the use of military force. Congress has a duty to consider any supplemental funding requests, but absent an AUMF, Congress shouldn’t approve additional funding.”

The Pentagon, Murphy said, “got a boatload of extra cash, more than $150 billion, in last summer’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act.”

With the goals of the war undefined, there is no way to project how long the war on Iran will rage on. “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on March 6, following a statement that the war could go on “forever.” 

Murphy told The Intercept that the White House needed to provide far more clarity. “Taxpayers deserve answers on the precise costs and timeline for this war,” he said. “‘Indefinitely’ isn’t an answer.”

Related

Pentagon Report: U.S. Military Fired Missile at Elementary School in Iran

More recently, the president seemed to indicate that there has been no reason to fight since the first day of the war. “Let me say, we’ve won,” Trump said last week. “You know, you never like to say too early you won. We won. We won, in the first hour it was over, but we won,” Trump said. Jacobs highlighted this uncertainty underlying the conflict, noting that Americans have been “misled into another regime-change war in the Middle East under false pretenses and with fairy tale ideas about what will happen next.”

The Intercept presented Bilmes’s long-term cost estimates to one of the government officials who offered the more immediate quarter-trillion-dollar estimate. That official agreed that Americans would be paying massive sums of money for generations to finance Trump’s second war with Iran. “These costs aren’t known to the American people. You’re never going to hear about them from the White House or the DoD,” said the official of the long-term expenses highlighted by Bilmes. “My kids’ kids, and probably their kids, are going to be paying for this.”

Correction: March 17, 2026, 5:06 p.m. ET
The article has been updated to correct the year Laura Blimes and Joseph Stiglitz determined the cost of the Iraq War would be at least $3 trillion; it was 2008, not 2015.

The post Trump’s War on Iran Could Cost Trillions appeared first on The Intercept.

The war in Iran has entered its first ceasefire — a two-week break from hostilities brokered largely by Pakistan that all sides have agreed to, with negotiations on a permanent end to the war to follow starting in a few days.

It’s hard to say who has emerged a “winner” in the war so far, but certainly when one examines what has been accomplished and what has not, the U.S. cannot claim a resounding victory, even as it demonstrated formidable military prowess.

Iran may, in fact, be the country that can claim the victory. It’s not just that the Islamic Republic of Iran survived, it’s also that the country demonstrated its control over the Strait of Hormuz — an outcome that establishes Iran’s position as both an influential regional force and a player able to exert sway over the entire world economy.

After the ceasefire announcement, Iran’s first vice president posted on social media: “Today, a page of history has been turned; the world has welcomed a new pole of power, and the era of Iran has begun.”

It sounds like Trumpian hubris, but it can’t immediately be dismissed as a far-fetched fantasy.

Survival — and More

First, the regime had to survive. And it did: Despite President Donald Trump’s self-serving claim, the regime in Iran hasn’t changed. In fact, the Iranian government may have become even more hard-line and less accommodating than before.

Iran took a beating. Despite the depletion of some of its strategic assets, however, the country has maintained many of its strategic capabilities.

Related

Lesson From Ukraine: Breaking Promises to Small Countries Means They’ll Never Give Up Nukes

The war hasn’t, for instance, eliminated the uranium stockpile Iran still possesses, though it is buried deep underground — leaving unmet another of the demands that the Trump administration. It is unclear if any of Iran’s thousands of advanced centrifuges survived the bombings in June of last year, but Iran’s ability to manufacture new ones has not been eradicated, despite the loss of some of its nuclear scientists over the past year.

Neither have Israel and the U.S. eliminated all of Iran’s missile launchers or its production lines, as evidenced by the ongoing attacks against Israel and neighboring Persian Gulf states with direct hits up to the ceasefire taking effect. Iran’s drone supply and production line also don’t appear to have been eliminated.

The war, in other words, hasn’t prevented Iran from being a threat to U.S. allies in the region — a threat that has shaken the Arab Persian Gulf states’ faith in U.S. security guarantees, to say nothing of investors’ confidence in the Emirates as a financial capital.

The Gulf is not the only region where the U.S. will suffer international consequences. The war also stoked tensions between Iran and Western nations — some of which assailed the U.S., while even staunch allies in Europe refused to cave to Trump’s admonishments to join the war.

Iran may remain one of the most geopolitically isolated states in the world, but U.S. isolation is rapidly on the rise as well.

The Clincher

Scoring the war and the previous attack on Iran’s nuclear sites like a boxing match, one might argue that Iran has “won” the second round, despite being bruised and bloodied in the fight.

Surviving intact after more than five weeks of intensive day and night bombing by two nuclear powers, the assassination of its supreme leader and some of its top leadership, and the destruction of infrastructure will itself be viewed by the regime and its supporters as victory.

Related

With Trump Threatening Genocide in Iran, Military Must Disobey His Orders, Former Pentagon Officials Say

The regime’s ability to keep fighting against arguably the greatest military power the world has ever seen will be viewed in Tehran and abroad as a remarkable show of strength, potentially establishing a deterrent against future rounds of fighting.

Ultimately, though, it is Iran’s demonstration of its ability to control the flow of oil, gas, and goods through the Strait of Hormuz that would clinch the match. It became evident that Iran’s sway over the strait, creating a toll booth of sorts, was virtually impossible to undo, short of a major ground invasion — something Trump and even his most reckless advisers were loath to authorize.

Leaving aside the bonus Iran received from the jump in prices as it continued to sell oil during the conflict, the toll it began charging — which amounts to about $2 million per ship — will fill its almost empty coffers in short order.

In his remarks to the press, Trump did not seem to be especially concerned with the toll, even suggesting that he, like any mafia boss, would like a piece of it. Iran may, in the event a permanent peace deal is achieved, even agree to pay the protection money if it guarantees the safety of the regime.

Stronger Position in Talks

From the perspective of many in the West and certainly in Iran, the claim that Iran “won” the second round of the match rings truer than the U.S. claim of having accomplished its goals.

Related

The Regime Survives, Trump Has to Deal, and Iranians Are the Biggest Losers

The U.S. and Israel’s assassinations and destruction of military and civilian infrastructure were never contestable; Iran was never a match for the two countries’ conventional forces. To what end, though, was the question.

Whether there is a final peace deal or not, the ends of the war can hardly justify the U.S. and Israel’s means. It may be enough to dissuade military action even absent a deal.

And looking forward, in terms of a longer peace deal and nuclear agreement, Iran is arguably in a stronger position than the days before the war.

At the announcement of the ceasefire, Trump said the Iranian 10-point plan was a workable start to negotiations. Though there are some disputes about whether the proposal Iran presented publicly matched what was transmitted privately, many of the new plan’s pillars matched those presented and what Omani mediators had described as a workable proposal for a diplomatic solution.

By surviving a war and inflicting real pain — physical and financial — on both the aggressors and their enablers, Iran can probably extract more concessions from Trump than it could before.

With his eye on the markets, the price of gasoline, the unpopularity of the war, and the realization in the wake of his apocalyptic threats that there is universal opposition to actually taking Iran back to the Stone Age, it should be obvious by now that Trump wants to put the Iran issue behind him as soon as possible.

In this way, too, the Iranians have shown that they have the upper hand. While Trump and Israel have demonstrated that they don’t understand the Iranian political system, the Iranians have a solid grasp of U.S. politics. They know about the upcoming midterm elections. Perhaps now they think the survival of the Trump regime is actually what’s at stake.

The post How the War Strengthened Iran’s Hand Against the U.S. and Israel appeared first on The Intercept.

The lethal strike on the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school building was the result of a “targeting error” by the U.S. military, which mistook the facility for part of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy base that was adjacent to the school, according to one of the U.S. officials who spoke to The Intercept on the condition of anonymity to discuss an ongoing investigation.

U.S. Central Command attacked the school based on long outdated coordinates for the strike provided by another defense agency, one of the officials told The Intercept. While the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school was once connected to the IRGC base by roads, the building was partitioned off by 2016, according to an investigation by New Lines Magazine.

The attack, which came after a yearlong effort by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to gut programs to reduce civilian casualties, killed more civilians than any other strike in Trump’s second Iran war. It was “colossal negligence,” one of the current government officials said.

Trump has repeatedly claimed that Iran was responsible for the strike, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. “In my opinion, based on what I’ve seen, that was done by Iran,” Trump told reporters March 7. “They have no accuracy whatsoever. It was done by Iran.”

Wes Bryant — who served until last year as the senior analyst and adviser on precision warfare, targeting, and civilian harm mitigation at the Pentagon’s Civilian Protection Center of Excellence — called the attack on the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school a “failure in fundamental targeting doctrine and standards.” 

Bryant, who called in thousands of strikes across the greater Middle East as a Special Operations joint terminal attack controller, said it was common to rely on outdated imagery while conducting operations.

Related

U.S. Military Refuses to Endorse Trump Claim That Iran Bombed Girls’ School

“As a targeter, the imagery and initial intelligence data you receive on a potential target or target set is just the start. You don’t prosecute based solely off any organization — NGA or otherwise — giving you an image and saying they have intelligence that it’s an enemy location,” he told The Intercept, referring to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which specializes in such imagery. “You corroborate with other intelligence, and you conduct as near real time as possible characterization of that target as well as the civilian presence and risk to include collateral damage analysis risk of civilian casualties.”

U.S. Central Command refused to comment on the preliminary findings of the inquiry. “It would be inappropriate to comment given the incident is under investigation,” a CENTCOM official told The Intercept by email.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency did not immediately reply to requests for comment on their potential involvement in providing intelligence that led to the strike.

The investigation’s findings were widely expected as evidence of a U.S. attack on the school mounted. A video released on Sunday by Iran’s semiofficial Mehr News Agency showed a cruise missile striking the IRGC naval base beside the elementary school as smoke appears to billow from the school itself, indicating that it had recently been struck. According to Bellingcat, the cruise missile was a Tomahawk missile. The U.S. is the only party to the conflict employing Tomahawk missiles.

“America, regardless of what so-called international institutions say, is unleashing the most lethal and precise air power campaign in history,” Hegseth said at a March 2 press conference. “No stupid rules of engagement.”

CENTCOM would not offer an estimated civilian death toll for the U.S. war on Iran. More than 1,300 Iranian civilians have been killed, according to the Iranian Red Crescent Society.

An investigation by Airwars, a U.K.-based airstrike monitoring group, found that the first days of the Iran war saw far more sites targeted than any recent U.S. or Israeli military campaign. “While the rate of civilian harm cannot be solely predicted by the number of targets hit, initial indications suggest it has been high — particularly with U.S. targets correlating with heavily populated areas,” according to the Airwars report. “The targets map heavily onto the highest populated areas.”

The post Pentagon Report: U.S. Military Fired Missile at Elementary School in Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

From the White House to Iran’s former crown prince, proponents of the U.S.–Israel war on Iran sell it to the American people — and Iranians themselves — as a crusade for liberation. Instead, the regime remains in place as the death toll grows, environmental hazards proliferate, and civilian infrastructure is decimated. 

As if the destruction inside Iran itself wasn’t enough, the war is starting to have serious ramifications for the global economy and, more to the point, expanding into neighboring countries.

Lebanon, in particular, has come into Israel’s crosshairs, with increasing Israeli incursions and missile strikes deeper into the country. The number of dead there is approaching 1,000 with Israeli missiles razing entire apartment blocks in central Beirut this week and a ground invasion getting underway. More than 1 million Lebanese people have been displaced.

“I think the Lebanese are suffering now, and there’s not really anyone who’s trying to save them,” says Afeef Nessouli, a Beirut-based journalist, speaking to The Intercept Briefing. “They know that, and they know that they’re just political pawns who are always at the worst end of the stick along with Palestine.” He adds, “The fear is that [Israel] will occupy south of Litani [River] … and just take people’s homes, take their land, and never give it back, make settlements for their country.”

“It’s been really stunning to watch that so many people fall for this idea of ‘This is a human rights intervention’ — and yet it’s accomplished through massive human rights violations,” says Ali Gharib, a senior editor at The Intercept. Commenting on Israel’s strategy of making failed states out of its adversaries in the region, he notes, the Israelis “don’t need [Reza] Pahlavi to work. They don’t need him to go in there and become this democratic leader. They just need him to lead a movement that damages the regime enough to put Iran into some kind of fractured state or state failure where it’s not a threat to Israel anymore.”

“We’ve had in the last 20 to 25 years, especially since the Iraq War in 2003, a lobby pushing for regime change in Iran,” says Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, a veteran peace strategist. “The Iraq version of regime change ended up being a catastrophe from a U.S. perspective, but actually from an Israeli perspective and from a Saudi perspective, and even from a UAE perspective, the decimation of Iraq has been a success because if Iraq had turned out to be a liberal democracy, it would’ve challenged Israel on the question of Palestine. It would’ve challenged Saudi Arabia on the question of Islam and what is Islam.”

It’s a region in upheaval, and at the center are Israeli and American fictions about liberatory bombs.

“I’ve been on podcasts with Israeli journalists where they’re telling me the Iranians wanted us to go in and liberate them,” says Naraghi-Anderlini, “And my response to them is: Liberate their bodies from their souls?”

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you listen.

Transcript

Ali Gharib: Welcome to The Intercept Briefing. I’m Ali Gharib, and I’m a senior editor at The Intercept. The U.S. and Israel’s war on Iran is stretching into its third week, with attacks having started on February 28. The bombardment of Iran has remained relentless. At least 1,400 people have been killed and more than 18,000 have been injured.

Civilian infrastructure has taken a hit too, including Iranian hospitals, pharmaceutical plants, educational centers, and civilian energy depots. Iran, for its part, has retaliated by launching missiles and drones into Israel itself, as well as attacking U.S. bases in the region. It has also targeted energy infrastructure in the nearby Gulf Arab states.

Meanwhile, Israel has increased its attacks on Lebanon, killing more than 900 people and displacing more than 1 million, and it’s preparing for a ground invasion against the paramilitary group Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. 

On Wednesday, Israel expanded its airstrikes into central Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, where it razed residential buildings. 

Afeef Nessouli, is a journalist and Intercept contributor based in Lebanon, where he has been reporting since November. He joins me now from Beirut.

Afeef, welcome to The Intercept Briefing. 

Afeef Nessouli: Yeah, thanks for having me, Ali. I appreciate it. 

AG: Afeef, what can you tell us about what it’s actually been like in the parts of Lebanon where you’ve been reporting, since Israel increased its attacks on the country following the strikes against Iran? 

AN: So I’m in an area of Beirut called Tayouneh. Tayouneh is hundreds of meters away from the evacuation orders that have been all over the southern suburbs — it’s just right north of the southern suburbs — so it’s very loud here. Right outside of my area, there’s hundreds of tents lined up.

It’s right outside of the park. Horsh Beirut is this public space, and families from the southern suburbs have just lined up their tents and have had to make do with such little resources.

It’s really so hard to see so many people without shelter. It’s just a catastrophic situation.

AG: It’s not entirely surprising to hear that you might be seeing people there in tent cities, given that, I think I read that 1 in 5 Lebanese people were displaced now, and especially with Israel expanding its attacks into Beirut and central Beirut, as we saw on Wednesday, decimating parts of central Beirut and imploding with missiles buildings in the center of town.

So what have you been seeing, what have you’ve been talking to people there, internally displaced people? 

AN: So on Wednesday, Israeli airstrikes hit central Beirut. They killed at least 12 people, wounding 41 people.

Going to the strike areas is really just awful to see and awful to witness. Buildings are rubble. It’s causing panic and fear among people in places that were not told to evacuate.

I talked to a mother who was displaced from the southern suburbs, a neighborhood called Bourj Al Barajneh. She’s been staying under this huge statue of a crescent moon right outside of Al Amin Mosque in downtown Beirut. She’s mostly just worried for her kids — worried that they’re not getting enough to eat, worried about them just being terrorized, and also it’s just so cold. 

You have to understand: Everything is all hands on deck. So a lot of schools are being turned into shelters. The stadium has been turned into a shelter.

One I visited in Ras, Beirut, which is in northwestern Beirut, over 200 families I think were in and out of that shelter. People are sleeping on the floors. I spend a lot of time with an organization called Truth Be Told that’s passing out hot meals from donations and prescription medication around Horsh Beirut, where all the families are lined up in tents.

What you’re mostly hearing is that people don’t have anywhere to go. They have nowhere to sleep. And everywhere they do have to sleep is incredibly uncomfortable. There are men sleeping in their cars. There are cars everywhere. People are struggling. They’re struggling to survive in an economy that was already just decimated from the last few years.

Related

Israel Is Banking on U.S. Support for a Wider War Against the Axis of Resistance

AG: I’m curious, on the geopolitics, Afeef — how do you think these attacks have affected Hezbollah, the Lebanese paramilitary group from the south of the country but has become a central player in Lebanese politics and obviously a group closely linked with Iran? Is your sense that Hezbollah has been weakened by these attacks? Is the group continuing to be diminished or are they holding pretty firm at this time? 

AN: I can say that a lot of people inside of Lebanon and a lot of people outside of Lebanon had seemed to count Hezbollah out, for the most part. They had seemed decimated, especially after the Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah was killed. It seemed like they were taking a long rest period. 

So a lot of the criticism is, Israel had had over 10,000 ceasefire violations — and it took the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to be assassinated for the group to push into the war and take decisive action. 

AG: And of course, you’re talking about Hassan Nasrallah, the late leader of Hezbollah who was killed by Israel during an earlier round of its war with Lebanon — [after] a pager attack that Israel lodged against Lebanon, where it loaded pagers with explosives and meticulously distributed them to Hezbollah officials, killing scores of Hezbollah officials as well as countless civilians. And Ali Khamenei was the supreme leader of Iran until he was assassinated by Israel at the outset of this latest war with Iran.

AN: After the supreme leader was assassinated, I went to the public mourning in Dahiyeh. It was literally the evening of when Israel started striking the southern suburbs, and you could tell that the emotion was palpable. People were crying, people were wailing, people were chanting, people were angry. It was extremely well attended, it was extremely big.

Ultimately, the same night, I was awoken in the middle of the night by two really loud strikes on Dahiyeh. It was really clear that Hezbollah had decided to take Lebanon into the war. And a lot of Lebanese people were pretty upset at that. They felt like they weren’t given any consent; they were not able to consent to this sort of act. It’s become a pretty polarizing subject.

Related

Beirut Suburbs or “Hezbollah Stronghold”? U.S. Media Parrots Israeli Propaganda to Justify Bombing Civilians

A year ago, when Hezbollah entered the war on behalf of Gaza, I think people were more amenable to the idea. They understood that Israel wanted to make incursions into the country and occupy land. I think in the last year, having not really responded to a lot of ceasefire violations in the south, but responding to Ali Khamenei’s assassination was just a disappointment to a lot of Lebanese people who felt, “Well, are you acting on behalf of Iran, or are you acting on behalf of our best interest?”

It seems like they’ve lost some support on the ground. So there is that, there is a decimation of their reputation right now, from what I am at least gathering on the ground. But also there’s a lot of people who understand or the people who are on the front lines, they’re the ones who have to self-help when all of their houses are demolished. And there’s military access roads for Israeli occupation soldiers to literally making their demolished houses gone forever because now there’s military access roads paved on top of them. 

In Lebanon, there’s so many political opinions. And when something like this happens, it really feels like the people of the country are pitted against each other. It feels like this big psychological operation done to Lebanese people for decades to separate them into sects, into tribes, and to get them destabilized, while all of these outside forces are manipulating their lived experience, their day-to-day experience. I think most people really just want to have a Lebanon that they can depend on economically, that they can depend on politically, and that they can depend on in general for having a life that isn’t burdened by cycles of violence every few months. 

AG: Touching on that a little bit, I’ve talked to my friends, Lebanese friends, who admittedly are probably very self-selecting, but it seems they have sensed a resentment. You were sort of touching on this, a resentment of the fact that between the so-called ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and the Israeli assassination of Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, there were some tens of thousands of Israeli ceasefire violations recorded, and none of these prompted a response from Hezbollah. But their willingness to go in retaliation for the assassination of a foreign leader — do you sense that kind of resentment? Is that one of the things contributing to Hezbollah’s diminishing stature?

AN: Yeah, so I spoke to one woman last night. She’s in her mid-30s. She has family from the south. Someone who theoretically supported Hezbollah getting into the war on behalf of Gaza after October 7. Someone who understands having land in the south — family homes in the south — that have been under fire for, really, decades. She says that, in the last year and a half, since the so-called ceasefire was brokered, after 10,000 violations from Israel, after Hezbollah really didn’t respond to all of the violations, and yet they woke up on behalf of the supreme leader’s assassination — just doesn’t sit well with her. She doesn’t see the reason why Lebanon would have to be in this fight. 

But on the other hand completely, there’s also this sophisticated understanding, obviously, that there’s a neighbor to the south that has occupied an entire country and wants to have the Litani River be its northern border. There is this idea that Israel has been manipulating and manufacturing this feeling for a while, that they are coming in and they were going to come in and they were attacking Lebanon much before Hezbollah had ever come around.

The fact of the matter is that Israel really does want to sow discord in the sectarian populations of Lebanon. They have dropped leaflets a couple days ago in central Beirut saying, “Lebanon is yours. You can inform on Hezbollah” and like they shared a QR code.

And then they target residential buildings and say, “We’re coming after Hezbollah” and cause psychological damage and physical damage and ruin so much peace for so many people. Ultimately what ends up happening is that a lot of people discriminate against people from the south, people from Shia backgrounds, because they’re basically afraid that if they let them into their buildings or try to take care of them, they’re going to be around people that are affiliated with Hezbollah and are going to be targeted. 

A lot of these people are just displaced. They’re unhoused in rain, their houses have been destroyed, and then their fellow patriots are literally just terrified that being around them or letting them in is going to result in Israel killing all of them. That’s a real fear on the ground right now.

It’s something that feels very beneficial to Israel and the U.S. to have: sects in Lebanon fighting each other all of the time not paying attention to the slow incursions — the slow pushing forth — on the southern border. Also, it’s probably beneficial to countries like Iran to pour money, pouring arms, have proxies that are fighting its battles.

Ultimately what happens is that the situation on the ground becomes unbearable. Everybody’s trying to pressure the people to orchestrate some heroic political ends that is impossible for the people to do because they’re obviously being manipulated by powers much larger than them. I think the Lebanese are suffering now, and there’s not really anyone who’s trying to save them. And they know that. They know that they’re just political pawns who are always at the worst end of the stick — along with Palestine. So, yeah, it feels really dismal in Lebanon right now. 

AG: You mentioned in the south, the razing of people’s homes to make roads for Israeli military infrastructure as they increase their ground incursions and seem to be making preparations for a full-scale ground invasion.

Of course, this is all fraught with the history of the rise of Hezbollah in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, an occupation that lasted for nearly two decades with ongoing hostilities in the two and a half decades since 2000, when Israel officially left south Lebanon. What is the mood among people today in Beirut and also more broadly in Lebanon with regard to fears of what an Israeli occupation could mean for the future of their country?

AN: I think most people in Lebanon look at Israeli occupation as something that’s just unacceptable. While there’s a lot of opinions that are diverse politically in Lebanon, sometimes in contradiction of each other, one thing I think that is mostly true is that most Lebanese people do not want any normalization with Israel. There are some people who do, but it’s not many.

Related

Israel Exploits Assad’s Fall to Expand Into Syria

The fear is that they will occupy south of Litani — the Litani River is Israel’s northern border — and just take people’s homes, take their land, and never give it back, make settlements for their country. The feeling and the fear is that actually the more Israel does, the more it greedily takes up land, the less that anyone in Lebanon is going to stop fighting back. Because the fear is that there’s always going to be violence, and being caught in a cycle of violence and a cycle of economic destruction. I think most people really just want a Lebanon that is peaceful. I think they want a Lebanon that they can feel safe in. And now half of the country really feels like Hezbollah has dragged them into this war.

A lot of people know that Israel would’ve done it anyway, and a subset is always going to fight back on the southern border because that’s where they come from. So it just becomes a ripple effect for everybody in the country. Nobody wants the land to be occupied by Israel, but also not everybody at all wants to be in war constantly with Israel either.

So you just have different lived realities where there are people who are losing their homes, they’re displaced, they’re suffering, they’re fighting back as best as they can. Then there’s people in Lebanon who are living in a totally different reality and are really mad because, admittedly so, their city is getting bombed, their economy is degrading, they have no chance for a future that feels at all stable. So you just have a society that is at the highest level of tension — and everybody, without fail, is afraid of civil war.

Related

Are Trump’s Middle East Envoys Pushing Lebanon Into Another Civil War?

Because the truth is that Hezbollah is part and parcel of society. So when the Israelis and the U.S. pressure the government to disarm Hezbollah, a lot of Hezbollah is in all sorts of society. A lot of them are in the army. So it’s not an easy fix here.

I think the idea is that the Israelis want to make it seem like the government can just easily disarm Hezbollah, and if they don’t, they’re going to get punished for it. But it’s obvious that’s impossible. So it’s made people feel completely disenchanted with all of the leadership that’s involved and the leadership in the state as well, because the response has been mostly inadequate. It’s just something out of a horror show.

AG: Given what we’ve seen, pretty clearly seems to be Israel’s strategy of making failed states out of its adversaries in the region, you have to wonder if Israeli’s strategic thinking is exactly to stoke that resentment. So yeah, a complicated situation. 

Afeef, thank you so much for taking the time to talk to us. It’s really a pleasure and really appreciate all your insights and also your excellent reporting. So thanks so much for joining us on the Intercept Briefing. 

AN: Ali, I really appreciate you for covering Lebanon and having me on your show.

AG: After a quick break, I’ll be speaking to Sanam Naraghi Anderlini about Iran. Sanam is a peace strategist and founder and CEO of International Civil Society Action Network, or ICAN. She has served around the globe as expert for the U.N. on conflict mediation and was architect of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. 

We’ll be right back.

[Break] 

AG: Welcome back to The Intercept Briefing. I’m Ali Gharib. 

The war in Iran is deepening. Instead of finding ways to tone down the conflict, all the sides are doubling down on ultimatums and escalation. The cost has come in human lives, including to Gulf residents, Israelis, and American troops, but most notably in Iran, where Israel and America have been expanding their bombing campaigns, including carpet bombing in densely populated cities.

Joining me now to discuss all this is Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, a peace strategist and the head of the civil society network ICAN.

And full disclosure here: This is gonna sound familiar to members of the family WhatsApp group, because Sanam is actually my cousin. 

She’s also a veteran peace builder and has been working on conflict resolution for decades. She intimately knows Iran and is an analyst on these issues as well. Thanks for joining us, Sanam.

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini: Thank you for having me. 

AG: I wanted to talk to you a little bit about the trap that the war is falling into — this kind of logic of “escalation of all sides.” There are all these interested parties that are involved in the war — which is basically the Iranians, the Israelis, and the Americans — and they all have different interests. Can you talk about how all of those different interests right now point to this conflict escalating, rather than finding any off ramps? 

SNA: So the way we have to understand this is that you have an Iranian regime that is basically focused on survival. They’ve always been — their logic has always been survival.

In a conflict like this, with two nuclear states, they are fighting a war of asymmetry. So their tactics have been, “How do you escalate the pain for the other side?” to actually bring it to an end quicker. We call it the “hurting stalemate”: How do you get into a stalemate of some sort that is hurting the various parties, so that you end up with some kind of resolution? But at the moment, it’s the logic of escalation to get to that point of pain. 

Related

Israel and Israel Alone Kicked Off This Escalation — In a Bid to Drag U.S. Into War With Iran

For the Israelis, the logic has always been to try and decimate Iran as a regional power and as a power that would challenge them on the question of Palestine more than anything else. We saw that for them, the decimation of Iraq — or basically Iraq falling to its knees, as opposed to turning into a liberal democracy or Syria or Libya or any of these countries. Their fragmentation and essentially the destruction of the state in those countries was beneficial to the Israeli cause of both Greater Israel, but also vis-a-vis specifically the Palestinians.

So right now, with the Iran war going on, they also want to do as much damage as possible, and we’re seeing that on a daily basis. Hospitals have been hit, civilian sites have been hit, residential areas. When they went after Larijani, the national security adviser, over 100 civilians were killed.

We’ve just heard on Wednesday about a petrochemical plant that’s been hit. This is de facto chemical warfare now being played out, using the sources that are on the ground. So they are going full on and essentially escalating.

Iran is retaliating and is doing a sort of matching retaliation. You hit a petrochemical plant, they say, we’re gonna hit yours. So then comes the U.S. The U.S. — as we have repeatedly now heard from different U.S. officials — doesn’t really know why it’s doing this. Iran was not a threat to them. There was no nuclear threat, there was no ballistic missile threat. They got dragged into this war by Israel, and they are now in it. 

The problem is that as a major power — as a superpower, frankly — they can’t be seen to lose. So it’s a little bit like the situation of Russia and Ukraine. Russia can’t be seen to lose to Ukraine. So the U.S. is now caught in that kind of trap. So they’re also escalating at the moment.

But actually what I’m really worried about is that there are no guardrails. We don’t have anyone standing and actually being the grown-up in the room saying, “There are nuclear plants. They shouldn’t be hit.” The implications of a Bushehr plant, which something was lobbed there. No damage was done. But the implications of this kind of damage and radioactive spillage for the entire Gulf region is really significant. And yet there is no real attention to this kind of escalation or trying to put, as I say, guardrails around essentially what are war crimes happening now.

AG: Sanam, maybe you can speak a little bit to what you see on the broader international scene, because I think there have been some shifts in the past week where we’ve seen Europe pushing back on a few things. But this has all been set up by a very long campaign that’s largely centered around human rights as an idea for justifying this sort of intervention and interventions like it before. We saw this in Afghanistan, we saw it in Iraq. We’ve seen it in a lot of places. 

For you and I looking at this who’ve worked in this world — you more than myself — it’s been really stunning to watch that so many people fall for this idea of “This is a human rights intervention” — and yet it’s accomplished through massive, massive human rights violations. This targeting of civilian infrastructure and civilian facilities and homes and disproportionate casualties happening on things like the Larijani assassination.

Can you talk about how we got to this place where this rhetoric is built up around human rights to justify something like, if not quite a total war, at least a massive full-scale destruction of a country that we’re seeing in process right now? 

SNA: We’ve had in the last 20 to 25 years, especially since the Iraq War in 2003, a lobby pushing for regime change in Iran. They did it in Baghdad. It used to be said that men go to Baghdad, real men go to Tehran. The Iraq version of regime change ended up being a catastrophe from a U.S. perspective, but actually from an Israeli perspective and from a Saudi perspective, and even from a UAE perspective, the decimation of Iraq has been a success because if Iraq had turned out to be a liberal democracy, it would’ve challenged Israel on the question of Palestine. It would’ve challenged Saudi Arabia on the question of Islam and what is Islam; we wouldn’t have ended up with all this sort of Wahhabi/Salafi versions of Islam being spread around the world. And it could have possibly challenged the UAE on being an economic powerhouse. 

Iraq is an educated — was an educated population. They have oil, they were wealthy, et cetera, but it was decimated. And these other three powers rose. 

Iran was always on their agenda, and especially on the Israeli agenda. And the first threat that was perceived was, let’s make it a question of a nuclear threat. OK, so that was the big thing on the table. Nuclear negotiations happened; 2015 JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] is achieved.

AG: The Iran nuclear deal. 

SNA: We see a change in tactic. We started seeing massive propaganda using Iran International and other television stations into Iran with very gauzy nostalgic stories of the Pahlavi era. Then we see them co-opting the Women Life Freedom movement in 2022. It was meant to be some sort of coalition opposition movement that was again, trying to co-opt Women Life Freedom. 

Now, Women Life Freedom was authentic. It was homegrown. It had nothing to do with the diaspora. The diaspora supported it because it was so beautifully nonviolent and so inclusive. It was women’s rights, and we had men standing with women. Life and the question of life is both around economic livelihoods and justice and so forth. And then freedom. The question of, can we have democratic freedoms and dignity?

The Iranian regime crashes down on that as they often do when they see protest movements. They crack down heavily, but ironically they also back down. So once the protest stopped, what we saw was that the mandatory nature of the hijab basically disappears. You see Iranian women walking around wearing whatever they want. 

But the question of, how do we go about with regime change from the outside again? The focus shifts, and with Trump coming into power [in 2016] and getting rid of the JCPOA, that was about controlling and containing the nuclear program, but also removing sanctions so there would be economic relief for the Iranian public. Obama never got rid of the sanctions, and by the time Trump came in, he got rid of the nuclear deal — nuclear side of it. 

The Iranians maintained and then they continued cooperating with the U.N. and the nuclear experts for a long time with inspectors. Then at some point it became clear that there was not going to be a new deal. And so the whole thing disappeared.

Related

Children Are Dying Because Companies Are Too Scared to Sell Medicine to Iran

In the meantime, what was happening was that the shift in D.C. and again with Israeli support, became about “maximum pressure,” which is around economic pressure. It was really strangling the Iranian economy and really hitting inflation and affecting very poor people. 

At ICAN, we did a report on sanctions in 2012. It was called “Killing them Softly,” and we were looking at the humanitarian implications of sanctions back in 2012. In 2017 onwards, it comes in really, really heavily. We’ve even had Nancy Pelosi in February of 2026 saying, we imposed these sanctions with the view of hurting the poor Iranians in rural areas so that there would be an uprising.

AG: It’s worth mentioning too that this strategy really came out of Israel’s closest allies in Washington, right? This was like the Foundation for Defensive Democracies — these Likud-oriented, right-wing pro-Israel think tanks that had literally called for a strategy of maximum pressure, which is what Trump put in place.

SNA: Exactly. This has been an ongoing fight between different think tanks, different leanings, et cetera. But of course those guys have a lot more money and a lot more resources because they’ve literally got the backing of the Israeli government behind them. 

So you get maximum pressure. You get the protests back in December of 2025. They were economic protests. It was the bazaar and the traders and others, but people were really feeling the inflation level. So December protests start, and we don’t really hear that much about them. There isn’t really that much sort of repression of these protests. It’s very much a domestic issue. 

Then all of a sudden we see Reza Pahlavi coming into this domain and calling out to people and saying, go out 7th and 8th of January, go out into the protest. Go out in your millions. We are with you. 

AG: Reza Pahlavi, of course, the former crown prince of Iran, who’s become a central figure of the right-wing Iranian opposition, and who has claimed for himself the role as the head of the transition to a purported democracy that’s soon to be coming in Iran. 

SNA: We start seeing Mossad or Israeli-aligned assets on Twitter saying, we’re there, we’re on the ground with you. We are there to help you. So these messages need to really be investigated. Because if you know the Iranian regime, you know that their instinct when feeling threatened is to crack down, and they will crack down heavily on their own population.

So how can you sit in Virginia or in Maryland and tell people to go out onto the streets and say, we’re going to be there with you, and actually expose them to what became a very violent crackdown coming on the back of the Twelve Day War, the Israeli American war in June?

Related

Israel Is Cynically Capitalizing on the Iranian Protests for Its Own Ends

Again, it had been during nuclear negotiations, and the attacks on Iranian leadership was pretty significant. So you’re dealing already with a regime that is going to be paranoid about infiltration. In January, you say to people, go out onto the streets. People’s kids are going out, and they go out into the streets, and then we see the internet blackout. Again, during the Twelve Day War, there was [an] internet blackout because banks were being attacked. There were cyber attacks against Iranian banks by Israeli assets. So you’re dealing, as I say, with a regime that is already on hyper alert and paranoid, and so they react very violently. 

How many people were killed? This becomes a big topic of debate and discussion. The human rights organizations, and the one that I follow is an organization called Harana, they did a very meticulous verification of people who died, families verifying and so forth. They had reached the number of about 7,008 people who had been killed during those two nights of protests. That’s a lot of people. But the machinery of propaganda — news, whatever you want to call it — started inflating the numbers. And it became 12,000 and then 20,000 and then 30,000 and then 40,000 and then 50,000. 

AG: The 7,000 number is bad enough. 

SNA: Yes. 

AG: Here we were in 2013 or whatever it was, completely outraged about Sisi’s counter-coup against the Muslim Brotherhood killing 1,500 protesters in one day. And that was outrage. We got talks in Washington about cutting off weapons to Egypt, cutting off Egypt from aid. 

These numbers were already staggering. So to just watch it balloon out of proportion like this with no basis and evidence, it really showed you that some of the opposition at this point was really just absolutely going for it and willing to stop at nothing, in a very Trumpian way, 

SNA: It was Trumpian, but it was also very — suddenly it started to look like the Gaza playbook, right? Because it was very much like the horrific things that happened on October 7 in Israel. It was using that horrific incident to then rile up and get emotionally charged around what the response should be.

In the case of Iran, it became about, well we need to go and protect people. We started subtly seeing Iranians in the diaspora using certain talking points. Because I was hearing it from different places. First it was somebody would say, “This is a war of liberation. These people who were on the streets were fighting a war of liberation.” That’s a dangerous thing to say, because if you’re claiming that the protesters who went out on a Friday night and a Thursday night out of frustration, out of anger, whatever, were soldiers and it’s a war — then you are putting them directly at risk.

AG: This is part of the opposition, from the opposition perspective, the Pahlavi perspective too. Pahlavi, as we know, has been traveling to Israel the past few years, is really — I think it’s safe to say at this point — has become a stooge of the Israelis. This was absolutely his strategy too. You heard him during the January protest crackdown. 

Related

Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran

The January protests were effectively a nonviolent movement. One of the things that was so shocking about the breadth of the crackdown was that this was a nonviolent movement. Sure, OK, setting the occasional police station on fire, but that is not what the movement was about.

And you had Pahlavi here saying everybody in the regime is legitimate targets, even civilian officials. That’s calling for a civil war. That’s calling for war crimes.

SNA: That’s the problem that you’re sitting, again, you’re sitting in Potomac, Miami, or wherever he happened to be when he said all this, and he’s sending out people. And either you know your opposition, you know the force that you’re fighting against the regime, in which case you have to be mindful of what you’re doing. We have known for 47 years that this is a regime that will use violence and it has used violence throughout time. So if you’re claiming to be the leader of the opposition, do you put your followers at risk like that? That, to me, is a question of responsibility. That’s definitely an issue.

If you don’t know the nature of your adversary, then that’s also admitting incompetence of some sort. How could you not know this could happen? So what was the intent of telling people to go out into the streets and then having all these Mossad voices on Twitter? What was the intent of it? Was the intent creating this space where this violence would come out so that then the next excuse for regime change becomes this is a regime that is killing its own people, it’s awful to its own people? We’ve had all the propaganda all these years. People, they’ve had it up to here with the economics, with the corruption, with all of the things that are going on, and the answer becomes well, yeah, it needs military attack.

AG: This is where you really see the Israelis start to step up and say, rise up. And for whatever reason, because of the desperation of Iranian people, people really latch onto this. It’s incredible for us to think, like many of our relatives have enough sense, certainly our relatives who are inside Iran, many of whom are geriatric and the rest of whom are just sensible, aren’t going out in the street and listening to Reza Pahlavi. But you listen to anecdotes from them about their friends. These people were actually listening to these messages and going into the street and being shot at and slaughtered. Meanwhile, Pahlavi and the Israelis are saying, do it, rise up, overtake the government. 

SNA: Yeah. 

AG: The people on the ground themselves can’t be blamed for thinking that there’s some sort of plan in place. This connects back to what you were saying about the Israelis, where this kind of is the plan, right? It’s that they don’t need Pahlavi to work. They don’t need him to go in there and become this democratic leader. They just need him to lead a movement that damages the regime enough to put Iran into some kind of fractured state or state failure where it’s not a threat to Israel anymore.

SNA: Yeah. So what I started seeing, and I think this is the situation we’re in now, unfortunately, is that you have a regime that has sacrificed the country and the nation for its own survival, and they’re continuing to do that. Then we have an opposition led by the Israeli sort of mentality — but now very much owned by Iranian diaspora themselves — that is so driven by getting rid of the regime that they’re also willing to sacrifice the nation. 

The rhetoric that we hear it’s just heartbreaking because when the girls’ school was hit some people were saying, “Oh, it’s the regime’s own rockets.” Exactly like what we heard in Gaza when the hospital was hit. Then it became “This is collateral damage. There’s a price for freedom.” I find that really quite revolting because I’m thinking, it’s not your kid. Those children did not sign up to be the price for freedom, whatever freedom means.

Then we started seeing Israeli journalists. I’ve been on podcasts with Israeli journalists where they’re telling me, “The Iranians wanted us to go in and liberate them.” And my response to them is: Liberate their bodies from their souls?

AG: Liberate them from their pharmaceutical factories and their hospitals and their girls’ schools.

SNA: So many schools now, I think it’s 60 schools have been hit. Schools, homes, energy sources, flour depots for making bread and corn, food, water, energy. All of these things are being hit. Police stations.

Ali Gharib: Homes — residential towers with hundreds of apartments.

SNA: Thousands, right? So they’re hiding behind this language of freedom and this language of human rights and then causing incredible mass human rights assault going forward in terms of atrocities. It’s all war crimes as well.

Again, at the forefront of it, we have Reza Pahlavi, who to me, is not only a puppet, he’s like a pied piper. He’s the one who led this diaspora into: I’m gonna give you heaven. And it’s now pretty hellish for the people on the ground in Iran. So this is something that we have to reckon with. I think diasporas — I’ve worked on conflicts for many years — diasporas often play a significant role in terms of shaping the policy. 

But what I always felt with Iranians was that no matter what differences we may have had politically, what drives us is a love of country. The targeting right now has been against the state and the nation. When you hear that something like 50 heritage sites have been damaged, for each of us, when we think about Isfahan or when we think about iconic buildings in Tehran, whether it’s the Azadi Tower or the Azadi Stadium, these are places and things that have meaning to us as a nation. They are part of how communities are formed and imagined and created. Iranians have a deep sense of nationhood, yet in this context, in the way that this polarization has happened, as I say, you have people who are saying, “Well, we will rebuild.” Are you now saying that in this war, another 30,000 people can die for freedom?

This is pretty despicable when you’re sitting outside the country. If you want to fight the war then by all means, fly to Istanbul, take the bus, and go straight to Tehran and be on the streets with the people. But to sit outside and wage war is horrific.

Those of us who sit outside have a particular responsibility. We have seen what the United States has done in these countries. We have access to all of the information — whether it’s Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan — we know what kind of entity we deal with and in the international space, when these countries get embroiled in conflict. I think we have a particular responsibility in terms of trying to prevent that happening to our own country. People living inside, they may not have the same information. As I say, they are so traumatized by what the regime has done that it’s easy to say, “I want something else.” 

One last point, which I think is really significant, is that there’s a generational issue here. My generation is probably the last generation that remembers the revolution and the Iran–Iraq war. I was 11 when that happened. And for the years that I was returning to Iran to do my research and understand what was going on, I remember in the 1990s, there were student protests. And the taxi drivers, I would say to them, “Did you go to the protests?” And the taxi driver would say, “No, ma’am, we’ve already been out there once to be against something. I’ll go out there when I know it’s for something.” 

So this idea of everybody united against the shah, thinking the day after was going to be better and then they got the Islamists. People have been inoculated against that. They remember the Iran–Iraq war. That was a pretty horrific war for eight years, and Iran had no allies in the world except for Israel and Syria. Israel was giving weapons to Iran throughout the 1980s. So it’s interesting the shifts that have happened. 

But what I’m saying is that I’m in my 50s now, so the generations that come after me, they don’t remember the revolution. They don’t remember the war. And this rallying around the Pahlavi name as an alternative to the regime — “whatever it is, it’s gotta be better than the regime.” That’s exactly the parallel that we’re seeing. And it’s a very dangerous one, I think. 

AG: This is something that you said when we spoke on the phone earlier that I do want to get to because I think this is very important and it actually speaks to both sides. What you said is that inside of us all— And I think this both animates the people inside Iran who, I don’t want to take away their agency. There are people there who are calling for these bombs and celebrating them. 

I think that now we’re getting to a point where some people are waking up to what that actually means. Something you’d mentioned before is that the Twelve Day War last June seems now like it might have been a prelude to calm people’s nerves, that this won’t be as bad as you think. So when the call for more bombs and war comes, “bomb this regime into submission,” people won’t get what it is — I think now people increasingly are starting to get a grip on it — but still there are people who are diehard for it. Diehard for Pahlavi. Part of this is polarization and information compartmentalization where people are watching Iran International, the Fox News of the Iranian diaspora that beams into the country. They’re getting bad information. There’s conspiracy theories about the girls’ school bombing — all this stuff that we don’t need to get into all this detail about. But those people really are just looking for something to grasp, to hope for, right?

Then you’ve got people on the outside throwing up their hands, and I think, like we’ve seen this in our family discussions where people say, “God, I hope it ends soon.” And what you said to me earlier in our pre-interview is that hope is not really a strategy. What can be our strategy on the outside that’s not just hope? How do we look at this conflict in a way that can advance things for the country and for the people inside that we think is morally sound for us to push?

SNA: I genuinely think that if we care about Iran and Iranians, we need to be really advocating for very serious guardrails around the type of weapons that are being used and the type of targets that are being hit. As I said, if they go after Bushehr nuclear plant, there’s going to be radioactive spillage in Iran and in the Gulf. This is dangerous. This is really dangerous. Petrochemical plants, oil plants, these are the kinds of things that have been hit, and Iran is retaliating. So there needs to be a collective voice of saying, “Enough, stop this, we have to put some limits on this.” The weapons and the targets, that’s number one.

Number two is that at this point, I would like more of us — and those people who have a larger platform than I do — to be talking about the political prisoners. There are thousands and thousands of people who were arrested in January who need to be released, but there are also the long-term ones and the dissidents and others who have had the courage, despite everything that’s going on, to actually issue statements and speak out about what they want change to be. 

So there’s been a pretty vibrant conversation inside Iran from within the regime and from the periphery of it and the opposition around referenda and changing things and so forth.

Third thing. We need to take a page out of the book of the countries that have done this before and learn some lessons. The first place I go back to is South Africa, where the opposition to the apartheid regime gathered together in the 1950s, all sorts of communists and ANC [African National Congress] and all sorts of liberation fighters and others. But they got together, and they articulated the people’s charter, and it was a vision of the South Africa they wanted to create. That document became a roadmap and a destination, if you want, for what they were fighting for. What is it that we are fighting for? What unites us? This is the kind of thing that I wish Pahlavi had done, or I wish that we could now do and actually open up the space for conversations.

Related to that is the acceptance amongst all of us that Iran is now a country of 93 million people. Even if 5 percent of those people are regime supporters, that is a population of 4.5 million, 5 million people. We have to say that this is a country in which they also have a role. The future of Iran, I would like if it was my choice, I would like a future of Iran where I get to go and visit my father’s grave without fear of being arrested or being detained, where I could take my children to visit the country and see the beauty of my homeland without fear. But I also want other people to be able to go live back home there, and the folks that are living there, who have had to be part and parcel of the system that is there — for them to also feel safe.

All the horrors that this regime actually played out on us, I don’t want to become them. That to me is the question. So it’s really thinking about it in this way of: What does it mean to live with the lens of human rights and inclusivity and plurality? Then what do we do with the most egregious elements, whether it’s in the prisons and the torturers, whether it’s the leaders who ordered the violence, those kinds of things need investigation.

Again, South Africa had a tribunal. They also had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Other countries have done that. Yemen had a national dialogue process for two years where they brought people from all sorts of political parties and tribes and young people and women to actually imagine the future that they were going to have. These are the kinds of things that we need to have in Iran. 

Let’s remove the embedded violence that has shaped this regime and has infiltrated into society, and actually bring it back to the Iran that we all love and the history of pluralism and frankly, secularism, that goes back 2,500 years. Secularism means Muslims — diehard Muslims — also get to live and practice their lives, right? It’s that kind of a vision that I think we need to be thinking about. 

AG: And we’re going to leave it there. Thanks for joining us on the Intercept Briefing, Sanam.

SNA: Thank you, Ali. 

AG: That does it for this episode. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief. Maia Hibbett is the managing editor. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer. Desiree Adib is our booking producer. Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is the copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. Legal review came, as always, from the great David Bralow.

Slip Stream provided our theme music.

This show and our reporting at The Intercept doesn’t exist without you, our loyal readers and listeners. Your donations, no matter the amount, makes a real difference. Keep our investigations free and fearless at theintercept.com/join. 

And if you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing wherever you listen to podcasts. And leave us a rating or a review, it helps other listeners to find us.

Let us know what you think of this episode, or If you want to send us a general message, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

Until next time, I’m Ali Gharib.

The post “Liberate Their Bodies From Their Souls”: The Lies That Sell the Iran War appeared first on The Intercept.

Both aircraft had two-person crews, U.S. officials told The Intercept, and in both cases, one crew member was rescued and one remains missing.

The downing of the U.S. plane undermined an assertion of strength President Donald Trump made in a nationally televised speech earlier this week.

“They have no anti-aircraft equipment. Their radar is 100 percent annihilated,” Trump said Wednesday. “We are unstoppable as a military force.”

A month ago, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Iranian leaders were “looking up and seeing only U.S. and Israeli air power every minute of every day until we decide it’s over.” He continued: “Iran will be able to do nothing about it. B-2s, B-52s, B-1s, Predator drones, fighters controlling the skies, picking targets, death and destruction from the sky all day long.” 

Neither the White House nor the Pentagon responded to requests for comment on how Iran could down an advanced U.S. aircraft when the country supposedly no longer possesses anti-aircraft weaponry.

The loss of the F-15 is the first known instance of an American combat aircraft shot down in Iran since the war began in late February. It comes after Trump repeatedly threatened critical infrastructure in Iran and the U.S. struck the B1 bridge outside of Tehran, which killed eight people and wounded 95, according to Iranian news media.

Last week, at least 15 U.S. troops were wounded in an Iranian attack on a Saudi air base that hosts American troops.

The U.S. military has previously provided misleading and stale casualty statistics, in what a defense official who spoke with The Intercept called a “casualty cover-up.”

Related

“Casualty Cover-Up”: The Pentagon Is Hiding U.S. Losses Under Trump in the Middle East

At least 15 U.S. troops in the Middle East have died since the beginning of the Iran war, including six personnel who were killed in a drone strike on Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, and a soldier who died due to an “enemy attack on March 1, 2026, at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.” More than 520 U.S. personnel have also been injured, according to an Intercept analysis.

On Friday, Iranian state media published pictures and videos that they claimed show parts of the downed plane and one of the ejection seats.

Update: April 3, 2026, 12:45 p.m. ET
The article has been updated with additional information about the surviving crew member who was located.

Update: April 3, 2026, 2:58 p.m. ET
This article has been updated with news of a second U.S. military plane that crashed near the Strait of Hormuz.

The post Iran Shoots Down F-15 Fighter Jet After Trump Bragged They Had No Capability appeared first on The Intercept.

Even in classified briefings, Trump administration officials laid out no clear vision for the U.S. war on Iran or its aftermath, the sources said.

“The administration doesn’t have a clue. They do not have an actual, real rationale, endgame, or plan for the aftermath of this,” one of the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss classified matters, told The Intercept.

“There is no thought process into what any of this means long term,” said another. “It’s not coordinated regime change. It’s just ‘bomb them until they’re less of a threat.’”

Asked about the administration’s plan for Iran after the war, that official responded: “Whatever.”

Internal criticism of the attacks comes as President Donald Trump teased that the war could go on “forever” despite promising his administration would avoid Middle East “forever wars.” Trump has floated the idea of de facto American rule of Iran through a puppet regime, similar to the leaders who have run Venezuela since the U.S. attacked that country and kidnapped its president, Nicolás Maduro, in January. “What we did in Venezuela, I think, is the perfect scenario,” Trump said on Sunday. “Leaders can be picked.”

“I have to be involved in the appointment, like with Delcy [Rodríguez] in Venezuela,” Trump told Axios on Thursday.

Related

Fool Me Twice: The Case for War With Iran Is Even Thinner Than It Was for Iraq

Officials predicted that the war would have negative consequences for decades, echoing the results of the last U.S. ouster of an Iranian leader. One of the sources, who has experience in the Middle East and talked to The Intercept on the condition of anonymity, likened this conflict to the 2003 Iraq War, which was also illegal, ill-planned, and resulted in decades of regional instability.

Trump has repeatedly called for an Iranian uprising in the wake of the U.S. attacks. “The hour of your freedom is at hand,” he declared on Saturday. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take.” But behind closed doors, the U.S. has made it clear that support for would-be Iranian revolutionaries isn’t certain — or even likely. In classified briefings, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said the U.S. might intervene to support the Iranian people if an opportunity for ushering in democracy presented itself, but that the U.S. was primarily focused on a discrete set of tactical goals to degrade Iran’s military power, two of the government officials told The Intercept.

One of the sources briefed on the attacks evoked the 1953 coup in which the U.S. and British governments toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The overthrow of Iran’s first and only democratically elected government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under U.S.-backed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his dreaded secret police, SAVAK. “Trump’s history only goes back as far as the revolution. But 1979 started in 1953. And this [war] goes back to that [coup],” the source told The Intercept, referencing the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Related

Trump’s Iran Attack Was Illegal, Former U.S. Military Officials Allege

Trump has also referenced the 1979 revolution, but not the anti-American backlash that fed it. “You go back 37 years, really 47 years, close to 50, look at what’s happened and all the death,” Trump said to CNN, referencing those killed by Iran since the revolution.

The U.S. official scoffed at Trump’s one-sided history, noting this war’s roots stretch back to the CIA’s coup almost 75 years ago. “It could be decades before we know how badly this will affect us. But you can bet it will,” the official said, referencing the lag between the 1953 coup and the 1979 revolution. “People in Iran remember. We do not.”

The CIA was responsible for the 1953 coup that ousted Mossadegh. “The military coup that overthrew Mosadeq and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government,” reads the agency’s postmortem.

The CIA was also behind the targeted killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the hard-line Shiite cleric who ruled Iran for nearly four decades. After tracking his movements, the CIA reportedly passed his location to Israel, which conducted the attack that killed him on Friday, according to U.S. officials.

The U.S. has offered shifting explanations for the new war with Iran, including claims that Iran posed an “imminent” threat to America or that Israel effectively forced the U.S. into the conflict. In a legally mandated, unclassified letter submitted to Congress on Monday, Trump declared that the military operation was designed to “neutralize Iran’s malign activities.”

In a phone conversation with ABC News’ Jonathan Karl, Trump also claimed that the killing of Khamenei was the latest salvo in dueling assassination attempts. “I got him before he got me. They tried twice. Well, I got him first,” Trump told Karl, apparently referring to U.S. intelligence from the summer of 2024 that Iran was plotting to assassinate then-candidate Trump. That same summer, a gunman with no known ties to Iran attempted to kill Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania. Iran denied involvement in the attack.

Related

Ghosts of Mossadegh: The Iran Cables, U.S. Empire, and the Arc of History

After a 1970s congressional inquiry, known as the Church Committee investigation, brought to light the CIA’s role in numerous plots to kill foreign leaders, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order that banned “assassinations.” The ban is now part of Executive Order 12333, which states: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” 

The White House did not respond to questions of the legality of, and rationale, for the targeted killing of Khamenei.

President Barack Obama, speaking in Cairo, Egypt, in 2009, admitted the U.S. role in the “overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Four years later, the CIA officially acknowledged its role in the 1953 coup d’état when it released declassified documents on the operation.

Related

Blowback: How a CIA-Backed Coup Led to the Rise of Iran’s Ayatollahs

CIA documents are also frank about the type of “blowback” — the unintended, often violent, consequences of covert operations and foreign policies that were kept secret from the American public — of which Trump is either ignorant or ignores. “Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of all CIA officers involved in this type of operation,” noted the CIA lessons-learned report on Mossadegh’s ouster. “Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type.”

In his 2013 book, “The Coup,” Iranian American historian Ervand Abrahamian wrote that Mossadegh’s removal by the CIA irreparably scarred Iran and “left a deep imprint on the country — not only on its polity and economy but also on its popular culture and what some would call mentality.” The Iranians who overthrew the shah in 1979 branded America “the Great Satan,” a moniker that endures to this day, as a result.

The Trump administration has overthrown two regimes in as many months this year with its killing of Khamenei last week and its kidnapping of Maduro in January. The Trump administration has been running Venezuela via a puppet regime ever since.

Trump said the U.S. had already killed the majority of those identified as potential Iranian quislings. “Most of the people we had in mind are dead,” he said on Tuesday. Trump also conceded that the war may yield a government little different than Khamenei’s. “I guess the worst case would be we do this and somebody takes over who’s as bad as the previous person,” he admitted. “It would probably be the worst, you go through this and in five years you realize you put somebody in who’s no better.”

Khamenei’s son Mojtaba Khamenei has emerged as the front-runner to become his father’s successor. Experts say his selection indicates that the more extreme Revolutionary Guard faction of the regime has taken charge amid the power vacuum, suggesting Trump’s worst-case scenario may be realized. But on Wednesday, Trump seemed to suggest that the U.S. and Israel would continue to kill all would-be front-runners. “Their leadership is rapidly going,” he said. “Everyone that wants to be a leader ends up dead.”

U.S.–Israeli strikes have killed at least 787 people in Iran and wounded hundreds more since Friday, according to the Iranian Red Crescent Society. This includes more than 170 people, many of them children attending class at Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school, in the town of Minab.

“Civilians are bearing the brunt of this conflict. With the extraordinary volume of U.S. and Israeli strikes in populated areas of Iran, coupled with internet blackouts, the civilian harm reports we are seeing so far likely represent just a fraction of the true civilian toll,” Annie Shiel, the U.S. advocacy director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict told The Intercept. “This war is also putting civilians at risk across the region. Iranian strikes are impacting civilian infrastructure, killing civilians, closing airspace, and generally disrupting civilian life and livelihoods. The longer this goes on, the more these harms will compound.”

The first government official reiterated to The Intercept that the full reverberations of the current war would only be revealed in decades to come. “You and I will be gone,” the U.S. official said, also referring to this reporter, “and Trump, too, but this attack on Iran is going to have a super long half-life. Generations long.”

The post Sources Briefed on Iran War Say U.S. Has No Plans for What Comes Next appeared first on The Intercept.

In the last few days, President Donald Trump has said that the U.S-Israel war on Iran will end soon, after oil prices jumped and the growing regional conflict continued to shake markets. After a wave of heavy bombardments throughout Iran, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth promised another round, “The most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes.” 

“Hegseth has, yes, said that it’s going to be basically death and destruction from the air, and they’re delivering that,” Hooman Majd, an Iranian American writer and journalist, tells The Intercept Briefing. 

“Killing civilians is a hallmark of American air war. This particular campaign Operation Epic Fury is set apart by the relentlessness of the attacks,” adds Nick Turse, senior reporter for The Intercept. “The two militaries — U.S. and Israel — combined were striking a conservative estimate of 1,000 targets per day in the first days of the conflict. Around 4,000 targets were hit in the first 100 hours of the campaign. For another point of comparison, Israeli attacks in the recent Gaza war were also relentless, but this far outpaces the Israeli campaign by more than double the number of strikes.” On Wednesday, Trump told Axios the war would end soon because there’s “practically nothing left to target.”

This week on the The Intercept Briefing, host Akela Lacy talked to Majd and Turse about the latest developments in the U.S. and Israel war on Iran and the growing number of conflicts the U.S. is engaged in. Senior technology reporter Sam Biddle also joined to discuss how artificial intelligence is being used in various U.S. conflicts.

Related

OpenAI on Surveillance and Autonomous Killings: You’re Going to Have to Trust Us

“Airstrikes, air war generally is already so prone to killing innocent people even when you take your time. But whenever you try to hurry for the sake of hurrying — and AI is great at enabling that — you just increase over and over again the chance of killing someone that you didn’t intend to or didn’t care enough to avoid killing,” says Biddle. “So I think that is an immense risk of just accelerating the metabolism of killing from the air by drone, by airplane — with the stamp of ‘intelligence’ that these AI companies are really pushing.”

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you listen.  

Transcript 

Akela Lacy: Welcome to The Intercept Briefing, I’m Akela Lacy, senior politics reporter at The Intercept.

Sam Biddle: And I’m Sam Biddle, senior technology reporter at The Intercept.

AL: Sam, this is your first time on The Intercept Briefing, correct? 

SB: It is. I’ve been at the Intercept for 10 years. I finally got the call. I’m excited.

Akela Lacy: Welcome, we’re very glad to have you. 

SB: Thank you so much.

AL: On a serious note, as we speak, the U.S. is engaged in war and acts of aggression on multiple fronts from the Middle East to the Caribbean and Central America. You have been doing some really important reporting on how the Pentagon is using artificial intelligence in wars and surveillance around the world.

Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that Claude, an AI tool from the company Anthropic, was used to capture now former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, which set off a dispute between the company and the U.S. government, and opened the door for Anthropic’s rival to swoop in. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Trump has used those same tools in strikes on Iran. Tell us more. 

SB: So what’s been reported is that the Pentagon has made use of a system it has called the Maven Smart System, which is operated by Palantir, the semi-infamous data mining firm. We know based on multiple reports at this point that they’re using the Maven system to essentially accelerate the selection and subsequent destruction of targets on the ground.

This is a way of executing airstrikes at a greater speed potentially, not necessarily more intelligently or with greater accuracy, but I think just faster. And I think people at the Pentagon would probably say, more effectively, more efficiently finding things to destroy and people to kill.

Target selection is a labor-intensive task. If you can have an LLM like Anthropic’s Claude system — we’ve all seen how quickly they can generate a huge wall of text, of questionable accuracy — can bring that same hyper-speed to creating lists of buildings to destroy and people to kill. I think that is proven to be the biggest value — not just to our military, but to militaries abroad as well.

AL: Sam, what do we know about how the Pentagon is using AI tools in the Trump administration’s various wars?

SB: Under Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, there has been a huge, very aggressive push to integrate AI really wherever and whenever possible.

Related

AI’s Imperial Agenda

I think that you’re seeing the Pentagon under Hegseth mimic a lot of tech industry rhetoric, which is “we don’t totally understand this technology. We don’t totally know where it’s got to be useful, but we need to use it as much as possible anyway.” I think that you’ve seen DOD under Hegseth be extremely aggressive in the cadence of airstrikes.

This is a Pentagon that believes in killing people. I think, at times, it seems to sort of give itself things to tweet about. This is a political movement and an ideology guiding the Pentagon that I think relishes violence. These AI systems, when you want to blow things up and kill people, these tools can provide a very rapid, turnkey means of having a list of people and places to destroy.

So what we know based on a recent Washington Post report that was discussing the use of Anthropic’s Claude system in Iran, was that it was not just used for target selection, but also target prioritization: Here are the most important targets to attack. Also, something that the Post described as sort of simulating battlefield outcomes. It’s a little unclear what exactly that means. One can imagine just asking a chatbot to basically create a story about how an airstrike could play out. That’s essentially what an LLM does, is generate text that’s plausible based on the inputs. How exactly these simulations are playing out of what value they are, how accurate they are in terms of what might actually happen subsequently in real life is unknown.

To me and for the public, the most concerning aspect of what’s been reported about the ongoing use of these LLMs by the Pentagon is the focus on speed. Airstrikes, air war generally is already so prone to killing innocent people even when you take your time. But whenever you try to hurry for the sake of hurrying, and AI is great at enabling that, you just increase over and over and over again the chance of killing someone that you didn’t intend to or didn’t care enough to avoid killing.

So I think that is an immense risk of just accelerating the metabolism of killing from the air by drone, by airplane — with the stamp of “intelligence” that these AI companies are really pushing. If you blow up a school because Claude told you that it was actually an IED factory or whatever, you could say, “Oh, well, the super-smart computer told me to.”

AL: It was the robot. It wasn’t me.

SB: Exactly. We’ve spent the past several years having the tech industry tell us how ultra-smart, ultra-intelligent these systems are. That’s worrying enough when we’re asking them to write our emails for us and do our homework for us. But again, this is the business of killing people. Mistakes are not just mistakes. I think that is now just the way wars are going to be fought, and that is a very troubling new reality.

AL: Backing up a little bit. There is a fight right now between these companies and the government over how, if at all, their tools should be used. We know that they are being used.

But can you tell us a little bit about what is in dispute here? It also sounds like there’s some talk about guardrails being put in place, but we know that means very little in this context. Can you walk us through that?

SB: So the original controversy here was Anthropic, a leading rival of OpenAI. Some would say they have a better product at this point. They got into a dispute with the Pentagon over selling access to Claude, which is their AI chatbot system, akin to ChatGPT.

AL: But it has a human name.

SB: It does have a human name. Don’t you love that?

The company says that they did not want to permit the Department of Defense to use Claude for domestic surveillance of Americans and for killing people without human oversight. The Pentagon says this is woke nonsense, you’re now banned from doing work with the government —and then OpenAI enters.

AL: I will also note in 2024, The Intercept sued OpenAI in federal court over the company’s use of copyrighted articles to train its chatbot ChatGPT. The case is ongoing.

SB: And this is where it gets very strange because OpenAI claims to have the same red lines as Anthropic, but somehow was able to seal a deal with the Pentagon.

Both are very muddled when it comes to what they actually refuse to do. They seem to both want to say that, look, we’re not going to do anything illegal and we’re also not going to engage in these acts — autonomous killing and domestic surveillance — which are largely considered legal.

Appealing to the law is no protection against these acts that the companies are saying that they will not facilitate. I wrote in a piece a few days ago, I think, ultimately, without being able to review the actual contract language for ourselves and to have lawyers go through it carefully, it all just comes down to whether or not you trust the corporate leadership of OpenAI and Anthropic, as well as Pete Hegseth and the White House. It ultimately comes down to what they, what their lawyers decide is legal. We’ve seen White House lawyers say a lot of things are legal: NSA spying, torture, et cetera. So that appeal to the law by these companies is not as reassuring as they want the public to believe it is.

Just one note though: Even though Anthropic’s deal with the Pentagon fell apart, the DOD is still able to use their technology through — it gets a little complicated here — Palantir’s Maven Smart System software, which has Claude in it as a feature, rather than getting it straight from Anthropic.

When you see headlines about Anthropic being banned or being rejected by the military, DOD can still use their software. It’s a pretty nice loophole. So they are still very much in use.

AL: I’ll also mention that the U.S.–Israel war on Iran is also the first example of countries attacking data centers as an act of war, which Sam, you have some reporting coming out on in the future, so everyone look out for that. 

So to recap, the Trump administration appears to be at war with the world. The self-proclaimed “president of peace” has sent U.S. forces jumping from conflict to conflict from Venezuela to Iran to Ecuador and more. As our colleague Nick Turse, senior reporter for The Intercept, tells me on the podcast today, the U.S. has launched attacks in eight countries and killed civilians in two bodies of water — and made threats against five other nations. We also speak with Hooman Majd, an Iranian American journalist and contributor to NBC News, about the latest developments in the U.S. and Israel’s war on Iran, which is ricocheting around the globe. This is our conversation. 

Nick and Hooman, welcome to The Intercept Briefing 

Hooman Majd: Thank you. 

Nick Turse: Thanks for having me on.

AL: Hooman, the Israel–U.S. war on Iran is stretching into another week. A new round of air bombardments hit throughout the country, Al Jazeera reported Monday evening, “We can say this is by far one of the most heavily intense nights in Tehran in terms of air bombardment.” Secretary of War Pete Hegseth promised, “The most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he hoped the Iranian people would oust the regime. The civilian death toll in Iran has reached about 1,300 people. To start, what are the latest developments, particularly over the last few days? 

HM: Last few days, I mean, it’s heavy bombardment. That’s what it is.

Hegseth has, yes, said that it’s going to be basically death and destruction from the air, and they’re delivering that. Bombing — whether it was Israel or the United States, I don’t know — but earlier this week, they bombed oil depots in and around Tehran. There was black soot, oily rain falling on people’s heads basically in Tehran.

You’ve got Netanyahu telling people to rise up. Rise up how? Exactly how are they supposed to take control of a government that is so secure right now that it can go through the constitutional process of setting up its three-person council that rules Iran in the absence of a supreme leader, then elects a supreme leader by a majority of ayatollahs in person? Because the actual vote has to be in person and they were not blown up. So they obviously had a secure location to do this. How are the Iranian people supposed to do this? You’ve got the Revolutionary Guards who are very powerful. They haven’t shown any real fracture in their ranks. There’s not been a split. The top leadership is there. The second tier of the leadership is there. The third tier of the leadership is there. How are people supposed to get out and go and take over the government?

It’s insane for someone like the prime minister of another country to say, “We’re bombing the hell out of you, now please rise up and go take over your government.” It defies logic.

Related

It’s a War With Iran, Not an “Intervention”

But to answer your question, what’s been happening? It’s just been war. It’s an all-out war. They can call it a special operation. They can call it whatever they want. The Iranians recognize it as war. The death toll is rising among Iranians, but also among the American servicemen and women.

The cost of this war is going up daily for everyone. It’s turning into this kind of — oh, I won’t call it a world war, that would be hyperbole — but way more countries are involved in this other than the U.S., Israel, and Iran.

AL: One of the first acts of aggression in this war was this strikes on this elementary school for girls in the southern Iranian town of Minab, which killed 175 people, mostly children, according to Iranian health offices. Trump blamed Iran for the bombing. But Nick, your reporting, and reporting from the New York Times and others, and new video evidence all suggest that the U.S. struck the school. What did your sources tell you?

NT: Even before footage of a Tomahawk missile landing near the school emerged, I was talking to sources that were refuting claims by President Trump about this being an errant Iranian strike. He apparently seized on talking points that emerged in Iranian monarchy circles. They were spread on social media that this attack on the elementary school was an errant Iranian rocket. Or he just made it up. This is standard Trump behavior.

But my sources — current government official, two former Pentagon officials who were experts in civilian harm, who worked on these issues for the Pentagon for years — said that the satellite imagery showed that these weren’t errant strikes, but they were precision attacks. The angle of the weapon, the precise nature of the strike, the fact that the munitions came straight down from above, the fact that all the strikes in the general area looked the same, including those that hit buildings on the nearby Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps base — all this made it crystal clear that this was a U.S. or an Israeli attack.

The fact that it was known that the U.S. carried out strikes in the specific area offered more evidence that America was behind this. And then this video emerged a couple days ago showing a Tomahawk missile landing in the area.

Now, only the U.S., Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands use Tomahawks. Israel doesn’t have them. Despite mis- or disinformation that President Trump peddled during a news conference on Monday, Iran does not have Tomahawks. Any country the U.S. sold Tomahawks to would have to obtain authorization from the State Department before transferring these sophisticated weapons to a third party. The U.K. is not going to sell Iran Tomahawk missiles.

If Iran was somehow able to obtain a black-market Tomahawk — and let me emphasize, there’s no such thing as black-market Tomahawk. There’s no market for these. Iran lacks the technical equipment and the capabilities that are used to program the flight paths of these missiles and to upload the data necessary to the missiles onboard computer. They also need a specialized launcher to fire a Tomahawk.

So Trump’s assertion on Monday that the Tomahawk is some sort of generic munition and that Iran has some Tomahawks — it’s absurd.  The only party to this conflict that’s firing off Tomahawks is the United States.

What’s also notable about this, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth was standing right next to Trump when the president claimed that it was Iran that hit the school, and Hegseth would not endorse those comments.

He said there was an ongoing investigation, and he issued a classic non-denial, denial taking Iran to task for targeting civilians. But the fact that he wouldn’t back up his boss who was standing right next to him, I thought was very telling.

Related

Pentagon Report: U.S. Military Fired Missile at Elementary School in Iran

Then I spoke to U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, oversees this war in Iran. They told me that to comment on any of this was getting ahead of an ongoing military investigation — which is precisely what President Trump did. They said it was just inappropriate to do. You don’t often have a military spokesperson say that what the commander-in-chief has just done was inappropriate, but they did so in this case.

HM: Yeah, I mean it’s really interesting, Nick. For Iranians, it reminds them of the USS Vincennes shooting down an Iran air jet killing all passengers — civilian jet — in the Persian Gulf under George Bush Sr. at the time. And denials, denials, denials that it was us. And then, “Well, it looked like an enemy aircraft, so we fired a missile.” George Bush refused to apologize, but the U.S. did finally admit that it was an accidental shooting down of the passenger plane. And did actually end up paying reparations to Iran for that act. 

Related

Seven Things You Didn’t Know the U.S. and Its Allies Did to Iran

It just adds to the litany of complaints or accusations that Iran throws at the United States for how the United States is the aggressor against Iran and not the other way around. There is a point to their claims that the U.S. will start aggression against Iran unprovoked. 

In this particular case, there’s very little evidence, if any at all, that Iran, as President Trump has just said, was about to attack the United States and therefore we had to attack them. There’s literally no evidence. And if they do have the evidence, they really should provide it because the American people at this point are not particularly keen on this war and the approval will probably go down from what it is now, the approval ratings for being at war, as we see more and more damage, as we see gas prices go up further, as we see American servicemen and women potentially lose their lives or be injured. And of course, our allies be continually attacked.

Which by the way, I should add, I don’t know why it’s a surprise to anybody. Iran said this after the last Twelve Day War in June. They said, “Next time, no more Mr. Nice Guy; we had restraint this time.” It’s that old joke, no more Mr. Nice Guy. They actually said it out loud, no one’s going to be safe if we are attacked again by U.S., Israel, or both. They said it to the Persian Gulf States. They said it to Saudi Arabia, which is probably the reason those countries were so adamant in trying to get President Trump to not attack Iran because they knew that the blowback would be against them. 

AL: A couple of things I want to just pick up on here. Going to your point on provocation and the idea that the U.S. was somehow provoked to attack Iran. They’ve already shown their hand on this. A couple days after the first strikes you had Marco Rubio blaming Israel for dragging the U.S. into the war. Then Trump is walking that back a couple days later. I think anyone who’s paying attention — obviously, there are a lot of questions about what the communication was here, how much the U.S. was actually goaded into this over Israel. I don’t think it’s a surprise that the neocons in the various administrations have been foaming at the mouth to go to war with Iran for a very long time. So I just want to make that point.

You mentioned this regime change thing. I mean we’ve talked about this when you were last on the show, Hooman. There’s been additional reporting in the last few days, hammering home this idea that that is not on the table right now.

HM: There’s been a million different reasons or rationale given by the U.S. administration for starting this war — bounces back and forth from one thing to another. Just this week, Trump now is saying that Kushner and Witkoff and Rubio, and these guys were telling him we have to go to war otherwise — two real estate people were telling you to go to war? Really? Would any president of the United States say that?

Jared Kushner doesn’t have a job. Has no title whatsoever. Steve Witkoff has never talked about Iran his entire professional life and has no knowledge. I’m not dissing him; I’m just saying he has no knowledge of the nuclear issue. None whatsoever. Probably got a briefing from the State Department, one-hour briefing — this is what enrichment means, this is how they can do this, how they can do that — and gets thrown into negotiations while he’s running back and forth from one negotiation to the Ukraine negotiations in Geneva and taking Jared with him. It’s an insane way to negotiate, but they did it. And so they, and this is what Donald Trump said this week, they — along with Marco Rubio and obviously Lindsey Graham, we know that — were pressing very hard for an attack on Iran, “Iran is the weakest that it’s ever been.” 

According, again, to Donald Trump, Steve Witkoff told him that Iran could build a bomb in two weeks. How Steve Witkoff could even think that when there is no access right now to the nuclear material, let alone bomb making ability of Iran? It’s just beyond belief. So it’s insane. 

The regime changed idea was clearly something that was in Donald Trump’s mind. We go in — I’m sure Lindsey Graham, Bibi Netanyahu, various people were telling him: Look, you did it in Venezuela. It’s not that hard. Look at all the protests in January. These people want to overthrow the government. This is what they want to do. They’re shouting “Down with the regime.” And they were brutally murdered. So all you have to do is just take out the supreme leader and bang, people will rise up. 

Related

The Regime Change President Who Won’t (or Can’t) Actually Change Any Regimes

Well, they took out the supreme leader, and people didn’t rise up because bombs were falling on their heads. If that’s all they had done, maybe some people would’ve been coming out on the streets celebrating. There were some celebrations, but they stopped pretty quickly because you keep bombing people. They’re going to care about their own lives, especially since there’s no leader to take over to help overthrow the regime. Trump has already ruled out the former Crown Prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. He himself has ruled himself out. He has no operations on the ground in Iran. His name is shouted by people when they protest a little bit because that’s the only name they know. It doesn’t mean that they want the monarchy to return.

Then the MEK, as we know, are absolutely despised by 99 percent of the Iranian people. They have some ground operations in Iran, but again, not enough to overthrow the regime. They’ve been trying for 47 years, and they haven’t been successful.

So talking about regime change is meaningless. Most Iranians understand that. Iranians want the regime changed. That doesn’t mean they want it overthrown, but they want it changed. No question about that. I would argue that there’s a majority, but there’s a minority — quite a strong minority, as we saw even from the images a couple of days ago, of crowds gathering to mourn the supreme leader’s death. So if there’s 10 percent, 20 percent of the population that are diehard supporters of the Islamic Republic, that’s a significant number of people, significant enough — and they tend to be the people with the guns.

[Break]

AL: Nick, in all of this, Iran is not the only country the U.S. is at war with at the moment. Trump also recently launched attacks on Ecuador. What can you tell us about the various countries the U.S. has attacked since Trump came into office this term and other conflicts that U.S. forces are involved in?

NT: Yeah, this is a president who ran for office promising to keep the United States out of wars, who claims to be a “peacemaker,” who has campaigned for the Nobel Peace Prize and founded a so-called Board of Peace but President Trump is conducting wars across the globe at a furious clip. Sen. Elizabeth Warren said Trump has conducted more strikes in more countries than any modern president. I’m not sure that’s actually true. It really depends on what you call a strike, what you’re counting. But during his second term, Trump has already launched attacks on Ecuador, two wars in Iran, attacks in Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen. He’s attacked civilians in boats in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

Related

Mexico Got Help Killing Drug Lord From Secretive U.S. Campaign Led by FBI and ICE

The Trump administration also claims to be at war with at least 24 drug cartels and criminal gangs, who, I should add, it won’t name. It’s also threatened Colombia, Cuba, Greenland, Iceland — I think, inadvertently, caught flack from Greenland — and Mexico. The Trump administration is threatening some sort of takeover of Cuba at this very moment.

There have been at least two attacks inside Ecuador, both of them since the second Iran war started. It’s unclear as to the extent of U.S. involvement in this. A lot of outlets initially reported that the U.S. simply provided intelligence to Ecuadorian forces. I specifically did not. A lot is unclear, but it seems to me that U.S. involvement in raids against so-called narco-terrorist targets was more than just passing along intel.

I believe this even more following a very strange war powers report that the Trump administration sent to Congress on Monday regarding the recent partnered U.S. operations in Ecuador. It says specifically, although present for this partnered operation, the United States ground forces did not come in contact with hostile forces. Mere mention of U.S. ground forces in connection with this operation raises red flags for me. And the fact that the administration actually filed this war powers report with Congress suggests to me that U.S. forces themselves took kinetic action, that it wasn’t just Ecuadorian forces. So I think there may have been U.S. forces on the ground and that the U.S. possibly conducted lethal strikes there, much like the boat strikes in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean that have killed close to 160 civilians since September.

My sources say that these strikes in Ecuador are the opening salvo of a larger campaign in that country and also elsewhere in Latin America. So I’d stay tuned on that.

AL: I’m just got to list these out for people. You mentioned Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, civilians boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific, the 24 unnamed cartels and criminal gangs and threats, to Columbia, Cuba, Greenland, Iceland, and Mexico.

HM: What about Canada?

AL: We haven’t even talked about Canada.

NT: Yes, our 51st state in the making.

HM: Yeah, by force if necessary. 

NT: If necessary, yes.

AL: Going back to Iran, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has said “America, regardless of what so-called international institutions say, is unleashing the most lethal and precise air power campaign in history.” Can you tell us more about how the U.S. is conducting this war on Iran? What does that actually mean? What does that look like?

NT: Lethal is certainly right, lethal to the Iranian security forces, but also to innocence — men, women, and children. The U.S. has been killing civilians from aircraft for more than 100 years, and lying about it, covering up, trying to explain it away, so that part is par for the course. Killing civilians is a hallmark of American air war.

Related

Facing Years in Prison for Drone Leak, Daniel Hale Makes His Case Against U.S. Assassination Program

This particular campaign — “Operation Epic Fury” — is set apart by the relentlessness of the attacks. There was a new investigation by Air Wars, which is a U.K.-based airstrike monitoring group. And it found that the first days of this Iran war saw far more sites targeted than any recent U.S. or Israeli military campaign.

The moniker “Operation Epic Fury” is ridiculous and bellicose. But there’s some perverse truth to this name because in the first 100 hours of this war the U.S. and Israel said that they struck more targets in Iran than in the first six months of the U.S. led coalition’s bombing campaign of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which was a formidable campaign. 

The two militaries — U.S. and Israel — combined were striking a conservative estimate of 1,000 targets per day in the first days of the conflict. Around 4,000 targets were hit in the first 100 hours of the campaign. For another point of comparison, Israeli attacks in the recent Gaza war were also relentless, but this far outpaces the Israeli campaign by more than double the number of strikes. It’s going to be a while, I think before the full civilian toll of this war is clear, if we ever really find out. Official Iranian sources say it’s creeping up on 1,500 or more killed, but it may actually be higher. 

While the true rate of civilian harm can’t solely be predicted by the number of targets that are hit, the initial indication suggests it’s been high, and I should add that U.S. targets have been correlated with heavily populated areas. So we have to assume that we’ll come to find out that large number of civilians have been killed and will continue to be killed before this war is over.

HM: The kind of war that is being waged on Iran, generally speaking, the Iranian Red Cross, or Red Crescent in Iran’s case, has been pretty accurate in terms of what they’ve reported. As Nick pointed out, it’s probably under-reporting right now. We do know there’s rubble in parts of the city of Tehran. Tehran, a city of more than 9 million, probably closer to 10 or 11 million people, densely populated, very densely populated.

For anybody who’s been there or even looked at a satellite image, they’ll see you cannot strike a building in Tehran and not kill someone who is unintended, an unintended target. Iran is not making this stuff up. They’re busy trying to protect themselves, trying to fire as many missiles as possible to try to bring an end to this war in a way by causing pain for not just America, but for American allies. 

Related

Trump’s Iran Attack Was Illegal, Former U.S. Military Officials Allege

A lot of people complain and say Iran is breaking international law by attacking countries that have nothing to do with this war. That’s probably true. It is probably against international law what Iran is doing, but so is the war that the United States and Israel started on Iran. That’s also against international law. So it’s a complete break of the so-called international order.

AL: I just want to add some context for our listeners. You’re mentioning these attacks by Iran on U.S. allies. Since the war began, Iran retaliated against the U.S.-Israel attacks by targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and three sites in Kuwait. Israel has also been attacking southern Lebanon where it says it’s targeting Hezbollah and seizing land, displacing at least 80,000 people so far. Lebanon’s government has now asked Israel to talk and blamed Hezbollah for attacks [on Israel].   

Iran’s strategy appears to be also targeting Israel and Gulf energy sites. Iran blocked oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz and attacked several oil tankers. Energy sites in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Oman have also reported damage from Iranian drones. Last week, U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, reported that the U.S. had destroyed Iran’s navy, and that there are no Iranian ships underway in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Gulf. But fighting has continued to slow ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Last week, President Donald Trump said the war could last weeks. On Monday, Trump now says the war could end very soon after oil prices jumped significantly and this conflict spooked the markets. For both of you, do you think that impact on the markets will actually motivate Trump to end U.S. involvement in the war? 

NT: It’s always difficult to gauge where this administration is at and you know what the president is thinking. This is a wildly unpopular war, and I think the longer it goes on, the more we’ll see whatever bare minimum of public support exists continue to drop. So if Americans continue to feel pain at the pump, I think there is a chance that it could hasten an end to this conflict.

Related

Sources Briefed on Iran War Say U.S. Has No Plans for What Comes Next

The trouble is it’s really difficult to gauge what the goals of this conflict were. I’m also not sure what impact public sentiment has on Trump at this point. It may take billionaire friends of his calling him, telling them that they’re starting to feel pain for him to decide to wrap up this conflict. 

On Monday, we heard that the conflict was almost over while the stock market was in session, and then afterward we heard that the war might go on for a week more, or maybe as long as it takes — unclear what that means. It does, at some points, appear the president’s trying to manipulate the markets with his statements.

HM: I would agree with that, Nick. I also would say some of his friends in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and places like that. Qatar just gave him a $400 million plane, and they’re not particularly interested in this war going on.

But what I want to add to this is that Trump may be looking for an off-ramp right now. Obviously, the war’s not going the way he expected. So looking for an off-ramp means the Iranians have to be willing to offer one. They’re very adamant in every interview the foreign minister has given, every X post that one of the other leaders — Larijani, Ghalibaf — make is: We’re not interested even talking to you and let alone a ceasefire. We’re not interested in a ceasefire.

If you look at that carefully, and if you know the Iranians, you understand where they’re coming from since the Twelve Day War back in June, is that this one is really existential. That one wasn’t existential. That one they could show some restraint and then maybe talk to Trump and figure out how to make this nuclear deal. As we know they did, they started talking about it. 

Now it’s like, this is going to happen every six months, if we stop the war. If we go to a ceasefire, six months from now it’s going to be the same thing. Our new supreme leader will be assassinated, and then we have to start all over again. So this time, we’re not going to give him that opportunity.

What it appears they are doing is bringing as much pain as possible so that when Trump, without begging, looks for an off ramp, Iran then says, sure, but I want these sanctions removed. I’ll give you that off ramp, but you’ve got to give me a non-aggression pact, and you’ve got to give me some of these sanctions because I need to fix my country, and I can’t do it with the sanctions you’ve got.

Then it’s a question of whether the U.S. and how Israel factors into this. Trump we know is fine with dictators. He’s totally fine with it. He’ll be totally fine with Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader. The question is really what will Trump do at a point where it appears that the U.S. wants to get out of this war he wants to get out, even if Hegseth doesn’t, and Lindsey Graham doesn’t, but he wants out? Gas is at $6 a gallon in California at that point, $7 a gallon in some places. And people are crying saying, wait a sec, this is not what we counted on. Then Iran is in the driver’s seat at that point. Did he ever think that could ever happen?

Related

Pentagon Makes Largest Known Arms Purchase From Israel — For Banned Cluster Weapons

I’m not trying to advocate for Iran’s position. I’m saying they’re playing it well, if you think about it, they are playing it well. It’s like yeah, we’re just got to keep going. It’s fine. We can handle it. Foreign Minister of Iran on NBC News, on “Meet the Press”: Ground troops, bring ’em on. We’re ready. We’re ready for them. They probably are prepared for ground troops.

Turkey doesn’t want this war right on their border. Iraq doesn’t want this war right on their border. Kuwait doesn’t want it, we know. And all the other Persian Gulf countries don’t want it. And I think they’re, all the Persian Gulf countries, in all the other countries are very worried that this is not regime change. And the regime will be in power, and the regime can threaten them again. Everyone will, in my mind, will want an end to this war that includes a strong sense that this won’t happen every six months. And then the question really becomes, what are the Israelis going to do? What’s Netanyahu — how is he gonna sell the end to the war?

AL: We know that on the question of ground troops, Trump has sent conflicting messages saying he hasn’t ruled out sending ground troops into Iran. We also know that seven U.S. soldiers have already been killed in the war, and as we’re recording, news broke that about 140 U.S. troops have been wounded in the war, including eight severely, according to the Pentagon.

Hooman, to your earlier point on the Trump administration’s expectations, as you mentioned over the weekend in Iran, the son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba, was named his successor. Trump told reporters at a press conference he was disappointed. Briefly, what can you tell us about the new supreme leader? 

HM: He was the second oldest son of the supreme leader who had a few other sons and daughters. Very little is known about him personally because he’s been behind the scenes, but known to be very close to the supreme leader, his closest adviser actually, and very close to the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who are the most powerful military force in Iran; and the Basij, who are the paramilitaries force under the IRGC. He is known among Iranians to have basically created that very close connection between the supreme leader’s office and the revolutionary guards. 

One thing we have to remember is that when Ayatollah Khamenei, his father, took over, he was considered a weak supreme leader. He didn’t have the same authority either — political or religious authority — that [Ruhollah] Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic had.

It’s also good to remember that the supreme leader is not the supreme leader of Iran. His title is the Supreme Leader of the Revolution — the Islamic Revolution. And it’s also good to remember that the military force, the IRGC, are not the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Iran. They’re the Islamic Revolutionary Guard of the Revolution. They’re the guardians of the revolution. So those two, that connection, that tight connection has meant that it’s always been something that any future supreme leader would try to maintain. Since Mojtaba already had that connection, one of his closest people inside the guards is the former intelligence chief for the IRGC.

Mojtaba was known — at least whether it’s true or not, because we don’t know, we can’t tell — [to be] behind the manipulation of votes or whatever you want to call it, to have the second term of Ahmadinejad to be president for a second term. On a personal level, people don’t really know him. Everybody in Iran knows who he is because he’s been talked about for years and years as being the closest person to the supreme leader.

He hasn’t shown up yet. There were rumors that he was killed in the first strike on his father. There were rumors that he’s injured, and if he was injured, I can imagine why he wouldn’t want to be seen as the new supreme leader in a hospital bed, for example, if that’s the case.

How will he command as the supreme leader, if you want to call it that? It’s hard to say, but Netanyahu and Donald Trump killed his dad, killed his mom, killed his wife, killed his sister, killed his niece in one strike, and potentially injured him. He’s not got to be keen on Donald Trump and on the United States, and he’s definitely not going to be keen on Israel either.

He’s also probably quite pragmatic. He’s 56 years old. I don’t think he wants to be assassinated. I don’t think he wants war for the long term. I’m sure he wants to continue this war, as we were talking earlier about Iran’s strategy, to go as long as they can to put pressure on Trump and on all the allies, but I don’t think in the long term he wants to commit suicide of any kind and or anything like that.

But he’s going to be a hard-liner. He’s considered to be hard-line, in some cases, more hard-line than his father. One thing that opens up for him is the fatwa that his father supposedly people talk about as prohibiting the building or use of nuclear weapons as being against Islam. He could arguably reverse that. He could arguably have his own fatwa.

Related

Lesson From Ukraine: Breaking Promises to Small Countries Means They’ll Never Give Up Nukes

So I think we’re in a very dangerous place right now in terms of what could happen in the future. Iran could certainly look at North Korea and say nobody’s threatening North Korea and they have missiles — nuclear missiles that can hit California. I think there’s a lot of things we don’t know what can happen in the future, what can Mojtaba do. 

Israel has already threatened to assassinate him or actually said they’re going to assassinate him. Trump has already said he should be careful. He’s not going to last long, meaning the U.S. is also potentially looking to assassinate him. Clearly he’s not got to be running around the streets of Tehran.

He’s only ever been seen in a few photographs, and he only ever comes out in the past publicly for the rallies which celebrate the birth of the Islamic Republic. He’s never given a speech, to my knowledge; he will have to as supreme leader, but he has not done so yet. So we don’t really know — the long answer to that. We really don’t know.

AL: I know you have a forthcoming piece in the Los Angeles Review of Books. I want to ask you, as we’re wrapping here, for your personal hopes for the future and thoughts on where this all goes, speaking as an Iranian exile.

HM: My hopes are always for Iran to be a democratic country, rule of law, have the people — it sounds cliché, but have people have freedom and freedom to choose their own leaders, not to be imposed from outside, not to be bombed, and not to be at war with anyone. And also to not suffer from economic sanctions that make the lives of the people miserable, hardly make the lives of whatever regime is in power miserable. That’s been proven. Regimes don’t change because of sanctions. All it does is immiserate the people. So that’s what I want for Iran. Whether that’s possible or not, I don’t know, but in terms of hope. 

There’s so many different things that can happen. War upends a lot of other kinds of predictions that we may have had in the past. The Iranians certainly thought at the last meeting they had in Geneva between the Iranian Foreign Minister and Witkoff and Kushner, that they thought things were moving ahead and they were going to have a deal.

They were sending their technical team to Vienna for the following week to go through the technical aspects of how this deal was going to work. What we do know, and this is not me, this has been printed and reported on that what Iran was willing to offer the United States was better — far better — than the deal that President Obama was able to make with Iran in 2015, 2016. Trump, we now know, could have taken that and said, I did better than Obama, but chose not to. 

The hope for some Iranians was that with a nuclear deal out of the way, sanctions perhaps being lifted, that the regime would change a little bit, if not completely into something different, but at least loosen up, meet the demands of the people, but that wasn’t to be as we know now.

AL: We’re going to leave it there.

Thank you, Nick and Hooman for joining me on The Intercept Briefing.

HM: Thank you. Thank you for having me. 

NT: Thanks so much.

AL: That does it for this episode. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief. Maia Hibbett is our managing editor. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer. Desiree Adib is our booking producer. Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is our copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. Legal review by David Bralow.

Slip Stream provided our theme music.

This show and our reporting at The Intercept doesn’t exist without you. Your donation, no matter the amount, makes a real difference. Keep our investigations free and fearless at theintercept.com/join. 

And if you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing wherever you listen to podcasts. Leave us a rating or a review, it helps other listeners to find us.

Let us know what you think of this episode, or If you want to send us a general message, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

Until next time, I’m Akela Lacy.

The post Trump’s AI-Powered World Wars appeared first on The Intercept.

“President Trump has repeatedly threatened war crimes in Iran and now he is expressing genocidal intent,” said Sarah Harrison, an associate general counsel at the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel, International Affairs during Trump’s first term. “Every single lawmaker and national security leader needs to stand against this and make clear to the U.S. military that these are unlawful orders and if carried out they will someday face criminal prosecution.”

This interpretation was echoed by Rebecca Ingber, a former State Department lawyer and now a law professor at Cardozo Law School. “The U.S. understanding of the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention requires a ‘specific intent’ to destroy a group — such as a national or ethnic group as relevant here,” she told The Intercept. “That is an intentionally high bar, and one that explicitly would not cover unintended consequences of armed conflict. If acted upon, the President’s statement would be evidence of that required specific intent.”

Trump has repeatedly threatened to obliterate Iran’s civilian infrastructure should the nation’s leaders not heed his demands. “We have a plan because of the power of our military where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12:00 tomorrow night,” he said on Monday. “Where every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding, and never to be used again.” This echoed an Easter morning missive. “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!!” Trump ranted on Truth Social. “Open the Fuckin’ Strait [of Hormuz], you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell.”

Asked on Monday if he was concerned that his threat to bomb power plants or bridges amounts to war crimes, Trump replied “No, not at all,” and said in another interview, “I’m not worried about it.”

“What President Trump is describing as the destruction of ‘a whole civilization’ would be a war crime, plain and simple,” said Sarah Yager, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch and a former senior adviser on human rights to the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. “There is no gray area on this under international law.”

Civilian infrastructure has been a frequent target since the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. “Strikes on critical infrastructure and industrial sites have disrupted basic services including electricity, water and telecommunications, also leading to increasing immediate and longer term environmental and health risks,” wrote the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or OCHA, in a brief report issued last week. Airports, cultural heritage locations, hospitals, industrial sites markets, residential areas, and schools have also been struck, including the civilian international airport in Tehran, a power plant in Khorramshahr, and water reservoirs in Fars and Khuzestan. Last week, the U.S. attacked the newly constructed B1 highway bridge, which killed 8 people, who were, according to the deputy governor of Alborz province, not military targets but nearby villagers celebrating Nowruz, the Persian new year.

Related

“Casualty Cover-Up”: The Pentagon Is Hiding U.S. Losses Under Trump in the Middle East

The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed strikes affected multiple nuclear sites, including Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. Rafael Grossi, head of the nuclear watchdog, warned on Monday that “continued military activity near the BNPP — an operating plant with large amounts of nuclear fuel — could cause a severe radiological accident with harmful consequences for people and the environment in Iran and beyond.”

Trump claimed that the Iranian people actually want the United States to attack their civilian infrastructure, citing “numerous intercepts” of communications. “‘Please keep bombing,’” Trump said on Monday of these supposed pleas. “And these are people that are living where the bombs are exploding. And when we leave, and we’re not hitting those areas, they’re saying, ‘Please come back.’”

In actuality, Iranians have been fleeing from Tehran and other major urban areas under attack. Almost a month ago, UNHCR — the U.N. refugee agency — reported that as many as 3.2 million people were already displaced inside Iran due to the conflict. While casualty counts are fragmentary, more than 2,100 civilians had been killed in the war by the end of last month and around 28,000 injured, according to Iranian Ministry of Health and Medical Education. This included 216 children killed and 1,881 injured, as of April 3.

Related

“Liberate Their Bodies From Their Souls”: The Lies That Sell the Iran War

Yager noted that Iranians who have already suffered severe government repression, including the mass killings of protesters earlier this year, now face obliteration by America. “They’re being told their entire society could be destroyed by the president of United States, with the power of the U.S. military at his fingertips. His previous threats to bomb their power plants and bridges are threats to the systems that keep people alive, their electricity, water, and health care,” she told The Intercept. “Even before anything happens, that kind of rhetoric creates deep anxiety and fear for millions of civilians who have no control over these decisions but who will bear the consequences.”

Almost 115,200 civilian homes, commercial properties, and other civilian sites have been damaged in the war, according to the Iranian Red Crescent Society. This includes 763 schools. The highest profile of these strikes was the U.S. attack on the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school. The attack killed around 175 civilians, most of them children. A preliminary Pentagon report concluded the strike was conducted by U.S. forces, directly contradicting assertions by Trump that Iran struck the school.

The Iranian Red Crescent also reported that more than 334 medical, health, pharmaceutical, and emergency centers have been damaged, including 18 of its own centers. Twenty-four health workers have been killed and 116 injured, according to Iran’s Ministry of Health and Medical Education.

Around 400,000 people are also facing food insecurity in Tehran alone, according to local authorities. Inflation for groceries is at almost 113 percent, severely curtailing people’s purchasing power, according to OCHA.

The post With Trump Threatening Genocide in Iran, Military Must Disobey His Orders, Former Pentagon Officials Say appeared first on The Intercept.

Three current and former defense officials, however, pushed back on his claims. Even Trump’s own Pentagon chief, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, refused to back him up. U.S. Central Command appeared to suggest that Trump’s comments were “inappropriate.”

“This is another instance of Trump lying and just talking out of his ass,” said a U.S. government official who reviewed satellite images of the Shajarah Tayyebeh school. “This clearly was not a failed rocket from the IRGC base.”

The U.S. official was referring to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps navy base that was adjacent to the school. The claim that the IRGC struck the school spread as part of a misinformation campaign about the attack peddled by social media accounts that support restoring Iran’s monarchy.

The U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to speak freely, said it was clear that Iran did not strike the school. Trump, however, endorsed the dubious claim when taking questions from the press aboard Air Force One on Saturday.

Related

Sources Briefed on Iran War Say U.S. Has No Plans for What Comes Next

“Based on what I’ve seen, it was done by Iran,” Trump said of the attack, which killed at least 175 people, many of them children, according to Iranian health officials and state media. 

Hegseth, standing alongside Trump, was asked if that was true and failed to endorse the claim.

“We’re certainly investigating,” he said before offering a non-denial denial. “But the only side that targets civilians is Iran.”

When asked for comment on the status of the U.S. military investigation, U.S. Central Command, the regional military command that oversees the Middle East, said that getting ahead of the investigation’s findings — precisely what Trump did — was improper.

The CENTCOM spokesperson, who did not give their name, said, “It would be inappropriate to comment given the incident is under investigation.”

The White House did not respond to requests for comment.

Missile Used Only by U.S.

A video released on Sunday by Iran’s semiofficial Mehr News Agency shows a cruise missile striking the naval base beside the elementary school as smoke appears to billow from the school itself, indicating that it had been struck just before the attack on the IRGC base. According to Bellingcat, the cruise missile was a Tomahawk.

“This munition is only employed by the U.S., not Israel or Iran,” said Wes Bryant, a former Special Operations joint terminal attack controller who called in thousands of strikes across the greater Middle East.

Bryant, a former adviser to a Pentagon body that provides analysis and training to mitigate civilian harm, said all were clearly struck by targeted munitions, with the school likely hit due to “target misidentification,” meaning U.S. forces mistook it for a military target.

“The strikes on this compound have the signature of a U.S. strike,” Bryant told The Intercept. “The strikes on this compound are also incredibly precise and well-placed. This entire compound — including the girls’ school — was deliberately targeted in a highly precise strike operation.”

While the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school was once connected to the IRGC base by roads, the building was partitioned off by 2016, according to an investigation by New Lines Magazine. Reports of the attack began to appear on social media just after 11:30 a.m. local time. An analysis by the New York Times based on satellite imagery, social media posts, and verified videos found that the school was hit at roughly the same time as the naval base. The video released on Sunday by the Mehr News Agency appears to confirm this.

Another former Pentagon official who specialized in civilian harm issues echoed Bryant and the current U.S. official.

“The entry holes suggest a near perpendicular entry. Meaning, this strike was precisely targeting the structures from high above, not some short range attack with a ballistic missile,” said the former Pentagon official, who spoke on background because their present employment doesn’t allow them to comment. The official said the vertical entry suggested a more parabolic trajectory than a short-range missile would show, indicating a longer-range weapon was used.

That former defense official pushed back against Trump’s claims, noting that the attack occurred within an hour of the announcement of U.S.–Israeli strikes and an hour before any reported Iranian retaliation.

“All evidence,” said the former official, “points to the compound being repeatedly attacked — over the course of a couple hours potentially — with highly accurate munitions that we know the U.S. and Israel routinely use and have used in strikes across Iran.”

High Rate of Strikes

CENTCOM would not offer an estimated civilian death toll for the U.S. war on Iran. More than 1,230 Iranian civilians have been killed, according to the Tehran Times.

“America, regardless of what so-called international institutions say, is unleashing the most lethal and precise air power campaign in history,” Hegseth said at a March 2 press conference. “No stupid rules of engagement.”

A new investigation by Airwars, a U.K.-based air strike monitoring group, found that the first days of the Iran war saw far more sites targeted than any recent U.S. or Israeli military campaign.

“While the rate of civilian harm cannot be solely predicted by the number of targets hit, initial indications suggest it has been high — particularly with U.S. targets correlating with heavily populated areas,” according to the Airwars report. “The targets map heavily onto the highest populated areas.”

For Bryant, the former Pentagon adviser on civilian harm, Trump’s claim that Iran hit the school is part of a pattern — and a dark turn for the country.

“If the administration truly believed that this was Iranian-caused, whether intentionally or inadvertently, then they should have immediately stated so, along with providing intelligence or information that proves such an assertion. But we know this was not the case,” Bryant said. “It is the stuff of tyrannical dictators to fabricate such propaganda for the sake of saving face and discrediting one’s enemies. This is not the behavior of a leader of the free world.”

The post U.S. Military Refuses to Endorse Trump Claim That Iran Bombed Girls’ School appeared first on The Intercept.

Almost exactly 10 years ago, as the U.S. was the cusp of sealing a historic agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program, Barack Obama offered a warning to those who were working to tank the accord: “Let’s not mince words: The choice we face is ultimately between diplomacy and some form of war — maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon.”

Obama struck the deal in 2015, but less than three years later, during President Donald Trump’s first term, the U.S. unilaterally violated the agreement. After a short time, the deal was dead.

Then came the war Obama had predicted. This month, Israel unleashed barrages of missiles, bombs, and drone attacks against Iranian military installations, nuclear facilities, and residential neighborhoods. Iran undertook retaliatory strikes at Israel.

It would be easy to lay the blame this war almost entirely on Trump and Netanyahu.

The U.S., after an apparent feint at diplomacy, then entered the fray, making a massive bombing run against Iranian nuclear facilities — and raising the specter of an all-out regional conflict or, worse, a world war. Thankfully, U.S. involvement was limited and, after 12 days of exchanges, Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire.

Related

Netanyahu and Trump Are Trying to Have It All

It would be easy to lay the blame this war almost entirely on Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. For decades, Netanyahu has sought to ensnarl the U.S. in a direct war with Iran — and in Trump he seemed to have found one, just as Trump acquiesced to Netanyahu’s catastrophic demand that the U.S. tear up Obama’s Iran deal.

While this is indeed true, it risks letting off the hook the people who could have restored Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran and helped avoid this new nightmare scenario.

Some blame for the war, for the dead civilians, and for the instability wrought on the lives of people in the Middle East belongs to President Joe Biden.

Biden, who served as Obama’s own vice president, squandered the chance to correct course and avert the crisis unfolding today.

Blown Opportunity

When Biden came into office in 2021, he had a laundry list of Trump excesses that he pledged to undo in his effort to restore normalcy. He made good on some of those promises — ending policies like the travel ban and returning to the Paris climate accord with the stroke of a pen on day one of his presidency.

Biden’s commitment to return to the Iran nuclear deal, his advisers said, would be more complicated. The new president and his team suggested that a precondition for a U.S. return would be for Iran to address steps it had taken to expand its nuclear work in retaliation for the U.S. violating the accord, rather than the U.S. simply restoring its own compliance with the obligations it had violated. This prompted weeks of back and forth and took time off the negotiations clock that neither party could afford.

The delay didn’t only affect prospects for a deal itself but had a wider effect on regional politics. Many observers thought the new administration understood the need to move swiftly to restore the deal before rapidly approaching Iranian presidential elections that summer. The elections could return hard-liners who had vigorously opposed the nuclear deal back into power.

Understanding as much, Biden was sure to seize the initiative — and wouldn’t fall for the advice of those arguing the president should “use Trump’s leverage” to force a “better deal.” Surely, Biden wouldn’t bide his time and allow opponents of the deal to tie his hands.

Rather than urgently restore U.S. commitments under the agreement, however, Biden ordered that his advisers “keep the Middle East off his desk” as he focused on his domestic agenda.

Advisers like Brett McGurk, who has been advocating for and celebrating America’s entry into Israel’s war on Iran on CNN over the past two weeks, dutifully complied. Negotiations started, but they were circular, undermined by congressional hawks and Israeli sabotage — including a 2021 Israeli attack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility just as negotiations were finally getting underway.

Ultimately, Biden’s team missed the window for a deal.

Ultimately, Biden’s team missed the window for a deal before a harsh critic of the original nuclear agreement was sworn in as Iran’s president. Iran’s nuclear program advanced by leaps and strides, with Iran becoming capable of producing enough enriched material for a nuclear weapon in a matter of weeks.

By the end of Biden’s term, his advisers were not debating a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue but rather were debating their own military strikes on Iran to set back its program.

Related

Proud Papa: How Joe Biden Became the Father of the Iranian Nuclear Bomb

The nuclear crisis — imminently resolvable under Biden — was instead made worse throughout his term in office and then handed to Trump, who acted wisely at first in engaging in nuclear negotiations with Iran but eventually caved to Netanyahu.

Now, hundreds of innocent people have been killed, destruction has been wrought in Israel and Iran, and we are much worse off in terms of Iran’s capabilities — and intentions — than we were 10 years ago.

One Way to Limit Iran

Time will tell if Trump will embrace the diplomacy-first leadership he briefly demonstrated earlier this year, or if he will hew closer to Biden’s feckless deference to Netanyahu.

The latter course brings tremendous risks — like dragging the U.S. into an endless campaign of sending in more and more bombers to “mow the lawn” in Iran because the diplomatic options, like Obama’s deal, have been left in tatters.

At the time of his nuclear deal, Obama was attacked by hawks for “kicking the can down the road” because it merely set back Iran’s nuclear capabilities by 15 years.

Related

Who’s the Real Bully of the Middle East?

Flash forward to today, and those same figures are cheering for Trump’s military strikes on Iran as some decisive victory, even though most estimates say Israel and America’s 12-day campaign only set Iran’s nuclear program back by as little as a month.

And unlike Obama’s deal that imposed permanent restrictions and intrusive inspections over every element of Iran’s enrichment program, Trump administration officials including Vice President JD Vance acknowledge that the bombing did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program but did drive Iran to move its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to a secret location.

The lessons here are clear. Obama was borne out. The only demonstrable way to concretely limit Iran’s nuclear program is through diplomacy. To fail at striking a deal is to risk war — possibly another disastrous American war in the Middle East.

We should hold everyone to account whose limited imaginations — whose inability to take needed steps in the face of pro-Israel pressure — prevented a nuclear deal. If we are to learn the lessons of this 12-day war, that list must include Joe Biden.

The post How Biden Is to Blame for Israel and the U.S.’s 12-Day War Against Iran appeared first on The Intercept.

The people of Iran are in the midst of one of the country’s biggest uprisings — and harshest government crackdowns — since the Iranian Revolution. 

It started with shopkeepers in bazaars closing their doors at the end of December in protest of the plummeting Iranian rial and economic distress. But demonstrations soon spread to universities and across the country to every single province. Working-class Iranians wanted relief — both from the inflation crisis and U.S sanctions.

This week on The Intercept Briefing, host Akela Lacy speaks with Hooman Majd, an Iranian American writer and journalist, who explains what sparked the protests and the government’s brutal response. 

“I don’t think in the history of Iran, even during the Islamic Revolution, have we seen this number of fatalities.” says Majd. “The death toll is staggering. Really, because that death toll is staggering, what’s happened is there are no more protests. And that’s where we are right now. No more protest, heavy security on the streets. Massive security on the streets, on every corner. It isn’t martial law. But it feels like martial law to people living there.”

The path forward is unclear, Majd says. But a few things are certain. “The idea is no to shah, no to an ayatollah, no to theocracy. Let’s just, finally, after 120 years of demonstrating — which is what the Iranians have been doing since 1906 — after 120 years of looking for democracy, can we just do that? Can we just get a democracy? That is probably the biggest sentiment in Iran: wanting a democratic rule, wanting the repression to end, wanting better relations with the rest of the world so these sanctions can be lifted.”

Some people inside and outside Iran have called on President Donald Trump to intervene. The idea that the U.S. should — or could — impose regime change militarily is folly, Majd says. “Sure, we were able to impose a regime change in Iraq militarily. They can do that again in Iran, possibly with the help of Israel or even without the help of Israel. But then what do you have? Do you have another basically authoritarian, autocratic government? That’s not what, I would argue, most people would want. And then there’s a whole other group of people in Iran, I think, who would say, ‘Anything is better than this.’” 

Meanwhile, Trump has threatened to intervene in another international arena. He has set his sights on taking over Greenland. 

Despite walking back his statements pledging to do so by force, Trump has now said he’s forming a plan with the secretary general of NATO for Greenland’s future. We’re joined by independent investigative journalist Lois Parshley, who explains the financial interests behind Trump’s obsession with the Arctic island, the billionaires and tech moguls plotting to exploit Greenland’s natural resources, and how the people of Greenland have responded to the president’s pledge to violate their sovereignty.

Shortly before Trump first expressed an interest in Greenland during his first term, his ambassador to Denmark and Greenland visited a major rare earth mining project on the island, Parshley reported last year.  

“More recently, The Guardian reported that it was Ronald Lauder, heir to the global cosmetics brand [Estée Lauder] who was also a longtime friend of Trump’s, who first suggested buying Greenland. He has acquired commercial holdings there and is also part of a consortium who want to access Ukrainian minerals. I should also say here, it’s probably important to note that blowing up NATO relationships and severing ties with longtime allies and fellow nuclear powers does not increase U.S. national security.”

Fresh off the invasion of Venezuela, the idea that Trump wants to take over Greenland is even more alarming, Parshley says. 

“I’m not the first person to report on these kinds of major tech interests in things like crypto states or special economic zones. People have been pointing this stuff out for a long time, but it’s not until President Trump started saying the quiet part out loud that people have really been registering some of these absurd concepts that seem to now be creeping toward reality.”

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen. 

Transcript

Akela Lacy: Welcome to The Intercept Briefing, I’m Akela Lacy. 

In late December, people in Iran took to the streets to protest the worsening economy as the country’s currency plunged to a record low. As protests grew, the government opened fire on civilians and implemented an internet blackout. 

Leila: We tried to overcome the regime, but every night, when it got late, about midnight, they attacked with their guns and they wiped out the streets from the living people. They killed everybody, almost everybody. If you got injured and you tried to run, they kill you. 

AL: We have obtained an exclusive and rare firsthand eyewitness account from one of the protesters who took to the streets of Tehran over the past few weeks. She wishes to remain anonymous, so for her safety, we’ll call her “Leila.”

Leila:  I’m sorry that I’m alive. I feel guilty that I’m not dead. And the others are.

AL: It’s been difficult to confirm the current death toll, and estimates range from the low thousands to over ten thousand. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has threatened to intervene, while Iran has blamed the U.S. and Israel for the protests.

To understand what’s happening, I’m joined by Hooman Majd, an Iranian American writer, and the author of numerous books, including most recently, “Minister Without Portfolio.” Majd has written for The Intercept, The New Yorker, The New York Times, and Foreign Affairs, among many others, and is a contributor to NBC News.

Welcome back to the show, Hooman Majd.

Hooman Majd: Thank you very much, Akela.

AL: To start, Hooman, can you give us a brief recap of what’s happening in Iran? What sparked the protest, what’s driving people to the streets, and how has the Iranian government responded?

HM: Yeah. The timeline is that the end of December, 28th or 29th, baazaris — people in the bazaar — in Tehran went basically on strike, closed their shops, and started protesting because of the incredible drop in the value of the national currency, the rial. The purchasing power of ordinary people has been decimated. And for baazaris who sell goods, often imported goods, it became an untenable situation with the currency fluctuation. So they were like, “Well, we can’t afford to sell things today at this price, because tomorrow we’re going to have to import them at a higher price.” So that was the beginning of the protest. 

Other people then took up the protests, as it were, and went out and protested. Some of them were also protesting about the economy and the terrible situation, living standard, reduction in living standards. Others wanted the regime to go completely.

So it started out really as an economic protest, and other people joined in, especially young people joined in, and demanded an end to the regime altogether. And the reason they did that is because they just didn’t buy it that the regime could, that the system — if you want to call it the government — could do anything about the collapse of the economy in the way that it has been collapsing.

And they also didn’t think the government or the regime could protect them after the 12-day war in June, the decimation of — the obliteration, as Donald Trump calls it — of the nuclear program. And so they’re like, “OK, what are you guys going to do to make things better?” No sanctions relief, no negotiations with the U.S. on the immediate horizon. So people were very angry. So apart from the actual economic protest, it’s like OK, time for change. We want serious change. 

The government actually responded and said, “OK, you guys are right.” Even the supreme leader responded on those initial couple of days. “You’re right, people have a right to protest. They have a right to be upset. We have to fix this.” The government said it was going to implement the equivalent of $7 [monthly] credit into everybody’s account so they could buy goods like eggs and stuff like that — but that really isn’t enough. Seven dollars in Iran basically will buy you the equivalent of a Happy Meal. They don’t have McDonald’s there, but that would be the equivalent. For a family, once a month? That’s nothing. That’s not really a solution. So the protests continued, and people weren’t satisfied. They weren’t going home. 

Related

Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran

Then former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi in Washington — the shah’s son — became the self-appointed leader of the opposition, leader of a transition to a new Iran, and told people in Iran to go out on the streets en masse — huge numbers — and chant slogans against the government, whatever. And they did.

And whether they did it because they are big fans of Pahlavi, or because it was just an opportunity to continue the protest in the name of someone — not everybody was chanting his name, but certainly huge numbers were, and that, I think, rattled the government. That night is when they cut off the internet, to stop people from being able to communicate and continue these protests.

That’s when the government said that infiltrators came in and started shooting and killing people and killing security officials and killing police. Up until then, it had been mostly peaceful, and the police had actually not interfered in any big way. But videos emerged, even despite the internet shutdown, videos of people attacking, burning buildings, attacking policemen. There’s one horrific video of a security officer — half-naked — being beaten almost to death. And then there are also videos of security officials firing into the crowd. 

There were riots, I should say. And it became a really, really scary situation for almost every Iranian, certainly the ones on the streets. But the terror that was happening on the streets, whether it was 100 percent on the side of the Iranian government shooting people and killing people, or whether it was some rioters killing some of the security people, setting fire to mosques, buses, cars, things like that.

And the crackdown continued and became even more severe. I don’t think in the history of Iran, even during the Islamic Revolution, have we seen this number of fatalities — deaths. This is where we are now. The amount of people having been killed and the number of people injured with all the videos that have emerged out of Iran through Starlink, or at various times when the internet does actually switch on for five minutes and then switches back off, is staggering. The death toll is staggering, really.

Because that death toll is staggering, what’s happened is there are no more protests. And that’s where we are right now. No more protest, heavy security on the streets. Massive security on the streets, on every corner. It isn’t martial law. But it feels like martial law to people living there.

I’ve been able to communicate with family briefly, very briefly, but I’ve been able to communicate video-wise. It certainly feels like martial law. People don’t want to go out at night. If they do venture out at night, they are told to stay off the streets by the security forces. But there isn’t really any shooting or protesting at this time.

The government is putting out that everything’s over and we’re going back to normal. I wouldn’t say it’s back to normal, go that far, but certainly there aren’t any protests at this time.

AL: A couple things you mentioned that I just want to pick up on. One, we’re talking about the death toll, and we actually were discussing this in a meeting with colleagues last week, and it was right when CBS had published the story that the death toll had risen over 12,000.

And we were discussing this along with my other colleagues, and we were like, that seems wrong. Because the numbers that had been coming out in the days prior to that were in the hundreds, or like some estimates in the low thousands, and then all of a sudden, it shot up.

But this is the result of there being an internet blackout, not being able to get accurate information out of Iran. And now it’s apparent that the death toll is well above 10,000. And so I just wonder if you could talk a little bit about the effect that this is having on how the world is interpreting these events as far as what we’re actually able to confirm.

HM: The government will eventually put out numbers — which will either be believed or not believed. And certainly, it’s been admitted, even by the supreme leader, “thousands” — that’s the word he used. He didn’t say how many thousand, but thousands.

AL: Yeah.

HM: Now, let’s remember these protests were not just in Tehran, and we’re getting most of our videos out of Tehran or Mashhad, these two big cities. But there were protests in the entire country, in almost every town, small towns. And yes, the number is horrific, but it’s not just in Tehran. They didn’t mow down 12,000 – 20,000 people just on the streets of Tehran, but they did mow down people. There’s no question there. People have been killed.

The internet shutdown is, the argument has been to prevent terrorists, as they say. The government says terrorists or infiltrators, Mossad agents, CIA agents, whatever you want to say, whatever you want to call them — and by the way, also the MEK, the other opposition group that actually is armed and does have people inside Iran — from communicating and stirring up trouble and taking over government buildings. 

You actually had Reza Pahlavi telling people to go out and take over government buildings. And then he also said to Norah O’Donnell on CBS News that this is war.

Norah O’Donnell: Is it responsible to be sending citizens in Iran to their deaths? Do you bear some responsibility?

Reza Pahlavi: As I said, as I said, as I said, this is a war, and war has casualties.

In fact, in order to preserve and protect and minimize the death toll, minimize innocent victims yet again be killed by this regime, action is needed.

HM: It also seems like people inside Iran who have communicated say, “We weren’t starting a war. That wasn’t our intention, to start a war.” They certainly weren’t starting a war because they were unarmed. Why would they start a war unarmed? 

But the internet shutdown is not just to stop people from communicating, which that’s one, obviously, one obvious element of it. The other element is because they’re turning it on and off right now and only in certain neighborhoods. Go from one neighborhood and it’ll be on for an hour, full 5G internet on your phone. And then it will be off. And then it’ll go to another neighborhood or another part of town, and it’ll be on and then off again.

Related

Hacked Documents: How Iran Can Track and Control Protesters’ Phones

And this is my own suspicion, is that they are trying to identify — they’re trying to monitor internet usage and find out where the organizers of any rioting and/or terrorist and/or Mossad agents are. And the way they can do that by having it come on so they communicate, because not everybody’s communicating by Starlink. There aren’t that many terminals in Iran. And they’ve been successfully jamming the Starlink communication. So occasionally it works, occasionally it doesn’t.

AL: I just want to mention for our listeners, people have been smuggling Starlink terminals into Iran in order to prop up the internet. That’s what we’re referring to. So we’re talking a little bit about Pahlavi, too. I want to play another clip from Leila, who we heard at the top, who is one of the protesters who is supportive of Pahlavi. Let’s hear her again.

Leila: We are here, and 90 percent purely looking for a better future with our king. We chant for our beloved king, Mr. Reza Pahlavi. And we chanted for our hero. He is going to do something, I know. I believe in him. And we listened to him. We listened to every order he gave.

AL: So this is one perspective from a protester who supports the son of the shah, Reza Pahlavi, and we’ve heard him a lot in recent media as you’ve mentioned.

Can you describe the complexities involved in the types of people who have been protesting, who they support? Obviously, this is not a monolith. They don’t all support Pahlavi. Can you expand on that?

HM: Yeah, I can. Well, I think I can, it’s complicated because the opposition to the Islamic regime has been there from the day the Islamic regime was created.

The initial opposition was the MEK, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, under Massoud Rajavi, who was hoping that he’d become prime minister. Khomeini and the Islamic regime set him aside. The people who had supported him, this was the MEK, the Mojahedin who had been a terror group on the American terror list because they had killed American citizens during the shah’s reign.

They fled after committing some terror acts against the Islamic regime, hoping to overthrow it and then take over. This is in 1980. They fled mostly to Iraq and then joined Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran. Which is why nowadays most Iranians, the vast majority of Iranians, do not consider them a viable opposition group, partly because they supported the enemy against their people and more than half a million Iranian boys basically died in that war.

Related

Defectors Tell of Torture and Forced Sterilization in Militant Iranian Cult

And secondly, because they’re considered to be somewhat cultish, if not an actual cult, the way that they operate. So that’s one opposition group, and they’re still very active, and they still do have people inside Iran. They commit assassinations from time to time, so on and so forth. 

Reza Pahlavi, who is the shah’s son, initially, when his father died in 1980, declared himself king in exile. And then subsequent to that, for many years, has been relatively quiet. The time that he really came out and started taking on this mantle of being a leader of an opposition was during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement; a little bit during the Green Movement, but not really because the Green Movement wasn’t against the regime, it was very much a civil rights movement. It was very much in favor of Mousavi who was actually part of the regime, who had, they claimed had lost the election to Ahmadinejad.

Related

The Dark Odds Facing Iran’s Brave Protesters

So this is going back a little bit into history in 2009, but in 2022 during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, when Mahsa Amini was killed by the morality police, it was claimed that she was killed by the morality police, and there’s video to show her dying in the hospital. There was a real genuine uprising in Iran against the system that produced this kind of result: that a woman with a “bad” hijab, as it were, not quite covering all her hair, could end up dead, a young woman at that. That uprising caused people in the diaspora to believe that the regime was very weak and could be potentially overthrown. Reza Pahlavi took on the mantle of being the leader of that. And then it fizzled again his attempts to become an opposition leader, who had a viable chance — a real chance — to go back to Iran and lead a transition to a new regime, if not actual monarchy.

And then he was promoted by Israel and went to Israel in 2023, met with Netanyahu and began a campaign against, once again, against the Islamic Republic and himself as the leader of an opposition. And during this period, from 2022 to 2025, now 2026, his visibility has grown. His reputation has grown. Some people do see him as a potential liberator as it were. And during these protests, he really took on a very, very public role. Coming out, issuing videos, issuing proclamations: Go out, take out government buildings, the revolution is nigh; I’ll be there; I’m joining you soon. But he’s still in Washington and then obviously hasn’t made that move yet.

The second week of January, I believe, he was in another interview asking President Trump and/or Israel to strike, in his words, strike Iran, to finish off this regime. That has made him, among some people who are against the regime, not as popular as he could be. Siding with the enemy, Israel, which killed 1,000 Iranians in their bombing campaign in June, that’s one aspect that makes some people uncomfortable with him. There’s another aspect of just not wanting to bring back another authoritarian regime after this one.

Certainly, if not he himself, his supporters in the diaspora, at least in the West and especially in England and America, have shown themselves to be very undemocratic — attacking the Iranian Embassy in London, for example, and then injuring a bunch of policemen, attacking them physically, the police and having some of them ending up in hospital, and getting arrested. Giving speeches where, “we don’t want to talk about democracy, only the shah.” Some people saying, “Let’s make SAVAK great again” — SAVAK was the shah’s secret police that tortured people in jail.

So some of that just turns other people off. And the idea is like, no to shah, no to an ayatollah, no to a theocracy. Let’s just finally, after 120 years of demonstrating — which is what the Iranians have been doing since 1906 — after 120 years of looking for democracy, can we just do that? Can we just get a democracy? 

That is probably the biggest sentiment in Iran wanting a democratic rule, wanting the repression to end, wanting better relations with the rest of the world so these sanctions can be lifted. I think that’s the greater goal. I think some people will use Reza Pahlavi to try to force that to happen in a way, if not being an actual supporter. And yes, there are people like Leila, who you’ve just mentioned or just played her tape who definitely are very much in favor of him as a leader and as even an autocrat.

A famous Iranian economist, Saeed Laylaz, who’s been very critical of the regime — he lives in Iran — has said Iran’s waiting for a Bonaparte. They want a Napoleon to come in and rescue everyone and fix the system — sort of like Reza Shah, the previous shah’s father, who came in and dragged Iran into the 20th century in the 1920s, and declared himself king overthrowing, the previous very, very, very weak Qajar kings who had sold off parts of the Iranian economy to various interests — British tobacco, British petroleum, so on and so forth. And he brought that together.

And then they demonstrated again in 1953, as we know, democracy under Prime Minister Mossadegh. And then again in the revolution in 1979. It’s always been for democracy, but the result has never been democracy. So some people would recognize that. Some protesters would recognize that, oh, if Reza Pahlavi comes here, either by being helicoptered in by Israel or the United States, it’s possible. Sure. We were able to impose a regime change in Iraq militarily. The U.S. can do that again in Iran, possibly with the help of Israel or even without the help of Israel. But then what do you have? Do you have another basically authoritarian, autocratic government? That’s not what, I would argue, most people would want.

Related

Children Are Dying Because Companies Are Too Scared to Sell Medicine to Iran

And then there’s a whole other group of people in Iran I think, who would say, “Anything is better than this. So if it means having Reza Pahlavi — great, fine. That’s better. That’s going to be better because at least the bars will be open. We’re going to have sanctions relief because he’s half American, basically. So the sanctions will be off, and the economy will improve. And who cares if he loves Israel?” So there’ll be those people, too. 

AL: I just want to mention, there was a clip going around on social media of the Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent saying, openly, that the goal of these sanctions is to push the Iranian people so far that they rise up and overthrow the regime.

MH: Yeah.

Scott Bessent: I said that I believe the Iranian currency was on the verge of collapse, that if I were an Iranian citizen, I would take my money out. President Trump ordered Treasury and our OFAC division — Office of Foreign Asset Control — to put maximum pressure on Iran, and it’s worked. Because in December, their economy collapsed.

AL: I also want to talk about the geopolitics here, and then I want to go back to Pahlavi, but particularly these allegations by the Iranian government that Israel has been involved in fueling the protests. Israel has admitted to being part of this. Can you walk us through what happened there? The impact both inside and outside of Iran, and, you’ve alluded a little bit to this, but if at all how that might discredit Pahlavi in the eyes of some of his would-be supporters.

HM: He was discredited by going to Israel first, praying at the Western Wall, but not visiting a mosque, not going into the West Bank. So going to Israel, and especially with this particular government in Israel, I think did leave a bad taste in Iranian’s mouths.

And then to top it all off, when Israel attacked Iran and didn’t just attack the nuclear sites — was blowing up buildings, children were being killed in apartment buildings where they weren’t the target, admittedly, but if you were targeting a general in the IRGC in a multistory building, you’re killing a lot of innocent people. Or a scientist, I should say, for example. There’s video, which was verified, of bombs falling on a square in north Tehran, and cars being thrown into the sky. When he then refused to even condemn the attack on his own people, that also lost him some support. 

Related

Israel Is Cynically Capitalizing on the Iranian Protests for Its Own Ends

And when he said, “This is [our] Berlin Wall movement” as his message to the Iranian people to rise up, it was a miscalculation because Iranians weren’t going to rise up as they were being attacked by a foreign country. They just weren’t. They were actually, I wouldn’t say they rallied around the flag, but they definitely rallied — not in support of the regime necessarily, but in support of the nation, as it were, that was being attacked by a foreign country. It doesn’t matter what the foreign country is, Iraq or Israel. So he did lose support there.

Israelis aren’t particularly interested in human rights in Iran; they don’t care about the freedom of the Iranian people. If they don’t care about the freedom of the Palestinian people, how are they going to care about the freedom of the Iranian people? It’s a very cynical view. The goal of Israel, especially the Netanyahu government, is and the Likud party is to make Iran as weak as possible so that it’s no longer a threat to them and no longer a challenge, not just as a threat, but a challenge to their hegemonic behavior in the neighborhood.

Right now, Israel has complete freedom to bomb any country in the neighborhood, and nobody can react. I think Iran is the only one that can react and has proven that it was able to react in the 12-Day War and actually got missiles through to Tel Aviv and other cities and killed innocent Israelis.

AL: If Pahlavi isn’t a realistic alternative, who or what do you think is the most appropriate or likely, rather, solution?

HM: The honest truth? It’s impossible to predict. What we should remember is that in these protests, which were large and very pointedly anti-regime in many cases, not in all cases, but in many cases, the security forces — the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards, the actual army itself, which are made up mostly of conscripts — none of them fractured. There were no defections. There was no sense that any of the security officials were going to not follow the orders and do the crackdown and bring about order. Not one that we know of, at least not one serious one. 

There may have been occasional cops or Basij or even IRGC members, younger ones, who wouldn’t fire on anyone but would just patrol. But they didn’t come out and say, we’re defecting to the side of the opposition.

And the other thing to remember is that Pahlavi, back in 2025, after the 12-Day War in June, set up a system where people could defect anonymously through a web portal. And he claimed at one point, within a month, that he had 50,000 armed people from the armed forces in Iran, various armed forces, ready to defect at the right time. If there was a right time, this was the right time. Not only did not 50,000 defect to his side, but not even one came out, or at least publicly, and defect to his side. So that’s not happening in terms of the regime crumbling, cracking in that way with the security services so far. That’s not happened.

So in terms of what is in the future, I think in the immediate future, the regime survives. And people are terrified. They’re shocked, they’re in trauma. People in Iran, I’d say even people outside Iran who have family in Iran, are shocked and traumatized. Not being able to reach our families is tough.

Related

The Other Giant Crisis Hanging Over the Islamic Republic of Iran

I think that for the immediate future — short of an interference or intervention by Donald Trump or Israel — I think the regime survives in the short term. In the long term, we have to remember that the supreme leader is going to be 87 years old this year, I think, and he’s had cancer, probably not in the best of health. So far, people have remained loyal to him. Whether that continues over the longer term is questionable. Whether Trump decides to pull a Venezuela and then decide that he can work with, or the U.S. can work with, one of the Revolutionary Guards generals, or the president of Iran, or the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council is very powerful, Ali Larijani — who knows?

Who knows what options, because it was just announced, I think, this last week that options are being presented to Trump by the military, by the, I assume, the intelligence agency, as to what options he has vis-à-vis Iran, in terms of what kind of blow he can do on Iran, or what kind of attack/strike was it were he could make on Iran, or what kind of blow it could be to the regime.

It does seem that he wants to do something to Iran because he said he was going to. It’ll be far, far too late to help the protesters, which he initially claimed he was doing.

AL: Right. 

MH: And now the argument is that [Trump says,] well, I saved 837 people from being executed. So that’s how I helped the protesters. Which may or may not be true, but it’s irrelevant. He hasn’t refuted that he believes it’s time for new leadership in Iran. Now what that leadership is, he certainly hasn’t met with the shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, and hasn’t indicated that he believes he’s a viable option. So we don’t know. 

Again, prediction is impossible, but there are various scenarios. It’s not what I would want to happen. I’m living in America. I don’t have a right to say what I would — I would like Iranians to be happy. I would like Iranians to have the government that they want. I would like Iranians to have democratic rule. I would like Iranians inside Iran to have an economy that works for them and have jobs and be able to spend money and have disposable income and travel. All the things that we take for granted in the West, I would want my fellow Iranians inside Iran to have. How they bring that about, it’s not my place to make the prescription.

AL: You mentioned the 837 people, you’re referring to the protesters that Iran has backed off from hanging now, as a result, ostensibly, of Trump’s comments. 

HM: Yes. 

AL: I want to turn back to this question of a targeted strike from the United States. We have another clip from Leila.

Leila: We are hopeful that Mr. Trump can help us because as long as we are not armed, we are only a bunch of meat in front of the bullets.

AL: What do you make of this kind of sentiment, asking Trump for help? And the idea of a targeted strike, what would that actually do? Does anyone think that striking a government from afar will remove that government? What are you hearing?

HM: I mean, certainly people like Leila, who you just played the tape of, certainly she’s not armed and I think most of the young people are not armed. But there have been armed people in Iran in these protests. We have verified videos of armed people, especially in Kurdish areas, in Baluchestan and in certain parts of the country, there have been armed clashes. 

It is hard to get guns in Iran. It’s not a gun-friendly country. I think people are desperate, and I think a lot of the protesters who either witnessed some killings or mass killings probably feel that there has to be some kind of strike to stop the government from behaving the way it does and or to potentially bring about regime change.

Now, striking the leadership, for example, if President Trump decides to do that — it’s very unlikely to bring about regime change because what’s behind that strike? We saw that in Venezuela. He wasn’t going to helicopter [María Corina] Machado into Caracas because he had no idea if the military would support her. You just don’t have any idea, and you don’t want a war.

Again, going back to 2003, George Bush did want a war. He was happy to have a war. But we know what that was. And as we know, Trump has, on his own personal level, always been against those kinds of foreign interventions. He likes the one-and-dones, as it were, one and done, I’m in and out. Same thing with Iran in June, when he in a space of a couple of hours, he, as he says, obliterated the Iranian nuclear program without killing anybody on the ground, without any American servicemen losing their lives. What appears to be his notion of doing something of striking Iran or some kind of strike on Iran would be to take out some of the top leaders but leave the regime in place and hope that someone powerful takes over, whether it’s, as I pointed out, Ali Larijani or Mohammad Bagher, who’s the speaker of Parliament. These are former IRGC generals who are in politics now. That’s a possibility. I don’t know if that’s something that he’s considering.

But regime change in a big way means what? The only way that can be accomplished by force is to land American troops. And go to war with basically the people who are going to fight to the death.

We have to remember that Iran isn’t a situation where 99 percent of the people are against the regime. Even if the regime only has 10 to 20 million supporters out of 90 million people — I’m not going to count the children, obviously — but it has shown to have had more than 10 million supporters.

In the last presidential election where the reform president won, Pezeshkian won, 13 million people voted for Saeed Jalili, who’s probably the most hard line of the hard-liners, who has zero relations with the West, an absolute hard line. His Ph.D. thesis was the foreign policy of the prophet. This is how deeply, Islamically theological he is. And he got 13 million votes. The fact that he lost but with 13 million votes should indicate something. Let’s say even the 13 million was exaggerated, 10 million people, and they’re the ones with guns and they’re not going anywhere. And they have no escape to go anywhere. 

Right now, people like Reza Pahlavi, or at least his people, not himself directly, are claiming that they will seek revenge for these people who have blood on their hands. And they’re going to basically do what the Islamic regime did to the shah’s closest allies and execute them the first day they take over. These people, they don’t have an escape route. Most of them, the vast majority of them, don’t have big bank accounts overseas that they can access. Most of them don’t have family overseas or places they can escape to. If you thought at one point that if there’s a revolution and these, the ones who are the diehard religious, diehard theocratic supporters, theocracy supporters would go to Damascus, that’s no longer possible. If you thought they would go to Beirut, that’s not possible. If you thought they’d go to Caracas, that’s not possible anymore. There aren’t a lot of places they can go, if there is a regime change. So they’re going to fight. If there’s a war, they’re going to fight. They’re going to fight. 

One of the potential problems with regime change attempts, at least by outsiders, is that we end up in a civil war like Syria. Because if there’s a decapitation at the top of the leadership, then there are Kurdish armed groups who are separatists. You’ve got Azeri separatists, you’ve got Baloch separatists down in the Southeast, you’ve got the Arab separatist in the Southwest — many of them armed, separatist groups, I mean — who could break up the country. You could have a civil war going on.

The MEK is not going to stand by and allow Reza Pahlavi to take over. Reza Pahlavi supporters aren’t going to allow the MEK to take over. So you’re going to see those clashes. So it could be very, very messy. And I have to believe that the U.S. intelligence community is laying all this out for President Trump as he makes a decision. In fact, I’m sure they are. It would be crazy, and I’m sure the Mossad has been laying it out for Benjamin Netanyahu as well.

AL: I do want to ask one more question about the weakening of Iran’s regional allies in recent months: Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. How has that affected the regime’s power and stability?

HM: No question it’s affected its power. It’s power projection, for sure. In terms of stability, yes, it’s one of the complaints of people who protest against the regime — that we spent all this money, all this effort to become this power in the region, and it’s all gone in the space of two years. We spent all this money which we could have spent inside Iran on people. Billions and billions of dollars on Hezbollah decimated, if not, it’s not gone completely, but still, the leadership is decimated. The power of Hezbollah has been weakened to the point where they’re not a threat to anybody really anymore, or certainly not to Israel in any significant way. Hamas decimated, certainly not a threat anymore to Israel.

Caracas is problematic only because that was their springboard to this continent, the South American continent. And so that’s no longer good. Syria, of course, not a threat to anyone. And the hundreds of billions of dollars spent keeping [Bashar al] Assad in power. So when you look at that and you look at Iranians saying, what about us? These are all countries that supposedly were going to end up being our protector in a way, so that if we were attacked, they would be on the forefront of attacking our attacker. And that didn’t happen. What was all that money spent for? 

The one thing it does have are ballistic missiles and the capability to produce ballistic missiles accurately — accurate ballistic missiles, I should say. And it does have drone technology that even the U.S. is reverse-engineered and is starting to use suicide drones that Iranians invented and can produce in huge numbers, which they also then sold the technology to the Russians, who now make them domestically in Russia.

Related

Iran and U.S. Wage a Shadow War Behind Gaza Conflict

But weakened? Yeah, it’s been significantly. There was always this sense that Iran had surrounded itself with these, if you want to call them proxies, they weren’t exactly proxies because they weren’t doing everything that Iran wanted. At one point Hamas, they were actually against Hamas because Hamas was for the rebels in Syria, and Iran was killing the rebels in Syria. So they had Hamas, they had the Iraqi Shia groups in Iraq right across the border. They had, as you pointed out, they had Islamic Jihad, they had Hezbollah, they had Damascus. So all that power is now basically gone, and it’s now down to just Iran really.

And the Houthis are still, yes, allies, if not proxies, and can cause some damage if Donald Trump decides to take out the supreme leader and kill him — the Houthis would react very negatively to that. The Shias in Yemen would react very negatively to that. And in fact, it’s quite possible that Shias in other parts of the Middle East, such as in Iraq and in Bahrain and places like that, even in Saudi Arabia, there might be some unrest for taking out an ayatollah at the end of the day, whether you like him or dislike him. For a lot of Shia faithful, he’s an ayatollah. It’s like, do you take out a cardinal that you don’t like in the Catholic church? I’m sure that the Pope would have an issue with that.

AL: Thank you so much, Hooman, for this conversation and for your insights. We’re going to leave it there.

HM: My pleasure, Akela. Thank you.

[Break] 

AL: In other news, President Donald Trump is making good on his threats to — for some reason — try to take over Greenland. And his efforts reached new levels of absurdity when the self-proclaimed “president of peace” texted Norway’s prime minister “Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace.” Setting aside the highly questionable “8 wars” claim — Trump went on to say, “The World is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland.” 

So why is Trump so obsessed with Greenland? Joining us to explain what’s behind Trump’s attempted land grab is investigative journalist Lois Parshley. 

Welcome to the show, Lois.

Lois Parshley: Thank you for having me.

AL: So Trump has repeatedly claimed an interest in taking over Greenland, though on Wednesday he walked back his comments about doing so by force. He’s been claiming that this is in the national security interest of the U.S., notwithstanding the blatant violations of sovereignty here fresh off the U.S. invasion of Venezuela. What is Trump actually interested in?

LP: That is a great question and one that I started to ask last year. As Trump took office, I thought it was really important to understand who is benefiting from his policy decisions.

So I started asking questions about the wealthy donors in his orbit and their personal financial interests. We still likely don’t have the full picture, but last January I found that shortly before Trump first expressed an interest in Greenland during his first administration, so back in 2019, his ambassador to Denmark and Greenland visited a major rare earth mining project on the island.

Now, more recently, The Guardian reported that it was Ronald Lauder, heir to the global cosmetics brand [Estée Lauder], who was also a longtime friend of Trump’s, who first suggested buying Greenland. He has acquired commercial holdings there and is also part of a consortium who want to access Ukrainian minerals. I should also say here, it’s probably important to note that blowing up NATO relationships, and severing ties with longtime allies and fellow nuclear powers does not increase U.S. national security.

AL: As you mentioned, Trump started talking about this after Ronald Lauder first brought up the idea, and last year you wrote about the tech moguls who’ve also taken an interest in Greenland. Can you tell us more about the specific interests that they have in the island and the resources that are at stake?

LP: Many of the tech moguls who are sitting in the front row of Trump’s inauguration, people like Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos, are investors in a startup called KoBold Metals. They are aiming to mine in western Greenland for minerals crucial to the artificial intelligence boom and used in data centers. Opposition to some of this mining actually ushered a new party into power in Greenland in 2021. They slowed some of the rare earth minerals development that was currently in explorations phases and banned all future oil development. But just two weeks before Trump came into office – so in 2025 — KoBold medals raised $537 million in a funding round, bringing its valuation to almost $3 billion. So we’re talking about a lot of money here.

AL: What does it say that these elite financial interests are so explicitly driving the U.S. to pursue this really anachronistic imperialism?

LP: That is a great question. How anachronistic that actually is, is another one? But I would say that overall —

AL: Fair enough.

Related

AI’s Imperial Agenda

LP: One of the things that just seems abundantly true here is that I’m not the first person to report on these kinds of major tech interests in things like crypto states or special economic zones. People have been pointing this stuff out for a long time, but it’s not until President Trump started saying the quiet part out loud that people have really been registering some of these absurd concepts that seem to now be creeping toward reality.

AL: I want to talk a little bit about Marc Andreessen, who has also taken a particular interest in the island. What can you tell us about his investments targeting Greenland?

LP: So among the contributors to KoBold’s funding is a leading venture capital firm, founded by Marc Andreessen, who has also helped shape the administration’s technology policies. A general partner at his venture capital firm was also listed as a KoBold director at one point on a company SEC filing.

Andreessen has been funding startups hoping to build experimental enclaves around the world. These are sometimes called network states. And sometimes they’re called crypto states, sometimes they’re called special economic zones.

Related

Honduras Ratchets Up Battle With Crypto-Libertarian Investors, Rejects World Bank Court

Often they involve the promise of freedom from the constraints of government. And proposals for these libertarian freeholds have sprung up in Honduras, Nigeria, the Marshall Islands, Panama — which by the way, Trump also proposed taking over by military force. 

AL: Lest we forget. 

LP: And while it looks a little different in each location, the sales pitch usually includes replacing taxes and regulations with things like cryptocurrency and blockchain to enable things like biomedical experiments on human subjects.

Related

Trump Frees Ex-President of Honduras, Right-Wing “Narco-Dictator” Convicted of Drug Trafficking

Trump also recently issued a full and unconditional pardon for former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who had been serving a 45 year prison sentence in the U.S. for drug trafficking and weapons conspiracy charges. During his time in office, Hernández and his administration consistently backed the legal framework that enabled Honduras’s special economic zone called Próspera, which was also funded by Andreessen, including submitting legislation to grant them tax exemptions and regulatory privileges. So this is not just an issue around Greenland.

AL: Greenland was ruled by Denmark from 1721 to 1979, but Denmark continued to control its foreign policy and defense after that. In 2008, Greenlanders voted for greater independence. You write, “The president’s renewed intention to take over Greenland has reignited debates over its sovereignty, as the country grapples with the trade-offs between economic opportunity and independence from Denmark. As the country’s glaciers recede, it’s also facing sweeping climate-driven transformations, threatening traditional industries like fishing and hunting and exposing valuable mineral resources.”

Can you tell us a little bit more about this tension? I’m really curious also about the movements that you alluded to earlier within Greenland to slow this development.

LP: The fight over Greenland’s resources has extended for centuries. As you noted, Greenlanders voted for greater independence in 2008, taking control of their natural resources along with other state functions.

There are abundant oil reserves around Greenland, but producing oil in those conditions has been historically very difficult and expensive. There are high transportation costs and infrastructure limitations, and how much to develop its abundant natural resources has been a debate within Greenland. Some of their politicians have supported development, particularly as a means to fund greater autonomy from Denmark.

Siumut, a pro-independence political party who was in power in the early aughts, declared that mineral extraction could help the country transition away from Denmark because it would need to find new sources of income. However, many residents still rely on traditional ways of life, including fishing, hunting for food security, living closely on the land. And development would impact all of those things, which are also under pressure from rapidly changing climate conditions, including warming temperatures and extreme weather.

AL: In response to Trump’s threats, Greenland has also seen some of its biggest protests in history. Can you tell us more about how the people of Greenland, the Greenlandic Inuit, have been responding to this tension and now the Trump administration’s aggressive efforts?

LP: I certainly don’t want to speak for any Greenland residents. I’m not a resident, but from the people I spoke to a year ago, the general vibe seemed to be more bemusement. Obviously, as tensions have escalated since then, it seems like far less of a joke today. 

All of this unwelcome attention has succeeded in delivering one change. Some of the residents I spoke to said the country is now more unified and wanting to find a path to independence from Denmark, although it is challenging to figure out a way to do so. He told me, “You can’t put a name on land. Land belongs to the people.” It’s not something they feel like can be sold.

Frankly, I think a lot of the news conversation around “Can Donald Trump buy Greenland?” overlooks the fact that no one in Greenland is interested in selling. More bluntly, as a Danish politician said, at one European Parliament meeting last week, “Let me put this in words you might understand: Mr. President, fuck off.”

But as you noted, at Davos President Trump reiterated that he wants to acquire Greenland, but said, “I don’t have to use force. I don’t want to use force. I won’t use force.” Certainly our allies hope that that is true.

AL: We’re going to leave it there. Thank you so much, Lois, for joining us on The Intercept Briefing.

LP: Thank you for having me.

Related

While Threatening Greenland, Trump Also Threatens Iceland

AL: On Wednesday at Davos as Trump rambled on about why he believes the U.S. is entitled to take Greenland, he repeatedly confused the island for Iceland. He would then later announce that he had a productive meeting with the secretary general of NATO, and they reached a “framework” of a deal over Greenland’s future.

That does it for this episode of The Intercept Briefing. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn and Desiree Addib, who is also our booking producer. Sumi Aggarwal is our executive producer. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief. Maia Hibbett is our managing editor. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer. Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is our copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. Legal review by David Bralow.

Slip Stream provided our theme music.

You can support our work at theintercept.com/join. Your donation, no matter the amount, makes a real difference. If you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing wherever you listen to podcasts. And tell all of your friends about us. Better yet, leave us a rating or a review to help other listeners find us.

Until next time, I’m Akela Lacy. 

Thanks for listening.

The post Protests and Power Plays: From Tehran to the Arctic Circle appeared first on The Intercept.

The Israel–U.S. military campaign in Iran has killed more than 1,000 people since the assault began on February 28. A war powers resolution in the Senate to curb President Donald Trump’s ability to drag the U.S. into the war failed on Wednesday. Similarly, a measure in the House failed on Thursday. 

“This war is just a few days old and it’s escalating really quickly,” says Ali Gharib, senior editor at The Intercept. “It’s becoming a regional conflict,” as Iran retaliates and targets U.S. bases as well as Israel and Gulf energy sites. This week on The Intercept Briefing, Gharib discusses the human and political toll of the Israel–U.S. war on Iran with co-host Jordan Uhl and journalist Séamus Malekafzali, who has been based in Paris and Beirut.

Related

Sources Briefed on Iran War Say U.S. Has No Plans for What Comes Next

“Trump has repeatedly failed to articulate anything even resembling coherent about why the U.S. got into this war,” says Gharib. He adds, “Marco Rubio even — who, again, not the sharpest tool in the shed, but usually has his shit pretty together — but in this case, he’s like changing his tune every two days because he has to keep up with Trump’s inanity about what the reasons for the war were.”

The end game for Israel here, says Malekafzali, is they want “a state that is incapable of defending itself, a state that is no longer sovereign.” He adds, “If you are bombarding police stations, if you are bombarding hospitals and schools, border guards, when you are attacking the very fabric of any society as your main target, CENTCOM and the IDF together, that means that you are going toward state collapse.”

“These are hard-won lessons over and over again for the United States — war after war, fallout, blowback. It just happens again and again. And yet we always seem to get leaders who are willing to run willy-nilly into these things,” says Gharib.

Listen to the full conversation of The Intercept Briefing on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you listen. 

Transcript

Jordan Uhl: Welcome to the Interceptive Briefing, I’m Jordan Uhl. 

Ali Gharib: And I’m Ali Gharib. I’m a senior editor at The Intercept.

JU: Today we’re going to talk about the growing war in the Middle East, specifically Iran. Last Saturday, Israel and the United States launched unprovoked attacks on Iran, and assassinated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as well as several senior military officials. 

The Israel–U.S. strikes have continued on Iran, bringing the death toll to more than 1,000 people since the assault began. On Thursday, the World Health Organization verified 13 attacks on health infrastructure that killed four health care workers. Ali, it feels like we’ve seen this playbook run before, but this time, it seems like they’re trying to distinguish what is and what isn’t a war.

AG: This is like the sort of last redoubt of the idiot, when it comes to national security policy, is that you don’t need congressional approval. There’s no real stakes because this isn’t a war. This is part of a long history. It’s bipartisan. We’ve seen Democrats in office. We’ve seen Republicans in office. People are constantly starting these wars. They say they’re going to be limited strikes. Well, you know what? When you’re dropping bombs on another country and that country is attacking your military personnel in the area, that’s a textbook war.

In the so-called global war on terror, they could bullshit this and say, “Oh, we’re not going after armies. We’re going after these non-state actors and terrorist groups,” or whatever. But in this case, it’s like you’re literally attacking the leadership of another country and another country’s military.

There’s just no way to bullshit this. This is war. It’s what it is. There’s civilians dying. It’s the whole thing. It’s maybe the most egregious example since Vietnam of this phenomenon.

JU: Now there are efforts in Congress to rein in the Trump administration’s attacks on Iran. We will look to see how those votes develop, but I think there’s a general sense of pessimism around the outcome.

Another way of looking at it is just getting people on the record. Do you think that’ll be something that is an anchor around people’s necks going into the midterms?

AG: It looks increasingly like this is going to be a midterm issue. We’re seeing these breaks. In the Senate, it was pretty clean.

There was a war powers vote this week that failed and we saw [Sen. John] Fetterman, D-Pa., was the only Democrat to peel off, which isn’t that surprising. He voted last summer against a war powers resolution to block another Iran attack, which would’ve given Congress the power to stop exactly this calamity that we’re seeing right now. But it failed on basically party lines, with Fetterman defecting.

Then in the House there’s a version where we see some pro-Israel Democrats peeled off and tried to introduce their own version, which would allow Trump 30 extra days to continue the war before a congressional block gets imposed. We wrote about it this week on The Intercept. Our great D.C. reporter, Matt Sledge, wrote about it.

Related

Democratic Leaders Avoid Criticizing Trump’s Iran War. Now Voters Will Have a Say.

Because this is becoming a midterm issue, and these guys have to try and thread the needle here between satisfying their pro-Israel donors, satisfying the American voters who are not happy with this war, all told. And we’ve seen in some cases, some pro-Israel Democrats who were getting primaried from the left came out preemptively and said, I oppose this. And they’re still getting hit by their insurgent primary opponents for not having come out soon enough and hard enough.

This is something that Jon Stewart made a joke about this week, is that it seems like every time a president starts a war, Congress wants to come in next Thursday and do a vote about whether it’s authorized or not.

There’s logic to what these insurgent Democrats are saying is that we’ve known what’s going to happen here for a long time, and Democrats on Capitol Hill could not get their act together. And yeah, I think that some of these progressive insurgents that we’re seeing are going to make hay of that on the campaign trail.

JU: So there are many troubling things coming from this administration. The general sense is that they don’t have a clear objective or plan. We’ve seen people forward concerns in Congress, and especially in the anti-war camps. But then how the White House has been messaging on this — even down to their social media posts — has people deeply troubled.

There’s a video, for instance, from the official White House account that was posted on Wednesday that spliced together footage from “Call of Duty” — I would argue a military propaganda video game — with footage of actual strikes in Iran. This is that blurring of lines that critics of intervention and those games have been worried about for years because it sanitizes the act of killing.

We’re already distancing ourselves from direct combat through this unseen aerial warfare, and that is pushed to young people through these games. And now the White House specifically is pushing that. So I’m curious if you could touch on both of those things: the sanitization of war and the meaning of war, and also this lack of a plan. 

AG: Honestly, I think those things go hand in hand that these guys — Trump, especially, you would think maybe Hegseth’s little military experience would be different, but I think maybe he’s a little too dull to really get what’s going on here — they just seem to not get the stakes that these are the most severe decisions that a government can make and that the stakes are really life and death, and not only just in the immediate dropping bombs, but long-term ramifications.

These are hard-won lessons over and over again for the United States — war after war, fallout, blowback. It just happens again and again. And yet we always seem to get leaders who are willing to run willy-nilly into these things. 

On the one hand, they don’t take it seriously. It’s a political ploy. They think it’s a joke. They’re just like meme lords running around trying to goose up their base to get all hot and bothered about bombing some Muslims over there. Then on the other hand, they’re not taking it seriously in the actual war planning either. It’s not just the propaganda. 

Watching Trump’s statements has been really incredible. To watch Marco Rubio even — who, again, not the sharpest tool in the shed, but usually has his shit pretty together — but in this case, he’s like changing his tune every two days because he has to keep up with Trump’s inanity about what the reasons for the war were.

Related

Rubio Admits That America Is Fighting Israel’s War

Rubio came out and said the other day that he thinks their imminent threat was that Israel was going to attack and there was going to be blowback on U.S. assets in the region. That’s a maybe true but slightly embarrassing justification for war.

And then you had Trump who came back after he was asked about Rubio’s comments and said no, no, this happened because of me. We were negotiating with the Iranians over their nuclear program — which by the way, as the details have come out, it turns out they were, and there was huge progress being made. And then the U.S. bombed the shit out of Iran. 

But Trump said these talks were going on and the talks weren’t going anywhere and were collapsing. (Again, bullshit.) And that he was worried that that would spur the Iranians to attack — for which there is no evidence. Something Iran has never done in the history of the Islamic Republic is lash out after a diplomatic exercise like that has failed. I’ve covered this for my whole career: There’s been a lot of diplomacy that’s failed, and Iran is never so much as hinted that they’re going to then lash out afterward. That became Trump’s excuse. It’s these constantly shifting goalposts.

Not only is there no clear justification, there’s no clear end game here. This is something I’ve talked about a lot, and I spoke with Séamus Malekafzali today on the podcast about it. He’s a journalist who writes about the Middle East, with a strong focus on Iran, and he’s been based in Paris and Beirut. We went through some of this stuff about the U.S. haplessly walking its way through this war, and the Israelis just don’t care what happens. And for them, a failed state is great. We’ve seen comments to this effect from Israeli analysts that are close to the military–industrial complex there. They just seem to have dragged Trump into this thing that Trump has haplessly, just buffooning his way through.

JU: Let’s hear that conversation.

AG: Hey Séamus, welcome to the show. 

Séamus Malekafzali: Happy to be here.

AG: The pleasure is all ours, Séamus. So today we’re going to be talking about the biggest story in the world right now: Israel and the U.S. launched an unprovoked attack against Iran last Saturday. It’s still going on. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was assassinated, so were a bunch of top regime figures — people from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, other military leaders. 

It’s been a pretty violent conflict so far. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia group that’s closely aligned with Iran, lobbed a few missiles into Israel. Israel, in retaliation, began seizing territory in southern Lebanon.

There’s a new wave of strikes on Iran, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said that we’re “just getting started.” This war is just a few days old, and it’s escalating really quickly. It’s spiraling out of control. It’s becoming a regional conflict. Does that sound about right to you, Séamus? Is this moving into a much more dangerous situation really, really fast?

SM: I would agree with that estimation, yes. Trump had said that he was surprised by this, but Iran had threatened to bring all these different Gulf Arab countries that are hosting American bases into the war, and they did that immediately once Israel and America launched their strikes.

Recently, they had even struck Oman and potentially even oil fields in Saudi Arabia against the advice of the civilian Iranian government. Apparently, there has even been an attempt to strike at a base inside Turkey that had been hosting American forces. I’m unsure of what the Iranian government has said about that matter, but I imagine they are not keen on Turkey being one of those targets. But because of the decentralized nature of the Iranian military, they had been given instructions to expand this without individual authorizations by the Iranian leadership.

Israel, however, is not a decentralized state; it is very much intentional in what it is doing. All of the strikes that are currently happening on Iran and inside Lebanon are the Israeli military leadership’s clear and specific directives. So as it currently is going on the path of completely expelling the population of southern Lebanon or carpet-bombing Tehran, that is not an unintentional part of this. That is a fully intentional aim to expand this and deepen this.

AG: You mentioned the expansion of the war. I think that that’s a really salient point about the decentralized leadership and in fact that’s become an essential directive for the Iranians because they’re just being so closely surveilled and any communications they have could potentially give away locations and they’re running tremendous risks.

It seems like the Israeli intelligence, to your point, is extremely good on these targets that it’s hitting. So it’s hard to imagine that when the targets get so broad or say, a girls’ elementary school gets hit in southern Iran, that these sorts of things are just terrible mistakes. Like, no, this is the nature of having a wide-scale conflict and I think we should be skeptical of claims of just that things go errant. 

There was this attack on Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s residence early on in the war, I think, on the first day of strikes. We’re talking about an opposition leader here who’s been under house arrest. A lot of apologists will claim that was an accident, but it’s not clear that it was. And then we see Trump complaining about there being nobody to take the place of the Iranian leadership. It stretches credulity when you put together all the statements.

SM: When Pete Hegseth says that they are investigating the strike on that elementary school for girls in Minab, and then they throw up on the screen a map of all these different strikes that CENTCOM has done — and Minab is right there, that school. They obviously know what they did. They’re covering that up, that fact.

On the Mousavi front, I’m unsure of the nature of that strike. I know that Mousavi’s apartment was near Pasteur, where all these different Iran government ministries are located. But [former President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad was apparently someone who at least a strike happened in his area. He appears to be alive still. There were reports of his death but he apparently communicated to Patrick Bet-David, an American Iranian podcaster, that he was still alive. But nevertheless, Itamar Ben-Gvir went out and said that Ahmadinejad was a righteous victim of the Israeli military

AG: Just for context, Ahmadinejad was the president of Iran, obviously, in the late 2000s and early 2010s, but also a figure who in recent years has fallen deeply out of favor with the Iranian government. I don’t know if I’d go so far as to call him an opposition leader. But certainly not somebody who has a hand in anything the government is doing these days.

SM: No, no, no. He is very much on the Supreme Leader’s shit list. They are not keen on leaving any sort of leadership of any kind, I think, if the strike near Ahmadinejad is intentional, which I still have doubts about.

Related

The Regime Change President Who Won’t (or Can’t) Actually Change Any Regimes

Trump had seemed to be confused about the nature of the temporary leadership council that took power after Khamenei was killed, that apparently there were second or third choices that may have been also killed, but also those three he might’ve had something to gain from them.

Then the reports that they wanted the IRGC, some aspect of them that could take over, be friendly to the United States. No, there’s no actual plan for any of this. In the same way that when Maduro was abducted and taken here to New York City that Delcy Rodriguez was the person who they were going to threaten and then have take power.

There is no parallel figure within the Iranian government, which means that they are pushing things towards state collapse, rather than trying to position an America-friendly, Israel-friendly Iranian government in power.

AG: Or even just in the Venezuela case, an alternative who might be compliant.

SM: Exactly.

[Break]

AG: Obviously, Israel has been a major player in this war. There’s been enough talk, at least, about Israel having pushed Trump into the war that Trump got asked about it and gave a pretty defensive answer.

Donald Trump: No, I might have forced their hand. We were having negotiations with these lunatics, and it was my opinion that they were going to attack first. They were going to attack if we didn’t do it.

AG: Israel has just become a rogue actor in the region. It’s constantly unleashing these military assaults. The lesson learned from Gaza was that there’s not going to be any accountability for anything that the Israeli government does.

Obviously, more than 70,000 people killed in the genocide there. Since the so-called ceasefire, Israel has killed 600 more people in Gaza. There’s been allegedly thousands of violations of the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel before this latest war with Iran started. And those are documented by the U.N. peacekeeping forces. These aren’t like Hezbollah numbers or anything. 

Now after the attack on Iran, we see the war expanding in Lebanon. You lived in Beirut, obviously, you know this terrain very well. Do you have any sense of what the mood is like there? 

SM: There is definitely been a difference in tone from this intervention than the intervention that happened after the war broke out against Gaza in 2023. Having a war for Palestine, regardless of the sympathies that a lot of Lebanese had for Palestinians, they never largely wanted to get involved in a war on Lebanese soil for Palestine.

Related

Israel Agrees to Stop Bombing Lebanon — So It Can Keep Bombing Gaza

There isn’t polling on such an immediate thing. Even if Hezbollah is responding to 15 months of unchecked Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory which they did phrase in their statement — and also the fact that they were apparently, according to Israeli reporting, even preempting an Israeli preemptive strike on Lebanon — the optics of doing this in retaliation for Khamenei’s death, that being the express logic that was said in their statement that has presented problems that Hezbollah is not — They’re in a very difficult situation, an impossible situation, an unenviable situation. But this has not gone the direction that it had after 2023. 

The Lebanese government has begun arresting members of Hezbollah and also some Palestinians who have been traveling down to the south. Amal [Movement], their closest ally in politics, has begun splitting in some regards. I have heard reports that Amal locals on the ground are participating in the offensive, but the party leadership is now more at odds with Hezbollah than it had been in the past.

The Lebanese government is not in the position in which it can allow this to happen. It is happening on their own volition. They’re making that decision expressly. But the impunity that Hezbollah had to act unilaterally without the permission of the Lebanese government — that still exists, in that they have military capabilities outside of the military, but the Lebanese government is clearly acting to stop Hezbollah’s retaliation from going on in a way that they were not after October 7th.

AG: And this is another example of the fracturing politics of the region over the past couple years, and especially in the past few days here in the Middle East. You mentioned earlier, the Gulf Arab neighbors of Iran and what this war has meant for them. We’ve seen reports repeatedly of energy infrastructure being hit. Some of that maybe is debris starting fires that are from intercepted missiles. It’s very unclear what’s being targeted, what’s being hit.

We know that in some examples there have been instances of civilian infrastructure. A luxury hotel in Bahrain got hit by Iranian missiles or maybe a drone and got severely damaged. There was an Iranian official who actually told Drop Site News that they had gotten intelligence that there were American war department officials in there.

The Washington Post got a hold of a State Department cable back that said yeah, two Pentagon officials were injured in that strike on the Bahrain hotel. So it does seem that the Iranians are going after some legitimate targets when they’re buried. Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, has said that the Americans, when their bases started to get hit, dispersed their assets and people moved into civilian areas and that’s what they’ve been going after. For us, a lot of that stuff is extremely difficult to check.

The Emirates have clamped down on information coming out because, again, this is the image of the region getting fractured. Abu Dhabi and Dubai as the safe havens for doing business that are safe and pleasant and easy to live in — that image is going up in flames with every Iranian missile that comes overhead. The airports are shut down, people can’t leave, and life on the ground there — I have some family that’s stuck in Dubai — life on the ground there is pretty normal, except this image is being completely shattered. I just saw a report in the FT that it cost $250,000 to get extracted from Bahrain right now.

SM: Yeah.

AG: This war is really remaking the Gulf Arab countries’ images as well.

SM: Yeah, and I don’t think they’re prepared for it at all. There was an Iranian parliamentarian, I think the head of the Parliament’s National Security Committee, that had said that the purpose of these strikes is to have these countries evict the Americans. The Gulf countries — I assume, I can only assume — they hosted these bases because of an assumption of American protection or American support if Iran were to launch this kind of attack against them. And there has been absolutely no American protection or real support, in the few ways that it has manifested. When American [F-15] fighter jets were taking off from Kuwait, three of them apparently got shot down by a single Kuwaiti jet that obviously was not anticipating being involved in this kind of conflict. 

There was a perception that these were places that were somehow outside of politics, despite being inside the Middle East next to Iran and very much close to Israel. I think it’s going to take many years for that to be repaired — if it will ever be repaired — because these countries have never suffered this kind of conflict.

Saudi Arabia has suffered through this. Iraq has suffered through this. Kuwait has suffered through this. But Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE. Like, even singular ballistic missile launches from the Houthis, or that drone that hit Abu Dhabi airport some years ago. Those were things that had to be covered up and rapidly ignored in order to maintain that image. It can no longer be ignored in this. It’s far too wide-ranging.

AG: And the reverberations aren’t just limited to that. Can you talk a little bit about what this is doing to energy markets — Iran’s strategy closing down the Strait of Hormuz, and this “bringing a cost to this conflict for others” strategy that Iran’s using, with regards to energy moving out of the Gulf?

SM: Qatar supplies 20 percent of the global output of energy, and they have shut down most of their production.

AG: LNG specifically, I think is their 20 percent, liquid natural gas. 

SM: Clearly a massive shock is on its way. Iran had hit an oil platform in Fujairah. Aramco had come under attack in some capacity by the Iranian military, a field in Saudi Arabia. Strait of Hormuz — I had seen some bizarre graph from somebody on Twitter where they showed all of the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz absolutely tanking, and then they created some sort of projection line where it all went back up after five days. I do not think that it’s going to happen.

Oil prices are already starting to shoot up, not overwhelmingly so, but they’re starting to shoot up. There were predictions made that by next month, gas prices could be up more than a 100 percent, perhaps even near 130, 140, 150 percent in Europe. For Americans, I imagine would be in a similar boat, gas prices that are higher than they were during the financial crisis — $5 a gallon, even higher than that. 

That is the lever that Iran is rapidly trying to pull up and down because it knows that it is the only one that truly affects the decision making in the West. Any sort of anti-war sentiment that exists in these places, it is not going to be able to move any of these officials. What is going to move them is if people are feeling this in their checkbooks at the pump, when it becomes so costly to continue executing this that they have to pull back or else it becomes prohibitively expensive.

AG: And I should note that the Aramco thing also remains a mystery because the Iranians did explicitly deny that. I thought that was curious. They said that, no, we’re not targeting Aramco, which I thought was interesting. It’s not necessarily true, but just that they haven’t been shy about some of the stuff they’ve been targeting, but that one they did deny.

So working the levers that these foreign governments will listen to and the way to put pressure on them that is broader than just an anti-war movement — do you have any thoughts on what this pressure means in the U.S. and the kind of fractures that we’re seeing? Is Trump susceptible even to these kinds of things? Or is he just in his own world enough where so far it seems like he’s committed to keeping going and just living in his own fantasies?

SM: I don’t think Trump is susceptible to public opinion. He cares about it to a certain extent, but he really just wants to be seen more than anything as a deals man. A deals man does not allow this kind of thing to go for months, if not years. He wants the perception that he can do that for as long as he wants, but this cannot follow him forever. He wants to focus on other things. He wants to be seen as somebody who is making peace, somebody who is getting things done quickly. And if that image is not true in a severely obvious way, that is something that he does not want to be associated with — either in government or by the public.

AG: His partner in all this, of course, who, again, maybe has dragged him along into some of it, was Benjamin Netanyahu. In a way Trump has repeatedly failed to articulate anything even resembling coherent about why the U.S. got into this war. But Netanyahu has been forced on American TV on Sean Hannity’s show to make the case for going to war in Iran. And let’s listen to a clip of that.

Benjamin Netanyahu: After we hit their nuclear sites and their ballistic missiles program, you’d think they learned a lesson, but they didn’t because they’re unreformable. They’re totally fanatic about this, about the goal of destroying America. 

So they started building new sites, new places, underground bunkers that would make their ballistic missile program and their atomic bomb programs immune within months. If no action was taken now, no action could be taken in the future. And then they could target America. They could blackmail America.

AG: All right, Séamus, you and I know that this is a lot of the same bullshit we’ve been getting for a while and there’s a lot to unpack here. But the thing I’d like you to talk about, if possible, is some of these claims that we’ve been seeing that, within months, Iran would be immune and have the bomb for 20 years now.

Then also this war coming right in the middle of negotiations over exactly these issues between the U.S. — in direct negotiations, I should say — over exactly these issues between the U.S. and Iran that were being led by Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. If you could talk about the context of Israel starting this war at this very moment.

SM: Jared Kushner and Steve Wikoff, I believe that these are diplomats, but they’re not actually diplomats. I mean, in a real sense, they are diplomats in that they’re real estate moguls — one a little bit more successful than the other. But these are not people who have any sort of diplomatic skill.

They are there to enforce an ideological line and extract concessions without any sort of expectation of concessions on their own part. This is why I think they were so favored by the Israeli government because there was no actual negotiating going on. It was deception. Explicitly, it was deception by these two people.

When America is sending negotiators to your country and demanding not only the cessation of your nuclear program, the taking of all of your enriched uranium and sending it directly through the U.S. who promises we’re going to send you nuclear fuel for your own civilian plants, but we get to control everything. But also apparently, according to Witkoff on Hannity, a few days ago, he had said that they even asked for Iran to eliminate its own navy so that America would have eternal freedom of operation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. 

They are effectively Israeli agents in this regard in that they are supporting a maximalist Israeli-led position, and they are very much supported by the Israeli government in this regard.

AG: What is Netanyahu’s end game here? What is the Israeli objective? Is this what you were talking about with state collapse being the direction we’re going? Is that the actual end game or is that just where we’re going?

SM: I think that is the actual end game. Look, Trump, I’m sure there will be discussion soon about resource extraction or getting something from the Iranians or wanting a friendlier government. That’s something that Netanyahu has said as well. But the things that are being demanded of Iran — that being no ballistic missiles at all, no navy — the basic thing that you would have as a country. What they want is a state that is incapable of defending itself, a state that is no longer sovereign, and a state that cannot exercise these abilities is a state that does not exist, fundamentally. 

If you are bombarding police stations, if you are bombarding hospitals and schools, border guards, when you are attacking the very fabric of any society as your main target, CENTCOM and the IDF together, that means that you are going towards state collapse. And that even if you are supporting in the future some group that may come up — or maybe [Reza] Pahlavi or this Kurdish [group], anything, doesn’t matter — the state that will eventually emerge is a state that has been stripped of its ability to do anything resembling a state. It will be a subdued state, either as severe as Gaza, even if Israel is not going to settle or depopulate Iran, or a state that is subdued like Lebanon, in which it has to listen to the directives of Israel and America for it to continue functioning in any capacity.

AG: I suspect that, without having a direct line into Netanyahu’s thinking, I suspect that you’re completely right, that is his goal there. Again, with the total lack of accountability in Gaza, I don’t see why he doesn’t think that he can do whatever he wants.

Then in the regional picture, these weakened and failed states have been pretty good for Israel in terms of eliminating threats. You said that you think Trump envisioned some kind of deal or maybe some sort of future benefit, and he’s going to start talking about that stuff. Do you think he quite understands what’s going on here?

SM: No. I’ll speak very plainly, no. The way in which Iran has been spoken about in Republican circles for a very long time is that Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, is a personality figurehead, and the entire government is based around his power, and when he falls, the entire Islam Republic will fall. If you take him out, then all the dominoes start falling immediately.

This was false. It has been false. Khomeini died, and Khamenei was elected to the deposition by the assembly of experts and the government did not collapse even though Khomenei took a much larger position within the Iranian political world, within Iranian society.

[Trump] does not seem to have any understanding of the different institutions that have influence within the country. He listens to what his advisers tell him about what people might be friendly to him or might want to deal, and he internalizes some of it. But he does not have an actual understanding of how the country works, how any sort of cultural forces might be working, anti-imperialism how that might inform other people’s decisions; how these people might feel like they have their backs against the wall, and that might inform their thinking that maybe they don’t want to be killed or made into a puppet. He fundamentally does not understand the country, not in a political sense in that Iran is some sort of brave and unsubdued power that is capable of anything, but that it is a country that does not function like Venezuela — even Cuba, as he envisions it.

AG: That’s pretty sound analysis given what we know about him. Séamus, thank you so much for taking the time to talk to us. It’s a pleasure to catch up with you and get your thoughts on what’s going on. You’re an experienced reporter who spent some time in the region, and I greatly appreciate your perspective.

SM: Thank you. Anytime.

JU: That was Ali Gharib, The Intercept’s senior editor and Séamus Malekafzali, a journalist and writer covering the Middle East.

That does it for this episode. 

This episode was produced by Laura Flynn. Ben Muessig is our editor-in-chief. Maia Hibbett is our Managing Editor. Chelsey B. Coombs is our social and video producer. Desiree Adib is our booking producer. Fei Liu is our product and design manager. Nara Shin is our copy editor. Will Stanton mixed our show. Legal review by David Bralow.

Slip Stream provided our theme music.

This show and our reporting at The Intercept doesn’t exist without you. Your donation, no matter the amount, makes a real difference. Keep our investigations free and fearless at theintercept.com/join. 

And if you haven’t already, please subscribe to The Intercept Briefing wherever you listen to podcasts. Do leave us a rating or a review, it helps other listeners to find us.

Let us know what you think of this episode, or If you want to send us a general message, email us at podcasts@theintercept.com.

Until next time, I’m Jordan Uhl. 

The post Trump’s War to Nowhere appeared first on The Intercept.